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AN

ESSAY

ON THE

ORIGIN of EVIL.

BY

Dr. WILLIAM KING,

Late Lord Archbiſhop of *Dublin.*

Tranſlated from the LATIN with large NOTES.

To which are added,

Two SERMONS by the ſame Author,

The former concerning DIVINE PRESCIENCE, the latter on the FALL of MAN.

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THE FOURTH EDITION CORRECTED.

EDMUND LAW, D.D.

PETER'S College, CAMBRIDGE.

ανθρωποις εξεταστεως δεομενος, δυσθη-
και η των Κακων ταχθεια αυ

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TO THE REVEREND

Dr. WATERLAND,

Maſter of MAGDALEN College in CAMBRIDGE, &c. &c.

SIR,

IT is a common obſervation, that the generality of ſuch Freethinkers as are ſerious, and have reaſoned themſelves out of the Chriſtian Religion, have at the ſame time rejected the belief of a Deity. This muſt ariſe either from their entertaining ſome Principles that lead equally to both theſe abſurdities; or, which is more probable, from their having no Principles at all; from mere Scepticiſm, and a habit of raiſing Objections without ever attending to the anſwers; without proceeding on any ſettled grounds of enquiry, or endeavouring to eſtabliſh any thing: a temper of

mind which may eaſily bring a Man to disbelieve any thing. But whatever be the Cauſe of this, the Obſervation is remarkably verified in the preſent Age. Moſt of our modern Unbelievers have ſo far perplexed themſelves with Difficulties about the Law of Nature, and right Reaſon, Liberty Divine and Human, Preſcience, Providence, and the like, that they ſeem to be in univerſal Confuſion. The chief deſign of the following Book is to clear up ſome of theſe Difficulties, to eſtabliſh true and proper Notions, as well as to refute falſe and unworthy ones, concerning the Exiſtence and Attributes of God, and his Government of the World; concerning the Nature and Condition of Man, the Obligations he lies under, the Rule and End of his actions; and to build the whole upon ſuch Principles of Reaſon as are perfectly conſiſtent with Revelation. This, 'tis hoped, will not be without its uſe at preſent, in ſtopping the growth of Irreligion by ſtriking at the Root of it; it may have ſome influence toward ſettling the minds of the *unlearned and unſtable*, and be ſufficient tho' not to reduce them to a hearty profeſſion of the true Faith, yet at leaſt to hinder

hinder them from falling into downright Infidelity; eſpecially if countenanc'd by a Perſon eminent for a thorough knowledge of theſe Subjects, confeſſedly an able Judge, an upright Defender, a bright Example of Religion both reveal'd and natural; who is zealous to aſſert the truth and enforce the neceſſity of the Principal Doctrines and Inſtitutions of the one, as well as to eſtabliſh the true ground and fundamental Principle, and fix the proper Limits of the other: and above all, who has always the Courage to maintain theſe great Truths, howſoever unfaſhionable or unpopular they may be ſometimes made.

Theſe, Sir, are very obvious reaſons for my being ambitious to prefix your Name to the following Work, and endeavouring to recommend it to the favour of one to whom its Author wou'd have been deſirous to approve himſelf.

'Tis with pleaſure alſo that I take this opportunity of declaring as well my ſenſe of the great benefits that attend the peruſal of your Writings, which muſt give equal warmth and conviction to all who have the leaſt concern for Religion; as my experience

of that candid condeſcenſion and communicative temper, which is ready to encourage and inſtruct every young enquirer after Truth.

To theſe more general Motives to an Addreſs of this kind, give me leave to add the many private Obligations which in a particular manner demand an acknowledgment from

SIR,

Your moſt obliged

humble Servant,

EDMUND LAW.

THE

TRANSLATOR's PREFACE.

I Have always looked upon an Enquiry into the Cauſe and Origin of Evil, as one of the nobleſt and moſt important Subjects in Natural Religion. It leads us into the moſt exalted Speculations concerning the Exiſtence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. It firſt endeavours to diſcover the true intent of the Deity in creating Beings at all, and then purſues that Intent through the ſeveral Works of his Creation: it ſhews how this is fully anſwered at preſent by the Inanimate and Brute Part, and how it might and ſhould be, and why, and in what reſpect, it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Divine Œconomy in the Government of the Univerſe, ſearches into the various Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compaſs of Nature.

Neither is its Uſefulneſs *inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to act upon any ſerious Views here, or to entertain any ſolid Hopes of Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in ſome degree, is abſolutely neceſſary in order to the ſettling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him; in order to the due Apprehenſion of his Deſign in creating, preſerving, and directing us; and to the regular Conduct of our Lives and Enjoyment of ourſelves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Pleaſure can we take in knowing any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am, I am told that an abſolutely perfect Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpoſe to communicate ſome Part of his Happineſs to me, and to make me, in ſome meaſure, like himſelf — This End is not obtained; — the direct contrary appears; — I find myſelf ſurrounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and Miſery; — By whoſe fault I know not, — How to better myſelf I cannot tell. What Notions of God and Goodneſs can this afford me? — What Ideas of Religion? —*

What Hopes of a future State? — For, if God's Aim in producing me be entirely unknown; if it be neither his Glory, *(as ſome will have it) which my preſent State is far from advancing;—nor mine own* Good, *with which the ſame is equally inconſiſtent; how know I what I am to do here, and in what manner I muſt endeavour to pleaſe him? Or why ſhould I endeavour it at all? — For, if I muſt be miſerable in this World, what Security have I that I ſhall not be ſo in another too; (if there be one) ſince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I ſee) have been happy in both?*

Such Thoughts as theſe muſt needs diſturb a Perſon that has any real Concern for his Maker's Honour, or his own Happineſs; that deſires to pay him a reaſonable Service, and anſwer the End of his Creation: in ſhort, that happens to think at all upon theſe things, and to think for himſelf. And therefore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of ſome of theſe Perplexities, cannot ſure be unacceptable, and a Solution of any one of theſe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind which can never be unſeaſonable.— But the Uſefulneſs, as well as Antiquity, of the preſent Debate; and the Abſurdity of the Manichean *Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explained, and need not here to be inſiſted on: all that ever ſeemed wanting to an entire Conqueſt over theſe Heretics, and their abſurd Hypotheſis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has effected, as I hope to make appear in the Sequel.*

There are two general ways of Reaſoning, called Arguments a Priori, *and* a Poſteriori, *or according to what Logicians commonly ſtile the* Synthetic *and* Analytic *Method: The former lays down ſome evident* Principles, *and then deduces the ſeveral* Conſequences *neceſſarily reſulting from them: The latter begins with the* Phenomena *themſelves, and traces them up to their* Original, *and from the known Properties of theſe Phenomena arrives at the Nature of their Cauſe. Now the former of theſe is evidently preferable, where it can be had, ſince the latter muſt depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which failing invalidates the whole Argument and ſpoils a Demonſtration.*

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An Attempt therefore to ſhew that the Subject before us is capable of the former Method, muſt be very deſirable; and this our Author ſeems to have done, without any precarious Syſtem, or illgrounded Hypotheſis. His ſuperior Excellence conſiſts in having laid down, and previouſly eſtabliſhed ſuch ſolid, ſubſtantial Principles as may be drawn out in infinitum, *and eaſily applyed to all the Difficulties that attend the preſent Queſtion.*

He firſt of all enquires into the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, and his Deſign in the Creation; ſettles the true Notion of a Creature, and examines whether any could be perfect; and if not, whether all ſhould have been made equally imperfect; or ſeveral in very different Claſſes and Degrees. Having proved the laſt of theſe Opinions to be the true one, he proceeds to the loweſt Claſs of Beings, viz. Material *ones: He enquires into the Nature and eſſential Properties of* Matter, *and the Laws of its* Motion, *and thereby eſtabliſhes ſuch Rules as direct us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attending it as diſtributed into various* Maſſes, *Syſtems, and Animated Bodies. He ſhews the unavoidableneſs, and abſolute neceſſity of* contrary Motions *in Matter, for the ſame Reaſons that it had any Motion at all, and conſequently of* Attrition, Corruption *and* Diſſolution, *and all the* Natural *Evils that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a* Self-moving *Principle, and the manner of its Operation, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to* Volition, *and the* Actions *conſequent thereupon. He ſtates at large the true Notion of* Free-Will, *and demonſtrates the abſolute Neceſſity for it in every Rational Being, in order to its Happineſs, Then accounts for the ſeveral Abuſes of it, and the* Moral *Evils ariſing from thence, and examines all the poſſible Ways of preventing them; and upon the whole, makes it appear that none of theſe could have been originally avoided, or can now be removed, without introducing greater; and conſequently that the very Permiſſion of theſe Evils, and the Production and Preſervation of theſe Beings, in the preſent State, is the higheſt Inſtance of infinite Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs.*

Now theſe are not mere Arguments ad Ignorantiam: *This is not telling us that we muſt believe ſuch and ſuch things to be*

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the Effects of an infinitely wise and good God, though no Marks of either Wisdom or Goodness appear in them; which though it may be true, and all that perhaps can be said in some particular Cases, yet has, I think, but very little Tendency towards either the Conviction of an Infidel, or the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Person is seriously contemplating any Parts of Nature, and solicitously enquiring into their several Ends and Uses, no Pleasure surely can arise to himself, nor Devotion toward the Author of it, merely from the Perplexity and Unaccountableness of those Parts. Nay every such Instance, one would think, must cast a damp upon his Spirits, and prove an ungrateful Reflection on his Weakness, a mortifying Argument of his Imperfection. Whereas one single Perplexity cleared up, or Objection answered, is a piece of real Knowledge gained; upon which he can congratulate himself, and glorify his Maker.

Our Author therefore was not content with mere Negative Arguments, *and barely* avoiding *Difficulties, by removing all Defects from external things to ourselves, and multiplying Instances of the Narrowness and Weakness of Human Understanding: (which any one that thinks at all will soon be convinced of, and heartily desirous of having it somewhat enlarged and improved, to which this manner of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.) But he attacks his Adversaries in their strongest Holds, and plucks up the* Manichean *Heresy by the Roots: he shews by certain pre-established Rules, and necessary Consequence, that we can easily reduce all to one supreme Head, and clearly comprehend how the present State of things is the very best in all respects, and worthy of a most wise, powerful, and beneficent Author: And why, taking the whole System of Beings together, and every Class of them in its own Order, none could possibly have been made more perfect, or placed in a better. He proves, in the first place (as we observed) that no created Beings could be absolutely perfect, and in the next, that no manner of Evil, or Imperfection was tolerated in them, but what was, either in their Class and manner of Existence, absolutely unavoidable, or else productive of some Good more than equivalent: In both which Cases there will be the same Reasons for the Creation of such Beings in such Circumstances, together with their comcomitant Evils, as*

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there was for any Creation at all; For which the ſole Reaſon will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of communicating Happineſs to as many Beings as could be made capable of it, on the very beſt Terms; or a Reſolution not to omit the leaſt Degree of pure *Good on account of ſuch Evils, as did not counterballance it: Or (which is the very ſame, ſince it will be evident that the Prevention of all the preſent Evils, in any conceivable Manner, would have been of worſe Conſequence than the Permiſſion of them) an Intention always to chooſe the leaſt of two Evils, when both cannot be avoided.*

This muſt be granted to come up to the Point; and when it is once made apparent, will be a full and ſufficient Anſwer to that old triumphant Queſtion, Πόθεν τὸ Κακὸν; *it will be an ample Vindication of the Divine Providence; a Demonſtration of the Power, and Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of God in the Production, Preſervation, and Government of the Univerſe; and as much as a reaſonable Man can expect or deſire. And I heartily wiſh this Method had been taken by more of thoſe Authors that have wrote on the preſent Subject, and the Argument purſued a little farther by* Natural Light, *in order to give ſome Light and Confirmation even to* Revelation *itſelf, in theſe inquiſitive Days, wherein a great many ſeem unwilling to be determined by its ſole Authority; wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every thing into queſtion; and a weak Argument is ſure to be exploded.—Even the moſt learned and ingenious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scripture when a Difficulty begins to preſs him: which, in my Opinion, is deſerting the Argument, and owning with Mr.* Bayle *(in his Explanation touching the* Manichees *at the End of his Dictionary)* "*that the Queſtion cannot be defended on any other* "*foot.*"—*Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanſwerable by Reaſon, or a plain Contradiction to our natural Notions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often urges)* "*we* "*perceive by our clear and diſtinct Ideas, that ſuch a thing* "*is intirely repugnant to his Nature and Attributes,*"—*referring us to Scripture, which declares that an infinitely perfect Being did conſtitute it thus, will be no manner of Satisfaction, ſince (upon this Suppoſition) we cannot have greater Aſſurance that this Scripture comes from him, than we have that the Doctrine therein contained is abſurd and impoſſible.*

And what that ingenious Perſon's intent might be in repreſenting the matter thus, and then referring us to Scripture for an Anſwer, I cannot determine. But ſure I am, that his Account of it ſerves rather to betray the Cauſe, and undermine the Authority of both Reaſon and Revelation, and is enough (if no better could be given) to make a Perſon that argues conſequentially, reject all kinds of Religion.

Farther, every one muſt have obſerved, that moſt Authors upon this Subject treat of God's Diſpenſations toward Man, as if they were ſpeaking of one Man's Behaviour toward another: They think it ſufficient to make the Almighty chooſe the moſt prudent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happineſs; and act upon the higheſt Probability, *though (upon what account ſoever it matters not) he fail of his End. Now this may indeed be the beſt manner of acting in all finite, imperfect Beings, and ſufficient to acquit the Goodneſs, and Juſtice of God, but 'tis very far from ſatisfying his* Wiſdom. *To a perfect Being who foreſees the Effects of all poſſible Cauſes and Means, as the ſame Authors allow God to do, theſe only appear fit and eligible for the effects and Ends which they will* certainly *produce. Nor is it any Reaſon why I ſhould purſue a Method which is apt and wont to ſucceed in moſt Caſes, if I* know *it will fail in this. To a Perſon therefore that takes all the Attributes of God together, and conſiders the whole Scheme of Providence from end to end, it will not appear a complete and ſatisfactory Vindication of them, to aſſert that God either now makes Men, or ſuffers them to make themſelves miſerable, for rejecting that Happineſs which he at firſt made them capable of, and endow'd them with ſuch Powers, and placed them in ſuch Circumſtances as render'd it naturally poſſible and even eaſy to be attain'd by them: though this may indeed clear his* Juſtice, *and lay the Blame upon ourſelves: And yet theſe Writers generally content themſelves with going thus far: They bring all our Sin and Miſery from the abuſe of Free-Will,* (i. e. *a Power whereby Man might poſſibly have acted otherwiſe, and prevented it*;) *without ever explaining the Nature of this Principle, or ſhewing the Worth and excellence of it, and proving that, as far as we can apprehend, more Good in general ariſes from the donation of ſuch a Self-moving Power, together with all theſe foreſeen Abuſes of it, than could poſſibly*

possibly have been produced without it. To demonstrate this was an Attempt worthy of our Author, who has at least laid a noble Foundation for it, and seems to be the first that has proposed the true Notion of Human Liberty, *and explained it consistently; All the Doubts and Difficulties attending which intricate Question will, I hope, be tolerably cleared up; or at least such Principles established as may be sufficient for that Purpose, by this Treatise of his, and the Notes upon it.*

So much for the Subject and our Author's way of treating it. As for the Translation, *'tis barely Literal. I endeavoured to keep close to the Author's Sense, and generally to his very Words. I once intended to have cut off every thing that I could not defend, especially about the Beginning (which used to discourage most Readers from perusing the rest of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have been omitted;) but considering that he had involved it so closely in the rest of his Scheme, that the whole would seem confused without it, and that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it, I contented myself with omitting part of his Notes, and obviating the rest all along, both from other Authors, and such Observations of my own as occurr'd upon the Subject.*

Some perhaps may think the frequent and long Quotations *tedious, and introduced only to stuff up.—I can only answer that the Notes, and References together, where intended to point out a sort of* Compendium of Metaphysics *or Speculative Divinity, by directing the Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjects which our Author touch'd upon, and which could not be found in any one particular Book, nor collected from several, without much Trouble, and Confusion, and unnecessary Reading. I chose rather to quote the very Words of the Authors, than either to use worse of my own, or pretend to discover what had been often discover'd before; or to repeat the same things over and over again, which is endless. 'Tis hoped the Reader will find that a citation of two or more Authors on the same Point is not always Tautology: and I believe it will appear that in the multitude of* References *no more than one is ever made to the same Place, except upon a very different Occasion, or in some different Light. A Writer often does more good by shewing the Use of some of those many Volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; though this be of*

much

much leſs Advantage to his own Character. I determin'd therefore not to ſay any thing myſelf where I could bring another conveniently to ſay it for me; and tranſcribed only ſo much from others as was judg'd abſolutely neceſſary to give the Reader a ſhort View of the Subject, and by that Sketch to induce thoſe who have leiſure, opportunity and inclination, to go farther and conſult the Originals; and to afford ſome preſent Satisfaction to thoſe who have not.

Since the publication of the former Edition, Archbiſhop King's *Relations have obliged me with a large Collection of his Papers on the ſame Subject both in* Latin *and* Engliſh. *They contain an Explication and Defence of the principal parts of his Scheme, and afford very good hints for improving it in ſeveral points; eſpecially with regard to the* Union *of the Soul and Body, and their mutual* Influence; *to Human* Liberty; *to the State of* Adam *in* Paradiſe, *and the Conſequences of his* Fall. *The laſt of theſe is alſo fully diſcuſs'd in the* Sermon *annex'd, which the Author had order'd to be printed after his deceaſe, and which cannot but be acceptable to the Public. Theſe advantages encouraged me to review the whole and endeavour to compleat the Author's deſign. To make room for the neceſſary Additions, I omitted all his Notes to the firſt Chapter, as well as ſome of my own which had no immediate relation to the main Subject. I have compared the Latin and Engliſh Papers together on each head, and give the Argument made up from them both. What is extracted from them I have ſet down by way of Note under thoſe parts of the Book which treat on the ſame things, with Capital Letters prefixed, to diſtinguiſh them from all the reſt, which I am anſwerable for.*

The great Value which the Author ſet upon this Work appears from the pains he has taken to vindicate it from the leaſt cavil; which view all that he has wrote would make a much larger Volume than his firſt. It was my intention to reduce it to as ſmall a compaſs as poſſible, by inſerting no more than what ſeem'd to give light to his main Scope, and was ſufficiently clear. He begins with an account of the preſent ſtate of the Controverſy about the Origin of Evil, and offers many Arguments againſt the ſuppoſition of an abſolutely Evil Principle, moſt of which are omitted, ſince few, if any, thinking Perſons now a-days can be imagin'd to embrace ſo extravagant an Hypotheſis; and there-

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fore it requires but little confutation. In the next place he lays down a ſummary of the chief Principles on which his Book is built, and then proceeds to rank his Adverſaries into their ſeveral Claſſes, and conſider the various Arguments which they have urged againſt him. The ſubſtance of his Anſwers, eſpecially to ſuch Objections as have been either omitted, or but ſlightly touched upon in the former Edition, will be given in their proper Places. The general view of his Scheme as laid down by himſelf, may perhaps be not diſagreeable to the Reader before he enters on the Book, and is as follows.

1. All Creatures are neceſſarily imperfect and at infinite diſtance from the Perfection of the Deity, and if a negative Principle were to be admitted, ſuch as the *PRIVATION* of the *PERIPATETICS*, it might be ſaid that every created Being conſiſts of Exiſtence and Non-Exiſtence; for it is nothing in reſpect both of thoſe perfections which it wants, and of thoſe which others have. And this Defect, or as we may ſay, Mixture of *NON-ENTITY* in the conſtitution of created Beings is the neceſſary Principle of all Natural Evils, and of a poſſibility of Moral ones; as will appear in the ſequel.

2. An Equality of Perfection in the Creatures is impoſſible, (as our Adverſarie sallow,) I add, neither would it be ſo convenient to place all in the ſame ſtate of Perfection.

3. It is agreeable to Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs to have created not only the more perfect Beings, but alſo the moſt imperfect, ſuch as Matter, ſo long as they are better than nothing, and no impediment to the more perfect ones.

4. Admitting Matter and Motion, there neceſſarily follows Compoſition and Diſſolution of Bodies, that is Generation and Corruption; which ſome may look upon as defects in the Divine Work; and yet it is no Objection to his Goodneſs or Wiſdom to create ſuch things as are neceſſarily attended with theſe Evils. Allowing therefore God to be infinitely powerful, good and wiſe, yet it is manifeſt that ſome Evils. *viz.* Generation and Corruption, and the neceſſary Conſequences of theſe, might have place in his Works; and if even one Evil could ariſe without the ill Principle, why not many? And if we knew the nature and cir-

circumſtances of all things as well as we do thoſe of Matter and Motion, it may be preſumed that we could account for them without any imputation of the Divine Attributes. For there's the ſame reaſon for them all, and one Inſtance to the contrary deſtroys an univerſal Propoſition.

5. It is not inconſiſtent with the Divine Attributes to have created ſome Spirits or thinking Subſtances, which are dependant on Matter and Motion in their Operations, and being united to Matter may both move their Bodies and be affected with certain Paſſions and Senſations by their Motion, and ſtand in need of a certain diſpoſition of Organs for the proper exerciſe of their thinking faculty; ſuppoſing the number of thoſe that are quite ſeparate from Matter to be as compleat as the Syſtem of the whole Univerſe would admit, and that the lower order is no inconvenience to the higher.

6. It cannot be conceived but that ſome ſenſations thus excited by Matter and Motion ſhould be diſagreeable, and tend to diſſolve the union between Soul and Body; as well as others agreeable. For 'tis impoſſible as well as inconvenient that the Soul ſhould feel itſelf to be loſing its faculty of thinking, which alone can make it happy, and not be affected with it. Now diſagreeable ſenſation is to be reckoned among natural Evils, which yet cannot be avoided without removing ſuch kind of Animals out of nature. If any one aſk why ſuch a Law of Union was eſtabliſhed? Let this be his anſwer; Becauſe there could be no better. For ſuch a neceſſity as this flows from the very nature of the union of things, and conſidering the circumſtances and conditions under which, and which only, they could have exiſtence, they could neither be placed in a better State, nor governed by more commodious Laws. Theſe Evils therefore are not inconſiſtent with the Divine Attributes, provided that the Creatures which are ſubject to them enjoy ſuch benefits as over-ballance them. 'Tis to be obſerved alſo that theſe Evils do not properly ariſe from the Exiſtence which God gave to the Creatures, but from hence that they had not more of Exiſtence given them; which nevertheleſs their State and the place they fill in the great Machine of the World could not admit. This Mixture there-

therefore of Non-exiſtence ſupplies the place of an ill Principle in the Origin of Evil, as was ſaid before.

7. The Happineſs and Perfection of every thing or Agent ariſes from the due Exerciſe of thoſe Faculties which God has given it, and the more Faculties and Perfections any thing has, 'tis capable of the greater and more perfect Happineſs.

8. The leſs dependent on external things, the more ſelf-ſufficient any Agent is, and the more it has the principle of its Actions in itſelf, 'tis ſo much the more perfect; Since therefore we may conceive two Sorts of Agents, one which do not act, unleſs impelled and determined by external force, the other which have the Principle of their Actions within themſelves, and can determine themſelves to action by their own natural Power: 'tis plain that the latter are much much more perfect than the former. Nor can it be denied but that God may create an Agent with ſuch a power as this, which can exert itſelf into action, without either the concourſe of God, or the determination of external Cauſes, ſo long as God by a general Concourſe preſerves the Exiſtence, Powers and Faculties of that Agent.

9. Such an Agent may preſcribe to itſelf an End, and proſecute it by proper Means, and take delight in the proſecution of it, though that end might be perfectly indifferent to it before it was propoſed, and be no more agreeable than any other of the ſame or a different kind would be, if the Agent had once reſolved to proſecute it. For ſince all the pleaſure or happineſs which we receive, ariſes from the due exerciſe of our Faculties, every thing which is equally commodious for the exerciſe of our faculties, will give us the ſame delight. The reaſon therefore why one thing pleaſes above another is founded in the Act of the Agent himſelf, *viz.* his Election. This is largely explained in the Book itſelf, together with the limits within which it is confined, and ſhall be illuſtrated more fully hereafter.

10. It is impoſſible that all things ſhould agree to all, that is, be good; for ſince the things are limited, diſtinct and different one from another, and are endowed with finite, diſtinct and different appetites, it neceſſarily follows that the relations of convenient and inconvenient muſt ariſe from

this diverſity. Since therefore every created being is from the imperfection of its nature neceſſarily limited, and from that limitation there neceſſarily follows diſtinction and diverſity, it follows that a poſſibility at leaſt of Evil is a neceſſary attendant on all Creatures, and cannot be ſeparated from them by any Power, Wiſdom or Goodneſs whatſoever. For when a thing is applied to an Appetite or Being to which it is not appropriated, as it is not agreeable to it, it neceſſarily affects it with uneaſineſs; nor was it poſſible that all things ſhould be appropriated to every Being, where the things themſelves and the appetites are various and different, as they muſt neceſſarily be, if created, even in the moſt perfect manner.

11. Since ſome Agents have a power over their Actions, as above, and can pleaſe themſelves in the choice of ſuch things as may exerciſe their faculties; and ſince there are ſome ways of exerciſing them which may be prejudicial to themſelves or others; 'tis plain that from this power there ariſes a poſſibility of chooſing amiſs, and they may exerciſe themſelves to their own prejudice, or that of others.

12. And ſince in ſuch a variety of things thoſe that are beneficial or hurtful cannot be known by an intelligent Being which is in its own nature limited and imperfect, it was agreeable to the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs to preſcribe ſome Rules and Directions to ſuch agents, in order to inform them of what would benefit or incommode them and their Fellow Creatures, *i. e.* what would be good or evil; that they might chooſe the one and avoid the other.

13. Since therefore, as was ſaid before, an Equality of Perfections in the Creatures is impoſſible, neither would it be convenient for them to be placed in the ſame State of Perfection, it follows that there are various Orders and Degrees even among intelligent Creatures; and ſince ſome of the inferior Orders and Degrees are capable of thoſe benefits which the ſuperior ones enjoy, and ſince there are as many placed in thoſe ſuperior Orders as the Syſtem of the Univerſe allowed; it follows that the inferior ones, as a more convenient place could not be left for them, ought to be content with a lower portion of Happineſs, which their nature makes them capable of, and [illegible] a higher than which they

they could not aſpire without detriment to the ſuperior which poſſeſſes that Station. For he muſt quit his place before another can aſcend to it; and it ſeems hard and very inconſiſtent with the nature of God to degrade a Superior as long as he has done nothing to deſerve it. But if one of a ſuperior Order ſhall by his own act, without any violence or compulſion, voluntarily quit his place, or freely chooſe ſuch things as deſerve a Degradation, God would ſeem unjuſt to thoſe who are in an inferior Degree, and by a good uſe of their Liberty become fit and qualified for a ſuperior State, if he ſhould refuſe them the free uſe of their Choice. It ſeems unjuſt for God to condemn or degrade any one arbitrarily, but he is not to be blamed for ſuffering one to degrade himſelf by his own act and choice, eſpecially when the uſe of that elective power belongs to the nature of an intelligent Being, and could not in the preſent ſtate be prohibited without detriment to ſome other.

Here the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God ſeem to have exerted themſelves in a moſt glorious manner, the contrivance appears to be the effect of the higheſt Policy and Prudence. For by this means God has ſhewn himſelf moſt equitable to his Creatures; ſo that no one can complain of, or glory in his lot. He that is in a leſs convenient Situation has no room for complaint, ſince he is endowed with faculties, and has power to uſe them in ſuch a manner as to acquire a more commodious one; and he muſt be forced to own himſelf only in the fault if he continues deprived of it: and he that is now in a ſuperior State may learn to fear leſt he fall from it by an unlawful uſe of his faculties. The Superior therefore has a Dread that may in ſome meaſure diminiſh his happineſs; and the inferior, Hope that may increaſe it; by which means they are both brought nearer to an equality; and in the mean time have the utmoſt provocation and incitement to chooſe the beſt, and make the moſt beneficial uſe of their faculties. This Conteſt, if I miſtake not, makes for the good of the Univerſe, and much more than if all things were fixed by Fate and Neceſſity, and abſolutely confined to their preſent State. Either God muſt have created no free Agents to be governed by the hope of rewards and fear of puniſhments, or this will be

the fitteſt means to that end, and worthy of a God. For what ground is there to complain of the Deity in this whole affair; except that when an equal ſhare of happineſs could not befal every one, he beſtows the beſt on ſuch as uſe their faculties aright, and takes away what he had given from thoſe that abuſe them? But more of this hereafter.

14. If what is laid down above be true, from thence 'tis manifeſt that all kinds of Evil, *viz.* that of *IMPERFECTION*, *PAIN*, and *SIN* may enter into a world made by the moſt wiſe good and powerful Author, and that its Origin may be accounted for without calling in the aſſiſtance of an Evil Principle.

15. 'Tis plain that we are tied down to this Earth and confined in it, as in a Priſon, and that our Knowledge does not extend beyond the Ideas which we receive from the Senſes; and who knows not how ſmall a part we underſtand even of thoſe Elements about which we are converſant? But ſince the whole Maſs of Elements is as a Point in regard to the whole Univerſe, is it any wonder if we miſtake when we are forming a judgment, or rather a conjecture, concerning the Beauty, Order and Goodneſs of the Whole from this contemptible Particle? This Earth of ours may be the Dungeon of the Univerſe, an Hoſpital of Madmen or a Work-houſe of reprobates; and yet ſuch as it is, there is much more both of Natural and Moral Good than Evil to be found in it.

Thus far has the Controverſy about the Origin of Evil proceeded in the Author's Book. For all that has been ſaid above is either expreſly contained in it, or may very eaſily be deduced from the Principles there laid down.

P. S. *The Perſons to whom I am more particularly obliged for the Papers abovementioned, are the Reverend Mr.* Spence *Rector of* Donnaghmore, *and the Reverend Mr.* King *Prebendary of St.* Patrick's *and Miniſter of St.* Bride's, Dublin: *who are deſired to accept of this Acknowledgement, and to excuſe the Freedom I here take of informing the Public, to whom I eſteem it, as well as myſelf indebted.*

The following Diſſertation was compoſed chiefly by the late Reverend Mr. Ga[illegible].

PRE-

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.

Concerning the

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

OF

VIRTUE or *MORALITY.*

THOUGH all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what particular Actions are virtuous and what otherwiſe, yet they have, or at leaſt ſeem to have differed very much, both concerning the *Criterion* of Virtue, *viz.* what it is which *denominates* any Action virtuous; or, to ſpeak more properly, what it is by which we muſt try any Action to *know* whether it be virtuous or no; and alſo concerning the *Principle*, or Motive, by which Men are induced to purſue Virtue.

As to the former, ſome have placed it in *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reaſon*; others in the *Fitneſs of things*; others in a Conformity with *Truth*; others in promoting the *Common Good*; others in the *Will of God*, &c. This Diſagreement of Moraliſts concerning the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the ſame time their almoſt perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be apt to make one ſuſpect, either that they had a different Criterion (though they did not know or attend to it) from what they profeſſed; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the ſame Criterion in reality, only they have expreſſed it in different Words.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we conſider the Ideas themſelves about which Morality is chiefly converſant, *viz.* that they are all *mixed Modes*, or

compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at firſt no Archetype or Original exiſting, and afterwards no other than that which exiſts in other Men's Minds. Now ſince Men, unleſs they have theſe their compound Ideas, which are ſignified by the ſame Name, made up preciſely of the ſame ſimple ones, muſt neceſſarily talk a different Language; and ſince this difference is ſo difficult, and in ſome Caſes impoſſible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to theſe Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to underſtand them) we ſhould not always take their Words in the common Acceptation, but in the Senſe in which we find that particular Author which we are reading uſed them. And if a Man interpret the Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe their ſeeming Inconſiſtencies and Diſagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, would in a great meaſure vaniſh; and he would find that *acting agreeably to Nature*, or *Reaſon*, (when rightly underſtood) would perfectly coincide with the *Fitneſs of things*; the Fitneſs of things (as far as theſe Words have any meaning) with *Truth*; Truth with the *Common Good*; and the Common Good with the *Will of God.*

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can ſcarce avoid obſerving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moſt particular Virtues, and alſo a confuſed Notion of Virtue in general, before they have any Notion of the Criterion of it; or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thoſe Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds ſhew how thoſe Actions (which the World call Moral, and moſt, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are diſtinguiſhed from other Actions, or why they approve of thoſe Actions called Moral ones, more than others.

But ſince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ in other reſpects) includes either tacitly or expreſly, not only the Idea of *Approbation* as the Conſequence of it; but alſo that it is to every one, and in all Circumſtances, an Object of *Choice*; it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to ſhew that *that* in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to

meet

meet with Approbation, but alſo that it is always an Object of *Choice*; which is the other great Diſpute among Moraliſts, *viz.* What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purſue Virtue.

For ſome have imagined that *that* is the only Object of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happineſs than Miſery to the Chooſer; and that Men are, and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle; and farther, that Virtue will produce more Happineſs than Miſery, and therefore is always an Object of Choice: and whatever is an Object of Choice, That we approve of.

But this, however true in Theory, is inſufficient to account for Matter of Fact, *i. e.* that the generality of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reaſon for their Approbation; and alſo, that ſome purſue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happineſs; nay even when it appears to be inconſiſtent with and deſtructive of their Happineſs.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue* has ſo evidently made appear by a great Variety of Inſtances, that a Man muſt be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere *Hobbiſt* in his Temper to deny it.

And therefore to ſolve theſe two Difficulties, this excellent Author has ſuppoſed (without *proving*, unleſs by ſhewing the inſufficiency of all other Schemes) a *Moral* Senſe to account for the former, and a *publick* or *benevolent Affection* for the latter: And theſe, *viz.* the Moral Senſe and Public Affection, he ſuppoſes to be implanted in us like *Inſtincts*, independent of Reaſon, and previous to any Inſtruction; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleaſure or Pain which ariſes from Senſation; *i. e.* Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies ſhould be accompanied with Pain rather than Pleaſure, and *vice verſa*.

But this Account ſeems ſtill inſufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it; and if it is not akin to the Doctrine

ctrine of *Innate Ideas*, yet I think it reliſhes too much of that of *Occult Qualities*. This ingenious Author is certainly in the right in his Obſervations upon the Inſufficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our *Election* and *Approbation* of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Neceſſity of ſuppoſing a Moral Senſe (*i. e.* a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of human Life. But then by calling theſe *Inſtincts*, I think he ſtops too ſoon, imagining himſelf at the Fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Actions, our own *Happineſs*.

And this will appear by ſhewing that our Approbation of Morality, and all Affections whatſoever, are finally reſolvable into *Reaſon* pointing out *private Happineſs*, and are converſant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the *Aſſociation of Ideas*, and may properly enough be called *Habits*.

For if this be clearly made out, the neceſſity of ſuppoſing a Moral Senſe or public Affections to be implanted in us, ſince it ariſeth only from the Inſufficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Actions, will immediately vaniſh. But whether it be made out or no, we may obſerve in general, that all Arguments *ad Ignorantiam*, or that proceed *a Remotione* only (as this, by which the Moral Senſe and public Affections are eſtabliſhed to be Inſtincts, evidently does) are ſcarce ever perfectly ſatisfactory, being for the moſt part ſubject to this Doubt, *viz.* Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable alſo to this Objection, *viz.* That though I cannot account for Phenomena otherwiſe, yet poſſibly they may be otherwiſe accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be neceſſary to ſettle all the Terms: We ſhall in the firſt place therefore enquire what is meant by the *Criterion* of Virtue.

SECT.

SECT. I.

Concerning the Criterion *of Virtue.*

THE Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Meaſure by " a Conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that ſort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the Criterion of any thing, we muſt firſt know the thing whoſe Criterion we are ſeeking after. For a Meaſure preſuppoſes the Idea of the thing to be meaſured, otherwiſe it could not be known (ſince what is the proper Meaſure of one thing is not ſo of another) whether it was fit to meaſure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Fleſh, have all different Meaſures; Gold and Silver different Touchſtones. This is very intelligible, and the Method of doing it generally clear, when either the Quantity, or Kind of any particular Subſtance is thus to be aſcertained.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abſtract, mixed Modes, which have no Exiſtence but in our Minds, and are ſo very different in different Men; we are apt to be confounded, and ſearch after a Meaſure for we know not what. For unleſs we are firſt agreed concerning the thing to be meaſured, we ſhall in vain expect to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to underſtand one another.

But it may be ſaid, if we are exactly agreed in any mixed Mode, what need of any *Criterion?* or what can we want farther? What we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this; *viz.* to know whether any inferior, or particular thing do belong to this mixed Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never ſo clearly, and if you pleaſe let this be the Idea, *viz.* the Eating or Drinking to that degree as to injure his Underſtanding or Health; and let him alſo be never ſo much convinced of the Obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent Queſtion in him to aſk you, How ſhall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we ſhall find that every little difference in the Definition of a mixed Mode will require a different Criterion. *e. g.* If Murder is defined

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the *wilful* taking away the Life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we ſhall know when the Life of another is taken away *wilfully*; i. e. when one who takes away the Life of another does it with that malicious Deſign which is implied by *Wilfulneſs*. But if Murder be defined the *Guilty* taking away the Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it ſhall be known when *Guilt* is contracted in the taking away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Murder, according to one or other of theſe Definitions, will be different. For Wilfulneſs perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt; but Wilfulneſs itſelf, if it want any, muſt have ſome farther Criterion; it being evident that nothing can be the Meaſure of itſelf.

If the Criterion is contained in the Idea itſelf, then it is merely *nominal*, e. g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the Will of God: To ſay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to ſay, what is agreeable to the Will of God is *called* Virtue. But the *real* Criterion, which is of ſome uſe, is this, How ſhall I know what the Will of God is in this reſpect?

From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mixed Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor contained in it. For, as has been ſhewn, the general Idea is neceſſarily to be fixed; and if the *Particulars* comprehended under it are fixed or known alſo, there remains nothing to be meaſured; becauſe we meaſure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fixed, the Criterion which is to meaſure or determine Inferiors, muſt be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Meaſure, by comparing it with the *general Idea* only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be applied. For the truth of the Meaſure muſt be proved independently of the Particulars to be meaſured, otherwiſe we ſhall prove in a Circle.

To apply what has been ſaid in general to the Caſe in hand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of *Virtue*; but it is to be feared that few know diſtinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this muſt be clearly ſtated. And in order to this, we muſt (as has been ſhewn) firſt fix our Idea of Virtue, and that exactly; and then

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our Enquiry will be, how we ſhall know this or that leſs general or particular Action to be comprehended under Virtue. For unleſs our Idea of Virtue is fixed, we enquire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give any Satisfaction, ought to be ſo general, as to be conformable to that which all or moſt Men are ſuppoſed to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus expreſſed.

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the Actions of all rational Creatures with reſpect to each other's Happineſs; to which Conformity every one in all Caſes is obliged: and every one that does ſo conform, is or ought to be approved of, eſteemed and loved for ſo doing. What is here expreſſed, I believe every one, or moſt, put into their Idea of Virtue.

For Virtue generally does imply ſome relation to *others*: where *Self* is only concerned, a Man is called *prudent*, (not virtuous) and an Action which relates immediately to *God*, is ſtiled *Religious*.

I think alſo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to conſiſt in, yet always make it to imply *Obligation* and *Approbation*.

The Idea of Virtue being thus fixed, to enquire after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are *obliged* to conform; or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my Behaviour towards *others*, which ought *always* to be purſued, and which, if purſued, will or ought to procure me *Approbation*, *Eſteem*, and *Love*.

But before I can anſwer this Enquiry: I muſt firſt ſee what I mean by *Obligation*.

SECT. II.

Concerning Obligation.

Obligation is the neceſſity of doing or omitting any Action in order to be happy: i. e. when there is ſuch a relation between an Agent and an Action that the Agent cannot be

be happy without doing or omitting that Action, then the Agent is ſaid to be *obliged* to do or omit that Action. So that Obligation is evidently founded upon the Proſpect of *Happineſs*, and ariſes from that neceſſary Influence which any Action has upon preſent or future Happineſs or Miſery. And no greater Obligation can be ſuppoſed to be laid upon any *free Agent* without an expreſs Contradiction.

This Obligation may be conſider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: Firſt, that Obligation which ariſeth from perceiving the natural Conſequences of things, *i. e.* the Conſequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd *Natural*. Secondly, that ariſing from Merit or Demerit, as producing the Eſteem and Favour of our Fellow Creatures, or the contrary, is uſually ſtiled *Virtuous*. Thirdly, that ariſing from the Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate, *Civil*. Fourthly, that from the Authority of God, *Religious*.

Now from the Conſideration of theſe four ſorts of Obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Caſes, can only be that ariſing from the Authority of *God*; becauſe God only can in all Caſes make a Man happy or miſerable: and therefore, ſince we are *always* obliged to that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the *whole* Will of God the Criterion or Virtue? No. For though the whole Will of God is equally obligatory; yet, ſince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to a Rule directing my Behaviour with reſpect to my *Fellow-Creatures*, the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this particular is, or what it directs me to do?

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, *viz.* his being infinitely happy in himſelf from all Eternity, and from his Goodneſs manifeſted in his Works, that he could have no other Deſign in creating Mankind than *their* Happineſs; and therefore he wills their Happineſs; therefore the means of their Happineſs: therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happineſs of Mankind, ſhould be

be ſuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new Criterion: not to a new Criterion of Virtue *immediately*, but to a Criterion of the *Will of God*. For it is an Anſwer to the Enquiry, How ſhall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Happineſs of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God; and therefore the Happineſs of Mankind may be ſaid to be the Criterion of Virtue, but *once removed*.

And ſince I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promoting the Happineſs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this *Happineſs*: i. e. How ſhall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happineſs of Mankind?

Now this is to be known only from the *Relations* of things, (which Relations, with Reſpect to our preſent Enquiry, ſome have call'd their *Fitneſs* and *Unfitneſs*.) For ſome Things and Actions are apt to produce Pleaſure, others Pain; ſome are convenient, others inconvenient for a Society; ſome are for the good of Mankind; others tend to the detriment of it; therefore thoſe are to be choſen which tend to the good of Mankind, the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one ſtep farther, *viz.* to the Criterion of the Happineſs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices.

The next Enquiry is, How ſhall I know that there is this Fitneſs and Unfitneſs in things? or if there be, how ſhall I diſcover it in particular Caſes? And the Anſwer is, either from Experience or Reaſon. You either *perceive* the Inconveniencies of ſome Things and Actions when they happen; or you *foreſee* them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the Fitneſs or Unfitneſs of things may in general be ſaid to be *Reaſon*: which Reaſon, when exactly conformable to the things exiſting, *i. e.* when it judges of things as they are, is called *Right Reaſon*. And hence alſo we ſometimes talk of the *Reaſon of things*, i. e. properly ſpeaking, that Relation which we ſhould find out by our Reaſon, if our Reaſon was right.

The

The expreſſing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called *Truth*; and hence, by the ſame kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the *Truth*, as well as *Reaſon of things*. Both Expreſſions mean the ſame: which has often made me wonder why ſome Men who cry up *Reaſon* as the Criterion of Virtue, ſhould yet diſlike Mr. *Wollaſton's* Notion of *Truth* being its Criterion.

The Truth is, all theſe juſt mentioned, *viz.* the Happineſs of Mankind; the Relations, or Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of things; Reaſon and Truth; may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to be Criterions of Virtue; but it muſt always be remember'd that they are only *remote* Criterions of it; being gradually ſubordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reaſon of what I ſuggeſted in the beginning of this Treatiſe, *viz.* That the Diſpute between Moraliſts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning; and that this Difference between them has been occaſion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and chooſing ſome a more remote, ſome a leſs remote one. And from hence we may ſee alſo the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For that in a great meaſure has occaſion'd all this Confuſion; as may eaſily be made appear in all the pretended Criterions of Virtue above mentioned.

Thus thoſe who either expreſly exclude, or don't mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind; muſt either allow that Virtue is not in all Caſes *obligatory* (contrary to the Idea which all or moſt Men have of it) or they muſt ſay that the Good of Mankind is a ſufficient Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to *me*, when perhaps in particular Caſes, ſuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happineſs?

Thoſe who drop the Happineſs of Mankind, and talk of the Relations, the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, are ſtill more remote from the true Criterion. For Fitneſs without relation to ſome *End*, is ſcarce intelligible.

Reaſon and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, becauſe they manifeſtly preſuppoſe them; but are ſtill

ſtill one ſtep farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has been ſaid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but ſtill it will be urg'd, that 'tis inſufficient to account for matter of Fact, *viz.* that moſt Perſons, who are either ignorant of, or never conſider'd theſe Deductions, do however purſue Virtue themſelves, and approve of it in others. I ſhall in the next place therefore give ſome account of our Approbations and Affections.

SECT. III.

Concerning Approbation *and* Affection.

MAN is not only a *ſenſible* Creature, not only capable of Pleaſure and Pain, but capable alſo of *foreſeeing* this Pleaſure and Pain in the future conſequences of Things and Actions; and as he is capable of knowing, ſo alſo of *governing* or directing the Cauſes of them, and thereby in a great meaſure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other: whence the Principle of all Action. And therefore, as Pleaſure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out of his Power, he purſues the former and avoids the latter; and therefore alſo thoſe things which are *Cauſes* of them are not indifferent, but he purſues or avoids them alſo, according to their different Tendency. That which he purſues for its own ſake, which is only Pleaſure, is called an *End*; that which he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleaſure, he calls *Good*, and approves of, *i. e.* judges a proper means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Object of Choice; and that which is pregnant with Miſery he diſapproves of and ſtiles *Evil*. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or the contrary; but whenever view'd in Imagination (ſince Man conſiders himſelf as exiſting hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) they have a *preſent Pleaſure* or Pain annex'd to them, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them in real Exiſtence; which Pleaſure or Pain ariſing from

from the Proſpect of future Pleaſure or Pain is properly call'd *Paſſion*, and the Deſire conſequent thereupon, *Affection*.

And as by reflecting upon Pleaſure there ariſes in our minds a *Deſire* of it; and on Pain, an *Averſion* from it (which neceſſarily follows from ſuppoſing us to be ſenſible Creatures, and is no more than ſaying, that all things are not *indifferent* to us) ſo alſo by reflecting upon Good or Evil, the ſame Deſires and Averſions are excited, and are diſtinguiſh'd into *Love* and *Hatred*. And from Love and Hatred variouſly modify'd, ariſe all thoſe other Deſires and Averſions which are promiſcuouſly ſtiled Paſſions or Affections; and are generally thought to be implanted in our Nature *originally*, like the Power of receiving Pleaſure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are theſe following; Hope, Fear, Deſpair and its oppoſite, for which we want a Name.

SECT. IV.

Approbation and Affection conſider'd with regard to Merit, *or the* Law of Eſteem.

IF a Man in the purſuit of Pleaſure or Happineſs (by which is meant the Sum total of Pleaſure) had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Approbation and Affections would be as deſcribed in the foregoing Section. But, ſince he is dependent with reſpect to his Happineſs, not only on theſe, but alſo on rational Agents, Creatures like himſelf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good and Evil, and of acting for an End; there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, and conſequently different Purſuits, though tending to the ſame End, Happineſs; and therefore different Approbations and Affections, and the contrary; which deſerve particularly to be conſider'd.

That there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, is evident from hence, *viz.* that Rational Agents, in being ſubſervient to our Happineſs are not paſſive, but voluntary. And therefore ſince we are in purſuit of that, to obtain which we

we apprehend the concurrence of their Wills neceſſary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleaſure or Pain expected from it by them. And therefore as I perceive that my Happineſs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happineſs, to be a means of Happineſs, *i. e.* I cannot but *approve it.* And ſince the annexing Pleaſure to their Endeavours to promote my Happineſs is the only thing in my Power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleaſure to ſuch Actions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent as a means of Happineſs, is different from the Approbation of any other means; becauſe it implies an Approbation alſo of an Endeavour to promote the Happineſs of that Agent, in order to excite him and others to the ſame concern for my Happineſs for the future.

And becauſe what we approve of we alſo deſire (as has been ſhewn above) hence alſo we *deſire* the Happineſs of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore *Love* or *Hatred*, when placed on a rational Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, that it implies a deſire of, and conſequently a pleaſure in the Happineſs of the Object beloved; or if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have ſeen, conſiſts in his voluntary contributing to our Happineſs) is called the *Merit* of the Agent ſo contributing, *i. e.* that whereby he is entitled (upon ſuppoſition that we act like rational, ſociable Creatures; like Creatures, whoſe Happineſs is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: *Demerit* the contrary.

And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call *Merit*, is very conſiſtent with a Man's acting *ultimately* for his own private Happineſs. For any particular Action that is undertaken *for the ſake of another*, is *meritorious*, i. e. deſerves Eſteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whoſe ſake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the Preſumption of ſuch Eſteem, *&c.* was the only Motive to that Action; and if ſuch Eſteem, *&c.* does not follow, or is preſumed not to follow it, ſuch a Perſon is reckoned

unworthy of any favour, becauſe he ſhews by his Actions that he is incapable of being *obliged* by Favours.

The Miſtake which ſome have run into, *viz.* that Merit is inconſiſtent with acting upon *private Happineſs*, as an ultimate End, ſeems to have ariſen from hence, *viz.* that they have not carefully enough diſtinguiſhed between an inferior, and ultimate End; the end of a particular Action, and the end of Action in general: which may be explained thus. Though Happineſs, private Happineſs, is the proper or ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means of Happineſs which any particular Action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aimed at by that Action; the thing which, if poſſeſſed, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally is called the *End* of that Action. As therefore Happineſs is the general End of all Actions, ſo each particular Action may be ſaid to have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to pleaſe by his Dreſs; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither pleaſing by Dreſs, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they ſtill tend or ought to tend to ſomething farther; as is evident from hence, *viz.* that a Man may aſk and expect a Reaſon why either of them are purſued: Now to aſk the *Reaſon* of any Action or Purſuit, is only to enquire into the *End* of it: But to expect a Reaſon, *i. e.* and End, to be aſſigned for an *ultimate* End, is abſurd. To aſk why I purſue Happineſs, will admit of no other Anſwer than an Explanation of the Terms.

Why *inferior Ends*, which in reality are only Means, are too often looked upon and acquieſced in as *ultimate*, ſhall be accounted for hereafter.

Whenever therefore the *particular* End of any Action is the Happineſs of another (though the Agent deſigned thereby to procure to himſelf Eſteem and Favour, and looked upon that Eſteem and Favour as a means of private Happineſs) that Action is meritorious. And the ſame may be ſaid, though we deſign to pleaſe God, by endeavouring to promote the Happineſs of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Action diſtinct from my Happineſs, and that view is his only *Motive* to that Action, though that Action promote my Happineſs to never ſo great

great a Degree, yet that Agent acquires no *Merit*; *i. e.* he is not thereby entitled to any Favour or Eſteem: Becauſe Favour and Eſteem are due from me for any Action, no farther than that Action was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happineſs is only the pretended End of that Action, I am impoſed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myſelf indebted to the Agent; and I am diſcharged from any Obligation as ſoon as I find out the Cheat.

But it is far otherwiſe when my Happineſs is the ſole End of that particular Action, *i. e.* (as I have explained myſelf above) when the Agent endeavours to promote my Happineſs as a Means to procure my Favour, *i. e.* to make me ſubſervient to his Happineſs as his ultimate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happineſs only as a means of his own, yet this leſſons not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confeſs, which makes a great alteration in this Caſe, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour *in general*, or only for ſome particular End. Becauſe, if he aim at my Happineſs only to ſerve himſelf in ſome particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing: And therefore I am under leſs Obligation (*cæteris paribus*) the more *particular* his Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.

Now from the various Combinations of this which we call Merit, and its contrary, ariſe all thoſe various Approbations and Averſions; all thoſe Likings and Diſlikings which we call *Moral*.

As therefore, from conſidering thoſe Beings which are the *involuntary* means of our Happineſs or Miſery, there were produced in us the Paſſions or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Deſpair, and its contrary: So from conſidering thoſe Beings which *voluntarily* contribute to our Happineſs or Miſery, there ariſe the following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Deſire to poſſeſs or avoid the thing beloved or hated; but this on voluntary Agents being a Deſire to give Pleaſure or Pain to the Agent beloved or

hated) Gratitude, Anger, (ſometimes called by one Name, Reſentment) Generoſity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other, they're only, as theſe are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.

Love and *Hatred*, and the Foundation of them (*viz.* the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be inſtrumental to our Happineſs) I have explained above. *Gratitude* is that Deſire of promoting the Happineſs of another upon account of ſome former Kindneſs received. *Anger*, that Deſire of thwarting the Happineſs of another, on account of ſome former Diſkindneſs or Injury received. And both theſe take place, though we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objects of either of them, and this is ſtill conſiſtent with acting upon a Principle of *private Happineſs*.

For though we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther from theſe particular Beings; yet the Diſpoſition ſhewn upon theſe Occaſions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us; *i. e.* other Beings will be moved to promote our Happineſs or otherwiſe, as they obſerve how we reſent Favours or Injuries.

Ambition is a Deſire of being eſteemed. Hence a Deſire of Being *thought* an Object of Eſteem; hence of *being* an Object of Eſteem, hence of doing *laudable*, i. e. uſeful Actions. *Generoſity* and *Benevolence* are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called *Pride*, of which there are ſeveral Species. The Title to the Eſteem of others, which ariſeth from any meritorious Action, is called *Honour*. The Pleaſure ariſing from Honour being paid to us, *i. e.* from others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Eſteem, is without a Name. *Modeſty* is the fear of loſing Eſteem. The Uneaſineſs or Paſſion which ariſeth from a Senſe that we have loſt it, is called *Shame*. So that *Ambition*, and all thoſe other Paſſions and Affections belonging to it, together with *Shame*, ariſe from the Eſteem of others: which is the Reaſon why this Tribe of affections operate more ſtrongly on us than any other, *viz.* becauſe we perceive that as our Happineſs is dependent on the Behaviour of others, ſo we perceive alſo that that Behaviour is dependent on the Eſteem which others have conceived of us; and conſequently that our acquiring or loſing Eſteem, is in

effect

effect acquiring or loſing Happineſs, and in the higheſt Degree. And the ſame may be ſaid concerning all our other Affections and Paſſions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to them, and what by the confuſion of Language about them, is almoſt impoſſible.

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reaſon which will then be obvious.

Thus having explained what I mean by *Obligation* and *Approbation*; and ſhewn that they are founded on and terminate in *Happineſs*: having alſo pointed out the Difference between our Approbations and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happineſs; and farther, that theſe Approbations and Affections are not innate or implanted in us by way of *Inſtinct*, but are all *acquired*, being fairly deducible from ſuppoſing only ſenſible and rational Creatures dependent on each other for their Happineſs, as explained above: I ſhall in the next place endeavour to anſwer a grand Objection to what has here been ſaid concerning Approbations and Affections ariſing from a proſpect of private Happineſs.

The Objection is this,

The Reaſon or End of every Action is always known to the Agent; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceived: but the generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and diſapprove, immediately, as ſoon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or is propoſed to them, without conſidering whether their private Happineſs is affected with it or no: or if they do conſider any Moral Character in relation to their own Happineſs, and find themſelves, as to their private Happineſs, unconcerned in it, or even find their private Happineſs leſſened by it in ſome particular Inſtance, yet they ſtill approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent: nay they cannot do otherwiſe. Whatever Reaſon may be aſſigned by ſpeculative Men why we ſhould be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the Diſtreſſed; yet if the grateful or compaſſionate Mind never thought of that Reaſon, it is no Reaſon to him. The Enquiry is not why he *ought to be* grateful, but why he *is* ſo. Theſe after-reaſons therefore rather ſhew the Wiſdom and Provi-

dence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of theſe Approbations (*i. e.* in Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s Language, *a Moral Senſe*) and theſe Public Affections in us, than give any ſatisfactory account of their Origin. And therefore theſe Public Affections, and this Moral Senſe, are quite independent on private Happineſs, and in reality act upon us as mere Inſtincts.

Anſwer,

The Matter of Fact contained in this Argument, in my Opinion, is not to be conteſted; and therefore it remains either that we make the Matter of Fact conſiſtent with what we have before laid down, or give up the Cauſe.

Now, in order to ſhew this Conſiſtency, I beg leave to obſerve, that as in the purſuit of Truth we do not always trace every Propoſition whoſe Truth we are examining, to a firſt Principle or Axiom, but acquieſce, as ſoon as we perceive it deducible from ſome known or preſumed Truth; ſo in our Conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Actions, *Happineſs:* but reſt contented, as ſoon as we perceive any Action ſubſervient to a known or preſumed *Means* of Happineſs. And theſe preſumed Truths and Means of Happineſs whether real or otherwiſe, always influence us after the ſame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Conſequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered to as the Conſequences of real truths or arguments; and what is ſubſervient to a falſe (but imagined) means of Happineſs, is as induſtriouſly purſued as what is ſubſervient to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Purſuit after Truth, and in his Conduct, has ſettled and fixed a great many of theſe in his Mind, which he always acts upon, as upon *Principles*, without examining. And this is occaſioned by the Narrowneſs of our Underſtandings: We can conſider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, through a long Series of Conſequences; to avoid this we chooſe out certain Truths and Means of Happineſs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which we may ſafely acquieſce in, in the Conduct both of our Underſtanding and Practice;

tice; in relation to the one, regarding them as *Axioms*; in the other, as *Ends*. And we are more eaſily inclined to this by imagining that we may ſafely rely upon what we call *Habitual* Knowledge, thinking it needleſs to examine what we are already ſatisfied in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, *viz.* few will examine them.

And theſe RESTING PLACES are ſo often uſed as Principles, that at laſt, letting that ſlip out of our Minds which firſt inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them not as they really are, the *Subſtitutes* of Principles, but Principles themſelves.

And from hence, as ſome Men have imagined *Innate Ideas*, becauſe forgetting how they came by them; ſo others have ſet up almoſt as many diſtinct *Inſtincts* as there are *acquired Principles* of acting. And I cannot but wonder why the *Pecuniary* Senſe, a Senſe of *Power* and *Party*, &c. were not mentioned, as well as the *Moral*, that of *Honour*, *Order*, and ſome others.

The Caſe is really this. We firſt perceive or imagine ſome real Good, *i. e.* fitneſs to promote our Happineſs, in thoſe things which we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explained) we annex pleaſure to thoſe things. Hence thoſe things and Pleaſure are ſo tied together and aſſociated in our Minds, that one cannot preſent itſelf but the other will alſo occur. And the *Aſſociation* remains even after that which at firſt gave them the Connection is quite forgot, or perhaps does not exiſt, but the contrary. An Inſtance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as ſtrong a taſte for *Money* as others have for Virtue; who count ſo much Money, ſo much Happineſs; nay, even ſell their Happineſs for Money; or to ſpeak more properly, make the *having* Money, without any Deſign or Thought of uſing it, their ultimate End? But was this Propenſity to Money born with them? or rather, did not they at firſt perceive a great many Advantages from being poſſeſſed of Money, and from thence conceive a Pleaſure in having it, thence deſire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an actual Pleaſure in obtaining it, thence deſire to preſerve the

Poſſeſſion of it? Hence by dropping the intermediate Steps between Money and Happineſs, they join Money and Happineſs immediately together, and content themſelves with the phantaſtical Pleaſure of having it, and make that which was at firſt purſued only as a *Means*, be to them a real *End*, and what their real Happineſs or Miſery conſiſts in. Thus the Connexion between Money and Happineſs remains in the Mind; though it has long ſince ceaſed between the things themſelves.

The ſame might be obſerv'd concerning the Thirſt after Knowledge, Fame, *&c.* the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and moſt of the various Exerciſes and Entertainments of Life. Theſe were at firſt enter'd on with a view to ſome farther End, but at length become habitual Amuſements; the Idea of Pleaſure is aſſociated with them, and leads us on ſtill in the ſame eager Purſuit of them, when the firſt Reaſon is quite vaniſh'd, or at leaſt out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of *Aſſociation* ſo great as not only to tranſport our Paſſions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, both as to Intenſeneſs and Duration; as is evident from daily Inſtances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, *&c.* but alſo, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and ſuch as are of a quite different Nature from thoſe to which our Reaſon had at firſt directed them. Thus being accuſtom'd to reſent an Injury done to our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him that offer'd it, we are apt to conceive the ſame kind of Reſentment, and often expreſs it in the ſame manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or a Stone; whereby the hatred which we are uſed to place on voluntary Beings, is ſubſtitute din the Room of that Averſion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be obſerv'd in moſt of the other Paſſions above-mentioned.

From hence alſo, *viz.* from the continuance of this *Aſſociation* of Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almoſt Diabolical) Paſſion called *Envy*, which we promiſed to conſider.

Mr. *Locke* obſerves, and I believe very juſtly, that there are ſome Men entirely unacquainted with this Paſſion. For

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moſt Men that are uſed to Reflection, may remember the very time when they were firſt under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which ariſes in the Mind from obſerving the Proſperity of others: not of *all* others indefinitely, but only of ſome particular Perſons. Now the examining who thoſe particular Perſons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Paſſion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to conſult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that theſe particular Perſons are always ſuch as upon ſome account or other he has had a *Rivalſhip* with. For when two or more are Competitors for the ſame thing, the Succeſs of the one muſt neceſſarily tend to the Detriment of the other, or others: hence the Succeſs of my Rival and Miſery or Pain are join'd together in my Mind; and this connection or aſſociation remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalſhip ceaſes, makes me always affected with Pain whenever I hear of his Succeſs, though in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalſhip; much more in thoſe that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may poſſibly caſt ſome Light upon the black Deſigns and envious Purpoſes of the fallen Angels. For why might not they have formerly had ſome Competition with their Fellows? and why may not ſuch Aſſociations be as ſtrong in them as us?

Thus alſo we are apt to envy thoſe Perſons that refuſe to be guided by our Judgements, and perſuaded by us. For this is nothing elſe than a Rivalſhip about the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a ſecret Pride both to let the World ſee, and in imagining ourſelves, that we are in the right.

There is one thing more to be obſerved in anſwer to this Objection, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the moſt part) *make* this Aſſociation ourſelves, but *learn* it from *others*: *i. e.* that we annex Pleaſure or Pain to certain Things or Actions becauſe we ſee others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by imitating thoſe whom we admire, or whoſe eſteem we would procure: Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Eſtate: Hence *National* Virtues and Vices,

Vices, Diſpoſitions and Opinions: And from hence we may obſerve how eaſy it is to account for what is generally call'd the *Prejudice of Education*; how ſoon we catch the Temper and Affections of thoſe whom we daily converſe with; how almoſt inſenſibly we are *taught* to love, admire or hate; to be grateful, generous, compaſſionate or cruel, *&c.*

What I ſay then in anſwer to the Objection is this: "That it is neceſſary in order to ſolve the principal Actions "of human Life to ſuppoſe a *Moral Senſe* (or what is ſigni-"fy'd by that Name) and alſo *publick Affections*; but I deny "that this Moral Senſe, or theſe public Affections, are in-"nate, or *implanted* in us. They are acquired either from "our own *Obſervation* or the *Imitation* of others."

☞ *As the following Papers, which were originally printed in the* Weekly Miſcellany *No.* 7, 8, 9. *are upon the ſame Subject with the foregoing Diſſertation, and may poſſibly ſerve to illuſtrate it; the Author has thought proper to inſert them in this fourth Edition, together with ſome hints that he has met with in relation to the* Origin of our Ideas, *which may help to Explain Mr.* Locke's *Principles, and determine the Controverſy about an* innate Moral Senſe; *and which are therefore here propoſed for a more full Conſideration.*

ON
MORALITY and RELIGION.

THE very Notion of a reaſonable Creature implies, that he propoſe to himſelf ſome *End*, and act in purſuit of it. The only Enquiry then can be, What End does Reaſon direct him to purſue, and by what *Means* ſhall he attain it? Now a *ſenſible* Being, or one that is made capable of Happineſs or Miſery, can reaſonably propoſe to himſelf no other End than the Perfection of this Being, *i. e.* The Attainment of the one, and Avoidance of the other. He can have no Reaſon or Motive to purſue that which does not at all relate to him; and it is evident that nothing does relate to him, but that which has relation to his Happineſs. If he be alſo endowed with *Liberty* of Will, it is impoſſible that any thing elſe ſhould move or affect him; nor can any other Influence or Obligation be laid upon him without an expreſs Contradiction. If therefore right Reaſon can only ſhew him to be what he is, and direct him to act accordingly, it is plain it can propoſe to him no other End but *his own Happineſs*, beyond or beſide which he can have no real Concern to know, to act, or to be.

Having ſeen the true End of Man conſider'd as a ſenſible, rational, and free Being; we will in the next Place enquire after the Means of attaining this End. Now as Man is alſo *dependent* on other Beings for that Happineſs of which he is made capable, the only Means of attaining it muſt be to recommend himſelf to the Favour of thoſe ſeveral Beings on whom he does depend, and in Degrees proportioned to that Dependence. But as himſelf and all other Beings depend abſolutely upon the Deity, who alone has their Happineſs or Miſery always in his Power, it is plain the Favour of God will be the only adequate and effectual Means to attain his End, *i. e.* Happineſs upon the Whole: And therefore, whatever tends to procure the Divine Favour, will be of perpetual Obligation, and ought to be the

principal Aim of all his Actions. As all Obligation is founded on the Deſire of Happineſs, and all our Happineſs entirely depends on God, it is evident that his Will muſt be always Obligatory, and what alone is able to make any thing elſe ſo. And though he has framed and diſpoſed the World in ſuch a Manner that certain Actions will generally recommend us to the Favour of thoſe other Beings to whom we ſtand related, and ſo may be ſaid to become Duties to us, and if Univerſally followed, would bring univerſal Happineſs; yet ſince all my Reaſon for purſuing them can only be their Fitneſs to bring Happineſs to me, which in the preſent State of Things they are not always fit and likely to do, the Will of God muſt neceſſarily intervene, to inforce theſe Duties upon me, and make them univerſally binding.

As far indeed as certain Diſpoſitions and Affections will recommend us to the Favour and Eſteem of all thoſe Perſons with whom we are or may be concerned, and thereby bring more Happineſs than Miſery to us, ſo far we have a good Reaſon to indulge and exerciſe them; but when (upon what Account ſoever) they have not this Effect, but the Contrary, or at leaſt have it not in ſo high a Degree as ſome other Diſpoſitions and Affections would have (as is very often the Caſe;) What Principle in Nature will oblige us to the Exerciſe of them in ſuch Circumſtances? Nay, what Reaſon can we find to juſtify us in it, but only our Dependence on the Deity, who requires it; and who, we are aſſured, will either defend and ſupport us here in the Exerciſe of them, or make us ample Amends hereafter for what we loſe by them.

It is not then any *Relations* of Things which in themſelves, and abſtractedly conſider'd, oblige us to the Practice of that which we call moral Virtue; but the Will of God which enjoins it, and which alone affords the *eternal and immutable Reaſon* for the Practice of it. We are able to conceive no kind of Reaſon or Obligation to [illegible] but what is founded on Happineſs, nor any fix'd and [illegible] Happineſs, but what is founded on the Will of God. Therefore his Will properly and ultimately [illegible] we follow in the Practice of Virtue, and Virtue only, [illegible] it is agreeable to

to, and an Indication of his Will; wherein its Worth conſiſts, and from whence it derives its Power of obliging.

And therefore to ſet aſide the Deity in the Conſideration of Virtue, muſt be to relax it from its true Principle, to take it off its only Foundation: and to endeavour to exalt Morality into an Independency on his Will, is to undermine and deſtroy it. Any other Principle but this, will either come ſhort of the Mark, or carry us from it.

Thus they who teach that Virtue is to be practis'd for its *native Lovelineſs* and *intrinſic Worth*, muſt either affirm that it is lovely and valuable they know not for what, or why; *i. e.* have no diſtinct Ideas to theſe fine Words; or muſt miſtake the Means for the End. Virtue, we find, is lovely for its good Effects, and truly valuable on account of the Conſequences that will certainly attend it, either by the Laws of Nature, or poſitive Appointment; therefore they will call it *lovely in itſelf*, or *abſolutely* ſo; and tell us it is to be purſued purely *for its own ſake*, and excluſively of all the aforeſaid Conſequences; *i. e.* excluſively of every thing that is good and valuable in it.

They who follow Virtue for the immediate *Pleaſure* which attends the Exerciſe of it, muſt either take it for granted that we have ſome innate Inſtinct or Affection, which at all times infallibly directs, and forcibly inclines us to what is Right, (all which is as falſe as Fact can make it) or elſe they practice Virtue for a Reaſon which is common to any other Practice, and will equally lead them to any; a Motive which accompanies every ſtrong Perſuaſion or ſettled Habit of Mind, whatever may be its future unforeſeen Conſequences. To do what either our Judgment approves, or we have choſe and ſet our Hearts upon, will give us this immediate Pleaſure in any Courſe of Life; eſpecially in one which we can purſue without external Diſturbance, or which happens to have the Vogue of the Place, or Eſteem of our Acquaintance, to encourage and confirm us in our Suit.

They who deſcribe Virtue to be *following Nature*, go upon a Principle near akin to the foregoing, and full as bad. For if our Nature, as far as it concerns Morals, be in a great meaſure of our own making, as we have Reaſon

ſon to ſuppoſe; if it may be greatly corrupted and perverted, as all allow; this will be a very erroneous, at leaſt an abſolutely uncertain Guide. It will amount to no more than this, Do always what you like beſt; or, Follow your preſent Humour.

They who practice Virtue for preſent *Convenience*, *Intereſt*, or *Reputation*, ſtand upon more ſolid Ground; which nevertheleſs will often fail them, as we have ſeen above. The like has been obſerv'd concerning *Reaſon*, and the *Relation of Things*.

IN our laſt, we endeavoured to eſtabliſh the following Concluſions. Private Happineſs, upon the Whole, is the ultimate End of Man: This abſolutely depends on, and can effectually be ſecured only by the Will of God; the Will of God therefore is our only adequate Rule of Action, and what alone includes perpetual Obligation.

We ſhall here endeavour more diſtinctly to point out the Reaſon and Neceſſity for ſuch a Rule, and ſhew what kind of Conformity to it will ſecure the End propoſed. The End of all, we ſaid, was private Happineſs. Now as we are aſſured that the Deity had no other Deſign in framing the World at firſt, nor can have any End in continuing to preſerve and govern it, but to lead us all to as much Happineſs as we are capable of; his Will and our Happineſs become perfectly co-incident, and ſo may ſafely enough be ſubſtituted one for the other. He propoſes only the Good of his Creatures by being obeyed, and makes it the Rule and Reaſon of all that he enjoins; and knows the moſt effectual Methods of attaining it: An abſolute implicit compliance with his Will may therefore not improperly be called our ultimate End; nay, ought to be eſteemed and acted on as ſuch in all particular Caſes. A[illegible] is an infallible Rule and adequate Meaſure of our Du[illegible] muſt oblige us to an Action when we can ſee no further Reaſon for it; and it is highly neceſſary and fit it ſhould. Our Knowledge of the Nature of ourſelves, and thoſe about us, is very ſhort and imperfect; we are unable to trace our

our Happineſs but a few Steps through the various Conſequences of Things, and Reaſons of Action; and are frequently apt to deviate from the Paths of Truth into Error and Abſurdity. We ſtand in need therefore of ſome *Rule* on which we may conſtantly depend, which will always guide and direct us in our Purſuit; and this, as we have ſeen, can only be the Will of that Being in whoſe Hands we always are, and who is both able and inclined to reward us to the uttermoſt. Our next Enquiry then muſt be, how we ſhall ſecure this Reward to us, or what will certainly obtain his Favour; and that is, in one Word, *Obedience*; the having a Regard to his Will in all our Actions, and doing them for this Reaſon only, becauſe they are well pleaſing to him, and what he requires of us.

That this muſt be the only Means of recommending ourſelves to his Favour, the only true Principle which can make our Actions properly virtuous or rewardable by him, is very plain: For nothing can in Reaſon entitle me to a Reward from another, which has no manner of Relation to him; and nothing can have any relation to the Deity, but what is done *on his Account*, in obedience to his Command, or with an Intent to pleaſe him. The *Matter* of the Act can neither be of Advantage nor Diſadvantage to him; therefore the *Intention* is all that can make it bear any Relation to him. In one Senſe indeed the material Part of the Act may relate to the Deity, *viz.* As it tends in its own Nature to further or oppoſe the Deſigns of his Government: But this will never relate to him in ſuch a manner, as to make the Agent a proper Subject either of Reward or Puniſhment for it. To make one a Subject of Reward for any particular Action, his Will muſt be concerned in it ſo far as to intend to merit the Reward which is annexed to the Performance of it, or at leaſt to will and intend the Performance of that Action as ſo propoſed. To be a proper Subject of Puniſhment, a Perſon muſt intend the Breach of ſome Law, or at leaſt the Neglect and Diſregard of it; or the Commiſſion of ſuch an Act as he knows, or might know, if he deſired, to be a Breach of it. Conſequently it is the Aim and Deſign of an Action only which makes Guilt or Merit imputable to the Agent; and in that Aim

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and Deſign does the Guilt or Merit of it wholly conſiſt. From hence then we may compute the Value or Defect of any particular Action in a Moral or Religious Account. As far as it is intended to obey the Will of God, and advance the Ends of his Government, in Preference of or Oppoſition to any other Intereſt or Inclination; ſo far it is meritorious with or acceptable to him: As far as it is done in compliance with any particular Intereſt or Inclination, in oppoſition to, or with a greater Regard had to it than to the Will of God, or in actual Diſregard of that Will; ſo far, and in ſuch Circumſtances it is offenſive or injurious to him: As far as it is done without any diſtinct End, or any diſtinct Conſideration of the Will of God in that End, ſo far it is at beſt purely indifferent, and of no moral or religious Account at all. If the End of any particular Action terminate in ourſelves *immediately*, and we have no farther View in it than the Attainment of ſome temporal Advantage, Honour, or the like; the Action can but be innocent at beſt; we ſerve not God herein, but ourſelves; and when we attain the natural good Effects thereof in this Life, we have our Reward. Nothing can intitle us to any ſupernatural and extraordinary Recompence from the Deity in another State, but what was done purely on his account; in Obedience to his Will, or in order to recommend us to his Favour. And though we cannot properly *merit* any thing of God, by reaſon of thoſe innumerable Benefits received from him, which we ſhall never be able to repay; by reaſon of our manifold Tranſgreſſions which our good Works cannot attone for; and becauſe of the many Defects attending even the beſt of them, which render them not ſo good as they might and ought to be; though for theſe Reaſons, I ſay, we cannot properly *merit* any thing of God; yet nevertheleſs by *Covenant* and *Promiſe* we may be certainly entitled to his Favour, ſo far as we comply with thoſe Terms of Salvation which he has propoſed, and perform ſuch Duties as he has commanded, purely in obedience to him; which is the only Principle (as we have ſeen) that can make any thing rewardable by him.

Not that it is neceſſary that we ſhould always have this Principle explicitly in view, and be ready to deduce every par-

particular Action immediately from a Conſideration of the Will of God, in order to make it acceptable to him: It may, it is hoped, be ſufficient, if we have a general Intent of ſerving him in the whole of any conſiderable Undertaking, and an expreſs Regard to him whenever he appears to be more immediately concerned in any Part of it. Our imperfect Underſtanding will not allow us to trace up every thing to our ultimate End; we find it neceſſary therefore to fix ſeveral inferior and ſubordinate ones, wherein we are forced to acquieſce, both in our Knowledge and our Practice; and it is ſufficient to recommend and juſtify an Action, if it can be fairly deduced from any of theſe ſubordinate Ends, and have ſome Connection or other with what is manifeſtly our Duty. Nay farther, ſome Actions which are directed to no diſtinct End at all, though in themſelves indeed they be no proper Subjects of Reward (as was obſerved) yet they may become ſuch by virtue of certain *Habits*, whereof they are Conſequences, and for which Habits we are properly accountable: and the Reaſon of this is evident. As we cannot have our main End conſtantly in view, it is neceſſary for us to acquire ſuch Habits of acting as may lead us almoſt inſenſibly to it, and carry us on our Journey, even when we are not thinking of it. Theſe Habits therefore, if they be rightly founded and directed, muſt intitle us to a Reward for all the ſeveral Actions which flow from them, even when the firſt Foundation is forgot. Thus a Servant ſufficiently deſerves both the Title and Reward of being faithful and obedient, if he have acquired ſuch Habits of conſtant Diligence in his Maſter's Buſineſs, as will carry him regularly through it, though he ſeldom conſider the End of all his Labour, or think of his Maſter in it.

WE have in two former Papers, conſidered the true *End* of human Actions, and the Means of attaining it. We have laid down the only adequate *Rule* or Criterion of Morality, as alſo removed ſome of the falſe and inſufficient ones uſually propoſed. We have inquired into the

Motive, Ground, or *Principle* on which Virtue ought to be purſued, and pointed out the proper Method of applying it. To compleat our Deſign upon this Subject, we ſhall now examine the *material* Part of Virtue, and obviate ſome Miſtakes that have ariſen, and may ſtill ariſe on that Head.

The moſt common one is to put the *Matter* of any Duty for the whole Duty. Thus ſome have defined moral Goodneſs to be nothing more than chuſing, willing, or procuring *Natural Good*, including both Private and Publick: Others make it to conſiſt in producing the greateſt Degree of *Pleaſure*, i. e. in the Agent himſelf; or in purſuing *private Happineſs*: But except theſe Writers intend to treat only of the *material Part* of Virtue, whenever they deſcribe it in ſuch Terms, their Deſcriptions are evidently partial and defective. Moral Goodneſs, or Moral Virtue in Man is not merely chuſing or producing Pleaſure or Natural Good, but chuſing it without View to preſent Rewards, and in Proſpect of a future Recompence only. For, obſerve how the Caſe ſtands. The greateſt Natural Good of all is ſo provided for by God himſelf, by the ſtrong Appetites he has implanted in Men, or the Neceſſities he has laid them under, that there is no Moral Goodneſs, no Virtue at all in chuſing it. The greateſt Natural Good I call what concerns the Being of the Moral World; and the ſecond greateſt, what concerns their *Well-being*. Now God has taken care to preſerve the World in Being, to continue both the Species and Individual. 1. By implanting a very ſtrong Love of Life in every Man. 2. By the Appetites of Hunger and Thirſt. 3. By warm Deſires for propagating the Species. 4. By the Στοργὴ of Parents towards their Offspring. 5. By neceſſitating Men to unite in Society, and mutual Offices of Trade, *&c.* Upon theſe five Articles depends the very Being of Mankind: And God would not truſt ſuch weighty Things as thoſe to the weak Reaſon of Man, but has provided for them by never-failing Appetites and Neceſſities; inſomuch that there is no Virtue in chuſing thoſe Actions, but in regulating or moderating them.

There is no Moral Goodneſs in eating and drinking, though a Natural Good, neceſſary to keep up Life: No Moral Goodneſs in propagating the Species, though that alſo

alſo muſt come under the Notion of chuſing Natural Good: No Moral Goodneſs in purſuing the Στοργη before-mentioned, nor in carrying on any Trade for the Service of the World; though without theſe Things the World could not ſubſiſt. Moral Goodneſs therefore lies not in chuſing the greateſt Natural Good, but in chuſing any Natural Good, when not impelled to it by *Neceſſity*, nor moved by *preſent* Pleaſure or Reward. Eating and Drinking is not Virtue, becauſe we do it to ſatisfy Hunger and Thirſt, and to pleaſe the Appetite: But the Virtue is in regulating and moderating the Appetite, that that very Appetite which is neceſſary for the Being of the World, may not be carried to ſuch an Exceſs as to diſturb its Well-being. The like may be ſaid of the reſt.

The Caſe is the ſame in Acts of the moſt immediate beneficial Tendency, whether they be directed to the Publick in general, to inferior Societies or particular Perſons: To defend, aſſiſt, relieve a Friend or Fellow-Citizen; to ſerve and ſupport him in his Credit or Fortunes, Body or Mind: If this, which commonly goes by the Name of Moral Goodneſs, proceed from ſelfiſh Views, or no diſtinct View at all; from a Proſpect of future Advantage in this Life, or from the preſent Pleaſure of performing it; it is nothing. To preſerve the Rights, Laws and Liberties of our Country, to improve and reform a whole Nation, to engage in Enterprizes that will be of univerſal Benefit to Mankind; any or all ſuch Actions, though never ſo good in their Effects, and right as to the *Matter* of them, yet if they be wanting in Point of Principle; if they are done for Profit, Honour, or out of mere Humour, nay out of the moſt diſintereſted Benevolence itſelf; ſo long as there is no Regard had to the Deity in them, they cannot be reckoned ſtrictly Virtuous, nor claim a Place in Morals or Religion.

Moral Goodneſs therefore is not barely the willing or producing *Natural Good*, whether private or publick. This would be denominating the Whole from a Part; the Fault of all thoſe Definitions formerly mentioned. Thus they who deſcribe it to be *following Nature*, neither ſettle the *Matter*, nor eſtabliſh any determinate *Rule*; and if they have a

Principle, it is either falſe or inadequate, as was before obſerved. They who determine it to be acting according to *Reaſon*, *Truth*, or the *Relations of Things*, at moſt lay down only the *Rule*, and *Matter*; but give us neither any diſtinct *Principle*, nor *End*. They who define it to be *Obedience to the Will of God* only, leave out the material Part, *i. e.* Do not ſhew what the Will of God requires, or wherein it conſiſts: Neither do they ſufficiently inform us *why* we ought to obey it, or direct us to what we call our ultimate End. A compleat Definition of Virtue, or Morality, ſhould take in all theſe Particulars, and can be only this: *The doing Good to Mankind, in Obedience to the Will of God, and for the Sake of everlaſting Happineſs.*

F. I.

THE

Nature and Obligations of MAN,

As a ſenſible and rational BEING.

1. ALL our primary, ſimple Ideas proceed from Senſation, external or internal; the latter of which may be extended through moſt parts of the Veſſels of the Human Body, and is extremely complicated; and will be found perhaps upon examination to produce much greater and more various Effects than we are commonly aware of. From the one or the other of theſe we receive continual impreſſions while we are awake; and from the united force of ſeveral ſuch impreſſions, may ariſe a new ſpecies of Senſation, or an Idea different from any that appear'd in any of the individuals. Thus various liquors, meats, and medicines producing a general agitation or compoſure in what is call'd the nervous Syſtem, raiſe as general a kind of rapturous gaity, or tranquil delight: and *v. v.* which bears ſo near a reſemblance to ſome intellectual operation, that it is often miſtaken for ſuch; and in reality is as diſtinct from the mere *Taſte* of all ſuch liquors &c. as any objects of the Senſe and Intellect are from each other.

2. By our faculties of repeating and enlarging, of comparing, and compounding, or abſtracting theſe and their ſeveral Objects we raiſe a ſecondary ſet of Ideas, ſtill more mixt and diverſify'd, but yet of the ſame general nature; which often go under the name of *intellectual*, from the intellect's being ſo evidently employ'd about them; but all grow out of the old Stock, all flow from the ſame Source, *i. e.* are originally form'd from Senſe and wholly grounded in it: as may in part appear from the *words* we uſe in deſcribing them, *v. g.* to *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *conceive*, &c. which are (as Mr. *Locke* obſerves) words manifeſtly *taken from the operation of ſenſible things, and apply'd to certain modes of thinking*. B. 3. C. 1. §. 5.

3. The

3. The contemplation of theſe very Faculties, by which we mold and modify the original materials of our knowledge, produces a third ſet of Ideas, ſtill more remote from the firſt origin; and therefore term'd Ideas of *pure* Intellect, as more immediately ariſing from and terminating in the reflex view of theſe ſame intellectual and active powers, and of their ſeveral operations: *v. g.* perceiving that we do perceive, &c. conſidering what it is to compare, compound &c. and what theſe and the like powers extend to and infer. Whence we form all the notion we have of a *Spirit.*

4. Man is a compound of corporeal Organs, (moſt of them conveying ſenſitive impreſſions, as obſerv'd above) and the diſtinct powers of *perception* (in the latter ſenſe of that word) or *Thinking* in general, and voluntary *Action* in cloſe union with theſe.

5. We may obſerve likewiſe that theſe latter, which are generally ſtiled active powers, are not always in exerciſe, any more than ſome of the paſſive, ſenſitive ones are; their Exerciſe being manifeſtly ſuſpended during ſome bodily diſorders, and altogether ceaſing in the intervals of what is called *ſound* Sleep. Whence it appears that Thought and voluntary Action cannot in ſtrictneſs be eſſential, or immutably neceſſary to any one part of our Conſtitution; but rather is connected with and dependent on a certain diſpoſition of the whole frame, or a regular State of the chief branches of it.

6. Some of theſe ſenſible Ideas are in certain reſpects agreeable to us, others the contrary; the former being, in all probability, ſuch as tend to the preſervation of each individual, the latter to its deſtruction.

7. A foreſight of them likewiſe, or of their ſeveral cauſes, has the ſame effect in ſome degree; nay ſometimes may be ſo form'd as to produce it in a higher degree than the objects themſelves would, were they preſent. Thus may the Imagination crowd the pleaſures or pains of a day, a year, an age into one moment, and thereby make the impreſſions of theſe two laſt Claſſes far more general and extenſive, as well

well as more intenſe and exquiſite, than any of the particular ſenſitive ones of which they are compoſed.

8. And as a proſpect of theſe and their cauſes is productive of the ſame kind of pleaſure or pain that attends the preſence of each, ſo the *purſuit* of the former and avoidance of the latter becomes alſo agreeable, and all that as ſenſible and rational Beings we can be concerned about; ſince the ſum total, or the aggregate of theſe ſame pleaſures or pains, is our ſupreme, ultimate *Happineſs* or *Miſery*; the attainment of the one, and ſecurity from the other, our moſt *perfect* State: the neceſſary means of attaining to which End compoſe our *natural Good*, and in the regular intended purſuit of it conſiſts our *moral Goodneſs*.

9. Now as moſt of theſe means of Happineſs lie in the power of others, who being of the ſame nature with ourſelves, can only be induced to contribute to it, or to co-operate with us in procuring it, by a ſettled diſpoſition in us of doing the like to them on all occaſions; hence the contracting of ſuch diſpoſition, and a regard to their good in the general courſe of our actions becomes neceſſary to our own; in the deſign'd proſecution of which lies the *formal*, and in the actual production of it the *material* part of Virtue; both which in common acceptation conſtitute the whole of our *merit* with reſpect to each other.

10. Not that the promoting of another's Happineſs is ever of itſelf immediately, or by any kind of natural or innate Principle, productive of our own: as well might one feel by another's Senſes, or be made happy by his Feelings without any real participation of them; as well might we ſuppoſe a man to act entirely on another's motives, as judge any thing good, right and fit for him to do, or to communicate to another, merely becauſe that thing is good and fit for the other to receive, or pleaſant to enjoy; except that ſame enjoyment is in ſome meaſure relative to his own proper Rule or End, or can be made right and reaſonable for him to purſue by ſome ſuch medium as connects it with his natural Principle, that conſtant and invariable ground of Action, *i. e.* his own Happineſs.

11. Nor is it difficult to find or form ſuch a Connection from what was hinted above; *Reaſon* diſcovers it, as well from the natural Conſequence of things; benevolent affections in each perſon being apt to generate correſpondent ones in others, and each beneficent act to engage a return of like good offices; as from the poſitive appointment of the Deity, who deſigns the common Happineſs or perfection of all rational Beings, according to the nature he has given them, and the Circumſtances under which he has placed them; having made them with no other view that we can conceive, than in order to have this communicated to them in the moſt effectual manner; and who muſt conſequently approve of every inſtance of their co-operation with him in the ſame deſign, and aſſuredly reward each regular courſe of Action in his Creatures that tends to promote it.

12. His *will* in this reſpect is therefore the general *Rule* or true *Criterion* of Morality, as what infallibly muſt, and what alone can, effectually ſecure to us our ultimate End, Happineſs upon the whole; Happineſs in ſome certain *State*, above and beſide the natural conſequence of all our virtuous Acts and Habits; and who will in that State make us moſt ample amends for whatever pains we take here, or whatever loſs and inconvenience we can poſſibly undergo in proſecuting of them; and thereby makes ſuch proſecution an invariable Duty to us, or conſtitutes a perfect and perpetual *obligation* thereto.

13. The ſame thing may be either traced out thus by Reaſon and demonſtrated, or come at in a more compendious way, which yet will have equally ſtrong and permanent Effects upon our Conſtitution, nay commonly more ſudden and more ſtriking ones; on which account it is often miſtaken for ſelf-evidence or intuition: — I mean the power of ASSOCIATION, which was juſt hinted at by Mr. *Locke*, but apply'd to the preſent purpoſe more directly by the Author of the foregoing *Diſſertation*, and from him taken up and conſider'd in a much more general way by Dr. *Hartley*, who has from thence ſolv'd many of the Principal

cipal appearances in Human Nature, the ſenſitive part of which, ſince Mr. *Locke*'s Eſſay, had been very little cultivated, and is perhaps yet to the generality a *terra incognita*; how intereſting ſoever, as well as entertaining, ſuch Enquiries muſt be found to be: on which account it is much to be lamented that no more thoughtful perſons are induced to turn their minds this way; ſince ſo very noble a foundation for improvements has been laid by both theſe excellent Writers, eſpecially the laſt: whoſe work is, I beg leave to ſay, in the main, notwithſtanding all its abſtruſeneſs, well worth ſtudying; and would have been ſufficiently clear and convincing had he but confined his obſervations to the plain *Facts* and Experiments on which it was firſt founded, without ever entering minutely into the *Phyſical Cauſe* of ſuch Phenomena; as the great *Newton* wiſely did in the point of *Gravitation*, throwing his whole Theory of that ſame *Æther* and its Vibrations, into ſome modeſt *Queries*: notwithſtanding his very probable ſuppoſition that both Gravitation in the greater Orbs, and all ſenſation and muſcular Motion in all animal Bodies, might depend upon it.

14. Nor will perhaps this Principle of *Aſſociation* appear of leſs extent and influence in the intellectual World, than that of Gravity is found to be in the Natural. It is already diſcovered to be an univerſal *Law of our Nature*, intimately connected with the mutual operations of the Mind and Body, notwithſtanding the odd whimſical appearance it firſt made in Mr. *Locke*'s Eſſay, (though he applied it to better purpoſes in his *Conduct of the Underſtanding*, §. 40.) and its being ſo often ſlighted as a *vague*, *confuſed* Principle by later Writers; particularly Dr. *Hutcheſon*. *Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy*, p. 55, *&c.* And though we may poſſibly never comprehend the Cauſe that actuates it, or the inſtrument by which it is exerted (any more than we can hope to ſee the Bond of Union between Mind and Body; though this, by the bye, may ſeem a fair ſtep towards it) yet 'tis enough for our preſent purpoſe if the Principle itſelf has been ſo far explained by the worthy Author abovementioned, as thence to demonſtrate that the Moral ſenſe may be wholly

generated from ſenſitive Pleaſures, and ſupported by them: which I apprehend to be done effectually. See his *Obſervations on Man*, V. 2. p. 471, *&c.*

15. If the forementioned account of our acquiring this Moral Senſe be admitted, it is ſhewn in reality to be no more than a *Habit*, which is never of itſelf a ſure and ſufficient Rule, but wants ſome other regulation; and like all other habits ſhould be grounded on ſome ſolid Principles of Reaſon, and ever ſubject to them.

16. But whether this account be admitted or not, Mr. *Locke* has plainly proved that it muſt be acquired ſome how or other, ſince there are no kind of *practical principles innate*, or ſo much as *ſelf-evident*; nor can our knowledge of any moral Propoſitions be *intuitive*; *ſince it requires diſcourſe and reaſoning to diſcover the certainty of their truth*, B. 1. C. 3. § 1. *which plainly depends upon ſome other truth antecedent to them, and from which they muſt be deduced*, ibid. *and Men may very juſtly demand a Reaſon for every one of them*, ib. § 4. which reaſon lies in another province, and muſt be fetched from the *natural relations* of the things and perſons that ſurround us, *i. e.* from ſenſitive pleaſure and pain, on which hinge all our Paſſions turn, and from whence muſt be derived the great Rule of our Actions, *ib.* § 3. 6, *&c.* and B. 2. C. 20.

17. The ſame judicious writer (Mr. *Locke*) has accounted for that *variety* of *Moral Rules* viſible amongſt Men, *from the different ſorts of Happineſs they have a proſpect of*, § 6. as alſo from their *Education, Company and Cuſtoms of their Country*, § 8. any of which ſerves to ſet *Conſcience* on work, and thereby tends to diverſify their moral rule; which if it were innate, or (what comes to the ſame thing) any natural Senſe or Inſtinct, muſt one would think be uniform and invariable: but whether any ſuch be found among our Species is after all *a matter of Fact* determinable only by thoſe who are well converſant in the early education of Children, and duly qualified to make juſt obſervations on their original frame and native diſpoſitions. If this had

had been more carefully attended to, with what the ſame able Writer has delivered concerning the true Hiſtory of the Human Mind, I fancy a right Theory of Morals might long ago have been laid down with more ſucceſs; and in particular we ſhould have been ſatisfied that any ſuch Principle as will perpetually influence and effectually induce us to promote the Happineſs of others abſolutely and entirely independent of our own, can never be wrought out of our original Feelings; or ſpring from that primary and purely native ſtock of our Ideas, on which are grounded all the Tribe of natural Appetites, and the whole Furniture of the Human Mind. It muſt therefore either be ſuperinduced by Reaſon, in view of attaining our great End, as obſerved above; or come in under the Head of *Aſſociation*, and by way of Habit, without any ultimate End or diſtinct view at all. Thoſe of the other ſide of the Queſtion may chuſe which of theſe two they like beſt.

18. From the whole it will appear, that there is properly but *one original ſource* of our Ideas, i. e. *Senſation*; nor any original pleaſures or pains beſide ſenſitive ones, however variouſly combined, abſtracted or enlarged: and therefore any innate intellectual determination, or Moral Principle wholly underived from and naturally independent of theſe, ſeems an *impoſſibility*. The Intellect perceives only what is in things, and if there be nothing in the Mind originally beſide theſe ſame ſenſitive Pleaſures or Pains, then can it conſtitute no other Claſs fundamentally different from theſe, and much leſs oppoſite to them, whatever alterations or improvements may be made amongſt them: and the *Medicina Mentis* will, like that of the *Body*, be all compoſed of the ſame ſort of Ingredients, however mixed and altered in the Compoſition.

If Mr. *Locke*'s plan were once rightly underſtood we ſhould have little room for any diſpute about the different natures of theſe two, or the diſtinct Principles that actuate and govern them. We ſhould ſoon find that all ſound Philoſophy in *Morals* is entirely built on *Natural* Philoſophy, and never to be ſeparated from it. But we ſeem not yet to have fol-

followed this great Author up to his firſt Principles, or duly traced the conſequences of his Syſtem, notwithſtanding his having been ſo long and juſtly admired amongſt us; and moſt of the inveterate prejudices that uſed to attend his confutation of the old idle Doctrine of innate Ideas and Inſtincts be now well nigh worn out. Though perhaps even yet there may be left enow to prevent an impartial examination of his Scheme; the aim and tendency whereof is no other than to reduce the foundations of our Knowledge, and our Happineſs, to that original *Simplicity* which Nature ſeems to obſerve in all her Works.

Con-

Concerning the Origin of EVIL.

CHAP. I.

Containing ſome Principles previouſly neceſſary to the Underſtanding and Solution of the difficulty about the Origin *of* Evil.

SECT. I.

Of the Knowledge of External Objects.

That ſenſations repreſent external things to us, or at leaſt diſcover the preſence of them.

I. IT is allowed that external objects are made known to us from without by the Senſes; but we have entirely forgot how *Light*, *Colours*, and other external Things at firſt affected our Senſes and entered the Mind; nor can we eaſily recollect the riſe and progreſs of our Knowledge concerning theſe Things.

However it is agreed that the *Conceptions* which we have of theſe either repreſent to us the Things themſelves, or at leaſt diſcover the *preſence* or *operations* of them: That the ſenſation of *Light*, for inſtance, ariſes from its being preſented to the Eye; and ſo in all other Objects of the Senſes.

That theſe are confuſed and complicated, but afterwards ſeparated

II. But it is to be obſerved that the repreſentations of Things which we have from the Senſes, are by no means ſimple, but very much confuſed and complicated; for Example, the Eye repreſents to the Mind *burning Wax*, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted in the Fire, red, and

by the understanding; an instance of this in burning Wax.

when ſoftened by heat changeable into any Figure, ſuſceptible alſo of various Colours; and laſtly, reſolvable into *Smoke*. The Eye exhibits all theſe Properties in the burning Wax almoſt at one glance, but the *Underſtanding* ſeparates thoſe things by Reflection, which the Sight had conveyed to the mind collectively. For it perceives that the Wax preſerves its Eſſence and Denomination, though from round it be turned into ſquare, from hard and red, into ſoft and black. From whence it appears that all theſe Properties are *extrinſical* to it, but that which continues under all theſe Changes is called its *Nature* and *Subſtance*.

The firſt diſtinction of our conceptions into *ſenſible Qualities* and *Subſtance*.

III. By *Subſtance* I here underſtand a thing which the Mind can conceive by *itſelf* as *diſtinct* and *ſeparate* from all others: For that Thing, the Conception of which does not *depend* upon another, nor include or ſuppoſe any other, is to us a *Subſtance*; and accordingly we diſtinguiſh it by that Name; But that which implies *dependence* in its conception we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*. For inſtance, we can conceive a certain portion of *matter*, ſuch as Wax, ſetting aſide all others, and alſo without any particular *Figure*: But we are not in like manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax therefore is a *Subſtance*, for our conception repreſents it as *diſtinct*, *divided* from, and *independent* of all other things: Nor is it neceſſary to the knowledge thereof that we join the couceptions of other things when we think of it: for the conceptions of that and theſe *contribute* nothing to, nor ſtand in need of each other in order to their being underſtood. But *Colour*, *Figure*, *Softneſs* and *Hardneſs* are *modes* or *accidents*, ſince they cannot be conceived without ſomething that is *coloured*, *figured*, *ſoft*, or *hard*; but they enter not into the *Subſtance* or *nature* of Wax, for *that* remains, whatever may become of *theſe*.

IV.

IV. But when this is reſolved into *ſmoke*, or *flame*, it has no longer the name of Wax given to it. We call the thing *Wax* which is applicable to a certain peculiar uſe; but when it is once reſolved into ſmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that uſe to which Wax is ſubſervient; and therefore changes its *Eſſence*, and *Appellation*. What then does it carry along with it under all mutations? It is always *extended*, and capable of *motion* or *reſt*; and has always parts which are *ſeparable*, and *exclude* one another out of the ſame place; the Subſtance therefore which is attended with theſe Qualities or Properties we call *Matter*. (1.)

How we know that there is any ſuch thing as *matter*.

V.

NOTES.

(1.) Our Author's Notion of *Subſtance*, as including all the conſtituent Properties of any thing, ſeems to be more plain and agreeable to nature, and therefore of greater uſe in Philoſophy than that which is commonly received. We find by experience that a thing will always exhibit the ſame appearances in ſome reſpects though it admit of Change in others: or in Mr. *Locke*'s Language, that certain numbers of ſimple Ideas go conſtantly together, whereas ſome others do not: The former of theſe we call the *Subſtance*, Thing or Being itſelf, the latter are termed its Modes or *Accidents*. Thus the ſubſtance of *Body*, as far as we know of it, conſiſts in Solidity and Extenſion; which being neceſſarily finite, it alſo becomes capable of Diviſion, Figure and Motion. Theſe are its original, inſeparable Qualities which conſtitute the thing, and ſeem not to depend on any thing elſe as a *Subject*. But a particular Figure, Motion, &c. are only Accidents or Modes of its Exiſtence, which do not neceſſarily attend it, though they themſelves cannot be ſuppoſed to exiſt without it. The ſubſtance of *Spirit* conſiſts in the Powers of thinking and acting, which likewiſe admit of various Modifications. This ſeems to be all that we can learn concerning the nature of things from obſervation and experience. To enquire into the *Manner* how theſe, which we call Properties, exiſt together, or to attempt to explain the *Cauſe*, Ground or Reaſon of their Union is in vain; to aſſign the word *Subſtance* for a repreſentation of it is ſaying nothing; it is ſetting a mere word for what we have neither any Idea of nor occaſion for. Indeed if we conſider theſe primary Qualities as needing ſomething to inhere in, we are obliged to ſeek for ſomething to ſupport them; and by the ſame way of reaſoning we may

What it is. V: What is obſervable in Wax, may alſo be obſerved in any other Subſtance, which we know by

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ſeek for ſomething elſe to ſupport that other ſomething, and ſo on; and at laſt ſhall find no other ſupport for the whole but the cauſe which produced it. Mr. *Locke* though he gave into this way of talking yet he has ſufficiently ſhewn his diſlike of it in *B.* I. *C.* 4. §. 18. *B.* 2. *C.* 13. §. 18, 19, 20. and *C.* 22. §. 23. and elſewhere*. Dr. *Watts* is of opinion, 'that it is introducing a needleſs *Scholaſtic* Notion into the 'real nature of things and then fancying it to have a real 'Exiſtence.' *Logic* p. 14. The Author of the *Procedure, Extent,* &c. affirms, 'that as far as we directly know the eſſential 'Properties of any Subſtance, ſo far we have a direct know-'ledge of the Subſtance *itſelf*; and if we had a direct Know-'ledge of *all* the eſſential Properties of any Subſtance, we 'ſhould have an *adequate* knowledge of that Subſtance; for 'ſurely, if there be any meaning in words, the knowing any 'of the eſſential Properties of a thing is knowing *ſo much* of 'its very Subſtance or Eſſence; † meaning the ſame by theſe two laſt words, though Mr. *Locke* uſes them in a very different Signification; the former being only that which makes any thing an *Ens* or Being; the latter that which makes it a Being of this or that *Sort*: Of which below.

In ſhort, whatever is underſtood by this word *ſubſtance*; it cannot as Mr. *Locke* obſerves ‡ be applied to God, Spirits and Body in the ſame ſenſe; and therefore the application of this and the like doubtful Terms to Subjects of a very different nature (eſpecially that of *Subſtratum*, which more apparently confines our thoughts to Body) muſt needs occaſion Error and Confuſion.

But though our Author's notion of Subſtance be very defenſible, he has applied the word *Matter* to the Idea of *Body*, whereof Matter is only a partial Conception containing nothing more than the Idea of a ſolid Subſtance which is every where the ſame. Theſe two terms therefore cannot be put one for the other, as Mr. *Locke* obſerves § though indeed they are often uſed promiſcuouſly.

Upon this occaſion it may not be improper to obſerve that the various ſignification of theſe general Terms *Matter, Subſtance, Eſſence,* &c. will ſerve to convince us in the firſt place, that theſe words don't denote the manner how things really exiſt, but only our manner of conceiving them, and ſecondly, that

* Comp. Mr. *Colliber*'s Enquiry into the Exiſtence and Nature of God. p. 227. 228. and Dr. *Sherlock*'s Vindic. of the Trin. p. 69. *&c.* and Dr. *Watts*'s Philoſophical Eſſays. Eſſ. 2. † B. I. C. iii. p. 80, 81. ‡ B. II. C. xiii. § 18. § B. III. C. x. § 15.

by the *Senſes*. For all things that are perceived by the Senſes admit of the like changes, and the above-

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that there is no real Exiſtencies ſtrictly conformable to this our manner of conceiving them, *i. e.* in *Generals*. For if either theſe general Terms ſtood for things really exiſting under ſuch a Preciſion, or this our way of conceiving things were fixed by Nature, neither of them would be ſo various and uncertain as we find they are. The end of making theſe *General Conceptions* is to range things into *Sorts* for the convenience of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows.

We are at firſt only acquainted with particular Subſtances; but obſerving that as theſe particular Subſtances differ in ſome reſpects, ſo they agree in others, (*i. e.* though this particular excites in the mind ſome ſimple Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there are ſome Ideas excited equally from both) we take no notice of thoſe Ideas in which two or more particular ſubſtances differ, but ſelect thoſe only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex Idea by giving them one Name. Which complex Idea becomes General, *i. e.* it may be affirmed of, or belongs to, or is found in more than one particular Subſtance; and the ſeveral Subſtances of which it is affirmed, *&c.* are ſaid to be contained under that General Idea. General Ideas of Subſtances therefore are not made by *adding* all or any of the particular Ideas found in each Subſtance, or by that refined method, which the Author of the *Procedure* imagines, of adding and omitting them at the ſame time; but only by *leaving out* all thoſe Ideas in which two or more particular Subſtances differ, and retaining thoſe in which they agree. And from general Ideas thus made we proceed to more general ones in the ſame way, *viz.* by always dropping the particulars wherein they differ. Thus obſerving a certain agreement among Individuals and omitting the reſt, we form an Idea of the ſeveral *Species*. In like manner leaving out the diſtinguiſhing marks of each Species, we get an Idea of the *Genus*, ſuch as *Man*, *Beaſt*, or of a higher Genus, ſuch as *Animal*: and again by dropping that by which Animals are diſtinguiſhed from all other things we acquire the ſtill more general or partial, Idea of *Being* or *Subſtance*. When any one of theſe general Ideas is found in a particular thing it is called the *Eſſence* of that thing: *Eſſence* therefore is only that general abſtract Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that *ſort*, which ſort we ſignify by ſuch a general name as *Animal*, or *Matter*. So that the ſame Quality may be eſſential or not eſſential to any thing according as that thing is ranked under a different *ſort*.*

* See *Locke* B. III. C. vi. §. 4, 5, *&c.*

abovementioned properties continue both *under*, and *after* all theſe motions and mutations. Any ſen-

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In the ſame way that we make General Ideas of Subſtances we alſo conſider ſingle *Properties*, *Modes* and *Relations*, *viz.* by ſeparating them from all other Properties, *&c.* with which they are found in Nature, or from all particular Subjects in which they inhere, and leaving only ſo much as remains in common, and includes, or may be affirmed of every Property, *&c.* of that kind: Thus obſerving that all Bodies agree in being *extended*, as well as ſolid, though they differ never ſo much in magnitude and figure, we take the former of theſe Properties apart from the latter, as alſo from any particular Magnitude or Shape, and call it *Extenſion* in the abſtract; which being thus made general it will comprehend all particular Extenſions, and may be enlarged every way and amplified *in infinitum*: We can conceive it as exiſting beyond the limits of Body, and by adding the confuſed Idea of a *Subſtratum* to it, it will become independent and ſerve both as a common *meaſure* and a common *Receptacle* for all Bodies, which probably conſtitutes our Idea of *Space*. See *Notes* 3 and 9. In the ſame manner we form an Univerſal *Mode*, *v. g.* Obſerving a train of Ideas ſucceeding one another in our minds at certain diſtances, and being conſcious that we our ſelves exiſt while we receive them, or that our own exiſtence is commenſurate to this ſucceſſion, we get the Idea of *continuing*. Obſerving alſo that ſeveral other things *continue* as well as ourſelves, we find that the ſame affection belongs to them; but it being an endleſs work to form as many diſtinct Ideas of this kind as there are things that thus continue, we abſtract from particular Exiſtences and make one general Idea of *Continuance*, which ſerves for all; and this is *Duration*.

The Parts or Periods of this common Duration we call *Time*; and every thing which is commenſurate to them is meaſured by it, and ſaid to exiſt in it, after the ſame manner as was obſerved before of Space.

Mix'd Modes and *Relations* are Combinations of Ideas of different kinds voluntarily put together and connected by their names. Such as *Goodneſs*, *Gratitude*; *Identity*, *Neceſſity*, &c. Theſe are apparently the work of the Mind, and though many of them have a real foundation in Nature, and may be found by obſervation in the concrete, yet they are generally got before from information or invention, abſtracted from particular Subjects, and lodged in the mind with general names annexed to them, according as the circumſtances of perſons and conveniencies of Life require. See *Locke*, B. III. C. iii.

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ſenſible Object, however changed, is always *extended, moveable, conſiſting* of *ſolid, diſtinct* and *diviſible parts.*

VI.

NOTES.

I have been the longer on this Subject of *Abſtract Ideas*, ſince notwithſtanding what Mr. *Locke* has hinted, the nature of 'em ſeems to be but little underſtood, otherwiſe we ſhould never hear of our Ideas of *Infinity*, of *Space, Duration, Number*, &c. requiring an external *Ideatum* or *objective* reality; — of their being real Attributes and neceſſarily inferring the Exiſtence of ſome immenſe and eternal Being; — whereas all univerſals, or abſtract Ideas, ſuch as theſe evidently are, (See Dr. *Clarke*'s Anſwer to the 4th letter) exiſt under that *formality* no where but in the Mind, neither have they any other foundation, nor can they be a proof of any thing, beſide that power which the mind has to form them.

If the nature of *Mix'd Modes* and *Relations* were ſufficiently attended to, I believe it would not be aſſerted that our Ideas of perfect Goodneſs, Wiſdom, Power, *&c.* are all inadequate and only negative: — that all our knowledge of theſe Perfections is improper, indirect, and only *analogical*, ——— and that the whole kind, nature, Eſſence and Idea of them is entirely different when applied to God from what it is when predicated of his Creatures. Whereas theſe being arbitrary combinations of Ideas made without regard to any particular Subject in which they may inhere, they are evidently their own Archetypes and therefore cannot but be *adequate* and *poſitive:* They are what they are immutably and univerſally; their *Natures* and *Eſſences* muſt be the ſame wherever they are found, or to whatſoever ſubject we apply them, ſo long as the ſame number of Ideas are included under the ſame word; and nothing more is requiſite than that the Ideas thus put together be conſiſtent to make all our knowledge concerning them, *real, proper, direct, adequate* and *univerſal.* See *Locke*, B. IV. C. iv. §. 5, 6. *&c.*

I ſhall trouble the Reader no farther on this Head than only to obſerve that the method of forming general Ideas (which our Author had advanced in his firſt Note, and which is ſince uſed by the Author of *Procedure*, &c.) by making the Idea of one Individual ſtand for the whole Species, muſt be wrong on this very account, *viz.* that according to the forementioned ſcheme *Univerſals*, ſuch as *Animal* or *Matter* would have a real Exiſtence in the ſame preciſe manner in which we conſider them; whereas under ſuch Preciſions they are confeſſedly the creatures of our own Minds and exiſt no where elſe. We have nothing at all to do therefore with *Analogy* in forming *Abſtract Ideas*, we can never come at them by ſubſtituting one particu-

That this Definition does not reach the *Idea* of matter, but only ſhews us the *Mark* to diſtinguiſh it by.

VI. Not that this is a Definition, or *Idea**(2.) of *Matter*, any more than the former was of *Subſtance*, but that hereby we are acquainted with its preſence, and diſtinguiſh it from every other thing; as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other Circumſtances: Nor is it neceſſary that theſe ſhould be applicable to all *Subſtance*, at all times, and to that alone: For it is enough if for this particular Time and occaſion we know the particular *Subſtance* we are talking of by them; and ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from other things.

How we come to the knowledge of *Space*.

VII. It is to be obſerved farther, that when a part of this matter is removed another ſucceeds into its Place, but is not in the ſame Place conſiſtent with it. *Place* therefore ſeems to be ſomething beyond, beſide and diſtinct from the *Matter* which it receives. For as from hence that Wax was ſucceſſively capable of different forms, figures, colours and changes, it appears that ſomething is in it beſide, and different from all theſe, which we call the *Matter* of the Wax: So in like manner from hence that the ſame *Place* or *Space* receives more

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lar for the reſt; but on the contrary muſt conceive them by removing all particularities of Exiſtence and leaving only what remains in common, as explained above. See *Locke*, B. III. C. iii. §. 7, 8, 9. or *Watts*'s Logic, Part I. C. iii. §. 3. or the words *Abſtraction* and *General* in *Chambers*'s Dictionary.

(2.) Our Author confines this word *Idea* to the ſenſe in which it was firſt uſed by *Plato*, viz. as an Image or Repreſentation of the ſuppoſed *Eſſence* of things; in which ſenſe it was attributed peculiarly to God, who was ſaid to perceive things immediately by their *Eſſences*, whereas we only know them by certain *Marks* or *Characters*, or by *Analogy*.

Our Author had endeavoured to explain this in his Note upon the place; which is omitted as we apprehend it to be much better explained and more conveniently applied by Mr. *Locke*, who makes the word *Idea* ſtand for every thing about which the Mind is converſant, or which can be the object of Perception, Thought or Underſtanding; In which large ſenſe we have an Idea of *Matter* or Body, as well as of *Subſtance*, or of *Space*.

(3)

more and different Bodies and Particles of matter ſucceſſively, but cannot admit more than one at the ſame time, it will appear that *Place* or *Space*, is as diſtinct from *Matter* or Body as Wax is from the Colours ſucceſſively received, and does not depend on them any more than Wax does on any particular Form.

What it is.

VIII. If therefore we ſet aſide, or annihilate *Matter*, whatſoever ſtill remains will all belong to the nature of *Space*; as in the former caſe when we had ſet aſide the Properties of *Wax*, that which belonged to the *Matter* or ſubſtance of it remained. If you aſk what that is? I anſwer, firſt *Local* Mobility is to be ſet aſide, for that ſeems peculiar to Matter. Secondly, an actual *ſeparation* of Parts, for what is immoveable cannot be divided. Thirdly, *Impenetrability*, or Solidity; for that ſuppoſes Motion and is neceſſary to the Production of it. It remains therefore that *Space* (as we conceive it) be ſomething extended immoveable, capable of *receiving* or *containing* Matter, and penetrable by it. Though therefore we have not a *Definition* or *Idea* of *Space*, properly ſo called; yet we can hereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from every other thing, and may reaſon about it as much as we have occaſion.

These three Conceptions, *viz.* of ſenſible Qualities (v. g. Motion, &c. of *Matter* and *Space*, ſeem to be the chief of thoſe that are external.

IX. Theſe three conceptions, namely, of ſenſible Qualities (viz. *Motion*, &c.) of *Matter* and *Space*, ſeem to be the chief of thoſe which we have from without, and ſo natural to us that there is no reaſonable Man but perceives them in himſelf. There are ſome who deny that Space is any thing diſtinct from *Matter*, nor is it much to our purpoſe whether it be or no: Yet we cannot without offering Violence to our Underſtandings, deny but that the *Conception* of *Space* is diſtinct from the conception of *Matter*. (3.)

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(3.) Though ſo much noiſe has been made about *Space*, (which *Leibnitz* juſtly calls an Idol of ſome modern *Engliſh Men*;) and ſo great uſe made of it in demonſtrating the divine Attributes,

SECT. II.

Of the Enquiry after the Firſt Cauſe.

An enquiry concerning Motion, Matter, and Space: whether they exiſt of themſelves.

I. SUppoſing theſe three, viz. *Motion*, *Matter*, and *Space*, we are in the next place to examine whether they be of themſelves, or of ſomething

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Attributes, in a way which ſome ſtile *a priori*; yet, I am forc'd to confeſs that I cannot poſſibly frame any other Notion of it, than either, firſt, as the mere *negation* or *abſence* of *Matter*, or ſecondly, as the extenſion of *Body*, conſider'd abſtractly or ſeparate from any particular Body; or thirdly, as a *Subject* or *Subſtratum* of that ſame *general extenſion*, for which laſt Notion ſee N. 9.

Now according to the firſt Suppoſition we may indeed have a *poſitive Idea* of it, as well as of *Silence*, *Darkneſs*, and many other Privations; as Mr. *Locke* has fully proved that we have, and ſhewn the Reaſon of it, B. III. c. viii. §. 4. But to argue from ſuch an Idea of Space, that Space itſelf is ſomething external, and has a real exiſtence, ſeems altogether as good Senſe as to ſay, that becauſe we have a different Idea of *Darkneſs* from that of *Light*; of *ſilence* from that of *ſound*; of the *abſence* of any thing, from that of its *preſence*; therefore Darkneſs, &c. muſt be ſomething poſitive and different from Light, &c. and have as real an Exiſtence as Light has; And to deny that we have any poſitive Idea, or, which is the very ſame, any Idea at all, of the Privations above-mention'd (For every Idea, as it is a perception of the Mind, muſt neceſſarily be poſitive, though it ariſe from what Mr. *Locke* calls a privative Cauſe) to deny, I ſay, that we have theſe Ideas, will be to deny Experience and contradict common Senſe. There are therefore Ideas, and *ſimple* ones too, which have nothing *ad extra* correſpondent to them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or objective Reality, and I don't ſee why that of *Space* may not be reckon'd one of them. To ſay that *Space* muſt have exiſtence, becauſe it has ſome *Properties*, for inſtance, *Penetrability*, or a *capacity* of receiving Body, ſeems to me the ſame as to urge that *darkneſs* muſt be *ſomething* becauſe it has the power or property of *receiving Light*; *Silence* the property of *admitting Sound*; and *Abſence* the property of being ſupply'd by *Preſence*, i. e. to aſſign abſolute Negations, and ſuch as by the ſame way of reaſoning may be apply'd to *Nothing*, and then call them poſitive properties; and ſo infer that the *Chimera* thus cloathed with them muſt needs be *ſomething*. Setting aſide the names

of

thing elſe? If they exiſt of themſelves, the Enquiry is at an End. For thoſe things that exiſt by *Nature* are cauſes of *Exiſtence* to themſelves, *i. e.* do not ſtand

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of its other pretended properties (which names alſo are as merely negative as the ſuppoſed properties to which they belong) thoſe that attribute *extenſion* to ſpace ſeem not to attend to the true notion of that Property, which, as the Schoolmen define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give us a better) is to have *partes extra partes*, and as ſuch, *i. e.* as including *Parts* (which parts, as they differ in ſituation from each other, may have things predicated of ſome of them different from thoſe which can be predicated of others) it appears plainly inconſiſtent with their own Idea of what they call ſimple, uniform, indiviſible ſpace. and is applicable to *Body* only. And to attribute Extenſion or Parts to ſpace, according to the firſt notion of it laid down by us, will be the ſame as to talk of the extenſion or parts of *Abſence, of Privation*, or of *mere Nothing*. Laſtly, to aſk if Space under the ſecond Notion of that word, (*i. e.* as Extenſion in the Abſtract) be extended or have parts, is apparently abſurd; it is the ſame with that noted Queſtion of the Man, who being told that to have Riches, was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then themſelves were Rich?

Well then, according to the firſt Suppoſition, Space will be mere *non entity*, or nothing, *i. e.* nothing can be affirm'd, but every thing denied of it: According to the ſecond, it will be only an *abſtract Idea* form'd in the mind from a property peculiar to matter, which property abſtracted in Idea cannot itſelf admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the *Divine Nature*, nor capable of poſitive *Infinity* in any reſpect. As to the laſt, 'If *Space*, ſays Dr. *Cudworth*, be concluded 'to be nothing elſe but the *extenſion* and *diſtance* of *Body*, or 'matter conſider'd in *general* (without reſpect to this or that 'particular body) and *abſtractly* in order to the Conception of 'Motion and the menſuration of things, then do we ſay that 'there appeareth no ſufficient grounds for this *poſitive Infinity* 'of Space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the 'World, or any figurate Body, never ſo great, it is not im-'poſſible but that it might ſtill be greater and greater without 'end. Which *indefinite increaſableneſs* of Body and Space ſeems to be miſtaken for a *poſitive infinity* thereof. Where-'as for this very Reaſon, becauſe it can never be ſo *great*, but 'that *more* magnitude may ſtill be added to it, therefore it can 'never be poſitively Infinite.

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ſtand in need of any *external cauſe*; if they depend on ſomething elſe, there will be a queſtion about that alſo, what it is, and what are its properties.

II. We

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'To conclude therefore, by Space without the finite World, 'is to be underſtood nothing but the poſſibility of Body farther 'and farther without end, yet ſo as never to reach to Infinity.*

Hence appears the weakneſs of that common Argument urg'd by *Gaſſendus*, Dr. *Clarke*, and *Raphſon*, for the *abſolute Infinity of Space*, viz. From the impoſſibility of ſetting *bounds* or *limits* to it: ſince that, ſay they, would be to ſuppoſe *Space* bounded by *ſomething* which *itſelf* occupies Space, or elſe by *nothing* both which are contradictions.

Which Argument either firſt of all ſuppoſes that Space is really ſome *thing*, or ſome poſitive Quality; which wants to be proved. Or elſe improperly applies bounds and bounders, to mere non-entity, or bare poſſibility; which has nothing to do with the Idea of Bounds.

If therefore we take Space in the firſt Notion laid down, then its unboundedneſs will (as Dr. *Cudworth* ſays) ſignify nothing but the poſſibility of Body farther and farther without end; according to which Senſe, let us ſtate their uſual Queſtion in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of it will appear. What is there, ſay they, *beyond* this Space? You muſt imagine more ſuch Space, or *nothing*. What is there ſay we, *beyond* this *poſſibility* of *Exiſtence?* You muſt either imagine *more* ſuch *poſſibility* of *Exiſtence*, or mere *nothing*, i. e. *non Exiſtence*. What Conſequence can poſſibly be drawn from ſuch an odd kind of Argumentation?

But if Space be taken in the ſecond Senſe, *i. e.* as Extenſion in *abſtracto*, then the meaning of our *not being able to ſet bounds to it* will only be, that we have a power of enlarging our abſtract Idea *in Infinitum*, or that we always find in our ſelves the ſame ability to add to, or repeat it; and if we always find that we can add, we ſhall never find that we cannot add, which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subject ‡ obſerves) is all the Myſtery of the Matter, and all that can be underſtood by infinite Space.

But it is farther urg'd that there muſt be ſomething more in the preſent Caſe; for *we find not only a Power of enlarging the* Idea, *but find it impoſſible to ſet bounds to the* thing; *whereas, we can enlarge the Idea of Matter to Infinity, and can alſo ſet bounds to the thing itſelf.* In anſwer to the firſt part of this Objection it is aſk'd, What thing, I pray you, but the thing in your own mind, that is, the Idea? Prove it to be a thing and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to ſay the

* True Intell. Syſt. P. 644 & 766. ‡ Dr. *Waterland* MS.

• II. •We muſt preſume that all our conceptions of ſimple Objects without us are true, *i. e.* repreſent the

We are to form our Judgment of things whether they exiſt of themſelves, or require a Cauſe from our ſimple Conceptions when there is no ground to ſuſpect a Fallacy.

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the thing is infinite or boundleſs, before you have prov'd it to exiſt, or to be a Thing, is too large a ſtep to take. The above-mention'd excellent Writer ſolves the Difficulty ariſing from the ſecond part of the Objection by another parallel Caſe, ‘ When I conſider the number of the Stars, I can go numbering ‘ on in my thoughts ſtill more and more Stars *in Infinitum*, but ‘ I can ſet bounds to them, can ſuppoſe number finite, but ‘ to number itſelf I can ſet no bounds. Yet what is Number? Nothing but an abſtract Idea, nothing *ad extra*, and to ‘ ſay that number is infinite, comes only to this, that we can ‘ ſet no bounds to our Faculty of Numbering, it being always ‘ as eaſy to add to a thouſand, or a Million, one more, *&c.* as ‘ to One. Well then, to ſet bounds to number in the abſtract, ‘ is to ſet bounds to the Faculty itſelf, and to deny that it is ‘ in my Power to add, when I plainly perceive that I can; and ‘ ſo is a direct Contradiction. But as to the number of Stars, ‘ or Hairs, or Men, or any thing, I can ſet bounds to that, ‘ without any contradiction, becauſe it ſtill leaves me in poſ‘ ſeſſion of the power of numbering, which I find I have; and ‘ which does not require any ſubject, *ad extra*, but may go on ‘ independent of any, and indifferent to all. Now to apply ‘ this to other caſes: The Mind finds in itſelf the faculty of en‘ larging and extending its Idea of extenſion. It can apply ‘ it to Matter, or can let it alone: Can ſuppoſe Matter infi‘ nitely expanded, or can ſet bounds to it. But to ſet bounds ‘ to all Extenſion, as well imaginary as real, is cramping the ‘ Faculty, is denying it the power of enlarging, which is al‘ ways preſent to the mind, and which ſhe can never loſe; ‘ and, in a word, is a contradiction. Any, either imagina‘ ry, or real Subject is ſufficient for the mind to exerciſe its ‘ Faculties upon; and ſo if you either ſuppoſe God or Matter, ‘ or Space to be infinitely extended, it is equally ſatisfied ‘ with any. All that ſhe requires, is, that ſhe may be able to ‘ enlarge the Idea of Extenſion. But if you take from her Ex‘ tenſion itſelf, that is the Idea of it, and the power of adding ‘ to it, you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny her a power ‘ which ſhe finds ſhe has. In a word, we can ſet bounds to ‘ any thing that ſtill leaves us the power of enlarging or ex‘ tending infinitely, as we find we always can: and if we ‘ would ſpeak ſtrictly, it is not *number* that is *infinite*, nor *ex‘ tenſion* infinite, which are nothing but *notions* abſtracted from ‘ things: But the mind of Man is able to proceed numbering ‘ or extending infinitely, that is, without ever coming to any ‘ Stop or Bounds. For to ſet Bounds is to deny and deſtroy the

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the things as God would have them known to us, except we elſewhere diſcover ſome *Fallacy* or *Prejudice*

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' Faculty itſelf: If it could not always do it, it could not ' do it at all: He that can add one to one, as often as he will ' can never find an end of numbering, nor he that can double ' an Inch as often as he will, find an end of enlarging; it is ' all nothing more than repeating one of the eaſieſt operations ' or exerciſes of the Mind, and it will always be a contradic- ' tion for any rational Mind to want it. The Caſe being ' plainly thus, I think it ſhould not be aſk'd, why a Man can- ' not ſet bounds to Number or Extenſion, but how he comes ' to have the Faculty of counting and repeating, which is real- ' ly tantamount to the other, and what it ultimately reſolves ' into. And then, I ſuppoſe, the Anſwer is very eaſy, and ' we need not go to the utmoſt Limits of the World to enable ' us to reſolve the Riddle.

' I cannot but ſmile to obſerve how groſly we are often im- ' poſed upon by Words ſtanding for abſtract Ideas, for want ' of conſidering how, and upon what Occaſions, theſe abſtract ' Ideas were invented for the help of weak and narrow Con- ' ceptions, and have been uſed ſo long till they are thought to ' ſtand for real Things.

This, I think, is a ſolid and ample confutation of the Argument drawn from the *Idea* of *Space* and its imaginary *Infinity*. We ſhall only add a Word or two to ſhew that *Duration*, (as well as *Space*,) *Number*, and all *Quantity*; any thing which can be conſidered only by way of parts, or in Succeſſion; is abſolutely repugnant to, or incapable of true poſitive infinity in any reſpect. Now by a poſitive, or *Metaphyſical Infinite* we always mean that which is abſolutely *Perfect* in its kind, which cannot admit of *Addition*, or *Increaſe*. It is an Idea of a certain Quality in the *Abſtract*, which has no mixture of the contrary Quality in it, no *failure* or *defect*; and which therefore is our *Standard* to which we always refer, and by which we try all imperfections, all mix'd or finite Qualities, which are for this reaſon call'd imperfect, becauſe they fall ſhort of our original Standard, and are properly *negations* of it: Conſequently our Idea of *Perfection* muſt be a poſitive one, and prior to that of *Imperfection*; as will appear from *Cudworth* cited in *Remark* l. where the Reader may find a full account of this poſitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea of it and are able to diſtinguiſh it from that negative one explain'd by Mr. *Locke*, which is frequently confounded with it. To return,

If then a Metaphyſical Infinite means *perfect*, or *that to which nothing can be added*, it is plain that Duration, Number, and all Quantity, the very Nature and Idea of which includes per-

judice, adhering to them. For we can judge of things no otherwiſe than from our Conceptions. Nor

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perpetual *Increaſableneſs* or *Addibility* muſt be eſſentially incapable of this abſolute or poſitive Infinity, in like manner as *Cudworth* has ſhewn of Space and Body in the Paſſage referr'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an *Infinite Series*, and take a view of the manifold Abſurdities which accompany it in any manner of conception, (from which abſurdities we draw our only proof of a *firſt Cauſe*, or *God*) we ſhall be neceſſarily led to exclude from Infinity all ſuch things as exiſt *ſeriatim*, or muſt be conceiv'd as conſiſting in and compoſed of *ſucceſſive parts*, *i. e.* ſuch a *Duration*, *Number*, *Space*, *Motion*, *Magnitude*, *&c.* all which, when ſaid to be infinite, are nothing but ſo many *infinite Series*, and therefore liable to the ſame abſurdities; as the abovemention'd Author has demonſtrated of them all together, *Intell. Syſt.* p. 642, *&c.* and of *Motion* in particular, *p.* 843. The ſame is ſhewn of Duration or Time, by Dr. *Bentley*, *Boyle's Lect. Serm.* 3. or by Sir *M. Hale*, *Primitive Origination of Mankind*, §. 1. c. iv. or Biſhop *Stillingfleet. Origines Sacrae*, B. III. c. i. prop. 7, 8. See alſo the confutation of an *Infinite Series* of ſucceſſive Beings in the beginning of Note 10. and Rem. b.* The like is ſhewn of *Number* and all *Quantity*, by the Author of the *Impartial Enquiry into the Nature and Exiſtence of God*, p. 24, *&c.*

'If any Number be abſolutely or infinitely great, it can be 'for no other reaſon than becauſe it is abſolutely or in its very 'nature incapable of increaſe without an abſolute contradic- 'tion. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the con- 'trary a neceſſity of the encreaſe of its Greatneſs on the ſup- 'poſition of the leaſt addition: For ſince no Quantity is more 'or leſs *ſuch*, or poſſeſſes more or leſs of the nature of Quan- 'tity, than another, it follows that all Quantities being of the 'ſame general Nature muſt ſeverally bear a proportion to each 'other. For example, that can be no Unit which by the ad- 'dition of an Unit will not become two: and by parity of 'reaſon, that is no Million which by the addition of a ſingle 'Unit will not increaſe to the greatneſs of a Million and an 'Unit. For if it be but a Million after the Addition of an 'Unit, it is plain, it muſt before that Addition have been 'leſs than a Million by an Unit.——The like may be ſaid 'of all other Quantities, *p.* 25.

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* How this is conſiſtent with the *Eternity* of God, and what the true meaning of that Attribute is, See Note 10. Rem. c. or Dr. *Bentley's Boyle's* Lect. Serm. 3d.

Nor are we to ſeek for any other *Criterion of Truth* than that a Conception of any thing offered to the Mind

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The learned Dr. *Clarke* endeavours to evade theſe Arguments about *Parts*, &c. by denying that any Number of Years, Days, and Hours: or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, 'can be conſidered 'as any *aliquot*, or *conſtituent* parts of infinite *Time* or *Space*, or 'be compared at all with it, or bear any kind of proportion to 'it, or be the foundation of any Argument in any Queſtion 'concerning it.' *Demonſtr. of Div. Attr.* p. 37, 38. 5th Edit. But does not this look ſomething like avoiding one great difficulty by admitting a greater? For how do we come at our confuſed Idea of infinite Quantity but by firſt having a clear Idea of ſome certain part of that Quantity; in *Space*, for inſtance, of ſuch a ſtated Length as a *Foot*; in *Time*, of an *Hour*, and then by doubling, trebling, or any way multiplying that ſame Idea as long as we pleaſe, and ſtill finding as much room for or poſſibility of multiplying it as we did when we began? See *Locke* B. II. c. xvii. §. 3. But does this Idea of Infinite (which ſeems to be the only one the Doctor ever thought of) when applied to *Time* or *Space*, alter the very *nature*, *eſſence*, and *idea* of that *Time* and *Space*? Do not we ſtill conſider it as an infinity of the *ſame* Time and Space; or as conſiſting in a continual *addibility* of *ſuch* portions of Time and Space; or as a *Whole* made up of numberleſs ſuch parts of time and ſpace as are of the ſame kind with theſe hours and feet? To ſay that infinite Space has no parts, is as *Leibnitz* urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. *Clarke*, No. XI. p. 99.) 'to ſay that it does not 'conſiſt of finite Spaces; and that infinite Space might ſubſiſt, 'though all finite ſpaces ſhould be reduced to nothing. It is 'as if one ſhould ſay, in the *Carteſian* ſuppoſition of a material, 'extended, unlimited World, that ſuch a World might ſubſiſt, 'though all the Bodies of which it conſiſts, ſhould be reduced 'to nothing*'. It is therefore impoſſible to conceive that hours and feet, *&c.* ſhould not be *aliquot parts* of infinite Time and Space, and that theſe parts ſhould not bear ſome kind of Proportion to this Infinity. Theſe parts indeed will never reach our *poſitive*, *abſolute Infinite* (i. e. that to which nothing can poſſibly be *added*) becauſe they include a perpetual addibility, as we obſerved, which is called their *Infinity*, and which is a direct contradiction to what we call a poſitive Infinite: And therefore poſitive Infinity applied to them is falſly applied, and a poſitive infinity of Matter, Number, Time, Space, or any quantity that conſiſts of parts, or muſt be conſidered in ſucceſſion?

i. e.

* See this plea fully confuted by Mr. *Colliber*, Impartial Enquiry into the Exiſtence and Nature of God. B. II. C. ii. p. 157, &c.

Mind forcibly extorts Aſſent; as there is no other Criterion of Objects perceived by the Senſes, than that an Object, by its Preſence forces us to perceive it even

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i. e. to which this negative infinite, and this only, is and muſt be apply'd, are all contradictions. Now inſtead of anſwering this Argument againſt the abſolute Infinity of Time and Space, Dr. *Clarke* firſt of all *ſuppoſes* that *Time* and *Space* are abſolutely infinite, and then becauſe, according to this our way of conceiving Infinity (which yet is the only way we have of conceiving it in theſe things) they could not poſſibly be infinite, he argues that we muſt not conſider them in this way, namely as if their *parts* had any relation at all to their *Infinity*. But ſhould not the Argument rather be revers'd, and the conſequence of it ſtand thus? This is our only way of conceiving any infinite applicable to theſe Things, but this way we cannot conceive theſe to be poſitively infinite (or poſitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to theſe) without a contradiction; therefore we cannot at all conceive theſe to be poſitively infinite without a contradiction, or therefore theſe are not poſitively infinite.

There is indeed a certain uſe of the term *infinite* among Mathematicians, where this reaſoning of Dr. *Clarke*'s might be admitted, but that is only where they conſider Quantities relatively, and not abſolutely, and therefore that can have no place where we are conſidering real Exiſtences. Thus when Geometricians ſay that one Quantity is infinitely leſs than another, they mean that their infinitely ſmall Quantity is no *aliquot* part of, bears no proportion to, or cannot be compared with the other; but proportion is (nothing real but) purely relative, and therefore the term infinite apply'd here muſt be ſo too. Thus for inſtance, the Angle of Contact made by a Curve and its Tangent is infinitely leſs than any rectilinear Angle, *i. e.* bears no Proportion to it, is no Meaſure of it, or cannot any ways be compared with it. But this is nothing to Infinity in the Senſe in which Dr. *Clarke* has uſed it; ſince by that he muſt mean ſome determinate thing, ſomething of which real Exiſtence may be predicated, which is very different from Infinity in a relative Senſe, as it is ſometimes conſidered by Mathematicians; or in a progreſſive and indefinite one, which is the Senſe in which it is applied to Quantities increaſing or decreaſing without End; and therefore what relates to theſe Infinites cannot be the Foundation of any Argument concerning the other. The equivocal Uſe of the Word *Infinite* in theſe different Senſes by jumbling Mathematics and Metaphyſics together has, I believe, occaſion'd moſt of the Confuſion attending Subjects of this Kind.

even againſt our Wills. If therefore the Conceptions, which we have of theſe three before mentioned, repreſent them to us as exiſting *neceſſarily*, ſo that they cannot be ſeparated from Exiſtence even in Thought, we muſt affirm that theſe exiſt of *themſelves*, and require no *Cauſe* of their *Exiſtence*. But if we can conceive theſe once not to have been, to have begun to be, or to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that *Neceſſary Exiſtence* belongs not to them, nor are they of themſelves; they muſt therefore have their Being from ſomething elſe. For, ſince they may either exiſt or not exiſt, Exiſtence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature, they muſt have it from without; and there wants a Cauſe by which this Indifference to or Poſſibility of either Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence, may be determin'd. Nor do we judge a Cauſe in things to be otherwiſe neceſſary than as they are in their own Nature *indifferent*, that is, *paſſive* in regard to Exiſtence. For, if our Conceptions repreſent ſomething to us as neceſſary in its own Nature, we enquire no farther about the Cauſe whereby it exiſts. (4).

III. If

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(4.) The Sum of what our Author is here endeavouring to prove is that neither *Matter* nor *Motion* (and he will ſhew the ſame by and by of *Space*) can be independent or ſelf-exiſtent, and conſequently that they require ſome cauſe of their Exiſtence diſtinct from and antecedent to themſelves. And tho' he frequently makes uſe of that confuſed equivocal Term, *neceſſary Exiſtence*, yet he ſeems to apply it only in a negative ſenſe for *Self-Exiſtence* or *Exiſtence without Cauſe*, which is as much as his Argument requires. For where any thing appears to be an effect, as Matter and Motion do, we muſt require a Cauſe; where no ſuch *Cauſedneſs* can be diſcovered, we call the Thing *Self-exiſtent*, tho' perhaps it really be not ſo, but might proceed from ſomething elſe; and where an abſurdity would follow from ſuppoſing any Thing not to have exiſted once, or not to exiſt for the future, we ſay there's a *neceſſity* for ſuppoſing that it did and will always exiſt; or we ſtile that Being *neceſſarily Exiſtent:* which is perhaps as far as we can go. But as theſe Words, *Neceſſary Exiſtence* ſeem to have

III. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the Things in queſtion, it will appear whether they be ſelf-exiſtent, or require a Cauſe. In the firſt Place let us examine *Motion*, which is really *Action*, but in all Action it is neceſſary, if we may truſt our Thoughts, that there be an *Agent* and a *Patient*, without theſe we have no Notion of Action. In *Motion* therefore, ſince that is Action, there is required an *Agent* and a *Patient*. We have indeed the Patient, namely *Matter*; We muſt in the next Place ſee what is the Agent: *viz.* Whether Matter produces Motion in itſelf; or (to ſpeak properly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, and neceſſarily adhering to its Eſſence, as Figure is to Body. But if we remember what was laid down above, and carefully examine the Sentiments and

'Tis proved that *Motion* requires a Cauſe, tho' it be ſuppoſed eternal; and that Matter is not the Cauſe of it.

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have been taken to denote ſome *poſitive, extrinſic Principle* of Exiſtence; and which accordingly is often ſtiled *antecedent, abſolute, original Neceſſity*; a *Neceſſity ſimple, and uniform, and abſolutely ſuch in its own nature, in itſelf*, &c. It may be of ſome uſe to conſider the ſeveral Things to which theſe Terms are apply'd, and what Ideas we fix to them; which will perhaps convince us that they are all merely *relative*.

Neceſſity is chiefly and primarily apply'd to *Means*; and when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has *Relation* to ſome *End* to be attain'd by thoſe *Means* of which it's affirm'd. Thus, when we ſay ſuch a thing is neceſſary, we mean that ſome *End* cannot be attain'd without the Exiſtence of that thing. Thus Religion is *neceſſary* to a Rational Creature, or more properly, to the Happineſs of a Rational Creature, *i. e.* a Rational Creature cannot attain Happineſs, its ultimate End, without Religion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idea, whatever is affirm'd of Means *as Means*, muſt be Relative alſo; or which is much the ſame, muſt be an Affection of a Relative Idea, v. g. When we ſay, any Action is *Good, Fit, Right, Reaſonable*, &c. all theſe Terms are or ſhould be apply'd to it, as it is conceiv'd to be a Means to ſome End, and conſequently are relative; therefore to call any Action *fit*, &c. *in itſelf*, will be the ſame as to call any thing to be *relative in itſelf*, which is nonſenſe.

Neceſſity is alſo applied to *Truth*, and then it has relation to ſome other Truths, either antecedent or conſequential, according to the different manner in which that Truth is

and Conceptions of our Minds, it will appear that the Nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is indifferent to *Motion*, or *Reſt*, and moves not except it be moved. Motion therefore does not follow from its Nature, nor is it contained in its Eſſence, nor do we conceive it to ariſe from thence: Matter is therefore merely paſſive in regard to Motion, and an Agent muſt be ſought elſewhere. If you ſay it has been in Motion from Eternity, you'll be

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proved to be *neceſſary*, *i. e.* according as the Proof is direct or indirect. When the Proof is direct, *i. e.* when the truth of any Propoſition is ſhewn to follow by unavoidable Conſequence from ſome other truth before known; then the *Neceſſity* of that Truth ariſes from the Relation which it has to ſome antecedent Truth: When the Proof is indirect, *i. e.* when the Truth of any Propoſition is ſhewn, by ſhewing that the Suppoſition of the contrary to that Truth, *i. e.* the denying that, would imply the Negation of, or be inconſiſtent with ſome other known Truth; then the Neceſſity of that Truth ariſes from the Relation which it has to ſome conſequential Truth. *Neceſſity* is alſo applied to Axioms; and then it has Relation to the Terms themſelves, *i. e.* it ariſes from the Relation which is between the terms, and means that ſuppoſing or laying down thoſe Terms, that Relation or Connection between them cannot but be. Farther, the ſame may be ſaid of *Truth*, as of *Means*, Truth being relative alſo; conſequently ſuch Phraſes as theſe, *true* or *falſe in itſelf*, a *Contradiction in itſelf*; or *abſolutely ſuch*, &c. are very abſurd ones.

Neceſſity is alſo applied to Exiſtence, and then it ariſes either from the relation which the Exiſtence of that thing of which it is affirmed has to the Exiſtence of *other things*; or from the Relation which the Exiſtence of that thing has to the *Manner* of *its own* Exiſtence. In the former Signification, when Neceſſity of Exiſtence has Relation to the Exiſtence of other things, it denotes that the Suppoſition of the Non-exiſtence of that thing of which Neceſſity is affirmed, implies the Non-exiſtence of things which we know to exiſt. Thus ſome independent Being does *neceſſarily exiſt*. Becauſe to ſuppoſe no independent Being implies *that there are no dependent Beings*, the contrary of which we know to be true; ſo that Neceſſity of Exiſtence in this Senſe, is nothing elſe but Neceſſity of Truth as related to Conſequential Truth. And this ſort of Proof is called *Demonſtratio a poſteriori*.

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be never the nearer; for Duration alters not the Nature of Things. If it has moved from Eternity, it has had an eternal Cauſe; and ſince Matter is only paſſive with reſpect to the Motion which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ſtill *paſſive only*, and there wanted an eternal Agent to produce eternal Motion (5) in it: For eternal Action cannot be more

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When the Neceſſity of Exiſtence ariſes from the Relation which the Exiſtence of any thing has to the *Manner* of its own Exiſtence, then Neceſſity means that that thing of which it is affirm'd exiſts after ſuch a Manner that it never could have not exiſted. Thus every *Independent Being*, or every being exiſting without a Cauſe, is neceſſarily exiſting. Becauſe ſuch a Being from the *very manner* of its exiſting, could not begin to exiſt, therefore muſt always have exiſted, *i. e.* does neceſſarily exiſt. For to ſuppoſe a Being to *begin* to exiſt, is to ſuppoſe a *Mutation*, *viz.* from Non-entity to Entity; and to ſuppoſe a *Mutation* is to ſuppoſe a *Cauſe*; For if there's no Cauſe, every thing muſt continue as it was. Therefore every Being which had no *Cauſe* of Exiſtence, *i. e.* which is independent, cannot begin to exiſt, conſequently cannot be ſuppoſed not to exiſt, *i. e.* is *neceſſarily* exiſtent. This ſome call *Demonſtratio a Priori.*

Neceſſity as applied to Exiſtence in theſe two Ways, muſt carefully be diſtinguiſhed. For tho' an independent Being cannot be neceſſarily exiſtent in the former Senſe, without being ſo in the latter alſo; yet it may be neceſſarily exiſtent in the latter Senſe without being ſo in the former. There may be two or more neceſſarily exiſtent Beings in the latter Senſe, *i. e.* with regard to *Independence*, though in the former, *i. e.* in relation to this *Syſtem*, there can be but one neceſſarily exiſtent Being; which may ſerve to ſhew us the inconcluſiveneſs of Dr. *Clarke*'s ſeventh Propoſition. And upon the whole, I think we may be convinced that no Ideas can poſſibly be fixed to theſe terms, *Neceſſity abſolute in itſelf.* See alſo the latter Part of N. 10. and R. e.

(5.) Eternal Motion ſeems to be a Contradiction, [See infinite Series in N. 3. and *Colliber*'s Impartial Enquiry, *c.* 7. and Rem. b.] unleſs we could conceive two Eternals, one before the other; as every mover muſt, in the order of our Ideas, neceſſarily operate before the moved: Theſe things therefore which imply Beginning, Change, Succeſſion, or Increaſe, are finite as well in Duration, as in any other reſpect, and conſequently the Suppoſitions here and below are all impoſſible ones.

more eaſily conceived, without an eternal Agent, than temporary, without a temporal one. But you'll ſay, what is eternal, ſince it was never made, requires no Cauſe. Why ſo? Suppoſe the Sun to have ſhined from Eternity, and the Earth, nouriſhed by its Heat, to have undergone eternal Viciſſitudes of Seaſons; had thoſe Viciſſitudes therefore no cauſe? Would they be ever the leſs dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of Action does not exclude an active Cauſe, and it is ſo far from Truth that ſuch Action was never produced, becauſe it is conceived to have been from Eternity, that we muſt rather ſay it has always been produced. For in the Inſtance given it appears that the Sun did always, and from Eternity, cauſe the change of Seaſons: Not that I think the Sun really was, or could be eternal; but if Motion ſhould be ſuppoſed eternal (which is the only Subterfuge left to them that deny the Neceſſity of an Agent, in order to the Exiſtence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal with its Light and their Effects. And if this be granted, it will plainly appear, that *Eternity of Action* does not exclude an *Active Cauſe*. If then we follow the guidance of our Thoughts, we muſt acknowledge that there is ſomething beſide *Matter* and *Motion*, which muſt be the Cauſe of Motion.

That *Matter* requires a Cauſe of its exiſtence.

IV. Secondly, as to Matter itſelf, if we may ſuppoſe it to have had a Beginning, or to be annihilated, *neceſſary* Exiſtence will manifeſtly not be implied

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Of how little Importance that old Controverſy is, whether *Matter* be eternal, may be gathered from Note 1. which ſhews that there is properly no ſuch thing as *Matter*, diſtinct from Body, *i. e. a ſolid Subſtance every where the ſame*, which that Word denotes, and which is not to be found in that preciſe manner of Exiſtence. But if, with our Author, we take Matter for *Body* only, this as it undergoes perpetual Changes is in its very Nature incapable of Eternity by Remarks c. and d.

(6.) Theſe

implied in its Nature, for that may be taken from it, at leaſt in Thought; but a thing cannot be ſeparated from its Nature or Eſſence even by the Mind: If therefore Exiſtence were *eſſential* to Matter, it could not be divided from it even in Thought; that is, we could not conceive Matter not to exiſt. But who doubts whether he can do that? Is it not as eaſy to conceive that *Space* which the Material World occupies to be *empty*, that is, void of Matter, as *full?* Cannot the Underſtanding aſſign to the Material World a Beginning and an End? They who admit of *Space*, or a *Vacuum* (6.) cannot deny but Matter is at leaſt mentally

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(6.) Theſe two Words *Space* and *Vacuum*, tho' they ought perhaps to have both the ſame meaning, *i. e.* neither of them to mean any real thing or Quality exiſting in Nature, but only a Negation of Matter and its Qualities; yet as the former is more evidently a poſitive Term, it is apt to convey an Idea of ſomething poſitive, and thereby lead us to frame ſome imagination of that ſomething, and ſo at length draw us into a Notion quite different from that, which the latter Word more naturally offers, and which comes nearer to the Truth of the Caſe; and therefore it ſeems not quite ſo convenient to uſe theſe two Words promiſcuouſly. It may be doubted whether our ſubſtituting the former of theſe terms for the latter, when the Ideas uſually fixt to them have in reality little to do with one another, may not have given riſe to moſt of the Diſputes againſt a *Vacuum*, which have been carried on by many able Writers. *Vacuum*, in Natural Philoſophy, is (according to the true import of the Word) only *Emptineſs*, or abſence of Matter, *i. e.* a Term that implies mere Negation; tho' when we come to prove that Matter exiſts not every where, or that there is really any ſuch emptineſs or abſence of Matter, we are obliged, thro' the Defect of Language, to make uſe of poſitive Terms about it, *viz.* that there *is a Vacuum* in this or that Place, or that there is a real Foundation in Nature for ſuppoſing it. Hence, probably, Metaphyſicians, when they come to conſider it, being uſed to the Contemplation of abſtract Eſſences, are led to underſtand it as ſomething poſitive, which might properly be ſaid to *be here* and *there*, &c. Their next Step is to bring it under the *Imagination*, and ſo finding the Idea of Space or Extenſion in ſome Meaſure connected with this Emptineſs, they eaſily ſubſtitute one for the other, and often change

tally ſeparable from Exiſtence. For Space may be conceived either full or empty; that is, with Matter,

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change the negative Idea into a poſitive one, and define *Vacuum* to be *Extenſion void of Solidity*, or *Space without Body* ‡, whereas the Ideas of Vacuity and Extenſion have no real Connection with each other, as was ſaid before, tho' they be very apt to go together. Theſe two diſtinct Ideas then being both included under the Word *Vacuum*, it becomes equivocal, and conſequently that may be affirm'd or deny'd of it according to the one Idea, which cannot according to the other, and here is room for endleſs Juggle. *v. g.* It may be ſaid that there is a real Foundation in Nature for ſuppoſing a *Vacuum* in the negative Senſe of the Word, *i. e.* as ſignifying mere Emptineſs; bnt the ſame Thing may be denied of it in the poſitive *i. e.* as ſtanding for pure Extenſion, which is an *abſtract Idea* form'd by the Mind itſelf, and as ſuch has no Foundation any where elſe. Again, Philoſophers, who take a *Vacuum* for Space or Extenſion in the Abſtract, ſtiffly deny that there is a *Vacuum* in Nature, which is true indeed of abſolute Space, which exiſts only in the Mind, but is not ſo of Vacuity or abſence of Matter, which has as real a Foundation in Nature as Matter itſelf has; except we'll argue that it cannot be ſaid to *be* or to have *Exiſtence* predicated of it, becauſe it is only a Negation; which is playing upon and puzzling one another with Words. To illuſtrate what has been ſaid of the Diſputes about a *Vacuum*, I ſhall preſent the Reader with ſome Arguments brought againſt it by Mr. *Green* and *Bayle*; which may be of uſe to us ſo far as they overthrow the Reality of abſolute, ſimple Space, which they do effectually, tho' I take them to be mere Quibbles with regard to the End for which theſe Authors ſeem to have quoted them. They may ſerve alſo for another Inſtance of the great Confuſion cauſed by a jumble of Mathematics and Metaphyſics together: An Example of which was given before in the Word *Infinite*, N. 3.

"Extenſion into Length, Breadth and Thickneſs, or what "is called mere Space, or Diſtance, is a Quantity abſtracted "by the Mind, as all other Mathematical Quantities are; as "a Line, or Superficies; and can be no more imagin'd to "exiſt in Nature alone, than Length or Breadth can. A Line "is produced from the flowing of a Point; a Surface from "the flowing of a Line; and a Space or Mathematical Solid "from the flowing of a Surface: But it is owned that there "is no ſuch real Point, and conſequently no ſuch Line in "being, therefore no ſuch Surface. And what Reaſon can "there be aſſigned why we may not go on one Step farther, "and from the ſame Principles conclude there is no ſuch Solid.

"For

‡ *Locke* B. 2. C. 13. §. 22.

ter, or without it. The Notion therefore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repugnant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.

V.

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" For how is it poſſible for a Superficies which has not a Being, " and is imaginary and abſtracted, to produce an Effect which " is not equally ſo.

" We have ſaid, that Length, Breadth, and Thickneſs is " the Definition of imaginary Space; and it is likewiſe the " Notion we have of *Vacuum*, as to the Nature and Eſſence " of it; for the foreign Properties of Light, or Heat, or " Sound, *&c.* are not included in the Conceptions our Minds " have formed of Room to move in, or ſimple Space. If " therefore the Definition of imaginary Space and a *Vacuum*, " are the ſame, and a *Vacuum*, is real Space, it follows, that " real Space and imaginary are the ſame, which is a Contra- " diction. Since to abſtract any thing in the Mind from Be- " ings as they really exiſt, is not to conſider Beings as they " really exiſt.

" From this Idea of *Space*, being only an abſtracted one, it " is eaſy to give an Account of what *Place* is, namely, that it " is only a Portion of this abſtracted Space, we have menti- " oned, ſeparated from the reſt, and applied to that Body " which it conſiders as a Meaſure of its Capacity. Therefore " primary or abſolute Place alſo, as well as Space is a Crea- " ture of the Mind, and nothing really exiſting, as ſome Phi- " loſophers imagine. *Mr.* Green's *Principles of Natural Phi- " loſophy*, B. 1. C. 4, 8, 18.

" Let us rummage as much as we pleaſe into all the Re- " ceſſes of our Mind, we ſhall never find there an Idea of an " unmoveable, indiviſible, and penetrable Extenſion. And " yet if there is a *Vacuum*, there muſt exiſt an Extenſion eſ- " ſentially endued with theſe three Attributes. It is no ſmall " Difficulty to be forced to admit the Exiſtence of a Nature, " of which we have no Idea, and is beſides repugnant to the " cleareſt Ideas of our Mind. But there are a great many o- " ther Inconveniences which attend this. Is this *Vacuum*, or " immoveable, indiviſible, and penetrable Extenſion, a Sub- " ſtance or a Mode? It muſt be one of the two, for the ade- " quate Diviſion of Being comprehends but theſe two Mem- " bers. If it be a Mode, they muſt then define its Subſtance; " but that is what they can never do. If it be a Subſtance, I " aſk whether it be created or uncreated? If created, it may " periſh without the Matter, from which it is diſtinct, cea- " ſing to be. But it is abſurd and contradictory that a *Va- " cuum*, that is, a Space diſtinct from Bodies, ſhould be de- " ſtroyed, and yet that Bodies ſhould be diſtant from each " other,

That it is not neceſſarily exiſtent, as appears from the confeſſion of thoſe Perſons who ſuppoſe Space to be the Image of Body.

V. But whether there be any ſuch Thing as Space or no, we are certain that we have an *Idea* of it

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" other, as they may be after the Deſtruction of the *Vacuum*. But " if this Space diſtinct from Bodies is an uncreated Subſtance, " it will follow either that it is God, or that God is not the " only Subſtance which neceſſarily exiſts. Which Part ſo- " ever we take of this Alternative, we ſhall find our ſelves con- " founded. This laſt is a formal, and the other at leaſt a " material Impiety: For all Extenſion is compoſed of di- " ſtinct Parts, and conſequently ſeparable from each other; " whence it reſults, that if God was extended he would not " be a ſimple, immutable, and properly infinite Being, but a " Maſs of Beings, *Ens per aggregationem*, each of which would " be finite, though all of them together would be unlimited. " He would be like the Material World, which in the *Car-* " *teſian* Hypotheſis, is an infinite Extenſion. And as to thoſe " who ſhould pretend that God may be extended without be- " ing material or corporeal, and alledge as an Argument, his " Simplicity, you will find them ſolidly refuted in one of Mr. " *Arnauld*'s Books, from which I ſhall cite only theſe Words: " *So far is the Simplicity of God from allowing us Room to think* " *that he may be extended, that all Divines have acknowledged,* " *after* S^t. Thomas, *that it is a neceſſary Conſequence of the* " *Simplicity of God, not to be extended.* Will they ſay, with " the Schoolmen, that Space is no more than a Privation of " Body; that it hath no Reality, and that, properly ſpeak- " ing, a *Vacuum* is nothing? But this is ſuch an unreaſon- " able Aſſertion, that all the modern Philoſophers who de- " clare for a *Vacuum*, have laid it aſide, though never ſo con- " venient in other Reſpects. *Gaſſendus* carefully avoided any " Reliance on ſuch an abſurd Hypotheſis; but choſe rather " to plunge himſelf into the moſt hideous Abyſs of conjectur- " ing, that all Beings are not either Subſtances or Accidents, " and that all Subſtances are not either Spirits or Bodies, and " of placing the Extenſion of Space amongſt the Beings, which " are neither Corporeal nor Spiritual, neither Subſtance nor " Accidents.

" Mr. *Locke*, believing that he could not define what a *Va-* " *cuum* is hath yet given us clearly to underſtand, that he " took it for a poſitive Being. He had too clear a Head not " to diſcern, that nothingneſs cannot be extended in Length, " Breadth, and Depth. Mr. *Hartſœker* hath very clearly ap- " prehended this Truth. *There is no* Vacuity *in Nature* ſaith " he, *this ought to be acknowledged without Difficulty, becauſe* " *it is utterly contradictory to conceive a mere Non-entity, with* " *all the Properties which can only agree to a real Being.* But if " it

it though whence we had it, Philoſophers are not agreed. Thoſe that deny any Diſtinction between it

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" it is contradictory that Nothingneſs ſhould be endued with " Extenſion or any other Quality, it is no leſs contradictory " that Extenſion ſhould be a *ſimple Being*, ſince it contains " ſome things of which we may truly deny what we may truly " affirm of ſome others, which it includes. The Space filled " up by the Sun is not the ſame Space that is taken up by the " Moon; for if the Sun and the Moon filled the ſame Space, " theſe two Luminaries would be in the ſame Place, and pe- " netrated one with another, ſince two Things cannot be pe- " netrated with a third, without being penetrated betwixt " themſelves. It is moſt evident that the Sun and Moon are " not in the ſame Place. It may then be ſaid truly of the " Space of the Sun, that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it " may as truly be denyed of the Space penetrated by the Moon. " There are then two Portions of Space, really diſtinct from " one another, by reaſon that they receive two contrary De- " nominations of being penetrated and not being penetrated by " the Sun. Which fully confutes thoſe who venture to aſſert " that Space is nothing but the Immenſity of God: And it is " certain that the divine Immenſity could not be the Place of " Bodies, without giving room to conclude that it is compoſed " of as many real diſtinct Parts as there are Bodies in the World.

" It will be in vain for you to alledge, that Infinity hath no " Parts; this muſt neceſſarily be falſe in all infinite *Numbers*, " ſince Number eſſentially includes ſeveral *Units*. Nor will " you have any more Reaſon to tell us that incorporeal Ex- " tenſion * is wholly contained in its Space, and alſo wholly " contained in each Part of its Space: For it is not only " what we have no Idea of, and beſides, thwarts our Ideas of " Extenſion; but alſo what will prove that all Bodies take up " the ſame Place, ſince each could not take up its own, if the " Divine Extenſion was entirely penetrated by each Body nu- " merically the ſame with the Sun and with the Earth. You " will find in Mr. *Arnauld* †, a ſolid Refutation of thoſe who " attribute

* *Tota in toto, & tota in ſingulis partibus:* that is what the Schoolmen ſay of the Preſence of the Soul in a human Body, and of the Preſence of Angels in certain Places.

† *Arnauld*, Letter 8 and 9 to Father *Malebranche*. See alſo a Book of *Peter Petit, de extenſione Animæ & rerum incorporearum natura*. And *M. de la Chambre*'s Anſwer to it, which he publiſhed at *Paris, Anno* 1666, 4*to* with this Title, *Defence de l' Extenſion & de parties libres de l'ame.*

All the Reaſ[illegible]e alledges to ſhew that Extenſion and Spirituality may be together are ſo weak, that they are only good to ſhew the Falſity of his Aſſertion.

it and Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated; and then, if we remember the Things that did exiſt, without conſidering of what Kind they were, but only that they were without the Mind, we have what we call *Space.* If this be true, then it will be certain that Matter is not Self-exiſtent: For we may conſider it as annihilated, neither can we attribute any other Nature to it, than ſuch as anſwers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a Phantaſm of Body, that is, an Idea of Body recalled to mind which formerly was, but now is not, or is it not ſuppoſed to be, 'tis certain that Body or Matter, ſo far as we know any thing of its nature, is indifferent as to exiſtence or non-exiſtence. It has not therefore Exiſtence of itſelf; for that which exiſts by Neceſſity of Nature, Exiſtence enters into its *Idea*, nor can it be conceived otherwiſe than as exiſting.

And of thoſe who deny *Space* to be diſtinguiſhable from Matter, any otherwiſe than as Extenſion in general is from a particular Extenſion.

VI. Others deny that *Space* is diſtinguiſhable from Matter, any other way than as a *generical Quantity* is from a *particular* one; *For as when Individuals are changed, the Nature of Man or Animal remains unchanged: So when Body is changed or tranſlated into another Place, the Extenſion of the Place which is occupied remains unchanged, namely empty, or filled with another Body.* I would not ſpend a Cenſure on this reaſoning; but granting it to be true, it would follow that Body or Matter contains nothing in the Idea of it, which might induce us to

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"attribute to God the diffuſing himſelf throughout infinite "Space. *Crit. Dict.* p. 3083, 3084. He concludes pag. 3085. "If the Nature of penetrable or impenetrable Extenſion draws "along with it ſuch a large Train of Inconveniencies, the ſhorteſt "Way is to aſſert that it hath no other Exiſtence than in our "Mind." If any Perſon want any more Arguments againſt the Exiſtence of ſimple Extenſion, or the Application of it to a Spirit, he may find enow in *Bayle*, p. 2790, 3077, *&c.* See alſo *Epiſcopius. Inſt. Theol.* p. 294.

believe

believe that it is of itſelf, or exiſts by the Neceſſity of its Nature: but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at leaſt in Conception.

If therefore we conſult our Ideas, we muſt confeſs that Matter does not exiſt neceſſarily, but is as indifferent to Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence, as to *Motion* or *Reſt*; i. e. is in that reſpect merely paſſive. It requires a Cauſe then which may determine it to *Exiſtence* no leſs than to *Motion*. For that which is not of itſelf muſt neceſſarily be of another, nor can we know that any thing is of itſelf, otherwiſe than from the Ideas which we have of its nature; if theſe repreſent the nature of any thing as *neceſſarily* exiſting, ſo that we cannot conceive it not to be, we enquire no farther about its cauſe; if not, we fly to a Cauſe; nor is the Underſtanding ſatisfied till it has found one. Why are we inquiſitive about the Original of Man, or any thing elſe? but only becauſe our Conceptions repreſent theſe as indifferent in themſelves to *Being*, and therefore as requiring ſome Cauſe of their Exiſtence diſtinct from themſelves. From the nature then of *Matter* as well as *Motion*, we are forced to admit of *another* Principle to be the Cauſe of both.

That *Space* ſeems at firſt Sight inſeparable from Exiſtence.

VII. Thirdly. As to *Space*, many doubt whether its nature be diſtinguiſhable from exiſtence. Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or conceived not to have been. For when the whole material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains, as of a thing yet exiſting; it obtrudes itſelf upon the Underſtanding, and ſuffers us not to aſſign any beginning or end of its Exiſtence. It forces us therefore to confeſs, whether we will or no, that it exiſts; nor does it ſeem to require a Cauſe why it exiſts, ſince it is of ſuch a Nature as being ſelf ſufficient, muſt have exiſtence of itſelf. For what will be ſelf-exiſtent, if that be not, which cannot even be conceived not to exiſt?

VIII.

'Tis ſhewn that this may ariſe from Prejudice.

VIII. This ſeems to argue ſtrongly for the *Self-exiſtence* of Space. Yet a Doubt may ariſe whether this Inability of our Underſtanding to ſeparate the Nature of *Space* from Exiſtence, proceed from that *ſame Nature* of Space, or rather from the *Imperfection* of our Reaſon. For though all our ſimple Conceptions muſt for the moſt part be looked upon as true, as we ſaid before *, yet theſe are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find any Grounds of Fallacy or *Prejudice*. And in this reaſoning about Space, it is to be ſuſpected that we connect Exiſtence with its Nature merely out of *Prejudice*.

Without ſuppoſes *Space*; while therefore we conceive ſome thing to exiſt without us, we cannot annihilate Space in Thought.

IX. We may underſtand how this comes to paſs, if we conſider *1ſt*. That our Conceptions come for the moſt part *from without*, when therefore ſomething is preſented to our Minds, we always conceive it as without us: This Notion therefore of *external* and *internal* adheres to all our Conceptions, and we continually aſſign a *Place* to every thing which we happen to think of; but that there ſhould be any thing external, or which has a *Place* and no *Space*, is inconceivable. As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at the ſame time believe that Space exiſts, in which Space we conceive that thing to exiſt. For while we ſuppoſe any thing exiſting beſide ourſelves, that neceſſarily ſeems to be without us; but imagine all Externals removed, and turn the Mind upon itſelf, and that *without* will be taken away, and together with it the neceſſity of *Space* or *Place*. For while we conceive nothing to exiſt beſide ourſelves, *i. e.* our *Minds*, we don't think of this *without*, that is, of *Space*, nor ſee any neceſſity for its Exiſtence. (7.)

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(7.) From hence, I think, it appears ſufficiently that *Space* were it granted to have any real Exiſtence at all, I mean to be any thing more than an Idea in our Minds (which ſome perhaps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive Conſideration

* Sect. II. Parag. II.

X. It is to be obſerved farther, that when we annihilate any thing in our Mind, we conſider it as ſome-

That things are conceived to be annihilated by ſubſtituting ſomething elſe in the Room of them; but we have nothing to ſubſtitute for Space.

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deration of the Notes 3. and 6.) yet it cannot be ſuppoſed to exiſt neceſſarily, in Dr. *Clarke*'s ſenſe of *neceſſary Exiſtence*. For according to him, '* Whatever is neceſſarily exiſting, 'there is need of its Exiſtence, in order to the Suppoſal of the 'Exiſtence of any other Thing; ſo that nothing can poſſibly be 'ſuppoſed to exiſt, without preſuppoſing and including antece- 'dently the Exiſtence of that which is neceſſary. Therefore the 'ſuppoſing of any thing poſſibly to exiſt alone, ſo as not ne- 'ceſſarily to include the preſuppoſal of ſome other thing, proves 'demonſtrably that *that* other thing is not neceſſarily exiſting; 'becauſe, whatſoever has neceſſary Exiſtence cannot poſſibly, 'in any Conception whatſoever, be ſuppoſed away. There can- 'not poſſibly be any Notion of the Exiſtence of any thing, 'there cannot poſſibly be any Notion of Exiſtence at all, but 'what ſhall neceſſarily preinclude the Notion of that which is 'neceſſarily exiſtent.

Now if we can conſider our own Souls as exiſting alone and without this *Space*, without conſidering it as a *cauſa ſine qua non*, or in any other reſpect; without *preſuppoſing*, or any ways *including* it: This (according to the Doctor himſelf) will prove demonſtrably that Space is not neceſſarily exiſtent. But let any one ſhew us what neceſſity there is for the Exiſtence of *Space*, in order to the ſuppoſal of the Exiſtence of a *Spirit*. Let him try whether he cannot conceive an *immaterial thinking* Subſtance, without the Idea of *Space* or *Extenſion*; nay, whether he can poſſibly conceive it with them: whether theſe Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not rather repugnant and contradictory to the very Notion of it; whether they belong not ſolely to *Matter*, and if that were annihilated, might not eaſily be ſuppoſed away. Few, I believe, beſide Dr. *Clarke*, can apprehend how Space is (as he calls it in his 4th Reply to *Leibnitz*) † the *Place of all Ideas*. I'm ſure Space and Spirit, and the diſtinct Properties of each, appear to me as diſtant and incompatible, as the moſt remote and inconſiſtent things in nature; and an *extended Soul* ſeems juſt ſuch another Phraſe as a *green Sound*, an *Ell of Conſciouſneſs* or *Cube of Virtue*. Dr. *Clarke* grants ‡ that *Extenſion does not belong to Thought*, (as our Author has indeed proved in many of its Modes, in Parag. XIV. and XV.) and at the ſame time endeavours to ſhift off the Conſequence by anſwering, that Thought is not a Being. But where's the Difference in this Reſpect? Don't we frame our Idea of the *Being* from its conſtituent

* *Anſwer to the firſt Letter*, p. 10. † N. 29. p. 144.
‡ *Anſwer to the ſecond Letter*, p. 16.

ſomething evaneſcent, and removed out of Sight; but yet we look upon ſome other thing as ſubſtituted

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ſtituent *Properties*? And if theſe have no manner of relation to Extenſion, why ſhould the ſuppoſed Being to which they belong have any? ‡ Which Being is indeed nothing but the Aggregate of theſe Properties. See Note 1. I'm apt to think that our conceiving *Subſtance* by way of *Subſtratum*, has led us into the Notion that all kind of Subſtances muſt be *extended*; and 'tis perhaps impoſſible for us to *imagine* any ſuch thing as an *Unextended Subſtance*; but yet Reaſon convinces us that there are many real things of which we can form no *Imagination*. And that there are Beings in Nature to which no manner of Extenſion can poſſibly be applyed, we find ſufficiently proved by *Cudworth* ‖. Among the various Arguments there produced this is the Subſtance of one. 'If the Soul be an *extended Subſtance*, then it muſt of neceſſity be either a *Phyſical Point* (for a *Mathematical Point* has no *Extenſion*) or *minimum*, the leaſt Extenſion that can poſſibly be; — or elſe it muſt conſiſt of *more* ſuch *Phyſical Points* joined together. As for the former of theſe, it is impoſſible that one *ſingle Atom*, or *ſmalleſt Point* of extenſion ſhould be able to perceive diſtinctly all the *variety* of things, *i. e.* take notice of all the *diſtinct* and *different* Parts of an extended *Object*, and have a *Deſcription* or *Delineation* of the whole of them at once upon itſelf: (for that would be to make it *diviſible* and *indiviſible* at the ſame time) As for the latter, if the Soul be an extended Subſtance conſiſting of *more Points* one without another, all concurring in every *Senſation*, then muſt every one of theſe *Points* either perceive a *Point* and *Part* of the Object only, or elſe the *whole* Object: Now if every Point of the *extended Soul* perceives only a Point of the *Object*, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the *whole*; or which can compare one Part with another. But if every Point of the extended Soul perceives the *whole* Object at once conſiſting of many Parts, then will the former Abſurdity return. And alſo there would be innumerable *Percipients* of the ſame *Object* in every Senſation, as many as there are Points in the extended Soul: And from both theſe Suppoſitions it would alike follow that no Man is one ſingle *Percipient*, or Perſon, but that there are innumerable diſtinct *Percipients*, or *Perſons* in every man Neither can there be any other Suppoſition made beſides thoſe three forementioned; As that the whole *extended Soul* ſhould perceive both the *whole ſenſible object*, and all its ſeveral *Parts*, no part of this Soul in the mean time having any Perception at all by itſelf; be-

'cauſe

‡ *See* R. h. *at the end of this Chapter.*

‖ Intell. Syſt. p. 823. — 832.

tuted in the room of that which diſappeared; thus when *Accidents* are removed, we conceive the *Subſtance*

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'cauſe the whole of an *extended Being* is nothing but *all the* 'Parts taken together; and if none of thoſe *Parts* have any 'Life, *Senſe*, or *Perception* in them, it is impoſſible there ſhould 'be any in the *whole*. But in very truth, to ſay that the whole 'Soul perceiveth all, and no *Part* of it any thing, is to acknow-'ledge it not to be *extended*, but to be *indiviſible*, which is the 'thing we contend for.

Where Mr. *Colliber* might have found a ſufficient Anſwer to his Argument for the Soul's *Extenſion* from its *receiving Ideas of extended Things**. And to his Maxim, that *like is known by like*, and by Conſequence a Subject abſolutely void of extenſion could have no Ideas of extended things †.

'Nay the Soul (ſays *Cudworth*) conceives *extended* things 'themſelves *unextendedly* and *indiviſibly*; for as the difference 'of the whole *Hemiſphere* is contracted into a narrow Compaſs 'in the Pupil of the Eye, ſo are all diſtances yet more contract-'ed in the Soul itſelf, and there underſtood *indiſtantly*: for the 'thought of a Mile *diſtance*, or 10,000 Miles, or ſemi-diameters 'of the Earth, takes up no more *room* in the Soul, nor *ſtretches* 'it any more than does the thought of a *foot* or *inch*, or indeed 'of a *Mathematical Point* ‡.

The foregoing Arguments againſt the ſimplicity of *Extenſion*, as well as thoſe in Notes 3. and 6. conclude equally againſt Mr. *Colliber*'s *Amplitude* or *Expanſion* ‖. Since, if it be any thing real, it muſt have parts really diſtinct from one another; which diſtinct parts can never be the ſubject of an undivided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a poſitive Infinity. But in truth, theſe Words *Expanſion*, *Amplitude*, &c. don't ſeem to imply any poſitive thing or quality diſtinct from material Extenſion, or indeed to have any determinate meaning at all; like the *Ubi* of the School-men, which was not *place*, but ſomething elſe, they did not know what, and muſt belong to Spirits, tho' how or why they could not tell.

The laſt mention'd Writer has a ſecond Argument for the *Amplitude* or *Expanſion* of the *Divine Nature*, grounded on another Maxim, viz. *Nothing can beſtow what it has not in itſelf:* but God has created *material expanſion*, therefore he muſt be expanded himſelf, p. 223. Which Argument is anſwer'd by our *Author* in the 18th Paragr. who ſhews that ſuch *Expanſion* is a mere *imperfection*, as well as *materiality*, and conſequently is equally inconſiſtent with the perfection of the Divine Being. See alſo Rem. h.

* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 222.
† *Ibid.* p. 223.
‡ *Intell. Syſt.* p. 827, 829, &c.
‖ *Impartial Enquiry.*

ſtance remaining; ſetting aſide *Matter*, we ſubſtitute *Space*; but when *Space* is removed, we have nothing to ſubſtitute in its ſtead, except material or external Things; but all theſe ſuppoſe *Space*, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we conceive theſe as exiſting. If therefore we would come to a right Underſtanding of the Nature of Space, we muſt not apply our Minds to any thing *material* or *external*, but attend to our own Thoughts and Senſations, which have no relation to external Things or to Quantity: And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no more Neceſſity for the Exiſtence of Space than of Matter.

We attempt to annihilate while thoſe things continue which ſuppoſe it, and therefore it cannot be annihilated.

XI. It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice*, and an unwary way of thinking, that we couple *neceſſity of Exiſtence* with *Space*; neither do we obſerve that for this very Reaſon we cannot conceive Space not to exiſt, becauſe we imagine thoſe things ſtill exiſting, which cannot exiſt without Space; which is no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, ſhould complain that he could not annihilate the *Matter* of them, while the *Motion* continued; for material and external things have no leſs Dependance on and Connection with *Space*, than Mobility has with *Matter*; if then we conceive God only to exiſt, while he contemplates himſelf as exiſting alone, he can no more be judged to ſtand in need of Space, or be conſcious of it as actually exiſting, than we are while we contemplate only the reflex Acts of the Mind. But when he willed external Things, he made *Place* or *Space* for them to exiſt in.

God cannot be conceived not to exiſt.

XII. It may be objected that *we can ſeparate Exiſtence from God* after the ſame manner as we endeavour to remove it from Space. For the Mind being reflected on itſelf, and ſolely intent upon

upon contemplating its Operations, may deny God to exiſt as well as Space. If therefore we deny Space to be ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe we can conſider our Mind as exiſting alone in Nature, and conſequently Space as not exiſting; why may not we, by the ſame way of reaſoning, deny that God is *ſelf-exiſtent?* I anſwer, we are conſcious that we do not exiſt of ourſelves, while therefore we contemplate ourſelves and our intellectual Operations, we are neceſſarily carried to ſome Cauſe; being certain that we have Exiſtence from another, and not of ourſelves; we cannot therefore exert even one act of the Underſtanding but it muſt have a neceſſary Connection with ſome *Cauſe* diſtinct from us.

XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourſelves as the only Beings in nature, for we muſt admit, along with us, the Cauſe from which we derive Exiſtence, which is a confuſed Conception of God. But the ſame cannot be ſaid of Space; for the Operations of our Mind are ſo intimately perceived by us as to have no neceſſary Connection with Space, and we underſtand clearly enough that theſe may be, tho' there were no Space, and do not ſtand in need of it for their Exiſtence. If we conceive ourſelves as conſiſting of both *Body* and *Mind*, 'tis certain we ſtand in need of Space for our Exiſtence, and during that Conception, 'tis impoſſible for us to conceive Space to be annihilated; *viz.* becauſe ſuch a Conception has a neceſſary Connection with Space. After the ſame manner, if we conceive ourſelves to be *Mind* only, yet we muſt own the Exiſtence of God. For a finite Mind requires a Cauſe *from* which it may receive Exiſtence, no leſs than a Body does a Place *in* which it may exiſt; and from hence, in reality, it is that we attribute *Self-exiſtence* to Space, becauſe whenever we think of ourſelves, we imagine ourſelves to conſiſt of both *Body* and *Mind*. While therefore we are conſcious of

Becauſe we are conſcious that we do not exiſt of ourſelves.

our own Exiſtence, we form our Belief of Space alſo as neceſſarily exiſting, ſince it is connected with the Conception of *Body*, i. e. of *ourſelves*.

Smell, Taſte, Hearing, do not give us any notice of the exiſtence of Space.

XIV. Secondly, It is remarkable that the Conceptions which we have from *hearing*, *ſmelling*, or *taſting*, tho' they be produced in us by external Objects, yet they have no Connection with the Conceptions of *Space*; for who can imagine the Longitude, Latitude, or Profundity of *Sound*, *Smell*, or *Taſte?* If then we had only theſe three Senſes, we ſhould not ſo much as imagine that there was any Space. Our Conceptions therefore abſtract from all Extenſion, nor do the Notions of external and internal adhere ſo cloſely to our Thoughts but we may lay them aſide; and if we ſet theſe aſide, the Self-exiſtence of Space does not neceſſarily *obtrude* itſelf upon us. Now as the common People attribute *Smells*, *Taſtes*, *Colours*, and other *ſenſible Qualities* to the Objects themſelves, and believe that they exiſt in them; while they who attend better to their Thoughts, know that they exiſt only in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are produced, beſide the peculiar Motion and Texture of their Parts; after the ſame manner, 'tis probable, we are impoſed upon in attributing neceſſary Exiſtence to Space, becauſe we obſerve that almoſt all our Thoughts are produced in us from without, and thereby accuſtoming ourſelves to join Space with them, while we are conſcious that we think, we conceive alſo that Space exiſts; Whereas, if we remember that all our Senſations, even thoſe produced by external Things, ſuch as *Smells*, *&c.* do not bring along with them the Notion of Space, we may eaſily lay aſide this Prejudice, and withdrawing our Thoughts from the Contemplation of Space, may conceive it not *to be*.

XV.

XV. And this will appear, Thirdly, if by a reflex Act we view the *Mind itſelf* and its *Operations*; for nothing of Extenſion or Space offers itſelf in theſe; nor does the Mind, when employed about them, think at all of Space, nor is it conſcious that it occupies Space: It withdraws therefore from the Conceptions of *internal* and *external*, and may conceive nothing to be in the World beſides *itſelf*, and its *Cauſe*; i. e. can imagine Space to be non-exiſtent. Thinking Beings then may exiſt without Space; It proceeds therefore from *Prejudice* that we join *Neceſſary Exiſtence* with it.

The Mind reflected upon itſelf has no relation to Space, nor any neceſſity for it.

XVI. Fourthly, It is to be remarked that Space, ſo far as appears to our Conceptions, is of ſuch a Nature as cannot be annihilated by *Parts*, for they are in ſuch a manner united to and dependent upon one another, that if we ſuppoſe one Part, it will imply a Contradiction for the others not to exiſt. We can in Thought remove all Water out of a Veſſel, or Chamber, and the Space interjacent between the Walls remains extended in Length, Breadth, and Depth: But the Space cannot be *removed*, ſince it is of its own Nature immovable, (8.) nor can it be *annihilated*; for Diſtance would remain between the Bounds, which cannot be without Extenſion, nor Extenſion without a Subject; but Space, as far as we can conceive it, is the primary *Subject* (9.) of

We may conceive Space to be annihilated all together, but not by Parts.

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(8.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we ſuppoſe it to have any *real Nature* or to *exiſt* at all, it muſt, as our Author ſays, exiſt every where, and cannot be removed by parts. And in this Senſe ſhould the Words of Sir *Iſaac Newton* be underſtood*. "*The order of the parts of Space is immutable; remove theſe from their places, and you will remove them, as I may ſay, from themſelves.*" For to ſuppoſe it all at once away, ſeems ſo far from amounting to that *abſurd Suppoſition* mention'd by Dr. *Clarke*†, that it is no more than what muſt be conceiv'd in every *Annihilation* of any thing, which is the

* Princ. Schol. ad def. 8.

† *Anſwer to the 6th Letter*, p. 39.

(9.) of Extenſion; therefore it neceſſarily continues with Diſtance, nor can it be annihilated, unleſs we would have Extenſion without a Subject, that is into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Depth* without any Thing *Long*,

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total deſtruction or *taking away* of Exiſtence, the removal of it, as we may ſay, *from itſelf*, or from Being: Which is a Suppoſition that is generally thought to carry no abſurdity along with it.

(9.) Dr. *Clarke* affirms ‡ that *Space* is not a *Subſtance*; and yet declares that it has real *Qualities* ‖. Is not this either to ſuppoſe *Qualities* or *Properties* inherent in one another? Or elſe, with *Gaſſendus*, to imagine ſome *middle* thing between *Subſtance* and *Accident*, which is neither of them, but partakes of both?

The learned Writer referred to in Note 3. is of the ſame Opinion with our Author in this Place, *viz.* that we are apt to conceive Space to be a ſort of Subſtance or *Subſtratum* of *Extenſion*, and ſo are uſed to attribute that and other imaginary Qualities to it. 'The Idea of Space is not the Idea of 'Extenſion, but of ſomething extended, it is the *Subſtratum* of 'Extenſion, and not Extenſion itſelf. But when I ſay it is 'the *Subſtratum*, do not imagine I make it be any thing 'without; it is an *Ideal Subſtratum*, and nothing more. When 'the Mind has been conſidering the Idea of Extenſion ab'ſtracted from the extended Bodies, from whence it firſt re'ceived the Idea, (whether as they were *Cauſes* or Occaſions 'of it I conſider not now) it is a very eaſy Step for the Mind 'to make farther, to frame an *imaginary Subſtratum* to ſupport 'an *imaginary Extenſion*. And this is the more eaſy becauſe the 'Idea we have of a *real Subſtratum* or Subſtance, the Support 'of real Qualities is dark and confuſed, an Idea of *ſomewhat*, 'and that's all. Now it is but joyning the Idea of *ſomewhat* 'with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extenſion, and 'we have an imaginary *Subſtratum* preſently formed, that is, 'an Idea of *Space*, or an *Ideal* extended ſomething. Whether 'this be not the very Caſe, I muſt leave to any Man to judge 'by reflecting on his own Ideas.

Again; To this Queſtion, *Why may not Space be rather defined Extenſion in the Abſtract, or imaginary Extenſion rather than the imaginary Subſtratum of imaginary Extenſion?* He anſwers, 'Extenſion in the general or in the abſtract, is an Idea 'of pure *Intellect*, i. e. is to be underſtood, but cannot be 'imagin'd, any more than *Whiteneſs* in the general, or a 'thouſand

‡ *Anſwer to the 3d Lett.* p. 22. *and to the 4th*, p. 28.
‖ *Anſwer to the 6th Letter*, p. 30.

Long, *Broad* and *Deep*. Hence it appears that Space cannot be *partially* annihilated, and from hence the Opinion of its *self-existence* might arise.

XVII. For since it is of such a Nature as must be annihilated either altogether, or not at all, they that attempted to annihilate it only by *Parts*, saw that it was impossible to be done, the Nature of the Thing remonstrated against a partial Annihilation, and

Hence arose the Prejudice for its self-existence.

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' thousand other the like abstract Ideas. But as soon as *Imagination* comes to deal with this general abstract Idea (or ' Ideas) it supplies it with an *imaginary* Substratum, and so ' makes the *general* which was *invisible*, be conceived as a ' *particular*, for the help of the Understanding. So if the ' Imagination comes to conceive any certain Degree of *Whiteness*, it supplies the Mind with some imaginary white Surface, and brings down the general Idea to a particular Object. In like manner, when it comes to conceive a *Length*, ' a *Breadth*, a *Thickness*, it supplies the Mind with a Substratum *pro hac vice*, such as may serve the Purpose, otherwise ' the Mind must rest in pure Intellect only, as in Numbers; ' and there is nothing more tedious or uneasy to the Mind ' generally than to be wholly *abstracted*; which is the Reason, ' by the way, that *Arithmetical* Demonstrations, tho' as clear ' and certain as any, are less delightful than *Geometrical*, and ' nothing more irksome than abstract Numbers. Now Space ' being the Object of the *Imagination*, and not of pure *Intellect*, as are all general, abstract Ideas, it is properly the ' *imaginary Substratum of an imaginary Extension*, or the general Idea of Extension particulariz'd in an *imaginary Subject*; ' and hence it is that *Space* is said to be extended, which ' would be Nonsense to say of Extension itself: And Bodies ' are said to be *in Space*, which would likewise be Nonsense ' to say of *Extension*. And so it is conceived as *immoveable*, ' *indivisible*, *infinite*. Immoveable, *&c.* all Properties of Substances; which makes it plain that it is conceived after the ' manner of Substance, and therefore is, because it can be nothing else, an *imaginary Substratum*, which the Mind takes ' to particularize, and thereby render conceivable its general ' Idea of Extension; which could not otherwise fall within the ' Imagination, nor be estimated any way but by abstract ' numbers, so many Yards, or so many Miles, 10, 20, 30; ' without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the ' meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, *&c.* as it is when we ' reckon Ounces, Pounds, *&c.* of Weight. — Thus then you ' see how we come by the Notion of *Space*, and what it is.' See also Note 3.

and if one Part be ſuppoſed, all others might be demonſtrated to exiſt by neceſſary Connection. But if any one ſhould ſuppoſe all extended things to be removed together at once, he would find nothing impoſſible in that Suppoſition: For one may imagine nothing to exiſt in Nature beſide his own Soul, and the Cauſe on which it depends; which, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extenſion in it: Every thing that is extended may therefore be ſeparated from Exiſtence. But they that attempted this by Parts, when they found it impoſſible, did not ſcruple to reſolve the Cauſe into the Self-exiſtence of Space; tho' in reality it did not ariſe from thence, but from this, that they attempted to ſeparate things naturally inſeparable, namely, the Parts of Space one from another.

We are certain of a *firſt Cauſe* in what manner ſoever the Diſpute about *Space* be determined.

XVIII. But whether there be any ſuch Thing as Space, or no; whether its Extenſion be diſtinguiſhed from the Extenſion of *Body*, or not: Be it nothing at all; Be it mere *privation of Contact*, as ſome are pleaſed to term it; be it mere *Poſſibility* or *Capacity* of exiſting, as others; be it, laſtly, either ſomething *created*, or of *itſelf*, and *neceſſarily exiſting*; yet ſtill, as far as we know any thing of the Nature of it, 'tis an *indolent* thing, it neither *acts*, nor is in the leaſt *acted upon*; it cannot therefore, as mere *Extenſion*, under which Notion only it appears to us, be the *Cauſe* of *Matter*, or impreſs *Motion* on it. There muſt then neceſſarily be another *Cauſe* of *Matter* and *Motion*, that is *active*, *ſelf-exiſtent*, and the Cauſe of all *Things* and *Actions*, which, ſince they are not of themſelves, require a *Cauſe*.

SECT.

SECT. III.
Of the Firſt Cauſe.

WHAT this *active Principle* is we cannot apprehend otherwiſe than by *Reaſon*, for it occurs not to the Senſes, unleſs by its *Effects*; nor is it perceived by them any more than *Light* is by the Ears: Our Reaſonings therefore about this Principle will be like thoſe of a *blind* Man about *Light*. A *blind* Man may be aſſured that there is a certain thing called *Light*, which the Eye can perceive, as the Noſe can Smell; he may be taught alſo by them who ſee, to underſtand many Advantages of Light, namely that it can *direct* the Steps, that it can *warm*, that it derives its Origin from a large remote Body, *i. e.* the *Sun*; that by the help of it very *diſtant* Bodies may be perceived, with their *Forms* and other *Qualities* unknown to him; and that *Fire* which affords only *heat* to him, can give *Light* alſo to them who ſee: Laſtly, that it ariſes from ſome Motion in the minuteſt Particles of a *Fluid*.

Our Reaſonings about the firſt Cauſe are like thoſe of a blind Man about Light, ſince it is not an object of Senſe.

II. From theſe *external* Properties he might diſcourſe of Light, and in ſome Meaſure underſtand the Reaſonings of other Men upon it; he would believe it to be diſtinct from *Heat*; he would eagerly deſire, and willingly undergo many Hardſhips, to enjoy the Benefit of it; yet would he never have any ſuch Senſe of it as thoſe who ſee. After the ſame manner we may know many things about this active Principle, which we are compelled, by the force of Reaſons, to believe certainly to exiſt, tho' we are no leſs ignorant of what it is in itſelf, than the blind Man is of the Senſation which Light produces in thoſe who ſee *.

Yet we know a great many things concerning it.

III. For

* *This Compariſon is farther illuſtrated by the Author of the* Procedure of Human Underſtanding, *in his Introduction: Concerning the uſe which is made of it, See* Rem. k.

That all other things proceed from it.

III. For inſtance; In the firſt Place we are certain that all other things come from this *active Principle:* For nothing elſe, as we have ſhewn before †, contains in itſelf *Neceſſary Exiſtence* or *active Power*, entirely independent of any other; as therefore itſelf is from none, ſo all others are from it. For from hence we conclude that this Principle does exiſt, becauſe after conſidering the reſt of the things which do exiſt, we perceive that they could neither *be* nor *act*, if that had not exiſted, and excited Motion in them.

That it is one.

IV. *Secondly*, We are certain that this Principle is *One*, ſimilar and uniform: For *Matter* is, as to its *Eſſence*, every where *One* and *alike*; the ſame muſt be ſaid of Space, if we grant it to be any thing diſtinct from Matter: much more muſt the Cauſe which fills Space with Matter be *One*, *ſimple* and *uniform.* (10.)

V. *Thirdly*,

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(10.) This Argument (as well as ſome others hereafter mention'd) were the Foundation of it true, can but be call'd a preſumptive one at beſt: nay, in truth the contrary will rather follow from the *multiplicity* and *diverſity* of created *Subſtances.* We ſhall therefore endeavour to give a diſtinct proof of the *Being* and *Attributes* of *God*, ſo far at leaſt as the knowledge of them may affect our preſent Subject.

Now theſe ſeem capable of a clear deduction from this one *ſelf-evident* Principle * *I exiſt. I myſelf exiſt:* therefore *ſomething* exiſts. If *ſomething* exiſts *now*, then ſomething has exiſted *always.* Otherwiſe that ſomething which now exiſts, muſt *once* either have been made by *nothing*, i. e. been *cauſed* by no *Cauſe*, which is abſurd; or elſe have *made* itſelf, *i. e.* have *acted* before it *exiſted*, or been at once both *Effect* and *Cauſe*; which is alſo abſurd; or, laſtly, (which is the only ſuppoſition left) it muſt have been produced by ſomething, which had its Exiſtence from ſomething *elſe*, which alſo depended on ſome *other* Cauſe, and ſo on in an *infinite Series* of caus'd or ſucceſſive Beings, without any eternal or firſt Cauſe; which is alſo abſurd. For either *ſome one* Part of this infinite Series has not been *ſucceſſive* to any other, or elſe *all* the ſeveral Parts of it have been ſucceſſive: if *ſome one* Part of it has not, then there was

† §. 2. *Paragr.* 3, 4, 5, &c. *and Remark* e.

* *See Remark* a. *at the end of* Chap. I.

V. *Thirdly*, That it is *Infinite* both in *Nature* and *Power:* For ſince it exiſts of *itſelf*, there is nothing Infinite in *Nature* and *Power*.

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was a *firſt*, which deſtroys the Suppoſition; if all the ſeveral Parts of it have been ſucceſſive to each other, then they have all once been *future*; and if they have been all once future, then there was a time when *none* of them exiſted; and if there was a time when *none* of them exiſted, then either all the *Parts* of this *infinite Series*, and conſequently the *whole*, muſt have ariſen from *nothing*, which is abſurd; or elſe there muſt be ſomething in the *whole* beſide what is contained in all the *parts*; which is alſo abſurd. Or thus: Since all the Parts of this *infinite Series* are *ſucceſſive* or *future* to one another, they muſt once either have been all future, *i. e. non exiſtent*, (and then the ſecond abſurdity will follow, *i. e. that this whole Series aroſe from nothing*) or elſe all but ſome *one*, (and then the firſt will follow, *i. e. that it had a Beginning*) which *one* added to the reſt either makes them *infinite*, which is abſurd; or they are *infinite* without that one, and then that one added to them, either makes one more than *infinite*, or adds nothing at all; both which are Abſurdities.

If it be ſaid that an Infinite Series is ſuppoſed to have no *whole*; I grant it, and on that very Account the Suppoſition is abſurd, ſince whatſoever has *Parts* muſt have a whole, which whole is nothing but a certain number or aggregate of theſe Parts. But as no number can be ſo great but that we may aſſign a greater, it follows that neither Number itſelf, nor any thing to which number can be applied, *i. e.* which conſiſts of *Parts*, is capable of real abſolute Infinity *.

From the Impoſſibility of an Infinite Series we gather the *Eternity* † of *ſome one Thing* or *Being* [That every one is not in like manner eternal *a parte ante*, or *never had a Beginning*; particularly that no *Body* or *material Syſtem* can be ſo (and the ſame Reaſons hold equally againſt any *imperfect immaterial Subſtance*) is ſufficiently prov'd in the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chriſtian Religion* ‡.]

From Eternity comes *Independence* or *Self-exiſtence*. For that which never had a Beginning of Exiſtence, could not poſſibly have any *Cauſe* of that Exiſtence (for then it would not be the *firſt Cauſe*, contrary to what we have proved above) or could *depend* upon no other thing for it, *i. e.* muſt be *independent* of all others; or, which is the ſame thing, muſt exiſt of itſelf, *i. e.* be *ſelf-exiſtent*.

Eternity *a parte poſt*, or *neceſſary Exiſtence*; or an impoſſibility of every ceaſing to be, follows from Independence ‖. For what depends upon no Cauſe can never be alter'd or deſtroy'd by

* R. b. † R. c. ‡ R. d. ‖ R. e.

nothing that can bound its *Nature* or *Power*. 'Tis to be obſerved farther, that the number of *poſſible* things

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by any, (as is ſhewn in Note 4. and Remark e.) and therefore muſt continue as it is.

From Independence comes alſo *Omnipotence*. For a Being that depends upon no external Cauſe for his Exiſtence, and has *active Power*, (as was ſhewn at the ſame time that we proved his Exiſtence, and by the ſame Medium) cannot depend upon any for the exertion of that Power, and conſequently no *limits* can be applied to either his Exiſtence or Power. For *Limitation* is an *effect* of ſome *ſuperior cauſe*, which in the *preſent* Caſe there cannot be: conſequently to ſuppoſe *Limits* where there can be no *Limiter*, is to ſuppoſe an *Effect without* a *Cauſe* *.

To ſuppoſe this Being limited *in* or *by* its own *Nature*, is to ſuppoſe ſome *Nature antecedent*, or *limiting Quality ſuperior* to that Being, to the Exiſtence of whom no Thing, no Quality is in any reſpect *antecedent* or *ſuperior*: And to ſuppoſe that there is no ſuch thing as *Action* or *Power* in a Being which appears to be the Fountain of all Action and Power, is (if poſſible) the worſt Suppoſition of all.

Liberty is alſo included in the Idea of Omnipotence: *Active Power* implies *Freedom*; *Infinite Power* is *abſolute Freedom*. What therefore has no Bounds ſet to its Power, what can have no oppoſition made to its Will, nor Reſtraint laid on its Actions, muſt both will and act *freely*. This Attribute is alſo proved from the Beginning of Motion, and the Creation and Diſpoſition of *indifferent* things †.

But tho' this Being is *free*, and as ſuch the Author of *Change* in other *Beings*, yet he muſt himſelf be *Unchangeable*. For all *Changes* have a Beginning, and conſequently are Effects of ſome *prior Cauſes*: But there can be nothing *prior* to the Exiſtence of this Being, as he is *eternal*; neither any *Cauſe* of it, as he is *independent*; nor conſequently any *Change* in it: except we could ſuppoſe him to *change himſelf*, which is the ſame Abſurdity as to *produce* himſelf, *i. e.* to be at the ſame time both *Effect* and *Cauſe*.

Thus we come to the Knowledge of an *Eternal*, *Independent*, *Omnipotent*, *Free* and *Unchangeable Being*.

Omniſcience, as well as ſome of the foregoing Attributes, may be more eaſily deduced thus. We find in ourſelves ſuch Qualities as *Thought* and *Intelligence*, *Power*, *Freedom*, *&c.* of which we have *intuitive Knowledge*, as much as of our own *Exiſtence*; and that to have theſe is a *perfection*, or better than to be without

* Rem. f. † See Note *E.* and the References.

things is conceived by us to be infinite, at leaſt in *Power*, but nothing can be *poſſible*, to which there is

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out them: We find alſo that theſe have not been in us from *Eternity*, conſequently they muſt have had a *Beginning*, and conſequently ſome *Cauſe*, (for the ſame reaſon that a *Being*, beginning to exiſt in time, requires a Cauſe) which Cauſe, as it muſt be *ſuperior* to its *Effect*, has them in a *ſuperior* Degree *; and if it be the *firſt Cauſe*, as itſelf can depend upon no *other*, muſt have them in *perfection*, or in an *infinite* or *unlimited* Degree (if theſe Words can properly be here apply'd †.) Since *Bounds* or *Limitation* would be without a Limiter (as has been ſhewn) *i. e.* an Effect without a Cauſe.

The *Phenomena* of *Nature* alſo lead us up to *One* ſuch firſt Cauſe, which is ſufficient for their Production, and therefore none elſe are *neceſſary*; and tho' *ſeveral* more *independent* Beings might poſſibly exiſt, yet would they be no *Gods* to us; for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them ‡. Since therefore the ſame Reaſon holds for no more than *One* ſuch, to ſuppoſe more than one is at leaſt unreaſonable.

Theſe ſeem to be all the *ſimple* Attributes obſervable in the Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combin'd by us, come under different Names. Thus the unlimited Exerciſe of God's *Knowledge* and *Power* demonſtrates him *Omnipreſent*, *i. e.* at all times and in all places ſo preſent with every Creature as to have an abſolute *Knowledge* of and *Power* over it; always to ſuperviſe and govern it ‖.

His enjoying all conceivable Perfections in an entire abſolute manner, denotes him Infinite, or rather abſolutely *Perfect* §; and, which is the ſame thing, his being capable of no *want*, *defect*, or *unhappineſs* whatſoever, defines him *All-ſufficient*.

The *Moral* Attributes of God may be deduced from theſe natural ones, and are immediate Conſequences of them when exerciſed on other Beings. They ſeem to be the Perfection of his external Acts rather than any new internal Perfections of his Nature, and may be termed his *ſecondary*, *relative* Attributes ¶.

And tho' the Exiſtence of any moral Quality or Action is not capable of ſtrict Demonſtration, becauſe every moral Action or Quality, as ſuch, depends upon the Will of the Agent, which muſt be abſolutely free: Yet we have as great Aſſurance that there are moral Qualities in God, and that he will always

* See the latter part of R. k. † See R. l. ‡ R. g.
‖ R. h. § See *Wollaſton*, p. 70, 93.
¶ See the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 29, 63. or *Note* 52.

is not ſome *power correſpondent*, that might actually effect

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always act according to theſe moral Qualities, as the nature of the thing admits, and may be as well ſatisfied of it as if we could demonſtrate it†.

I ſhall begin again with a Self-evident Propoſition.

Pleaſure is different from *Pain*; conſequently there is a *difference* in things. Pleaſure is *fit* for, or *agreeable* to the nature of a ſenſible Being, or (as theſe words are commonly uſed) a *natural Good*; Pain is *unfit*, or is a *natural Evil*: Conſequently there is a natural *fitneſs* and *unfitneſs* of things; or (which is the very ſame, and what theſe Terms ſhould always mean) *Natural Good* and *Evil*.

The voluntary *Application* of this natural Good and Evil, to any *Rational* Being, or the Production ‡ of it by a rational Being, is Moral Good and Evil: Conſequently there is ſuch a thing as Moral Good and Evil. An *Inclination* to and *Approbation* of this Moral Good is in every rational Creature ‖; and is perfective of its Nature, and therefore it muſt be communicated by, and conſequently be inherent in the Creator §.

To act agreeably to this Inclination and Approbation is alſo a Perfection; the contrary an Imperfection; conſequently the former, as it is a Perfection found in ſome Degree in the Creature, muſt belong to and be in the higheſt Degree in the Creator, who has been already prov'd to have all *natural* Perfections in an infinite and perfect Degree ††; and therefore he muſt have all *moral* ones ſo too.

As his *Knowledge* and *Power* are *perfect*, he muſt always both perceive and be able to purſue this Moral Good. And as his *Happineſs* is *complete*, there can be no poſſible Reaſon why he ſhould ever *will* the contrary; nay, there is a good Reaſon why he ſhould not, namely, otherwiſe a perfect Thing would contradict itſelf, and will a *Defect* or *Imperfection*, i. e. be perfect and not perfect at the ſame time: or a Being infinitely happy, and who loves and approves himſelf becauſe he is ſo, would hate and diſapprove the very ſame thing in others, *i. e.* would love his own Nature, and yet hate any thing that reſembles it; which is abſurd ¶. It follows then that he muſt always *know*, be *able*, and *willing* to do, and therefore *actually* do what is abſolutely *beſt*, *i. e.* produce the greateſt ſum of Happineſs, or be abſolutely and completely *Good*.

This alſo was included in the Inclination and Approbation above mentioned. For if he has given us Benevolent Affections

† See *Ditton* on Moral Evidence, p. 1, 2. ‡ R. i.
‖ See the latter Part of Rem. i. § R. k. †† R. l.
¶ See *Scott*'s Works, V. 2. Diſc. XIV. p. 30.

effect it; since therefore the things that are possible cannot

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fections and a Sense which approves them, he must himself have both the same Affections, and the same Sense of them †.

Again; the Idea of *Goodness* properly implies a Disposition to communicate Happiness to others; if then this Being be *good*, he must actually have communicated Happiness to others; and *vice versa*, if he have communicated Happiness to others, he must be *good*: But this Being has communicated Happiness to others, therefore he is *Good*.

The Idea of *Wisdom* implies his Knowledge and Observance of the most proper Methods of effecting this, and is included in his *Omniscience*; it being nothing but that very Knowledge consider'd with relation to Practice. It appears farther from considering the only *Causes* of *Imprudence* in Men, which are either *Ignorance*, *Partiality*, or *Inattention*; none of which can have place in God: He cannot be ignorant of any thing, since both all things and their *Relations* to each other, proceed from him: He cannot be *aw'd* by any *Power* or *sway'd* by any *Interest*, since (as has been shewn) he is *independent* and *all-sufficient*; and he cannot be *inattentive*, since he always sees every thing *intuitively* and at once; and consequently he must always *know* and *do* what is *fittest* and *wisest* to be done.

From which also follows his *Justice*: For he that sees all the *Circumstances of things* and the *Qualifications of Persons* and has *Ability* to *regulate* these, and no manner of *Temptation* to do otherwise, must certainly suit these Circumstances to those Qualifications, or provide that Persons receive the natural and proper Consequence of their Actions; or (which is the same) do with every Person what is exactly *just* and *right*.

The same also holds for his *Holiness* and *Veracity*, or rather *Faithfulness*. As to the former, he must always dislike and detest Evil, since it can never become in the least agreeable to his *Perfections*, or serviceable to his *Use*: As to the latter, he must adhere to *Truth*, as it is a *Perfection*, and co-incident with *Good*, *&c.* since he can have no possible *Reason* or *Motive* to deviate from it *.

Thus may we reason about the several moral Perfections of the supreme Being, as they are commonly distinguish'd. But that which should chiefly direct us in these our Enquiries is the Idea of his *Infinite Goodness*, which implies, or rather includes them all ‡. Nay, all the other moral Attributes (if they

† See R. i.

* See Bp. *Wilkins* Nat. Rel. C. 10. p. 142. 6th Edit.

‡ See *Tillotson* Serm. 90. 2d. Vol. Fol. p. 672. Or *Stackhouse*'s Body of Divinity C. 5. Sect. 12. p. 101.

cannot be limited, there muſt alſo be a Cauſe infinitely powerful. For as one Poſſibility requires an equal

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they can properly be called Attributes) are ſo far from exiſting apart from this, that they ought to be conſider'd only as ſo many different *Views* of the ſame *Goodneſs* in the Creator, and various *Sources* of *Happineſs* to the Creature. Theſe are always *ſub-ordinate* to and *regulated* by this one principal Perfection and brighteſt Ray of the Divinity. Thus we conceive his *Juſtice* to be exerted on any Being no farther than his Goodneſs neceſſarily requires, in order to the making that Being, or others, *ſenſible* of the *heinous* Nature and *pernicious Effects of Sin*; and thereby bringing either *it*, or ſome *others*, to as great a Degree of Happineſs as their ſeveral *Natures* become capable of ‡. His *Holineſs hates* and *abhors* all *Wickedneſs*, only as the *neceſſary Conſequence* of it is abſolute and unavoidable *Miſery*; and his *Veracity* or *Faithfulneſs* ſeems to be no farther concerned for *Truth*, than as it is connected with and productive of the Happineſs of all rational Beings: to provide the propereſt *Means* for attaining which great *End* is the exerciſe of his *Wiſdom*.

I have all along declin'd the Argument *a priori*, drawn from the Antecedent *neceſſity* of *Exiſtence*, as well for the Reaſons given in R. e. as alſo, becauſe it ſeem'd not to carry *ſome* Attributes ſo far as they might be deduced *a poſteriori*, and to be ſcarce conſiſtent with *others*. That the *Self-exiſtent* Being, for inſtance, is not a *blind*, *unintelligent* Neceſſity, but in the moſt proper Senſe an *underſtanding* and really *active* Being, cannot be demonſtrated ſtrictly and properly *a priori*, as Dr. *Clarke* ſays ‖ with a great deal of Reaſon; and how *abſolute Neceſſity* is reconcileable with *abſolute Freedom* ſeems hard to conceive. For why ſhould not this Neceſſity extend to all the *Operations*, the *Wills*, the *Decrees*, as well as the *Exiſtence* of the firſt Cauſe; and take away that Freedom of Determination, that entire *Liberty* of *indifference*, which our Author has ſufficiently proved †, to be a property of *God* himſelf, as well as *Man*? And if we cannot admit it in one Caſe, why ſhould we in the other? I don't ſay this *Neceſſity* is inconſiſtent with perfect *Freedom* as the former is an *Imperfection*, ſince we do not conceive it to be ſuch any farther than as it proceeds *ab extra*, from ſome ſuperior Cauſe *impoſing* it. But this I ſay, that be it what you pleaſe, the very *Nature* and *Idea* of it ſeems repugnant to that of *Freedom*, i. e. *the Power of determining in Caſes abſolutely indifferent, without any previous* Reaſon, Impulſe, or Neceſſity *whatſoever*; and conſequently theſe two can

‡ R. m. ‖ *Demonſt.* p. 52. 5th Edit.
† Chap. 5. §. 1. Subſ. 4. and elſewhere.

equal Cauſe, ſo infinite Poſſibilities require a Cauſe infinitely powerful. (11.)

VI. *Fourthly*,

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can never be *co-exiſtent* in the *ſame Cauſe*. He that conſiders this attentively will, I believe, find it to be more than a mere *Quibble* on the Words ‡.

Laſtly, This *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, being (as Dr. *Clarke* contends ‖) *ſimple* and *uniform*, without any poſſible *difference* or *variety*, ſhould admit of no difference or variety of any ſort, or in any reſpect; and conſequently muſt exclude all *diverſity*, or *different Kinds* of *Perfection* (as well as different *Perſons*) from the Divine Nature, which is ſuppos'd to exiſt thereby. It muſt be utterly inconſiſtent with that Variety of Attributes, ſuch as *Knowledge* and *Power*, &c. which we conceive to be very *diſtinct* Properties, and which Dr. *Clarke*, and every one elſe, concludes to be eſſentially in God.

If the *Learned Doctor*'s Notion of *abſolute Neceſſity* proves all this, I humbly conceive it proves too much, and if it does not prove this, I cannot apprehend how it proves any thing at all.

(11.) I ſhall give the Reader this Argument as it is propoſed after another manner by Dr. *Fiddes*, and the Anſwer to it by Mr. *Colliber*.

'To ſay a thing is poſſible, is to ſay there is ſome *thing*, ſome 'power or other capable of producing it. For *nothing*, or what 'has no power, can produce *no effect*. The Power therefore 'which is to bring what is *poſſible* into *Being*, is neceſſarily 'ſuppoſed already to exiſt; otherwiſe a *Perfection* might ariſe 'out of *non entity*, or without a Cauſe; and what we conceive 'poſſible would be *really* impoſſible. *'

Which the *Author* of the *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. confutes by a parallel Inſtance.

'If a Perſon having firſt proved the Exiſtence of a Power 'that is perfect, and made it appear that a perfect Power can-'not but extend to whatever is a capable Object of Power, 'or includes not a Contradiction; ſhould proceed to prove that 'the *Act of Creation* implies no Contradiction, and then at 'laſt ſhould conclude that therefore *Creation* is a poſſibility '(*i. e.* effectible by the exerciſe of that perfect or almighty 'Power, whoſe Exiſtence he had before demonſtrated) I con-'ceive there could be no reaſonable exception againſt ſuch a 'method of arguing. But if, on the contrary, he ſhould ſay, 'I plainly perceive there's no Contradiction in the Suppoſition 'of the Creation, or production of a thing that was not, and ſhould

‡ See R. e. and Note 43. ‖ *Demonſt.* Prop. 7.

* Theolog. Spec. p. 15.

Free. VI. *Fourthly*, Since *Space* is conceived as merely *idle* and *indifferent* with reſpect to *Repletion* or *Vacuity*;

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'ſhould from thence immediately infer that a Power capable of 'Creation exiſts, this would be a very prepoſterous way of de-'monſtrating: Which yet is the ſame method with that of the 'preſent Argument †.'

The ſame way of reaſoning has been made uſe of by the *Carteſians* and ſeveral of our own Philoſophers to demonſtrate the Being and Attributes of God from our Ideas of them in the following manner.

We can have no Idea of any thing, but what has either an *actual* or a *poſſible* Exiſtence; but we have an Idea of God, *i.e.* of a Being of infinite Perfections, which may poſſibly exiſt; therefore he muſt have an actual Exiſtence: For actual Exiſtence is a Degree of Perfection, and the forementiond Idea, according to the Suppoſition, includes all poſſible Perfection, therefore it muſt include that, otherwiſe we ſhould have an Idea of ſomething abſolutely perfect without one poſſible Degree of Perfection, which is a Contradiction in Terms.

But this is all begging the Queſtion. For it is not the bare *ſuppoſing* it to have all poſſible Perfections that infers its *actual Exiſtence*, but the *proving* it to have them. Indeed if we ſuppoſe it to have all poſſible Perfections, we muſt at the ſame time neceſſarily ſuppoſe it to exiſt, ſince Exiſtence is a poſſible Perfection; otherwiſe we ſhould ſuppoſe it to have all poſſible Perfections, and yet to want one, which is a Contradiction. But ſtill this is only an Exiſtence *ex Hypotheſi*, a true Conſequence from doubtful Premiſes, and which will as eaſily follow from the ſuppoſal of its having but any *One* perfection, ſince that muſt neceſſarily imply exiſtence. The certainty then of ſuch actual exiſtence does by no means follow from the ſuppoſed *poſſibility* of it, as theſe Men would be underſtood: This Concluſion will never hold good; what cannot be ſuppoſed without a Contradiction, certainly does not *exiſt*, therefore what can be ſuppoſed without a Contradiction certainly *does*.

Others endeavour to prove the *exiſtence* of God from our *Idea* of him after this manner. Whatever we have an *Idea* of, that either *is*, or if it be not, it is *poſſible* for it to *be*; but we have an Idea of an *Eternal* and *neceſſarily exiſtent Being*; therefore ſuch a Being either *is*, or it is *poſſible* for it to be. But if ſuch a Being either now *is not*, or once *was not*, or ever will *not actually be*, it would not be *poſſible* for it *to be at all* (except it could make itſelf, or be made by Nothing) contrary to the *former* Part of the Suppoſition: nor would

† *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 178.

cuity; ſince the *Matter* which fills Space is in like manner merely paſſive and indifferent with reſpect to *Motion* and *Reſt*; it follows that the *Cauſe* which fills Space with Matter, and produces Motion in that Matter, is perfectly *free*; ſo that the Creation and Motion of Matter muſt be the Works of free Choice, and not Neceſſity, in the Agent. For, if the Agent effected theſe by Neceſſity, they would alſo be neceſſary Effects, and could not be conceived to be in themſelves indifferent to Exiſtence or

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would it be either *Eternal*, or *neceſſarily Exiſtent*, contrary to the latter. Therefore ſuch a Being now is, and always was, and ever will be. Or ſhorter thus: Our Idea of God is an Idea of ſomething which implies no contradiction, and therefore ſuch a Being may *poſſibly be*; and therefore he *muſt actually be*, or elſe he *could not poſſibly be*, which is contrary to the Hypotheſis.

Now to make this or the like Argument of any force, it muſt be clearly prov'd that we have ſuch an *Idea* of a *neceſſarily exiſtent Being* as will infer its actual exiſtence; (which may perhaps appear ſomething doubtful from Remark e.) and alſo, that this Idea is *ſtrictly innate* or *connate* with us, and conſequently capable of being urged *a priori*, for a Proof of the Exiſtence of ſome Being correſpondent to ſuch an Idea; (which is now generally given up) For if this Idea be only gathered *a poſteriori*, viz. by a deduction of Arguments from our own Exiſtence, then it is only a Conſequence of theſe Arguments, and cannot itſelf be alledg'd as a diſtinct one. For how can any Idea conſequent upon ſome certain proofs of ſomething *a poſteriori*, be an antecedent, independent proof of the ſame thing *a priori*? Beſides, either theſe arguments are enough to convince any Man of the Exiſtence and Perfections of God, or they are not; if they *are*, this is *unneceſſary*; if they *are not*, this is *inſufficient*; nay, it is *none at all*, ſince 'tis a bare *conſequence* of theſe, and entirely *founded* in them, and therefore muſt ſtand or fall with them. It is ſubmitted to the Reader whether the famous Arguments drawn from our Ideas of *Eternity*, *Infinity*, *&c.* be not of the ſame kind with the foregoing. Thoſe that have a Mind to be farther acquainted with the proofs of a Deity drawn from the *Idea*, may find the Queſtion fully diſcuſs'd in *Cudworth*, p. 721, *&c.* or in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec.* B. 1. P. 1. C. 9. or in the Impartial Enquiry into the Exiſtence of God. B. 2. Part 1. See alſo *Parker.* Diſput. VI. Sect. 19, 20, 24. or *Ode.* Theol. Nat. p. 26, 31, *&c.*

* For

or Non-Exiſtence, as proceeding from a neceſſary Cauſe*.

That it is a conſcious *intelligent* Being, and *Omniſcient*

VII. *Fifthly*, Tho' by our outward Senſes, and the Notices which they convey to us, we cannot go beyond *Space*, *Matter*, *Motion*, *ſenſible Qualities*, and this *active Principle* which we are ſpeaking of; yet, if we inſpect our own Minds, we may contemplate a *Self-conſcious* and *thinking Principle* within us, whoſe Actions are to *will*, *refuſe*, *doubt*, *reaſon*, *affirm* and *deny*, which carry nothing of Extenſion along with them, nor neceſſarily include it in them, nor have any Relation to *Place* or *Space*; but are entirely abſtracted from the Notions of *external* or *internal*. That there is ſuch a Principle in us we are certain, not only from our Senſes, or the impulſes of external Objects, but alſo from Reflection and Self-conſciouſneſs. 'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that we can at our Pleaſure move ſome Parts of Matter, and ſhake the Limbs of our Body by Thought only, that is, by Volition †, whence it appears, that Motion may be produc'd in Matter by Thought; and that ſomething of this Kind is to be attributed to the firſt Cauſe, in order to put Matter into Motion, nay, to bring it into Being. *Cogitation* alſo, *Will* and *Conſciouſneſs*, or Faculties equivalent to theſe, are neceſſary to a *free* Cauſe, and on that Account to be attributed to the firſt Cauſe, being (as ſhall be ſhewn below) perfectly Free; Which Cauſe, ſince it is infinite (as we have prov'd) in its Eſſence and Power, it muſt be ſo likewiſe in *Intelligence*, viz. *Omnipotent* and *Omniſcient*.

VIII. *Sixthly*,

* For an excellent Illuſtration of this Argument, ſee Dr. *Clarke*'s *Demonſtrat.* p. 24, 25, 26. and 65, 66, 67. 5th *Edit.* See alſo *Cudworth*, p. 667, *&c.* and the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, *&c.*

† That *Volition* and *Action* are perfectly diſtinct, and muſt proceed from two different *Powers*, See Note 42. That *Action* alſo is two-fold, See Note 43.

VIII. *Sixthly*, Since this Principle (which we call *God*) is the Cauſe of all things, and infinite in *Knowledge* as well as *Power*, it follows that he acts, not by blind impulſe, but *for an End*; and has order'd his Works by ſuch Wiſdom, as to be conſiſtent with themſelves, and not deſtructive of each other. That he acts for an *End*.

IX. *Seventhly*, Since God is perfect in himſelf, ſince all Things ſubſiſt by his Providence, and ſtand in need of him, but he of none; and ſince he can neither be profited nor incommoded by his Works, nor affected by their Good or Evil; it follows that he made theſe Things for no advantage of his own, and that he neither receives nor expects any Benefit from them. For by creating things without himſelf, he muſt neceſſarily have ſought either their Benefit or his own; but what Benefit can God ſeek for himſelf, who poſſeſſes all Good? That certainly which was wanting to him, and neceſſarily muſt be wanting to a Being even abſolutely perfect, till he has created ſomething; I mean the Exerciſe of his Attributes *without*, the communicating of his Power and Goodneſs: That therefore only muſt he be ſuppoſed to have ſought in the Creation and Diſpoſal of his Works. (12.) Not that *Externals* can add That the end of Creation was to exerciſe the power, and to communicate the *Goodneſs* of the Deity.

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(12.) Some have objected here, that according to this Notion, there muſt have been a Time before the Exiſtence of any created Beings, when God was neither infinitely *happy*, nor abſolutely *good* *. But the one Part of this Objection evidently ariſes from a Miſtake of our Author's Notion, who has often told us, that he does not ſuppoſe any thing external to the Deity, to *add* the leaſt to his own Happineſs, or eſſential Perfections; (and indeed to think otherwiſe, would be worſe than to imagine the Fountain fed by its own Streams; or the Sun enlighten'd by its own Rays) but only to *manifeſt* them to us his Creatures, and encreaſe *our* Happineſs and Perfection, by our *Knowledge* and *Imitation* of them. The *other* part cannot be of force againſt Creation in any *particular* time, becauſe it will hold equally againſt it in *all* times; Againſt the very poſſibility of Creation in general; ſince with God there is no *prior*

* *See Bp.* Pearſon *on the* Creed, *2d. Edit. p.* 62, 63.

add any thing to *God*, for they have no manner of Proportion to his *Power* or *Nature*; but he has in himſelf the adequate Exerciſe of his Power, namely in the Contemplation and Love of himſelf. Externals therefore can neither encreaſe or diminiſh the *Exerciſe* of his Powers, which before was *infinite*. God is indifferent therefore as to theſe, nor does his Exerciſe *without* pleaſe him, otherwiſe than as he has choſen to exerciſe himſelf thus; as will be ſhewn below *. And hence it manifeſtly follows that the World is as well as it could be made by infinite *Power* and *Goodneſs*. For ſince the Exerciſe of the Divine Power, and the Communication of his Goodneſs, are the Ends for which the World was framed, there is no doubt but God has attained theſe Ends.

X. I

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poſterior, no difference of time applicable to his Exiſtence, as we have endeavour'd to prove in R. c. Beſides, is it not abſurd to talk of *Time*, before the beginning of Things, which (as we have ſhewn in the ſame Place) can only be conceived as *co-exiſtent with*, or rather *conſequential to* the Being of theſe things? 'Tis in vain therefore to aſk, why were not Beings created *ſooner?* Since no Part of Duration conceivable can ever be aſſigned when ſome were not created, and every Period of Time has equal relation to Eternity. 'As to the ſecond 'Senſe of the Queſtion (ſays *Cudworth*) Why the World tho' 'it could not poſſibly be from Eternity, yet was no ſooner, 'but ſo lately made? We ſay that this is an *abſurd Queſtion*, 'both becauſe Time was made together with the *World*, and 'there was no *ſooner* or *later* before *Time*; and alſo, becauſe 'whatſoever had a Beginning, muſt of Neceſſity be once but 'a *Day old*. Wherefore the World could not poſſibly have 'been ſo made by God in time, as not to be once but *five* 'or *ſix Thouſand* Years old and no more, as now it is," p. 887. See the ſame more at large in *Fiddes's Theol. Spec.* B. 3. Part 1. Chap. 2. and in *Bentley's Boyle's Lect.* p. 232, 235. 5th Edit. or *Jenkin's Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, Vol. 2. C. 9. or Sir *M. Hale's Prim. Originat. of Mankind*, S. 1. C. 6. Where you have all the abſurd Queries of that kind ſolidly and acutely anſwer'd.

(*A.*) We

* See Chap. 5. §. 1. Subſ. 4.

X. I know 'tis commonly ſaid, that the World was made for the *Glory of God:* But this is *after the manner of Men.* For *Deſire of Glory* is attributed to God in the ſame manner as *Anger*, *Love*, *Revenge*, *Eyes* and *Hands (A.)* When therefore the Scripture teaches us, that the World was created for the Glory of God, 'tis to be underſtood that the Divine Attributes, namely *Power*, *Goodneſs* and *Wiſdom*, ſhine forth as clearly in his Works, as if he had no other intent in making them beſide the Oſtentation of theſe Attributes; nor could they have anſwer'd that end more fitly if they had been deſign'd for *Glory:* But ſtrictly ſpeaking, the Power of God is infinite, and when he acts for the Good of his Creatures according to that infinite *Power*, he is *infinitely good.* Infinite knows no Bounds, nor has the

When the World is ſaid to be created for *God's Glory*, 'tis *after the manner of Men.*

NOTES.

(A.) We ſee many Things are aſcribed to God in Scripture by way of *Accommodation*; as Hands and Feet, Heart, Anger, Revenge, and Repentance. And ſince we underſtand all theſe to be ſpoken of him by way of Condeſcenſion to our Capacity, why ſhould we not underſtand the *Deſire of Glory* to be aſcribed to him in the ſame way? Eſpecially ſince we muſt conceive God to be obliged by his Goodneſs to ſet a great value on his *Glory*, and to require the promoting of it from us as a principal Duty. For the Good and Advantage of all reaſonable Creatures depends on the Obedience that is paid to God's Law; and there cannot be a more effectual Means to promote that Obedience than a due Senſe of the great and glorious Attributes of God; of his Wiſdom, Power, Juſtice, and Goodneſs. The more lively theſe are repreſented to intelligent Beings, the more willing and careful they will be to obey God, and the more afraid to offend him; and therefore it is agreeable to the Goodneſs of God to exact our Endeavours to beget this Apprehenſion in us and all other thinking Beings. Not for any Advantage this Glory brings to God; but becauſe the Reputation of the Lawgiver and Governour of the World is a Means neceſſary to advance the Good of his Creatures, and therefore it is our Duty and Intereſt in the higheſt Degree to promote that Glory: and therefore God may be ſaid to do all things *for his Glory*, becauſe if that were the end of all that he has done, he could not be more concerned for it, nor would it be more our Duty to promote it.

the Goodneſs of God any other Bounds beſide his *Wiſdom* and *Power*, which are alſo infinite. And in reality this makes moſt for the *Glory of God*, *viz.* to have created a World with the greateſt *Goodneſs*. (13.)

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(13.) 'The Reaſon why God made the World (ſays the 'learned *Author* ſo often cited above) was from his own over-'flowing and communicative Goodneſs; that there might be 'other Beings alſo happy beſide himſelf, and enjoy themſelves. And afterwards, 'God did not make the World merely to oſtentate 'his Skill *and* Power, *but to communicate his* Goodneſs, *which* 'is chiefly and properly his Glory, *as the Light and Splendor of* 'the Sun is the Glory of it *.

We have a fine Paragraph or two to the ſame purpoſe in Mr. *Wollaſton's Delin. of the Religion of Nature*, p. 115,—120.

The ſame Notion is well ſtated in *Scot's Chriſtian Life*; where the Glory of God and the Happineſs of Man are ſhewn to be *co-incident* †. As this ſeems to be very often miſunderſtood, it may not be improper to inſert a Paſſage or two from that excellent Author. '‡ A true Survey and inſpection of 'God's *Nature* will inſtruct us, that being *infinitely perfect*, as 'he is, he muſt be *infinitely happy* within himſelf; and ſo can 'deſign no ſelf-end without himſelf; and conſequently that 'the end for which he requires our Service, is not any Ad-'vantage he expects to reap from it, or farther *addition* to his 'own Happineſs, he being from all Eternity *paſt*, as complete-'ly happy as he can be to all Eternity *to come*; and therefore 'what other End can he be ſuppoſed to aim at, than our Good 'and Happineſs? It is true indeed, he deſigns to glorify *him-'ſelf* in *our* Happineſs; but how? not to render himſelf *more* 'glorious by it than he is in himſelf, for it is impoſſible; but 'to *diſplay*, and *ſhew forth* his own eſſential Glory to all that 'are capable of *admiring* and *imitating* him, that thereby he 'might invite them to *tranſcribe* that Goodneſs of his into 'their Nature, of which his Glory is the *Shine* and *Luſtre*, and 'thereby to glorify *themſelves*; and what can more effectually 'diſplay the Glory of a Being who is infinitely *wiſe* and *power-'ful*, and *good*, than to *contrive* and *effect* the Happineſs of his 'rational Creatures, who, of all others, have the moſt ample 'Capacity of Happineſs?

And again: '‖ But doth not the Scripture tell us, *that he* 'doth all things for his own Glory, and that he obtains this End, as well by *puniſhing*, as by *rewarding* his Creatures? Very 'true,

* *Intell. Syſtem*, p. 886. † See Vol. 1. p. 4, 5.
‡ Vol. 2. Chap. 6. p. 434, 435. ‖ Vol. 2. p. 204. Fol.

° XI. By *Good* I here underſtand that which is *convenient* and *commodious*, that which is *correſpondent* to the *Appetite* of every Creature. God therefore created the World with as great Convenience and Fitneſs, with as great Congruity to the Appetites of things, as could be effected by infinite *Power*, *Wiſdom*, and *Goodneſs*. If then any thing inconvenient or incommodious be now or was from the beginning in it, that certainly could not be hindered or removed even by infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs. (14.)

That God made the World as well as it could be made by the higheſt Power, Goodneſs and Wiſdom.

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° true, but then it is to be conſider'd that the Glory he aims ° at, conſiſts not in receiving any *Good* from us, but in doing ° and communicating all Good to us. For infinite Goodneſs ° can *no otherwiſe* be *glorified*, than by its own overflowings ° and free communications, and it can no otherwiſe be glori- ° fied in the Puniſhment of its Creatures, but only as it doth ° *good* by it: For ſhould it puniſh without good reaſon, it ° would reproach and vilify itſelf: but if it doth it for good ° reaſon, it muſt be becauſe it is good either for *itſelf* or *others*: ° for *itſelf* it cannot be; for how can an *infinitely* happy Be- ° ing reap any *Good* from *another's* Miſery? And therefore it ° muſt be for the Good of others, either to *reduce* thoſe who ° are puniſhed, or to warn *others* by their Example from run- ° ning away from their Duty and Happineſs. So that to do ° *Good* is the end of God's Puniſhment; and becauſe it is ſo, ° he is *glorified* by it: And conſidering that he is ſo *infinitely* ° happy, that he can no ways ſerve himſelf by our Miſeries, it ° is impoſſible he ſhould have any other end in concerning *him-* ° *ſelf* about us, but only the *great*, *God-like* one of doing us ° Good, and making us happy." See alſo Diſcourſe 14 in the ſame Vol. p. 302.

To the ſame Purpoſe is *Smith*'s excellent Diſcourſe of the *Exiſtence and Nature of God*, Ch. 4. and 7.† And *D'Oyly*'s firſt *Diſſertation*, p. 122. and *Rymer*'s *General Repreſentation of Reveal'd Religion*, p. 260, — 267. and p. 511. Bp. *Ruſt*'s Remains 1ſt Diſcourſe; and Bp. *Burnet*'s *Expoſition of the Articles*, p. 27. 4th Edit. and our *Author*'s *Sermon* on *Divine Predeſtination*, &c. §. 33. For a ſufficient Anſwer to the Objection drawn from *Prov.* 16. 4. ſee *Tillotſon*'s 2d Vol. of Sermons, Fol. p. 681.

(14.) Our *Author* rightly concludes from the *Nature* and *Will* of God, as diſcover'd above, that nothing can be made by him (by whom are all things made) really unworthy of, or incon-

† *See* Select Diſcourſes, p. 136. and 147, and 393.

inconſiſtent with theſe; however unaccountable and irregular things may at preſent ſeem to us; For, having demonſtrated the Divine Perfections in one Senſe *a priori*, i. e. prior to the Examination of particular Phenomena, no ſeeming difficulties or objections whatſoever *a poſteriori*, i. e, from theſe Phenomena, ought to invalidate the Belief of them, but ſhould be all over-ruled by, and give way to theſe; except they amount to an equal degree of *Clearneſs* and *Certainty* with the Proofs of theſe themſelves; and alſo cannot poſſibly admit of any manner of *Solution* conſiſtent with them; neither of which Caſes can ever be made out, as will, I hope, appear from the following Chapters of this Book.

REMARKS referred to in Note 10.

[Remark a.] THAT this Propoſition muſt be allow'd for *ſelf-evident*, and as ſuch, incapable of *proof*, appears from the *abſurdities* which they all run into who attempt to prove their own Exiſtence from any other *medium*, *viz.* from any of their *operations*. '*I think*, ſay they, therefore *I am*:' i. e. *I*, who *am*, *think*; therefore *I*, who *think*, *am*. I being ſuppoſed to *exiſt*, do think, therefore this *thinking* proves that *Exiſtence*. Is not this plainly arguing in a *circle*, and *proving* a thing by *preſuppoſing* it? And is it not full as clear to me firſt of all that *I am*, as that *I think*? Tho' I could not be certain of my Exiſtence except *I perceiv'd* ſomething; yet ſure the perception of my own Exiſtence muſt be both as *early* and as *evident* as any other perceptions. The firſt Propoſition therefore is *ſelf-evident*. I begin with our own Exiſtence becauſe we have *intuitive Knowledge* of no other.

[R. b.] See the abſurdity of this infinite Series, as to Generations, Motion, Number, Magnitude, in the Notes 3, and R. d. All or any of which Arguments demonſtrate the Abſurdity of it, as it is fairly and fully ſtated by Dr. *Green* in his late *Philoſophy**. Where you ſee the true old *Atheiſtic Series* in a different dreſs from that in Dr. *Clarke*'s 2d Propoſition.

The ſame way of reaſoning is made uſe of in a *Philoſophical Eſſay towards an Evidion of the Being and Attributes of God*, by *Seth Ward*†. This Piece being ſcarce as well as curious, an extract from it may not be diſagreeable, 'That the World 'was not eternal, but created, is demonſtrable from things 'that are viſible: Our Argument ſhall be from Generation. 'Whatſoever is begotten, was begotten of ſome other; for 'nothing can poſſibly beget or make itſelf, otherwiſe it will 'follow

* B. 6. C. 5. §. 8. p. 763. †. 2d. Edit. *Oxf.* 1655.

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'follow that the ſame thing is, and is not, both at one in-
'ſtant, ſeeing it is both the producer, and the thing to be
'produced. It is to be produced, and ſo it is not yet; it is
'likewiſe a producer, and that ſuppoſeth that it is in Being:
'It is therefore in Being, and it is not in Being, that's a ma-
'nifeſt contradiction. Wherefore nothing can generate, make,
'or produce itſelf: wherefore every thing that is begotten,
'is begotten of ſome other, and then the other which begot it,
'either was itſelf in the ſame manner begotten, or it was not;
'if it was not, we are already come to the firſt Principle,
'which was unbegotten; and ſo have diſcover'd a Godhead. If
'it was begotten, either we muſt follow up the Courſe of
'ſucceſſive Generation to ſome firſt Production from a Cauſe
'eternal, or elſe we muſt neceſſarily ſay that the Courſe of
'Generations had no beginning, and conſequently that infinite
'Succeſſions are already paſt, which is as much as to acknow-
'ledge that an infinite Number of Succeſſions are paſt, and if
'paſt, then they are at an end; So we have found an infinite
'Number which hath had an end, that is another Contra-
'diction. Again; if any ſhall affirm that the Courſe of Ge-
'neration had no beginning, but that the number of them hath
'been infinite: Let us put a Caſe, and reaſon with him. We
'will imagine the Generations of *Abraham*, for Example, and
'*Joſeph* the Son of *Jacob* the Son of *Iſaac*, the Son of *Abraham*.
'I demand therefore whether before the Birth of *Abraham* there
'had paſt an infinite Series of Generations, or not? If the
'Series was finite, the Work of Generation had beginning;
'which is the Concluſion I contend for: if the Series paſt was
'infinite; then at the Birth of *Joſeph*, 'tis evident that more
'Generations were paſt, ſo we have found a Number greater
'than that which was ſuppos'd to be Infinite: and conſequently
'that was not Infinite; ſo that it was both Infinite and not In-
'finite, a manifeſt contradiction.

'But if we ſay that *Abraham*'s was Infinite, and that ſo was
'*Joſeph*'s alſo, then it will follow that the Number of *Abraham*'s
'was equal with the Number of *Joſeph*'s; but *Abraham*'s was
'but a Part of *Joſeph*'s, wherefore the Part is equal to the
'Whole. Elſe admit that *Abraham*'s was finite, but when it
'came to *Joſeph*, that then the Number was Infinite, it follows
'then that a finite Number added to a finite ſhall make an In-
'finite, which likewiſe is againſt the common light of reaſon.
'We ſee therefore that ſuppoſing the Eternity of the World, or
'the Infinity of Generations, doth force the Mind to contra-
'dictions, and conſequently the Fiction is vain and utterly im-
'poſſible. And as we have argued in the way of Generation,
'ſo we may likewiſe in every thing where there is a Motion,
'or Mutation, that is, in all the parts of the viſible World.

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'The Creation therefore of the World, from the viſible things 'thereof, is manifeſt. *Q. E. D.* *

And again †. 'Well, having concluded the Creation and 'Beginning of the World, we ſee it follows that thence we 'conclude the Eternal Power and God-head; that is, the 'Eternity and Power of the God-head. As for Eternity, we 'have by undeniable Conſequence reſolved all Motions in the 'World into the Boſom of a Firſt-mover, and if we ſuppoſe 'him a Firſt-Mover, the Suppoſition will evidently conclude 'that he is Eternal, *i. e.* that he is without Beginning of Eſſence, 'or without any term or limit of Duration. For if it had any 'Beginning of Eſſence or Duration, that beginning of Being 'preſuppoſeth a priority of not-being, (that is, actual Being 'is not of the Eſſence of it) and ſo that we may, without any 'Contradiction, ſuppoſe it not to be yet in Being; that is, we 'may bring our Underſtandings, without Error, to the Appre-'henſion of it as being yet in the State of Power only, or Po-'tential-being, ſo as things are in their Cauſes. So then, let 'us conceit it in this State, and compare this State with the 'other when it had Being; and it is evident that this Paſſage, 'or Tranſition from want of Being to a Being, cannot be with-'out a Motion, nor Motion without an actual Mover: but that 'which moves a Thing from not-being to a State of Being, is 'neceſſarily a precedent Mover to that which from it receives 'its Being: So then that which is ſuppoſed to be the firſt ori-'ginal Mover will have a Mover, which ſhall of neceſſity have 'gone before it, and conſequently it will be both a Firſt and 'not a Firſt-Mover, which is a plain Contradiction. Inſtead 'of multiplying Arguments without neceſſity, we will only re-'turn by the Footſteps of our Analyſis, and ſo from the Be-'ing of the firſt Mover conclude the Eternity. If it be a 'firſt Mover, then it had no former Mover; and if ſo, then 'it never was produced from Nothing into Being; and if ſo, 'then it never had any beginning of its Being, then it is 'Eternal. Therefore whatſoever is the firſt Mover, it muſt 'of neceſſity likewiſe be Eternal: but from the common af-'fections of things viſible, we did before demonſtrate an Ori-'ginal and firſt Mover: Wherefore the Viſible things of this 'World, they likewiſe do evict the Eternity of the God-'head ‡.

'And that God was a God of *Power*, it was demonſtrated 'then, when we found him to be the firſt Cauſe and original 'Mover and Creator of the World ‖.

[R. C.] The generally receiv'd Notion of *Eternity*, as conſiſting in a continual addibility of *ſucceſſive Duration*, is, I think, the very ſame thing as an *infinite Series*, and conſequently liable to the ſame objections: We muſt therefore try to reſcue

* P. 19. † P. 22. ‡ P. 25. ‖ P. 34.

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reſcue this Divine Attribute from ſuch an abſurd interpretation.

Now, if we attentively examine our *Idea* of *Eternity*, I believe we ſhall find that it amounts to thus much: *viz. uniform, invariable Exiſtence:* or *ſimple Exiſtence* join'd with *Neceſſity:* by which laſt Word we only underſtand an *Impoſſibility of having ever began, or of ever ceaſing.* This I apprehend to be all that can conſiſtently be affirm'd of the Divine Exiſtence in this reſpect, and perhaps we may more eaſily and ſafely determine what the manner of it is *not*, than what it is; *v. g.* that it continues not by *time*, or in *place*. Indeed *local Extenſion* and *ſucceſſive Duration* are modes of the Exiſtence of moſt Beings, and therefore we find it very difficult to conſider any Exiſtence without them: But as we have endeavoured to ſhew the poſſibility of removing the *former* from the Divine Eſſence, in Notes 3, 6, and 7. ſo here, I think, it may be ſhewn alſo that the *latter* has no neceſſary connection with it, but rather the contrary.

In order to do this, it will be neceſſary to explain what we mean by *Time*, which (according to Mr. *Locke*) is of the very ſame *kind* with *Duration*; and may properly be term'd a *part* of it. This is very well defin'd by *Leibnitz*, to be the *Order of Succeſſion of created Beings*. We manifeſtly get the Notion of it by reflecting on the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, which we are apt to conceive as a *Chain* drawn out in length, of which all the particular Ideas are conſider'd as the *Links*. Whereas, had we but one *invariate perception*, without any ſuch Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, we could have no ſuch Notion as this of *Duration*, but that of pure *Exiſtence* only. Now *Exiſtence* being evidently a ſimple Idea, (tho' perhaps *Duration* be not) is conſequently incapable of a Definition, and we need, I think, only obſerve of it here, that if we join our Idea of *Duration* to it, we ſtill add nothing to the Idea of it as it is in *itſelf*, but merely a relation to *external* things; which Idea of Duration therefore ſeems purely accidental to it, and no neceſſary Ingredient of the former Idea, which is complete without it. *Time* then, or *Duration*, is an Idea entirely reſulting from our Conſideration of the Exiſtence of Beings with reference to a real or imaginary *Succeſſion*. Whence it will follow in the *firſt* place, that we cannot poſſibly frame any Idea of this kind of *Duration* without taking in Succeſſion; and ſecondly, that we cannot eaſily ſeparate the *Exiſtence* of any finite, changeable Beings from this kind of *Duration*.

Our next Enquiry muſt be whether this Idea of Duration be connected with the Exiſtence of thoſe Beings entirely as they *exiſt*, or only as they exiſt in ſuch a *particular manner:* Whether it belongs to all *Exiſtence*, as *Exiſtence*, or only to a particular *Sort* of Exiſtence, *viz.* that which includes the foremen-

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tion'd relation to Succeſſion. The latter, I think, will appear more probable, when we reflect that it is only from the *variableneſs* and *contingency* of our own Exiſtence, that all our Succeſſions ſpring: Whereas, were we entirely *independent*, we muſt be abſolutely *immutable*, and invariably *permanent*; and alſo, that we can contemplate even this Exiſtence of ours without any Succeſſion, *i. e.* we have a Power of confining our Thoughts and attending to one Idea *alone* for ſome ſmall *time* (if that Word be excuſable here) excluſive of all other Ideas and conſequently excluſive of Succeſſion. This Mr. *Locke* allows, being what he calls an *Inſtant*, which, ſays he, 'is *that which* 'takes up the Time only of one Idea in our Minds, without the 'Succeſſion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succeſſion at all*.'

Succeſſion therefore does not appear to be neceſſarily join'd with the Idea of abſolute exiſtence, ſince we can conſider *one* (for how ſmall a time ſoever) *without*, and *independent* of the *other*. Nay, laſtly, there is a certain exiſtence to which it cannot poſſibly be in any ſenſe apply'd, and that is a *Perfect* one. Suppoſe this perfect Being *alone* in nature, as we muſt believe him once to have been, and then what *change* of Nature, or *Succeſſion* of Ideas can be found? What *flux* of Moments, what *alteration* or *increaſe* can we imagine in his own uniform, invariable Eſſence? What Idea have we of *Duration* as apply'd to his Exiſtence, antecedent to his *Willing* and *Creating* External things? Such Duration then as we are acquainted with, can, I humbly apprehend, have no manner of relation to this immutable Being, while ſuppoſed to exiſt alone: But as ſoon as he determined to exerciſe his ſeveral Attributes in the production of ſomething without himſelf, then we have reaſon to think that *Time*, *Succeſſion*, and *Increaſe* began. "Tho' "the eternal Being had no neceſſary Succeſſion in his own Na- "ture, yet being perfectly *ſelf active* and *free*, thence it pro- "ceeded, that the exerciſe of his freedom in decreeing and pro- "ducing the Creatures, in ſuch a manner and order as was "judged fit by his moſt perfect Wiſdom, became the Original "of whatever real Succeſſion has been in Nature, and ſuch Suc- "ceſſion as we are apt to conceive to have *preceded*, is no other "than imaginary." †

To the ſeveral Objections againſt this Notion drawn from God's eternal *Wiſdom*, *Ideas*, *Decrees*, &c. See a ſufficient Anſwer in the ſame place.

I ſhall tranſcribe this Author's reply to the moſt common and conſiderable one about the Schoolmens *punctum ſtans*, which we alſo eſteem as indefenſible an Hypotheſis as the other.

"Some

* Eſſay on *Human Underſtanding*, B. 2. Ch. 14. §. 10.

† *Impart. Enquiry*, p. 208.

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" Some will poſſibly object that if there was once no real " Succeſſion in Nature, it will follow that the divine Exiſtence " was then at leaſt (as 'tis uſually ſaid to be) *Inſtantaneous*. But " to this it may be replyed that Exiſtence is nothing, if di- " ſtinguiſhed from the Being which exiſts. Conſequently there " can no real Quantity belong to it as ſo diſtinguiſhed. Where- " fore it cannot properly be denominated either *finite* or *infi-* " *nite*, *ſucceſſive* or *inſtantaneous*. For theſe are Attributes which " have a Reference to *Quantity*, and can no more agree to ex- " iſtence, which is but a *Mode* of Beings, than they can to Ne- " ceſſity, or Contingence, which are Modes of Exiſtence. To " define Eternity or neceſſary Exiſtence by Infinity or the Ne- " gation of Limits, ſeems to be no leſs impertinent, than to " define Virtue by the Negation of *Red* or *Blue*. For Exiſtence " (which has no Quantity or Dimenſions) hath no more Ana- " logy to Extenſion and Limits, than Virtue (which hath no " Colour) hath to Red or Blue. And for the ſame Reaſon it is " no leſs improper to define it to be *inſtantaneous*, ſince even " an *Inſtant* (as likewiſe an Atom) is conceived as quantity, " though the minuteſt imaginable. But if it cannot properly be " denominated inſtantaneous, much leſs can it be ſucceſſive." *

To which give me leave to add the Teſtimony of *Cudworth*.† Having confuted the abſurd Notion of the World's Eternity, he adds: " Here will the Atheiſt think preſently he has got a " great advantage to diſprove the *Exiſtence of a God*. *Do not* " *they who thus deſtroy the Eternity of the World at the ſame time* " *alſo deſtroy the Eternity of the Creator? For, if Time itſelf* " *were not Eternal, then, how could the Deity or any thing elſe* " *be ſo?* The Atheiſt ſecurely taking it for granted, that God " himſelf could not be *otherwiſe Eternal than by a ſucceſſive* " *flux of infinite Time*. But we ſay that this will on the contrary " afford us a plain *Demonſtration* of the *Exiſtence of a Deity*. " For ſince the *World* and *Time* itſelf were not *infinite* in their " *paſt Duration*, but had a *Beginning*, therefore were they both " certainly made together by ſome other Being, who is, in or- " der of *Nature*, *ſenior* to *Time*, and ſo *without* Time, *before* " Time: He being above that ſucceſſive Flux, and compre- " hending in the *Stability* and *immutable Perfection* of his own " Being, his *Yeſterday* and to *Day*, and for *Ever*. Or thus: " Something was of Neceſſity *infinite* in *Duration*, and without " a *Beginning*; but neither the *World*, nor *Motion*, nor *Time*, " i. e. no *Succeſſive Being* was ſuch; therefore is there ſome- " thing elſe, whoſe being and Duration is not *ſucceſſive* and " *flowing*, but *permanent*, to whom this Infinity belongeth. The " Atheiſts here can only ſmile, or make Faces; and ſhow their little

* *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 210. See alſo *Epiſcopius* Inſt. Theol. L. 4. C. 9. † *Intell. Syſt.* p. 644. *&c.*

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" little Wit in quibling upon *nunc ſtans*, or a *ſtanding Now of* " *Eternity*; as if this *ſtanding Eternity* of the *Deity* (which with " ſo much reaſon hath been contended for by the ancient *ge-* " *nuine Theiſts*) were nothing but a *pitiful ſmall moment of Time* " *ſtanding ſtill*; and as if the Duration of all Beings whatſo- " ever muſt needs be like their own; Whereas the Duration " of every thing muſt of neceſſity be agreeable to its Nature; " and therefore as that whoſe *imperfect Nature* is ever *flowing* " like a River, and conſiſts in *continual Motion*, and *changes* one " after another, muſt needs have accordingly a *ſucceſſive* and " *flowing Duration*, ſliding perpetually from *preſent* into *paſt*, " and always poſting on towards the *future*, expecting ſome- " thing of itſelf which is not yet in Being, but to come; ſo muſt " that whoſe *perfect Nature* is *eſſentially immutable*, and always " the *ſame*, and *neceſſarily exiſtent*, have a *permanent Duration*; " never loſing any thing of itſelf once preſent, as ſliding away " from it; nor yet running forwards to meet ſomething of itſelf " before, which is not yet in Being, and it is as contradictious " for it ever to have begun, as ever to ceaſe to be."

After all, it muſt be again confeſſed, that the Idea of Succeſſion (as Mr. *Colliber* obſerves) ſo inſinuates itſelf into our Idea of Exiſtence, and is ſo cloſely connected with the Exiſtence of all finite Beings, that we find it extreamly difficult to imagine the Eternal Exiſtence of God, any otherwiſe than as an Eternal continued Series or Succeſſion.

Our conſtant Converſation with material Objects makes it almoſt impoſſible for us to conſider things abſtracted from *Time* and *Place*, which (as was obſerved before) are Modes of the Exiſtence of moſt things, and therefore we are apt raſhly to apply theſe Conſiderations to the great Author and Preſerver of all Things. We ſeem to think that as the moſt exalted Idea we can form of God's *Eternity* and *Omni-preſence* muſt be infinite *Duration*, and unbounded *Extenſion*, ſo theſe are to be ſtrictly and poſitively attributed to him; whence muſt follow all the Abſurdities of *Paſt* and *Future*, Extenſion in *this* and *that* Place as compatible with the Divine Eſſence. Whereas *abſolute poſitive Infinity* (ſuch as belongs to God *) does, in its very Notion exclude the Conſideration of *Parts*; ſince no Addition of any Parts whatſoever can amount, or in the leaſt degree approach to it. (Though ſuch negative Infinity as belongs to all *Quantity*, cannot poſſibly be conſidered otherwiſe.†) So that whoſoever acknowledges God's Perfections to be ſtrictly *infinite*, does by that Confeſſion, deny that they may be conſidered as made up of Parts: That *Immenſity* can be compoſed of any *finite Extenſions*, or *Eternity* conſiſt of multiplyed *Durations*, and conſequently, that there can be *Length* or *Space*, *Diſtance* or *Time*, *paſt* or *future*, with the *Infinite and Eternal God*‡. When there-

* See Note 3. and R. 1. † See Note 3. and R. 1.

‡ See *Locke* on Hum. Und. B. 2. C. 15. § 42.

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therefore we ſay that God *always was*, or *ever will be*, we don't mean by theſe and the like Words, that his Exiſtence has ſtrictly any relation to Times paſt or future, that it is at all increaſed, altered, or affected thereby; but only thus much is intended, *viz.* that whenever we ſuppoſe any other Beings exiſting, or Time and Succeſſion begun, then it was, is, or will be poſſible for theſe Beings to affirm in any Part of this their Time or Succeſſion, that God *alſo exiſts*. In the ſame manner as it may be affirmed of ſome Propoſitions that they always were and will be true, that they are true in this or that, and every Place: though ſuch Aſſertions are exceedingly improper, becauſe Propoſitions or neceſſary Truths have no manner of Relation to either Time or Place. All Expreſſions therefore which imply Succeſſion, ſuch as, *was*, *will be*, *always*, *when*, &c. as well as thoſe that imply Locality, ſuch as *Ubi*, *where*, &c.† can only be applied to finite temporary things, which exiſt in Time and Place: With which things ſo exiſting, as well as every Point of Time and Place, the Deity is ſuppoſed to be *co-exiſtent*; though his own Nature and Eſſence be very different from theſe, and have properly no manner of relation to or connection with them. If then we will attribute *Duration* to him, it muſt be *permanent*, *unſucceſſive* Duration, *i. e.* Duration of a quite different *kind* from what we meet with here. But it is to be remembered that we don't pretend to explain the *Nature* of Eternity, or to determine the *manner* of ſuch Exiſtence as excludes all *Succeſſion*; ſince it is ſufficient for us here to ſhew the poſſibility of conceiving the thing in general, the certainty of it having been demonſtrated already, when we proved that ſomething muſt be *Eternal*, having alſo ſhewn that Eternity could not conſiſt in ſucceſſive Duration.

If then the Divine Exiſtence cannot include ſucceſſion of Parts, or our kind of Duration, (which perhaps by this time may not ſeem altogether improbable) neither can his *eſſential Attributes*. His *Knowledge*, v. g. can have no relation to times *paſt* or *future*, to *fore* or *after*; nor can any object be ſaid to be at a *Diſtance* from it, or any imaginary diſtance ſet *Bounds* to it.

The chief Reaſon why *we* don't perceive and know any thing that has a real Exiſtence, is becauſe that Exiſtence is removed from us by the Diſtance of *Time* or *Place*; But this Reaſon cannot hold with God, who is (though in a manner far different from his Creatures) always *preſent* to *all* times and places, and conſequently muſt behold all things exiſting therein, as well as we ſee any object at due Diſtance directly before us. Thus he that is travelling on a Road cannot ſee thoſe that come behind or are gone far before him; but he who from ſome *Eminence* beholds the *whole* Road from end to end, views at once all the diſtant travellers ſucceeding one another. But this,

† See R. h.

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I think, is ſo evident in itſelf thot neither Argument nor Simile can make it more ſo. See *Martin*'s Diſcourſe of Natural Religion Part 1. C. 8. or Note 76.

Hence then appears the Impropriety of thoſe Terms, *Divine Preſcience, Predeſtination*, &c. which have ſo long puzled the World to no manner of Purpoſe; And the only Concluſion at laſt muſt be, that all things which ever *were* or *will be*, which with reſpect to ſome former or latter times, and to Perſons placed therein, may be called *paſt* or *future*, are always equally and at once *preſent* to the view of God; that to him ſtrictly and abſolutely *a thouſand Years are as one Day*, and *one Day as a thouſand Years*, and that whatever Difficulties ſeem to attend this conception of things being *ſucceſſive* to us, and not ſo to him, can be no Argument againſt the Matter itſelf, which is demonſtrable; but only one of the many Inſtances of the Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding in things pertaining unto God.

Againſt the common Notion of *Eternity*, ſee the *Spectator*, N°. 590. or Sir *M. Hale*'s *Prim. Orig. of Mankind.* § 1. c. 6. p. 123. or a *Philoſophical Eſſay*, &c. by *Seth Ward*, p. 23. or *Grew*'s *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1. c. 1. par. 9. or *Ode, Theologia Naturalis*, p. 220.

Both this Attribute and Omnipreſence are alſo well treated of by *J. Smith*, in his Diſcourſe concerning the *Exiſtence and Nature of God*, C. 2 § 4, 5. *Select Diſcourſes*, p. 125, 126, &c. and by D. *Martyn*, *Diſcourſe of Natural Religion*, Part 1. C. 7. and Dr. *Sherlock on the Trinity*, p. 76, &c.

[R. d.] 'Here we find certain *Chains* of *Cauſes* and *Effects*, and many Parts of this *Syſtem* owing their *Exiſtence*, and 'the *manner* of their Exiſtence, to a preceding Cauſe, conſequently we cannot, with any Poſſibility of Reaſon, aſſert that 'the *whole* Syſtem exiſts without a Cauſe, for this is the ſame 'as to aſſert that the *Parts* do not belong to the *whole*. Again, 'a material Syſtem compoſed of Parts that are *changeable*, cannot exiſt without a Cauſe *diſtinct* from, and *prior* to ſuch a 'Syſtem. For wherever there is a *Change*, there muſt be a *Cauſe* 'of that Change, otherwiſe there would be a *Beginning* without a *Cauſe*. The Cauſe of this Change cannot be in the *materials* of this Syſtem for the very ſame Reaſon; therefore it 'muſt be in ſomething *diſtinct* from and *prior* to the Syſtem itſelf. The ſame will be the Caſe as to *Motion* in a material Syſtem; there is no Motion but what is the effect of a *former* 'Motion, conſequently there is no Motion in ſuch a Syſtem which 'has been from *Eternity*, or which has not been *Cauſed*, &c.*

'From the *Imperfection* alſo, or *Unhappineſs* which we ſee in 'this Syſtem, in *Man* particularly; from the *Frame* and *Conſtitution* of it, 'tis evident that it did not exiſt without a cauſe.

'The

* See *Collier*'s *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 31, 32, &c.

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'The Queſtion then will be, what *is* the Cauſe of its Exiſt-
'ence? Now that cannot be in *itſelf*, for then a thing would
'be before it was, which is a Contradiction. It follows then,
'that ſome other Being is the Cauſe of its Exiſtence, and the
'next Queſtion will be, *who* is this Being? Now as whatever
'began to exiſt muſt owe its Exiſtence to ſome *preceding Cauſe*;
'ſo that Cauſe, if it has not exiſted eternally, muſt likewiſe
'owe its Exiſtence to ſome *other* preceding Cauſe, and that to
'*another*, and ſo on till we aſcend to (the *firſt Cauſe*, or to) a
'a Being that is *Eternal*, and exiſts abſolutely *without* Cauſe.
'And that there is ſuch a Being is evident, otherwiſe, as no-
'thing could begin to exiſt without a Cauſe, ſo nothing that is
'not eternal could ever have exiſted. †

[R. e.] That the Idea of *Self-Exiſtence* can imply nothing more than a *Negation* of *Dependence* on any Cauſe; and that *neceſſity of Exiſtence* can only be conſidered as a Conſequence reſulting from ſuch Independence ſeems very clear. A Being which is the firſt of all Cauſes, itſelf abſolutely uncauſed, cannot have any thing in any manner of Conception *prior* to it, or which may be conſidered as a poſitive *Ground* of its Exiſtence. We can therefore only prove his Exiſtence *a poſteriori* and argue from the manner of it in a *negative* way. See Note 4. From the order of Cauſes we gather that he muſt neceſſarily have been from all Eternity, otherwiſe his Exiſtence would have aroſe from nothing; and that he muſt continue to all Eternity, otherwiſe an end would be put to that Exiſtence by nothing. But this is ſtill only a *Conſequential* Neceſſity ariſing from the Abſurdity which would attend the contrary Suppoſitions, and to infer any thing from hence concerning the *Modus* of the Divine Being ſeems to be building a great deal more on this Argument than it will bear. This is indeed a *Reaſon* by which we find that he muſt always exiſt, but it is a Reaſon to *us* only, and does not affect *his* own Nature, or the Cauſe of it, and when it is applyed to *that*, I think 'tis uſed equivocally. Conceiving that he cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed not to exiſt, is far from conceiving *how* or *why* he actually *does exiſt*; we can eaſily ſhew a Reaſon for the one, but it ſeems above human Comprehenſion to account in any Reſpect for the other: Nay, the Attempt to do it ſeems altogether as abſurd and uſeleſs, as endeavouring to ſhew how or why a thing is what it is: How a Firſt Cauſe is a Firſt Cauſe; or why Truth is Truth.

Farther: This *eternal Being*, we ſay, is *Independent*; or, which is the ſame thing, *Self-exiſtent*, i. e. his Exiſtence depends upon nothing *beſide* himſelf? But does it therefore poſitively

† *Enquiry*, p. 11, 12, 18, *&c.* See alſo Dr. *Bentley*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* Serm. 6. p. 127, *&c.* 5th Edit. and the other *Authors* referred to in Note 3.

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depend *upon* himſelf? Will it follow that becauſe he has no *external* Cauſe, therefore he muſt have an *internal* one? Or becauſe no ground or reaſon of his Exiſtence can be drawn from any other Subſtance, therefore one muſt be contained in his *own Subſtance, or ſelf?* This is uſing the Word *Self-exiſtent* in two different Senſes, both as *negative* and *poſitive*, which have no manner of Connection with each other, and the latter of which will perhaps appear to be no very good one. It is not then apparent yet that there needs any *Phyſical Reaſon* at all for the *Exiſtence* of the *eternal, independent Being.*

Nor, Secondly, if there did, would this *Neceſſity* of *Nature* uſually aſſigned as ſuch, ſerve for that Purpoſe. For firſt it is not the *Subſtance* itſelf, that would be to make the ſame thing the *Ground* of itſelf; which is nonſenſe. 'Tis therefore a *Perfection, Property* or *Attribute* of that Subſtance (we know no other Diſtinction) and as ſuch muſt, in the Order of our Ideas, be Conſequent upon the exiſtence of that Subſtance in which it is ſuppoſed to inhere. Whatever it is, it has in ſome reſpect or other a *relation* to the Subject to which it belongs. Let it then be an *Attribute ſui generis, cujuſcunque generis* (if we mean any thing at all by this Word) it muſt be *predicated* of, and *preſuppoſe* its Subject, and conſequently cannot, according to the Order of our Ideas, be the antecedent *ground* or *foundation* of it. And to endeavour to clear it (as ſome do) by making it not an Attribute of the *Subſtance*, but of the *attribute* of the Subſtance; or as they phraſe it, a *Property* of a *Property*; is only thruſting it ſtill farther back, and making it poſterior in conception to both the Subſtance and its Attribute or Property.

But Thirdly, ſuppoſing this *Neceſſity*, this *Ground* or *Reaſon*, could be conſidered as *antecedent* to the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual *exiſtence*, we are got but one ſtep farther yet; for, will there not be the ſame neceſſity for demanding a *reaſon* for that reaſon, *a ground* for that ground, and ſo on *in infinitum?* And what ſhall we get by ſuch an endleſs progreſſion? Why ſhould we not ſtop at a firſt *Being*, as well as at this *Ground*, which muſt itſelf want a foundation if the other does, ſince there cannot be any intuitive Knowledge in either: and the ſame reaſons which are given for ſtopping at this *Ground* will hold equally for ſtopping before we come at it, and convince us that we might as well, or perhaps better, acquieſce in the *actual* Exiſtence of the firſt Being. We muſt then reſt ſomewhere: We muſt either admit one firſt Cauſe of all Things and Qualities, itſelf *exiſting* without Cauſe (for that is implyed in its being called the firſt) or an *infinite ſeries* of Beings exiſting without any original Cauſe at all; *i. e.* either *ſome one* thing muſt be without a Cauſe or *every thing*.

Here then are two Difficulties; the leſs is to be choſen, let us ſee which that is. Now if the *Manner of Exiſtence* in all theſe

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Beings were entirely the ſame, I grant it would be as eaſy to ſuppoſe *all* of them *exiſting* without a Cauſe, as *One*. But here I think lies the Difference: There was a time when all of them, except one, were indifferent either to *exiſtence* or *non-exiſtence*; were nothing. Therefore for them that were once indifferent to *exiſtence* or *non-exiſtence*, to be actually determined into Exiſtence, to be brought from *nothing* into *ſomething*, or made what they once were not; is a real *change*, an *action*, an *effect*, and as ſuch, muſt require ſome *changer*, *agent*, *cauſe*. But on the other hand, all that we know of this *one* Being, is, that it *now exiſts* and *always* did ſo; that it never had a *Beginning* of its *exiſtence*, was never changed from what it is, never *made* or produced: Here is no *effect*, and therefore no *reaſon* nor *room* for a *ground* or *cauſe*. Nay, to aſſign one in any reſpect *prior* to its exiſtence, as it muſt be ſuppoſed to be if conſidered as a Cauſe; (and it muſt be conſidered as a Cauſe, or extrinſic Principle, if conſidered at all; I mean ſo as to be made any uſe of in the preſent Queſtion, or to infer any thing concerning actual Exiſtence) I ſay, to aſſign any Ground *prior* to the *exiſtence* of this Being, would be to prove this Being *not eternal*, nor the *firſt Cauſe*: as attempting to prove a *ſelf-evident* propoſition is endeavouring to ſhew that propoſition not to be ſelf-evident by aſſigning a *clearer*.

Now to lay down ſome *neceſſity*, *ground*, or *reaſon* of Exiſtence, muſt either be to propoſe it by way of *Cauſality*, or to fix no manner of Idea at all to theſe Words: and indeed no manner of Idea ſeems poſſible to be fixed to them, which is not utterly inconſiſtent with exiſting without Cauſe, as that Being is proved to exiſt. For why do we conſider that *Ground* or *Reaſon in the order of our Ideas* as *antecedent* to the Exiſtence of the Being, otherwiſe than as it ſeems *in the Order of Nature antecedently neceſſary* to the Exiſtence of that Being? To which nevertheleſs we allow, that no *Thing*, *Mode*, *Quality* whatſoever can be really antecedent.—The Caſe will be no better if we imagine this neceſſity *co-etaneous*, or *co-exiſtent* with the Exiſtence of the Being which is ſupported by it; Since this is to ſuppoſe *that* actually exiſting already, in order to the Exiſtence of which this *neceſſity* is introduced; and alſo ſeems much the ſame as an effect *co-exiſtent* with its Cauſe. For as we ſaid before, this *Neceſſity* muſt either be a *Cauſe*, or *nothing* at all to the preſent purpoſe. And that it was propoſed as ſuch by the Author that introduced it, is I think pretty plain, from his terming it ſometimes a *formal* Cauſe, and ſometimes one which *operates*. *

The whole Caſe then ſeems to ſtand thus. On the one hand there is a certain *alteration* made, a poſitive *effect* produced

* See Dr. *Clarke*'s Anſwer to the 3d. Letter, p. 473. and Anſwer to the 6th. p. 488. Lines 1, 8, 35. Seventh Edition.

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without a *Cauſe*; which is a clear Contradiction. On the other hand there is a *difficulty* indeed, but not an apparent Contradiction: There is ſomewhat exiſting of which we can give no *account* (the manner of whoſe *Exiſtence* is different from that of any thing elſe) which will admit of no *Cauſe*, the Idea of which is entirely repugnant to that of *Cauſality*.

This may be hard to conceive, but cannot be denyed without affirming ſomething worſe, namely an expreſs contradiction, as has been ſhewn above. In order to ſet this in as clear a light as is poſſible, I ſhall take the Liberty to inſert a Paſſage from the learned Writer cited in Note 3. and 9. 'The Idea of a 'Self-Exiſtent Being is the Idea of a *Being that always was, is, 'and will be*, becauſe he always was, is, and will be infinitely '*able* to be. If you aſk why he is ſo, I know not; Why I be-'lieve ſo, I think I know; it is becauſe he has *in fact* exiſted 'from all Eternity, which he could not have done, had he not 'been infinitely able to exiſt. If you aſk after the ground or 'foundation of this *infinite Ability*, it is the ſame that is the 'ground or foundation of all his other Perfections, his infinite 'Nature, Eſſence or Subſtance; if you aſk farther for the ground 'of *that*, I muſt call it trifling: if you aſſign *abſolute Neceſſity*, 'I muſt aſk what's next? Or what that means? Or refer you to 'the *Indian* Philoſopher's *Elephant* and *Tortoiſe*, as the beſt 'comment upon *abſolute, antecedent Neceſſity*.'

Neither need we run ourſelves into ſuch Abſurdities as theſe: This independent Being *exiſts becauſe it does exiſt*; or, it exiſts by *chance*. Since it is enough for us to ſay, *There can be no Reaſon why it does exiſt*; or, which is the very ſame thing ſtill, no Cauſe, either *Efficient* or *Formal*; no cauſal Neceſſity, or antecedent Ground of its Exiſtence.

I ſhall only beg leave to obſerve one thing more in this place, namely, that all the abovementioned reaſoning about *neceſſary exiſtence* ſeems to be built upon that falſe Maxim which *Leibnitz* lays down as the foundation of all Philoſophy (and which Dr. *Clarke* was very ready to grant him, ſince it was the foundation of his own Book on the Divine Attributes) namely, that *Nothing is without a reaſon, why it is rather than not, and why it is ſo rather than otherwiſe*. Though the Dr. is ſoon forced to deny this very Principle, when (in his Way of conſidering *Time* and *Space*) he propoſes the *mere Will of God*, as the only reaſon why the World was created at ſuch a certain period of time, and in ſuch a particular point of Space.* Of which *Divine Will*, or of its determination, according to himſelf, there can poſſibly be no manner of *reaſon*, ſince he ſuppoſes theſe effects of the divine Will to be, in every poſſible manner of Conception, abſolutely *equal* and *indifferent*, and conſequently it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe any reaſon of ſuch ſpecial *Will*, or ſuch

* 3d *Reply*, N°. 5. p. 81.

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ſuch particular *determination*. If then we may ſuppoſe two things in nature abſolutely and in every reſpect *equal* (which *Leibnitz*, to be conſiſtent with himſelf, and I believe for no ſufficient reaſon elſe, found it neceſſary to deny) the preference of one of theſe before the other muſt be abſolutely without a *reaſon*. And though there may be a ſufficient reaſon for a perſon's *acting* in general, rather than not acting at all, yet (as *Leibnitz* well obſerves*) except there be one alſo for his acting in a certain *particular manner*, which in the preſent Caſe there cannot be (according to Dr. *Clarke*'s own Conceſſion †) the abovementioned Principle is intirely overthrown. See more of this in Note 42. and the latter part of N. 45.

The ſame Argument will hold againſt *Locke*'s *Hypotheſis of Anxiety*, if it be conſidered as the ſole and abſolute determiner to all Action ‡, ſince it can never determine the *Mind* to *Will* one Action before another, where both are entirely equal; of which kind numberleſs occur in life, as will be ſhewn at large in its proper place.

[R. f.] For a Being to be *limited*, or *deficient* in any reſpect, is to be *dependent* on ſome *other* Being in that reſpect, which gave it juſt ſo much and no more ‖; conſequently that Being which in *no* reſpect depends upon any other, is not limited or deficient at all. For though *Figure*, *Diviſibility*, &c. and all manner of Limitation, is in *one* Senſe (*viz.* in Beings *eſſentially* imperfect) as Dr. *Clarke* obſerves §, properly a mere *Negation* or *Defect*; yet in another, *viz.* in a Being which is eſſentially perfect in any reſpect, Finiteneſs muſt be conceived as a *poſitive Effect* of ſome Cauſe reſtraining it to a certain Degree. In all Beings capable of Quantity, Increaſe, &c. and conſequently *uncapable* of *Perfection* or *abſolute Infinity*; *Limitation* or *Defect* is there a neceſſary conſequence of *Exiſtence*, and cloſely *connected* with it, and is only a *Negation* of that Perfection which is entirely *incompatible* with their *Eſſence*; and therefore in theſe it requires no farther *Cauſe*. But in a Being naturally *capable* of *Perfection* or abſolute *Infinity*, all *Imperfection* or *Finiteneſs*, as it does not *neceſſarily* flow from the *Nature* of that Being, it ſeems to require ſome *ground* or *reaſon*, which reaſon muſt therefore be foreign to it, and conſequently is an effect of ſome *other*, external Cauſe, and conſequently cannot have place in the Firſt Cauſe. That this Being is *capable* of Perfection or abſolute Infinity, appears, I think, from hence, that he is manifeſtly the Subject of one infinite or perfect Attribute, *viz. Eternity*, or abſolute invariable Exiſtence. His Exiſtence has been ſhewn to be perfect in this one reſpect, and therefore it may be perfect in

* *5th Letter* N°. 17. p. 169. † N°. 1, 2. p. 12. *of his 4th Reply.*
‡ See Note 45. ‖ See *Scott* in Note 21. § *Dem.* p. 56, 57.
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every other alſo. Now that which is the Subject of one Infinite Attribute or Perfection, and *may* have others ſo too, *muſt* have all of them Infinitely or in Perfection: Since, to have any Perfections in a finite limited manner when the Subject and theſe Attributes are both *capable* of ſtrict *Infinity*, would be the foremention'd abſurdity of poſitive *Limitation* without a Cauſe. This method of arguing, will prove any Perfection to be in the Deity *infinito modo*, when we have once ſhewn that it belongs to him at all: at leaſt, will ſhew that it is unreaſonable for us to ſuppoſe it limited, when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation, which is as far as we need, or perhaps can go.

[R. g.] That the Word *God* is generally underſtood in a *relative* Senſe, ſee *Newton. Princ. Schol. Gen. ſub. fin.* p. 523. *&c.* 3d. Edit. or *Maxwell's* Appendix to *Cumberland*, p. 106. or *Chambers* under the Word *God*.

To ſhew that there is only *one* Eternal Self-exiſtent Being, which bears the Relation of God to us, ſeems to be going as far as either is neceſſary or natural Light will lead us. As Dr. *Clarke's* Demonſtration of this and ſeveral other Attributes is entirely founded on his Idea of *Neceſſity* of Exiſtence, as that alſo is on *Space*, *Duration*, &c*. they muſt ſtand or fall together. They who endeavour to deduce it from *Independence*, or *Omnipotence* evidently preſuppoſe it in their definition of theſe Attributes.

The foregoing Paſſage and part of Note 10, to which it refers, having been called in Queſtion by the Author of *Calumny no Conviction*, or *a Vindication of the Plea for human Reaſon*, p. 58. *&c.* I ſhall endeavour to explain them in this Edition. *The Phenomena of Nature lead us up to one firſt Cauſe, which is ſufficient for their Production, and therefore none elſe are neceſſary*; i. e. neceſſary to the Production of theſe Phenomena, according to the former Senſe of *Neceſſity* laid down in p. 23.† and which is the only Senſe that Word could be applyed in here without Equivocation. *And though ſeveral [illegible] Independent Beings might poſſibly exiſt, yet would they be no [illegible] would have no relation to us, nor we any thi[illegible]* i. e. if the Suppoſition of their Exiſtence [illegible] to the Production of this Syſtem we could perceive [illegible] it at all, we could never diſcover it by our [illegible] therefore it would be nothing to us. And though two or three ſuch Beings ſhould exiſt and act in the Formation and Government of their diſtinct Syſtems, or *agree in one*, yet till their Exiſtence and Operations were made known to us, and a natural Relation diſcovered, nothing would be owing from us to them, they would have no *religious* or *moral* Relation to us (if I may ſo ſpeak) we ſhould have no reaſon to call any more than one of them *our* Creator, Preſerver, and Governour, which Senſe the Word *God* more eſpecially bears, as this Author I'm ſure will not deny.

Since

* See Note 3. and R. c. p. 65. † *1ſt Edition.*

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Since the ſame Reaſon holds for no more than one *ſuch, to ſuppoſe more than one is at leaſt unreaſonable.* By an unreaſonable Suppoſition here I mean a groundleſs one, or that which has no reaſon to ſupport it, as the ſame Word is uſed concerning *Infinity*, p. 63.* *It is unreaſonable for us to ſuppoſe it limited when we can find no manner of Ground for any Limitation.* Such Suppoſitions as theſe ought never to be built on in philoſophy, but yet when they are advanced I ſhould not think that my not ſeeing any reaſon for them is an effectual confutation of them. There may be many Beings in Nature that have no apparent relation to any thing that I know of, and conſequently for or againſt whoſe Exiſtence I can find no reaſon. I ſhould be glad therefore to ſee upon what this Author grounds the following Conſequence which he adds, 'the ſame Reaſon holds for no 'more than one, *therefore there is but one:*'—If by the Word Reaſon he means a Reaſon *a priori*, I muſt expect ſome better Proof of it than I have hitherto been able to meet with before I can admit it: And it was exclusively of any ſuch that I aſſerted that *they who endeavour to deduce the Unity from Independence or Omnipotence, preſuppoſe it in their Definition of theſe Attributes*; which I think they do in the following manner. Having proved the Exiſtence of ſome firſt Cauſe, which as ſuch can depend upon no other Cauſe for its Being and Perfections, and therefore muſt exiſt *alone* or be *originally ſelf-exiſtent*; (all which is demonſtrable, but does not ſhew us why there may not be twenty ſuch firſt Cauſes, all underived and ſo far *independent*) having got thus far in their Proof of Independence, they add another Idea to it and include an abſolute Independence in every reſpect, an infinite *extent* or *exerciſe* of its ſeveral Attributes on every Being in Nature; which ſuppoſes that there are no other Beings of equal Perfections with himſelf, but that he exiſts *alone*, or is *ſelf-exiſtent* in another Senſe of theſe Words, which does not at all follow from the former. In like manner inſtead of defining Omnipotence to be Power perfect in kind, which has no defect or mixture of weakneſs in it, or a Power in God over every thing which he has produced, (which is enough for our purpoſe, and all perhaps that can be ſtrictly demonſtrated, but yet does not infer Unity) they make it a Power over every thing which exiſts beſide himſelf, which again ſuppoſes that there are no Beings of the ſame kind with himſelf, which I apprehend to be begging the Queſtion. If this Author takes theſe two Attributes in the larger Senſe, I ſhould be obliged to him for a Proof of them from any Medium but that of *antecedent Neceſſity*, which I fear is a Principle that may with equal Reaſon be brought to prove any thing. I muſt confeſs that to me who am obliged to draw all my Notions and Arguments concerning the Deity from his Effects, it would be difficult to demonſtrate

* 1*ſt Edition.*

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monſtrate againſt the Suppoſition of more than one uncauſed active Beings governing in their ſeveral Provinces, and each producing (not whatever was abſolutely poſſible or *fit to be produced* * but) what was poſſible or fit for *him* to produce; tho' I don't know any Ground for ſuch a Suppoſition. I ſhall make no obſervation on this Author's eight Arguments for the *Unity* till he has taken an Opportunity (as he promiſes †) to conſider what has been ſaid againſt the Principles on which they are founded, which I heartily deſire. His Appendix ſhall be examined in its proper place.

[R. h.] We cannot include any ſuch Notion in *Omnipreſence*, as makes the Deity *preſent in his ſimple Eſſence to* (i. e. co-extended or co-expanded with) *every point of the boundleſs Immenſity*; ‡ ſince this Idea of *Extenſion*, or Expanſion, ſeems plainly inconſiſtent with that *ſimple* Eſſence. § Not that we ſuppoſe theſe Attributes of *Knowledge* and *Power* acting *ſeparate* from his Eſſence; but we ſuppoſe his Eſſence to have no more *relation* to the Idea of *Space, Place, where*, &c. than either of theſe Attributes has. ‖

Dr. *Clarke*'s Query, 'How can it be ſhewn upon any other 'Principle than that of Neceſſary Exiſtence, that his *governing* '*Wiſdom* and *Power* muſt be *preſent* in thoſe boundleſs Spaces 'where we know of no *Phenomena* or *Effects* to prove its Ex-'iſtence?' ¶ is well anſwered by *Epiſcopius*. 'I ſhall give it in his own Words. '*Hoc* (*nempe Deum eſſe extra mundum*) *non* '*modo prorſus eſt* ἀκαταλήπτον, *ſed etiam valde abſurdum; quia* '*totum atque omne illud ſpatium quod extra hunc mundum eſſe di-*'*citur, nihil omnino reale eſt, ſed pure pute imaginarium, & pror-*'*ſus nihilum; ut autem Deus eſſe dicatur in pure pute imaginario,* '*& prorſus nihilo, per ſe abſurdum eſt: quia* eſſe in *dicit realem* '*habitudinem aut denominationem ab eo in quo quid exiſtit: Rea-*'*lis autem habitudo & denominatio a nihilo, ſive ab eo quod nihil* '*reale eſt, accipi nullo modo poteſt. Dicere Deum ibi habere in-*'*triſicam & abſolutam præſentiam* [illegible] '*eſt fingere præſentiam ſine Relati*[illegible] '*quid præſens eſſe dicitur, quod imp*[illegible] '*enim ſive abſoluta præſentia, qu*[illegible] '*non eſt præſentia in nihilo; ſed m*[illegible] '*nihilum*' ‖‖

That a wiſe and powerful Being [illegible] all parts of the Univerſe is plain from *Effects*, but to go beyond this into what is called *extramundane Space*, and prove the Exiſtence of Knowledge and Power where there is nothing to which they can be referred, nothing to be *known* or *acted upon*, is to us in-

* P. 59. † P. Laſt. ‡ Dr. *Clarke*'s Demonſt. p 47.
§ See Note 6. ‖ See Note 7. ¶ *Anſwer to the 7th Letter*, p. 499. ‖‖ *Inſt. Theol.* L. 4. c. 13. p. 294.

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incomprehenſible. And no leſs ſo to ſpeak of the *Preſence* of theſe Attributes, or of a Being endowed with them, (*viz.* an immaterial unextended one) to any point or Part of Extenſion; except it be metaphorically, as eternal Truths are ſaid to be the ſame in every time and place, *&c.* Though in reality they have no relation to either one or other, but are incommenſurate to and of a nature quite different from both Time and Space, as we obſerved in R. c.

To argue that every Subſtance which affects another muſt be *preſent* to it, from the old Maxim that *nothing can act where it is not*, is ſtill ſuppoſing that a *Spirit* exiſts *ſomewhere*, or is circumſcribed by ſome Parts of *Space*: 'Tis confining its Exiſtence to one particular *Mode*, concerning the *Modality* of which we can only reaſon negatively, *viz.* that it is not the ſame as that of *Matter*, or by way of *Extenſion* in any Senſe.

To the trite Objection, that what has no *Magnitude*, or is *no where*, is therefore *Nothing*, ſee a ſufficient Anſwer in *Cudworth*, p. 770, to 778, *&c.* How this agrees with *Philo*'s Paradox, *that God is every where and yet no where*, ſee *ibid.* p. 773. But the ſtrongeſt Confirmation of this Opinion, which Dr. *More* ſtiles *Nullibiſm*, may be drawn from the learned Dr's Arguments againſt it in his *Enchir. Metaph.* C. 27.

[R. i.] By the above mentioned *Pleaſure* or *natural Good*, I mean that Pleaſure which every one feels in himſelf. By the *Production* of it here I underſtand both the producing ſuch in himſelf, and alſo in others; to both which he is equally determined by his Nature, though from quite different Principles. To the former he is directed by Self-Love: To the latter by a certain diſintereſted benevolent Inſtinct or Affection; and that which determines him to approve this Affection and the Actions flowing from it is called his *moral Senſe*. The former of theſe Inſtincts, as it implies Increaſe of Happineſs, is only applicable to finite, imperfect Creatures: The latter may be common to us and the Deity; Who could have been determined to create us only by ſuch a diſintereſted Benevolent Affection as this is ſuppoſed to be? This is always approved by the Moral Senſe; though it may be doubted whether ſuch a Senſe be confined entirely to it. See *Butler*'s Diſſert. on the Nature of Virtue, p. 315.

The Object of both theſe Inſtincts is *natural Good*; and, I think, *moral* Good may be allowed to conſiſt in the Proſecution of either, or both of them together, ſo long as the former is in due Subordination to the latter.

That all the Notion we can poſſibly frame of *Moral Good* or *Evil*, of *Virtue* or *Vice*, &c. conſiſts entirely in *promoting* this natural *Good* or *Evil* is ſufficiently confirmed by *Sherlock*.‡ Whereas, ſays he, we diſtinguiſh between *Moral* and *Natural Good*

‡ *On Judgement*, p. 20, to 24.

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'*Good* and *Evil*; the only difference between them is this, that '*Moral Good* and *Evil* is in the *Will* and *Choice*, *Natural Good* 'and *Evil* is in the *Nature of things*; that which is *good* or '*hurtful* to ourſelves or others, is *naturally Good* or *Evil*; to '*love*, to *chuſe*, to *do* that which is *good* or *hurtful* to *ourſelves* 'or *others*, is *morally Good* or *Evil*: or is the *Good* or *Evil* of 'our *Choice* or *Actions*. If you will recollect your ſelves, you 'will find that you have no other notion of *Good* or *Evil* but 'this:- when you ſay ſuch a Man has done a very *Good* or very '*Evil* Action, what do you mean by it? Do you not mean 'that he has done ſomething very good or very hurtful to *him-* '*ſelf* or others? When you hear that any Man has done *Good* 'or *Evil*, is not the the next Queſtion, *what* good or what hurt 'has he done? And do you not mean by this, *Natural Good* 'or *Evil*? Which is a plain Evidence, that you judge of the '*Moral Good* or *Evil* of Actions, by the *Natural Good* or *Evil* 'which they do.' See more on this Subject delivered in the the ſame Place, with an elegance and perſpicuity peculiar to that *Author*. And to the ſame purpoſe is *Turner*'s *Diſcourſe* of the *Laws* of *Nature* and the *Reaſon* of their *Obligation*.

This ſeems to be the ultimate *Criterion* of that *Fitneſs*, *Congruity*, *Reaſonableneſs* and *Relation of Things*, ſo often repeated by ſome late Writers, *without* or *beyond* which I can fix no meaning at all to theſe words. And this Criterion ſhould I think, have been more clearly and diſtinctly ſpecified. For when you ſay any thing is *fit*; muſt we carry our Enquiries no farther? Is it not a very proper Queſtion, to aſk, *for what is it fit? Fit*, *Congruous*, &c. as well as the Word *Neceſſary*, are mere relative terms (as we obſerved in Note 4.) and evidently refer to ſome *End*, and what can the end be here but Happineſs? ‡ Theſe *Relations*, &c. may perhaps in ſome tolerable Senſe be called *Eternal* and *Immutable*, becauſe whenever you ſuppoſe a Man in ſuch certain Circumſtances, ſuch Conſequences and Obligations did or will always follow.

What is now good for me in [illegible] ſpects, will always be ſo in the [illegible] ſpects, and can never be altered [illegible] of things, or the preſent Syſtem: [illegible] *Relations* therefore to be any real *Entities*, or to have exiſted from all *Eternity*, or to be antecedent to, or independent of the Will of God himſelf; as ſome Writers ſeem to have done, if they had any determinate meaning at all (for which ſee Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s Illuſtrat. § 2. p. 250, 251.) We cannot, I ſay, imagine them

‡ See an excellent Piece entitled, *Divine Benevolence*; particularly, pages 15, 22, 30, 31, 32.

‖ See *Locke*'s Eſſay, B. 4. C. 11. § 14. or *Turner* on the Laws of Nature, and their Obligation, § 20, or Note 5a.

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them to be either ſtrictly *eternal* or *independent* of the Will of God, becauſe they muſt neceſſarily preſuppoſe a determination of that Will, and are in truth only Conſequences of the Exiſtence of things proceeding from that Determination.* Much leſs can we apprehend how theſe *Relations*, &c. 'Are to be 'choſen for their own Sakes and intrinſic Worth; or have a full 'obligatory Power antecedent to any reward or puniſhment annexed either by natural Conſequence or poſitive Appointment to 'the Obſervance or Neglect of them.'† Since the Natural Good or Happineſs conſequent upon and connected with the Obſervance of them, is to us their ſole *Criterion*, the *Argument* and *Indication* of their *Worth*, the Ground of all their *Obligation*.

The Notion of abſtract *Fitneſs* is pretty well handled by *Turner*. 'The *Laws of Nature* [or which is the ſame, *Natural* 'Right and Wrong] are ſuch Laws and Rules of Life, as to the 'Breach of which there is a natural Puniſhment annexed. For 'to ſay a thing is eſſentially good or evil, to call it by hard 'Names, and to affirm that it hath a Natural Turpitude; or, 'to paſs a Compliment upon it, and call it a Moral Rectitude, 'and ſuch like fine ſcholaſtic Terms — without aſſigning a 'particular Reaſon of Intereſt, why we ſhould do the one or 'avoid the other, is as much as to ſay, a thing is good for 'nothing; or it is bad, but we know not why; or it is good 'or bad, for a Woman's Reaſon, becauſe it is: And this Reaſon will ſerve as well to prove that Murder or Adultery are 'good things, as that they are bad ones.' ‡

'The Laws of Nature, therefore, have every one of them 'their Sanction in *themſelves*, ‖ *i. e.* ſome things naturally tend 'to our Happineſs, and others to our Miſery, and for that Reaſon they become natural *Laws* to us, or are *Rules* to direct 'our Actions by; and we are *obliged* to do the one and avoid 'the other upon a Principle of Self-happineſs, and Self-preſervation, which is the very Root and Spring of all Obligation 'whatſoever. ¶

'From whence we may diſcern the Vanity and Folly of 'thoſe learned Men, who are uſed to talk ſo loudly of *eſſential Rectitudes*, and *eternal Notions*, and I know not what 'phantaſtical *Ideas*, in an abſtracted way; whereas there is 'indeed nothing which is either good or bad merely *by itſelf*, 'but every thing which is good, is good, that is, uſeful to 'ſomething; and every thing which is bad, is ſo with reference to ſome Nature or other, to which it is more or leſs 'pernicious and deſtructive; from whence it follows (the

'nature

* See our *Author*, C. 1. § 3. par. 9. and C. 5. § 1. par. 23, &c. and Note 52.

† *Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, prop. 1. § 7. p. 218.

‡ *Laws of Nat.* &c. § 1. ‖ *Ibid.* § 2. ¶ *Ibid.* § 6.

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'nature of Obligation being a reſult ariſing from the uſefulneſs or hurtfulneſs of a thing propoſed to be the Object of 'a free Agent's choice, with reſpect to that Agent which is 'converſant about it) that all Obligation muſt be not of a 'ſimple, but of a compound, or concrete nature, and muſt always have an inſeparable reſpect to the Intereſt or Happineſs of thoſe to whom that Obligation is binding. And it 'is not only true, that our Intereſt and our Duty are both of 'them the ſame, but that it is abſolutely impoſſible any thing 'ſhould be our Duty, which is not our Intereſt into the Bargain; for no Man can poſſibly be obliged to that which all 'things conſider'd, will be to his Diſadvantage †.'

Farther, moſt Authors who treat of the Production of this *Natural Good* or *Evil* in ſuch a manner as to conſtitute Right or Wrong, moral Good or Evil, *&c.* appear either to equivocate in a double meaning of the Words: *viz.* as they imply producing Happineſs either in *ourſelves* alone, or in *others*; (which are two very different things, and ſhould accordingly be always diſtinguiſh'd) or elſe to be deficient in pointing out a *Rule*, and proving an *Obligation* to it in the latter Senſe, *viz.* with reſpect to *others*. This great defect in their Syſtems ſeems to ariſe from not ſufficiently attending to the above mention'd *Moral Senſe* or *Conſcience*, (as the meaning of this latter Word is fix'd by Mr. *Butler* ‡) which is of itſelf both *Rule* and *Obligation*. As an *Inſtinct*, it directs us to approve ſuch Actions as tend to produce Happineſs in others, and ſo is a *Rule* whereby we determine all ſuch Actions to be virtuous; as it gives us pain, or makes us uneaſy at the Neglect of theſe Actions, or at the Practice of the contrary ones, it ſo far *obliges* us to purſue them, or makes the Practice of them neceſſary to our *Happineſs*: Which is the true meaning of the Word *oblige*, (as was ſhewn in the *preliminary Diſſertation*: and is proved more at large by *Cumberland* *.)

That, and that only can be ſai[illegible] to oblige us, which is *neceſſary to our Happineſs*, and every [illegible] does ſo far oblige us as it is neceſſary. Now, as the Sum of [illegible] depends upon the whole of our Exiſtence, [illegible] only can be a *complete* and indiſpenſible Obligation, which is [illegible] to the Sum total of our Happineſs. Or, that Being only can abſolutely and effectually oblige us, who has it in his Power to

† *Laws of Nature*, &c. §. 14. *See alſo the* Supplement *to the Nature of the Sacraments*, &c. *The* Eſſay *on* Moral Obligation, *or Divine Benevolence, or* Mr. Clarke's *Foundation of Morality, or* Bp. Gaſtrel's 1ſt Boyle's Lect. p. 93, *&c.*

‡ Serm. *2d.* and *3d.*

* C. 5. §. 27. See alſo *Puffendorf*, B. 1. C. 6. §. 5. N. 4. and §. 8. Note 1.

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to make our whole Exiſtence happy or miſerable; and of conſequence, the *Deity* who alone has that Power, muſt neceſſarily be taken into all Schemes of Morality, in order to ſuperinduce a full, adequate Obligation, or ſuch an one as will hold at all times, and extend to every Action; and an endeavour to exclude the Conſideration of his Will, or to deduce all Obligation from any Principles independent of it, has, I think, occaſion'd another great Defect in moſt of our modern Syſtems.

N. B. What has been here ſaid about *Inſtinct, Affection, Moral Senſe*, &c. may ſeem to imply that theſe are all *innate*: contrary to what was proved in the *Preliminary Diſſertation*: And indeed this was drawn up at firſt upon a Suppoſition of the Validity of that Notion, which many may perhaps eſteem valid ſtill, and therefore I let the Argument ſtand in the old Terms: eſpecially as it is not at all affected by the Truth or Falſity of that Notion; ſince it will really come to the ſame thing, with regard to the Moral Attributes of God and the Nature of Virtue and Vice, whether the Deity has *implanted* theſe Inſtincts and Affections in us, or has framed and diſpoſed us in ſuch a manner; has given us ſuch Powers, and placed us in ſuch Circumſtances, that we muſt neceſſarily *acquire* them; they'll be alike natural, and equally valuable parts of our Conſtitution in either Senſe, as all *Axioms* are equally certain and ſelf-evident in Mr. *Locke*'s Scheme of no innate Principles, and the old one.

And tho' I take implanted *Senſes, Inſtincts, Appetites, Paſſions* and *Affections*, &c. to be a Remnant of the *Old Philoſophy*, which uſed to call every thing *Innate* that it could not account for; and therefore heartily wiſh that they were in one Senſe all *eradicated*, (which was undoubtedly the Aim of that great *Author* laſt mention'd; as it was a natural Conſequence of his firſt Book) yet common uſe has fix'd this Notion of Innateneſs to them, I am obliged to follow my Author, and treat of them in the common Language. Only let it be obſerved here once for all, that every Argument which is built upon theſe Senſes, &c. will be equally concluſive whether they be implanted or acquired. As to the preſent point in particular, Mr. *Hutcheſon* has fully proved that in fact we are led inſenſibly, and by the Circumſtances of our Being, to love and approve certain Actions which we call virtuous: Which is enough for my purpoſe as was hinted above. Againſt the Notion of *implanted Inſtincts*, See *Velthuyſen de Principiis juſti & decori*, p. 73, &c. *Amſtel.* 1651. or an Eſſay on *Moral Obligation*, Chap. 5.

[R. k.] That God muſt have the ſame Judgment and Approbation of this Moral Good, which all Rational Beings naturally

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turally have ¶; and that we muſt judge of the Nature and Perfections of the Deity, only by that Nature and thoſe Perfections which we derive from him, is, I think, very plain: I mean, that we muſt not endeavour to conceive the ſeveral Attributes of God by *ſubſtituting* ſomething in him of *a quite different kind, and totally diverſe* from that which we find in ourſelves, (as the learned Author of the *Procedure of Human Underſtanding* ſeems to declare, p. 138, and elſewhere) even though that could be in ſome reſpects ſimilar and *analogous* to this: But we are to ſuppoſe ſomewhat of the very *ſame kind* and *ſort*, the ſame Qualities or Properties in general, to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of *Defect* or *Imperfection* which attends the particular *Modus* or Degree of their Exiſtence, as they are in us. Thus we aſcribe to God all kinds of apparent Perfection obſervable in his Creatures, except ſuch as argue at the ſame time Imperfection (v. g. Motion, which neceſſarily implies Limitation) or are inconſiſtent with ſome other and greater Perfection (v. g. Materiality, which excludes Knowledge and Liberty †.) We alſo remove from him all *want, dependence, alteration, uneaſineſs*, &c. In ſhort, all that reſults either from ſimple finiteneſs, or from the mere Union of two finite imperfect Subſtances, ſuch as conſtitute Man. And when we have thus applied every thing in every manner of Exiſtence which ſeems to imply Perfection, and excluded every thing in every manner of Exiſtence which implies or includes the contrary, we have got our Idea of an abſolutely perfect Being, which we call God. 'Tis therefore attributing to God ſome real Qualities of a certain determinate kind, (v. g. Knowledge or Power, Goodneſs or Truth) the nature of which Qualities we do perceive, are directly conſcious of, and *know*, which gives us an Idea or Conception of him, and a *proper* one too, (if any ſuch Diſtinction of Ideas were allow'd) and not imagining ſome others, we cannot tell of what ſort, totally different in nature and kind from any that we ever did perceive or know; which would give us no Idea or Conception at all of him, either proper or improper.

In like manner we frame a natural Conception of a Spirit in general (which we confeſſedly have) not by ſubſtituting ſome properties *different* in *kind* from thoſe which we perceive in our own Spirit; but by ſuppoſing the very ſame properties, *i.e.* in *kind* (*viz. Thought* and *Action*) to be alſo inherent in ſome other immaterial Beings which we therefore call by the ſame Names.

¶ See *Scott*'s Chriſtian Life, Part 2. C. 1. p. 21, 22. 1ſt Edition.

† See *Tillotſon*, Serm. 76. 2d Vol. Fol. p. 569, &c. Dr. *J. Clarke* on Moral Evil, p. 95, &c. and *Scott*'s Chriſtian Life, Part 2. C. 6. §. 2. p. 447, &c. 1ſt Edit.

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Names. Now this is (as far as it goes) true, real knowledge, and may be apply'd and argu'd on intelligibly: but the other would, I fear, take away all poſſibility of arguing about the ſeveral Attributes or Properties of the Deity from thoſe of ourſelves, and *vice verſa*; all our reaſonings upon them (as the learned Author ſays of *Metaphor*, p. 134.) would be precarious, and without any ſolid foundation in the *Nature* of things. Such analogical Knowledge then as that, is (according to my Notions of Knowledge) ſtrictly and properly none at all; and if the Author uſes *Analogy* in that Senſe, 'twill, I believe, be ſtill taken only for a ſort or degree of *Metaphor*, after all he has ſaid, in the laſt Chapter of his firſt Book, to diſtinguiſh them.

I would here be underſtood to affirm thus much of the ſimple *Nature* only, or *Kind*, or our *abſtract Idea* of theſe Qualities *themſelves*, and not of the *manner* of their Exiſtence: which two [though this Author is pleas'd to uſe them promiſcuouſly in p. 84, *&c.*] ſeem yet very diſtinct Conſiderations. For we apprehend ſeveral Properties, or Qualities, as exiſting in our own Nature, independent of any particular manner; nay, in very *different manners*: v. g. Knowledge, either by Senſation or Reflection, by Deduction or immediate Intuition: Love attended with a certain degree of Pleaſure or Pain, *&c.* and therefore we ſuppoſe that theſe Qualities may exiſt in the Divine Nature in a manner entirely different from what they do in us, and yet be the very ſame Qualities ſtill; which *Modus* of the Divine Being, or of any of his Attributes, is totally unknown to us, and we can only gueſs at it by ſome diſtant reſemblance or *Analogy*; which Analogy I would therefore apply to this *Modus* of Exiſtence, and to this *only*; which ſeems ſufficient for all the great Purpoſes of Religion, and in which Senſe the Notion is exceedingly juſt and uſeful, but cannot, I think, be extended to our Idea of the *whole Nature* and *Genus* of the Attribute itſelf. For if the Divine Attributes be *toto genere* diſtinct and different from thoſe Qualities which we eſteem perfections in ourſelves or others, if [as the ſame Author urges ¶,] '*the* '*greateſt perfections of thoſe Creatures which fall under our* '*Obſervation, and thoſe we find in ourſelves particularly* [and 'theſe he will grant to be all that we have any Idea of] *are* '*really but ſo many Imperfections, when referr'd or attributed to* '*the Divine Nature, as it is in itſelf, in any meaning whatſoever, even with the moſt exalted meaning we can poſſibly annex* '*to them,*' [the Author underſtanding, I ſuppoſe, as uſual, the *whole Nature* and *diſtinguiſhing kind* of thoſe Qualities in themſelves;] Then, how ſhall we diſcover which kind of Qualities God prefers before the contrary? How can we be certain that *theſe* in particular are agreeable to him? or how ſhall we hope and endeavour to make ourſelves *like* him? Can we know the na-

¶ Pag. 82.

nature of one thing by another, entirely different from it? or can we imitate what we don't at all apprehend? 'It is *fooliſh* [ſays A.Bp. *Tillotſon*] *for any Man to pretend that he cannot know* 'what *Juſtice, and Goodneſs, and Truth in God are; for if we* 'do not know this, 'tis all one to us whether God be good or not; 'nor could we imitate his Goodneſs: for he that imitates, endea-'vours to be like ſomething that he knows, and muſt of neceſſity 'have ſome Idea of that to which he aims to be like; ſo that if 'we had no certain and ſettled Notion of the Juſtice and Goodneſs 'and Truth of God, he would be altogether an unintelligible Be-'ing: and Religion, which conſiſts in the Imitation of him, would 'be utterly impoſſible ¶.' Theſe Conſequences will hold equally againſt the Doctrine deliver'd by our Author in the Sermon annex'd, if he did not ſuppoſe that there were ſome Qualities in Men in *ſome reſpects* really *correſpondent* to thoſe in God, and ſo very like them that nothing could be more ſo except that which exiſts in the very ſame *Manner* and *Degree* too, *i. e.* in a *perfect* one. If this be his meaning, [as is not improbable from his Anſwer to the like Objections in §. 22. where he declares that the Divine Attributes have much more *Reality* and *Perfection* in them than the things by which we repreſent them, *&c.*] If, I ſay, he be taken in this Senſe, as I would willingly underſtand him, he is perfectly clear from the exceptions made above. I wiſh the learned Author of the *Procedure, &c.* could be ſhown to be ſo, who is generally ſuppoſed to have purſued his notion of *Analogy* farther than moſt Perſons will be able to follow him. As he has charg'd our Author with a *miſtaken way of treating the Subject* †, I hope he will be ready to excuſe any for obſerving what they conceive to be a miſtake in his own method, eſpecially if they endeavour to ſhew *directly that the foundation of Analogy*, as he has placed it, *is falſe and groundleſs* ‡: which Foundation is the general *nature* or diſtinguiſhing *kind* of theſe *Qualities*. Now the nature of the forementioned Qualities muſt either be wholly the ſame in God and us, or wholly different: if the former be maintain'd, then this analogical Senſe is turn'd into an identical one; if the latter, then can no manner of Reſemblance or *Analogy* be drawn between them; ſince one nature (as has been obſerv'd) cannot in the leaſt help to repreſent or explain another *quite different* from it; I mean, in thoſe very points wherein they differ; for that is to be different and not different, alike and unlike in the very ſame reſpect, at the ſame time: And then this analogical Senſe is turn'd either into a *diſparate* or quite *oppoſite* one, *i. e.* into no analogy at all: Or laſtly, they muſt be *partly* the *ſame*, and *partly different*, or alike and unlike

¶ See ABp. *Tillotſon*'s Serm. 76. Vol. 2. Fol. p. 672. and p. 678.

† Introduction, p. 17. ‡ Ibid.

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like in *different reſpects* (which is the thing we contend for) *viz.* alike in *Perfection*, or in *being* Perfections of a certain kind, and unlike in *Defect*, or imperfection; *i. e.* mixed with the contrary Qualities: or the ſame in *Nature*, or *Eſſence*, but different in *Degree*, and the *manner* of Exiſtence. Or take it thus: the Qualities *as ſuch*, or conſider'd in the *Abſtract*, are the ſame; as exiſting in a particular *Subject*, different. In an infinite (or rather *perfect*) Subject, they exiſt *perfectly*, or in the *higheſt Degree*; they are *abſolute*, without any *Mixture* or *Defect*. In a finite or imperfect one they are *limited*, *allayed*, or *defective*; they exiſt in an *imperfect Manner*, or *inferior Degree*. Conſequently we conceive them to be alike in both as *Perfections*, or Qualities of a certain *nature* or *kind*; unlike only as mix'd with *Imperfection*, or as confin'd to a certain *Degree*. If therefore the Author founds this Analogy on the very *Nature* of the thing, he ſeems to incur the forementionn'd abſurdity, of ſuppoſing a nature contradictory to itſelf; *i. e.* analogous to ſomething from which it is at the ſame time totally and entirely different. If, with us, he will pleaſe to diſtinguiſh between the *Nature* of the thing in general, and the particular *Modus* of its Exiſtence, he muſt with us alſo remove this analogy from the former foundation, and fix it upon the latter. — Farther, no *Similitude* whatſoever, whether deduced from human Reaſon or Holy Scripture, can have force enough to perſuade us, that the *whole nature* of theſe things is quite different from what we apprehend or can conceive them to be; ſince it is univerſally allow'd, that no compariſon can [as we commonly ſay] *run upon all four*; or [which is the very foundation and deſign of this whole analogical Scheme] can ever conſtitute a proper and *concluſive Argument*, in order to prove to us ſuch a paradox: and if ſo great Streſs is to be laid on any, v. g. that of a *Looking-Glaſs*, uſed in a ſtrict Philoſophical manner, [as the Author of the *Procedure* ſeems to do ¶] why may not ſome urge it ſtill farther, and argue that as the Image of your Face ſuppoſed to be ſeen in the Glaſs, is nothing real, ſolid, and ſubſtantial contain'd in the Glaſs itſelf, but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain; ſo all the conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himſelf, but mere Phantaſms and deluſive Images, exiſting only in our own Mind. This, will theſe Men ſay, muſt appear abſurd at firſt Sight, and yet may be drawn from the Similitude with as much Propriety as the reſt; conſequently the whole Scheme of this *Analogy* is to be rejected as entirely falſe, and at laſt the true Medium of all our Knowledge in the Nature of theſe things, will be what we truly and properly *perceive* of them, in ſome ſmall degree in *ourſelves*.

¶ Pag. 112, &c.

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If it be objected here, that the *Nature* and *Modus* of any thing muſt be the very ſame, ſince by different Natures are only meant different *Manners* of Exiſtence.

I anſwer: By the Nature of any thing, I underſtand its ſeveral *diſtinguiſhing Properties*. By the Nature of any *Property* I underſtand ſome certain poſitive *Mark* or *Character* which diſtinguiſhes that property from any others. Thus, by the nature of Body, I mean, ſolid, diviſible, figur'd and moveable Extenſion. By the Nature of Solidity, I mean Reſiſtence, or a power of excluding other Bodies out of its place; which Mark ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from Diviſibility, or any other property belonging to the ſame Body, as well as all the fore-mention'd properties diſtinguiſh a Body from ſomething elſe: both which we may therefore properly enough be ſaid to perceive or *know*; tho' perhaps we may never in like manner know *how* theſe ſeveral Properties are united together, and come to form one Aggregate or *Subſtance*; nor *whence* this Power or Property of Reſiſtence proceeds, or how it is *caus'd*, which is what we underſtand by the *Modus* of each. So that knowing or having a clear determinate Idea of a certain Thing or Quality, ſo as to be able to diſtinguiſh it from another Thing or Quality, and always perceive it to be really *thus*; is quite different from knowing how the ſaid Thing or Quality *comes to be* thus: *How* or *why* it is, are *Modes* of Exiſtence, and differ plainly from *what* it is, or what *Idea* we have of it, which denotes its *Nature* or *Eſſence*.

Againſt this Notion of *Analogy*, as apply'd to the *whole Nature* of the Attributes of God, ſee *Fiddes*'s *Body of Divinity*, B. 1. Part 2. c. 13. and his *Practical Diſcourſes*, Fol. p. 234, &c. or *J. Clarke* on *Moral Evil*, p. 95, &c. or *Chubb*'s *Tracts*, p. 146, &c. or, *the preſent State of the Republick of Letters for* July 1728. or, *a Vindication of the Divine Attributes*, by Dr. *Edwards*. See alſo the *Minute Philoſopher*, V. 1. p. 247.

Some objections having been made to this Remark by an eminent Writer ¶, I ſhall here ſet down the Subſtance of his Arguments, and what I take to be an Anſwer.

In the firſt place, the learned Author would have it obſerv'd that in a compariſon made between the Attributes of God and thoſe Qualities which we eſteem Perfections in ourſelves, it is affirm'd that they are of the ſame *Nature or Eſſence*, and yet *partly the ſame and partly different*, p. 68.

Anſwer. Nature or *Eſſence* is only that which determines the *Species* of theſe Qualities, or denominates them of this or that *Sort*: this may be the ſame, tho' they be different in another ſenſe of the word *Nature*, *i. e.* as including every thing which does or may attend the whole of their Exiſtence. Thus *Goodneſs* or Benevolence is of the ſame *kind* in God, Angels and Men, *viz.*

¶ Caſe of Reaſon, by *W. Law*, p. 68, &c.

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viz. a *Diſpoſition to communicate Happineſs*, which I call the *Nature* or *Eſſence* of it; but differs as it is attended with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*; as *calm* or *paſſionate*, which I call *manners* of Exiſtence: or as it is more or leſs *intenſe*, *pure* or *unmix'd*, which I term *Degrees* of Perfection.

For affirming things to be the ſame in nature which are in ſome reſpects very different, we have this Author's own Authority, p. 149. 'As Love is the ſame paſſion in all Men, yet it 'infinitely different; as Hatred is the ſame paſſion in all Men 'yet with infinite differences; ſo Reaſon is the ſame faculty in 'all Men, yet with infinite differences.

2dly. 'Tis urged that all the Attributes inherent in the Divine Nature are *neceſſary*, *eternal*, *infinite*, *immutable*, *independent*, *&c.* all the Qualities in human Nature the direct contrary, therefore they cannot be *partly the ſame*, but muſt be *wholly different*: as different in their *Nature* as mutable is from immutable, *&c.* Ibid.

Anſw. *Eternity*, *Neceſſity*, *&c.* don't at all affect the Nature of theſe Attributes or Qualities in our ſenſe of the Word *Nature*, *i. e.* do not make 'em to be Qualities of ſuch a *ſort*, any more than if they were in a contrary ſtate. *Knowledge* is no more *Knowledge* for being *eternal* or *immutable*. Power is as much *Power*, whether it be independent or derived, whether it ceaſe to morrow, or laſt for ever; and ſo of the reſt.

3dly, If the Attributes in God and Qualities in Men be *alike in Perfection*, they muſt be alike in *Eternity*, *neceſſary Exiſtence*, *&c.* becauſe theſe things conſtitute the *Perfection* of the Divine Attributes, p. 69.

Anſw. This is taking the Word *Perfection* in a ſenſe different from that in which we underſtand it, and in which this Author himſelf ſeem'd to uſe it in the laſt Page, where he mentions *thoſe Perfections which are in ourſelves*. In this place he means the *abſolute* perfection of any thing in *all reſpects*: I take it only for ſome certain Quality, which as ſuch is called *a* Perfection, *i. e. valuable*, or the foundation of Happineſs to a Being in one reſpect, tho' not in others. Thus Knowledge, as far as it is *Knowledge*, or can be intitled to that Name, is as much, or as *really*, a perfection in Man as in God: the Idea of this Quality as diſtinguiſhable from any other Quality is the ſame in both; tho' there be a difference as to extent or freedom from Ignorance, which is the *Degree* of it; or as it does, or does not conſiſt in Deduction, or ariſe from Senſation, *&c.* which are *Modes* of its Exiſtence. 'Tis therefore properly alike in *Perfection* or in *its being a Perfection* of a certain kind; unlike in *Defect*, or in being attended with Imperfection in Manner or Degree.

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4thly. If Power in Man and Power in God are alike in *Perfection* but unlike in *Defect*, they muſt be alike in *Omnipotence*, but unlike in *Defect of Power*. Ibid.

Anſw. Rather they muſt be alike as far as they are ſimply *Power*, or agree in the general Idea of it; but unlike as far as they are Power *mix'd* with impotence; or as the Exerciſe of 'em is attended or not attended with *Uneaſineſs*. &c.

5thly. What is alike in Perfection muſt be alike in Imperfection, unleſs a thing may be like another in *Strength*, but not like it in the *want of Strength*. p. 70.

Anſw. May not a thing be like another in having *ſome* Strength, tho' not like it in having the *ſame* Strength? ſure it is no inconſiſtency to ſay things are of the ſame *Nature* or *Genus*, tho' in a different *Degree*.

6thly That which differs only in *Degree* can only differ in *a certain Degree*, but *finite* and *infinite*, *mutable* and *immutable* can't be ſaid to differ only in a certain Degree. Ibid.

Anſw. An abſolute or *metaphyſical Infinite*, which is the only one that can be applied in the preſent Caſe, is a poſitive Idea of ſome certain Quality in the *Abſtract*, in the *higheſt Degree*, or to which nothing of the ſame kind can be *added*; ſince then there is a *higheſt* in all ſuch Qualities as *Goodneſs*, *Power*, &c. (contrary to what we find in mathematical Quantities) they may be ſaid to differ in a *certain Degree*, ſee R. I. *Mutability* or Immutability are nothing to theſe Qualities *as ſuch*.

7thly. To ſay that they differ only in a Degree or Manner of Exiſtence ſuppoſes that *Degree* or *manner of Exiſtence* ſignify the ſame thing, whereas they are exceedingly different. Ibid.

Anſw. Or, is here taken *disjunctively*. Tho' theſe two amount to the ſame thing: A different *Degree* always implies a different *Manner* of Exiſtence.

8thly. The Exiſtence of God differs from the Exiſtence of Man in the *Manner* of Exiſtence, but not in the *Degree* of Exiſtence. p. 71.

Anſw. Exiſtence is properly no Attribute, nor is it capable of Degrees.

9thly. If their manner of Exiſtence muſt have all that Difference there is between finite and infinite, &c. then it can ſignify little whether you ſay they are different in their *Nature* or *Eſſence*, or only different in their *Manner* of Exiſtence. Ibid.

Anſw. Let the *Manner* in which Divine Knowledge exiſts be never ſo different from that of human Knowledge, yet ſo long as it is *Knowledge*, or agrees in the *general Idea* with what Men call Knowledge, it muſt ſignify ſomething more than if it were *totally different*, of quite another *kind*, and had no more reſemblance to it than *Knowledge* has to *Power*, as ſeems to be the Caſe upon the *Analogical Scheme*.

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10thly, Who can tell the *Nature* and *Eſſence* of any thing any farther than he knows the *Manner* of its Exiſtence? Ibid.

Anſw. The *Nature* or *Eſſence* of any Quality according to us, is only its *abſtract Idea*, or that which determines it to be of this or that Sort, which muſt be the ſame in what *Manner* ſoever it exiſts, or is exhibited in any particular Subject. See Note 1.

11thly. But the foregoing Diſtinction ſuppoſes a real difference between theſe two, and that a thing has not ſuch a *Manner* of Exiſtence becauſe it is of ſuch a *Nature*, nor is of ſuch a *Nature* becauſe it has ſuch a *Manner* of Exiſtence. p. 72.

Anſw. No more it is, in our Senſe of the Word *Nature*. Knowledge does not come by Senſation or Reflection in particular becauſe it is *Knowledge*, nor is it therefore Knowledge becauſe it comes by Senſation or Reflection. *Goodneſs, Power, &c* are of the ſame *general* Nature in Men and Angels, tho' they be more imperfectly diſplayed in the one than in the other; which can ariſe only from the different Capacities of the Subjects that receive them; or in other Words, from the different manner of their Exiſtence in thoſe Subjects; which *Manner* is therefore entirely independent on their abſtract *Nature*, nor have they any relation to each other.

12thly. He muſt ſhew that the *Manner* of *Underſtanding*, *Will* or *Power* in God and Man is not at all owing to the *Nature* of *Underſtanding*, *Will* or *Power* in God or Man. p. 73.

Anſw. The *Manner* of theſe Qualities may be ſuppoſed to be very different, and yet the Nature of them (in our Senſe of that Word) will continue the ſame, which ſhews ſufficiently that the former is not owing to the latter. If *Will* be defined a *Power* of *Preferring* or *Chooſing*; is not that the ſame whatever it prefers, or however it be moved ſo to do? Whether it chooſe Good or Evil, whether it be determin'd by Anxiety or the laſt Judgment, or nothing at all? If *Power* be *an Ability* to *produce Change*, is not that the ſame whether it be done in *Thought* or *Motion*, whether it be attended with *Pleaſure* or *Pain*? If *Underſtanding* be a *Conſciouſneſs of ſomething*, is not that the ſame whatever the manner be in which it is acquired, exerciſed, or exiſts? Is it more or leſs *Underſtanding* for being got by *Deduction* or immediate *Intuition*, by Eyes or Ears, or any other Way?

13thly. The Difficulties charg'd upon the Doctrine of *Analogy* are the ſame in the other Account, which ſays that the Divine Attributes are different in the *Manner* of their Exiſtence from the *Qualities* of Men. For if they differ *infinitely* and *immutably* in their *Manner* of Exiſtence, are we not as much at a loſs to know what they are, and as unable to imitate that which ſtands at an *infinite* and *immutable* diſtance from us,

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as if we had ſaid that it is different in *Nature* from our Qualities?

Anſw. Is it not much more eaſy for me to *imitate* perfect or abſolute Goodneſs, when I know the nature of Goodneſs in general, and ſee it partially exhibited in the World, than if I only believ'd it to be ſomething *tranſcendently high* (as this Author deſcribes it *,) and *totally different* from any kind of Goodneſs which I can form an Idea of, and as *remote* as my Idea of Goodneſs is from any other Idea? If the nature of the Qualities be but fixt, the *Manners* of their Exiſtence, however diſtant, alter not the Caſe, Tho' I don't ſee how thoſe in the Deity can be properly ſaid to be *infinitely* diſtant from theſe in us if we have any Degree at all of them, and if we have not, 'tis plain we can know nothing at all of them.

14thly. Let us ſuppoſe the Creation of all things out of nothing to be an *Effect* of Divine Power, and changing the Shape of a Piece of Wood to be an *Effect* of human Power. I aſk whether theſe Effects are *toto genere* diſtinct and different in their *Nature?*

Anſw. The Effects are different, the Idea of *Cauſe* or *Power* ariſing from theſe Effects is the ſame. I ſhould have the Idea of Power *equally* (tho' not of *equal* Power) from ſeeing a *Change* made in a Piece of Wood, as from the Creation of it.

15thly. If the nature of Cauſes can be at all known by their Effects, is it not reaſonable to ſuppoſe theſe *Cauſes* muſt be as different in their *Natures* as their Effects are? p. 75.

Anſw. No: They both agree in the general Idea of *Cauſe*, which is all that we require to conſtitute their *Nature*; and all theſe Arguments are built only on a different Senſe of that Term, as obſerv'd above.

16thly. Has any one loſt his Reaſons for fearing and adoring the Divine Power becauſe it can only be compared to human Power, as *infinite* may be compared to *finite?* Has he nothing to *ground* his Fear upon, becauſe this Power has ſuch a *reality* as nothing can repreſent to him as it is in its own nature? &c. Ibid. p. 76, 77.

Anſw. *Finite* and *Infinite* (wherever theſe Terms can properly be applied) ſuppoſe the ſame common *Nature*, *Kind* or *Sort*, and differ only in *Extent*. If therefore Divine *Power*, *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs* may be ſo compared to human Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, they are Qualities of the ſame *Nature*, *Kind*, or *Sort*, which ſeems to be giving up the Queſtion. —— If they cannot be ſo compared I ſhould be glad to know in what they are alike, or wherein this *Analogy* between them conſiſts: Or in ſhort, how we ſhall at all be the wiſer by it

* p. 66, 67.

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it. For to believe the *Reality* of that which nothing can give us an Idea of as it is in its own Nature, will be at laſt I fear, no more than believing the reality of we know not what; which can never be a good Ground for any rational Devotion.

[R. 1.] By the Words, *Infinite Degree*, here and above, we don't mean any *indefinite Addition*, or encreaſableneſs of theſe ſeveral Attributes partially conſider'd (to which ſuch terms are vulgarly, tho' not ſo properly apply'd) but only an entire abſolute *Perfection*, without any kind of *failure* or *deficiency* in theſe reſpects: Which we have intimated in Note 3. * and elſewhere, to be our Notion of Infinity as apply'd to any of the Divine Attributes. 'Thus Infinite *Underſtanding* and 'Knowledge is nothing elſe but *perfect* Knowledge, that which 'hath no defect or mixture of *Ignorance* in it, or the Know-'ledge of whatſoever is knowable. Infinite *Power* is nothing 'elſe but *perfect* Power, that which hath no defect or mixture 'of *Impotency* in it: A Power of producing and doing all 'whatſoever is *poſſible*, i. e. whatſoever is *conceivable*, and ſo of 'the reſt.

'Now, that we have an Idea or Conception of *Perfection* 'or a *perfect Being*, is evident from the Notion that we have 'of *Imperfection*, ſo familiar to us: *Perfection* being the *Rule* 'and *Meaſure* of *Imperfection*, and not *Imperfection* of *Perfecti-'on*, as a *ſtraight Line* is the *Rule* and *Meaſure* of a *crooked*, 'and not a *crooked* of a *ſtraight*. So that Perfection is firſt 'conceiveable in order of Nature, before *Imperfection*, as *Light* 'before *Darkneſs*, a *poſitive* before the *privation* or *defect*. For 'Perfection is not properly the want of Imperfection, but 'Imperfection of Perfection.

'Moreover, we perceive ſeveral Degrees of Perfection in 'the Eſſences of things, and conſequently a *Scale* or *Ladder* 'of Perfections in Nature, one above another, as of *living* 'and *animate* things above *ſenſeleſs*, and *inanimate*; of *rational* 'things above *ſenſitive*; and that by reaſon of that *Notion* or 'Idea which we firſt have of that which is *abſolutely perfect*, 'as the Standard by comparing of things with which, and 'meaſuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more 'or leſs near thereto. Nor indeed could theſe gradual *Aſcents* 'be *infinite*, or without End, but they muſt come at laſt 'to that which is abſolutely perfect, as the top of them all. 'Laſtly, we could not perceive Imperfection in the moſt 'perfect of thoſe things which we ever had Senſe or Expe-'rience of in our Lives, had we not a *Notion* or *Idea* 'of that which is *abſolutely perfect*, which ſecretly com-'paring the ſame with, we perceive it to come ſhort 'thereof †.

Where-

* P. 15, 16. † *Cudworth*, p. 648.

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'Wherefore, ſince *Infinite* is the ſame with *abſolutely perfect*, 'we having a Notion or Idea of the latter, muſt needs have 'of the former. From whence we learn alſo, that though the 'Word *Infinite* be in the Form thereof *Negative*, yet is the 'Senſe of it, in theſe things which are really capable of the 'ſame, *poſitive*, it being all one with *abſolutely perfect*: As 'likewiſe the Senſe of the Word *Finite* is negative, it being 'the ſame with *Imperfect*. So that *finite* is properly the *Ne-'gation* of *infinite*, as that which in order of nature is before 'it, and not *Infinite* the *Negation* of *Finite*. However, in 'theſe things which are capable of no true *Infinity*, becauſe 'they are eſſentially *finite*, as *Number*, *corporeal Magnitude*, 'and *Time*; Infinity being there a mere *imaginary* thing, and 'a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the *Negation* of *Fi-'nite*, as we alſo conceive *Nothing* by the Negation of *Something*, 'that is, we can have no *poſitive Conception* at all thereof. ‖

Now, all this is not attempting to make the Attributes of God *poſitively infinite* by ſuperadding a *Negative Idea* of *Infinity* to them: (as the Author of the *Procedure* &c. juſtly urges againſt Mr. *Locke*, in B. 1. c. 3. p. 82. and the ſame might with equal Juſtice be objected to Dr. *Clarke*, when he applies *infinite Space* and *infinite Duration* to the Deity, and calls one his *Immenſity* and the other his *Eternity*.) But it is making them poſitively and abſolutely *perfect*, by firſt proving them to have ſome *real Exiſtence* in the Divine Nature, and then by removing from it all Poſſibility of *Want*, or *Deficiency*, *Mixture*, or *Allay*, as explained in the laſt Remark.

[R. m.] By the Word *Juſtice*, as it relates to Puniſhment, we mean the *Exerciſe of a Right*, or doing what a Perſon has a *Moral Power* to do. *Mercy* implies his *receding* from that Right, or not exerting that moral Power. When we apply theſe Terms to the Deity, we conſider his Diſpenſations in a partial View, *viz.* only with Relation to the Perſon offending, and himſelf the offended; or as mere Debtor and Creditor, excluſive of all other Beings, who may be affected thereby, and whom therefore we ſhould ſuppoſe to be regarded in theſe Diſpenſations. In this Senſe theſe two Attributes have a diſtinct Meaning, and may both be always ſubordinate to *Goodneſs*; but can never be repugnant to each other. Thus, where a Creature has forfeited its Right to a Favour, or incurred a Penalty, by the breach of ſome Covenant, or the Tranſgreſſion of ſome Law, the Creator, conſidered with reſpect to that Being alone, and in thoſe Circumſtances, has always a Right to withdraw the Favour, or to inflict the Penalty; and will proſecute that Right, whenever he finds it neceſſary to ſome farther End: But yet his Goodneſs may incline him often to ſuſpend or remit it, on ſome foreign Motive, *viz.* on account

‖ *Cudworth*, p. 649.

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count of the preſent Relation between the Criminal and other Men, in very different Circumſtances, or in view of a future Alteration in the Circumſtances of the Criminal himſelf. Now as theſe Motives belong to, and are generally known by God alone, though they may influence his Actions towards us, yet they don't at all affect his Right over us, and therefore ought not to diminiſh our Love, Gratitude, *&c.* to him in any particular Inſtance either of Judgment or of Mercy. Whenever we ſuffer for our Crimes, we have no Reaſon to complain of any Injury, nor can he, when upon the forementioned Motives he forgives us, ever injure himſelf. For Juſtice, conſidered barely as a *Right* or *Moral Power*, evidently *demands* nothing, nor can properly be ſaid to *oblige* one way or other: And therefore the Being poſſeſſed of it is at liberty either to ſuſpend or exert it; but he will never uſe this Liberty otherwiſe than as his *Goodneſs* requires, conſequently *Juſtice* and *Mercy* in ſuch a Being can never claſh.

Whether this Way of conceiving theſe Divine Attributes be not attended with leſs Difficulty than the common manner of treating them under the Notion of two Infinites *diametrically oppoſite*, muſt be left to the Judgment of the Reader.

As to the Nature of *Diſtributive* Juſtice, or the true Reaſon of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*, ſee *Colliber*'s *Impartial Enquiry*, B. 1. c. 11. prop. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the Nature and Diviſion of Evil, *and the Difficulty of tracing its* Origin.

By Evil we underſtand what ſoever is incommodious, inconvenient or troubleſome.

GOOD and *Evil* are oppoſites, and ariſe from the Relation which things have to each other: For ſince there are ſome things which profit, and others which prejudice one another; ſince ſome things agree, and others diſagree; as we call the former Good, ſo we ſtile the latter Evil. Whatever therefore is *incommodious* or *inconvenient* to itſelf, or any thing elſe; whatever becomes *troubleſome*, or fruſtrates any *Appetite* implanted by God; whatever forces any Perſon to do or ſuffer what he would not, that is *Evil.*

Evils are of three kinds, thoſe of Imperfection, Natural and Moral.

II. Now theſe Inconveniences appear to be of three kinds, thoſe of *Imperfection*, *Natural*, and *Moral* ones. By the Evil of *Imperfection* I underſtand the Abſence of thoſe Perfections or advantages which exiſt elſewhere, or in other Beings: By *Natural* Evil, Pains and Uneaſineſſes, Inconveniences and Diſappointment of Appetites, ariſing from natural Motions: By *Moral*, vicious Elections, that is, ſuch as are hurtful to ourſelves or others.

The Difficulty is how theſe come into the Work of a God of the higheſt Goodneſs and Power.

III. Theſe Evils muſt be conſidered particularly, and we are to ſhew how they may be reconciled with the Government of an infinitely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For ſince there is ſuch a Being, 'tis aſked, as we ſaid before, whence come

come Evils? Whence ſo many *Inconveniences* in the Work of a moſt *good*, moſt *powerful God?* Whence that perpetual War between the very *Elements*, between *Animals*, between *Men?* Whence *Errors*, *Miſeries* and *Vices*, the conſtant Companions of human Life from its Infancy? Whence Good to Evil Men, Evil to the Good? If we behold any thing irregular in the Works of Men, if any Machine anſwer not the End it was made for, if we find ſomething in it repugnant to itſelf or others, we attribute that to the Ignorance, Impotence, or Malice of the Workman: But ſince theſe Qualities have no place in God, how come they to have place in any thing? Or, Why does God ſuffer his Works to be deformed by them?

IV. This Queſtion has appeared ſo intricate and difficult, that ſome finding themſelves unequal to the Solution of it, have denyed, either that there is any God at all, or at leaſt, any Author or Governor of the World: Thus *Epicurus*, and his Adherents: Nor does *Lucretius* bring any other Reaſon for his denying the *Syſtem of the World to be the Effect of a Deity*, than that *it is ſo very faulty*.* Others judged it to be more agreeable to Reaſon to aſſign a double Cauſe of things, than none at all. Since it is the greateſt Abſurdity in Nature to admit of Actions and Effects, without any Agent and Cauſe. Theſe then perceiving a Mixture of Good and Evil, and being fully perſuaded that ſo many Confuſions and Inconſiſtencies could not proceed from a good Being, ſuppoſed a malevolent *Principle*, or God, directly contrary to the good one; and thence derived Corruption and Death, Diſeaſes, Griefs, Miſeries, Frauds and Villanies; from the good Being nothing but Good: Nor did they imagine that Contrariety and Miſchief could have any other Origin than an Evil Principle. This Opinion was held by many of the

Some that were unable to ſolve this Difficulty have denyed the Exiſtence of a God, others have ſuppoſed a double one.

* B. 2. v. 180.

the Ancients, by the *Manicheans*, *Paulicians*, and almoſt all the Tribe of ancient *Heretics*. (15.)

V.

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(15.) In order to give ſome Light into the Opinions of theſe Men concerning the Origin of Evil, I ſhall tranſcribe a Paragraph from *Bayle*'s Dictionary, in the Article *Manichees*, Remark D. where he introduces *Zoroaſter* defending the two oppoſite Principles above mentioned, 'Zoroaſter, ſays he, would 'go back to the time of the Chaos, which with regard to his 'two Principles, is a State very like that which *Hobbs* calls the 'State of Nature, and which he ſuppoſes to have preceded the 'Eſtabliſhment of Societies. In this State of Nature, one Man 'was a Wolf to another, and every thing belonged to the firſt 'occupier; none was Maſter of any thing, except he was the 'ſtrongeſt. To get out of this Confuſion, every one agreed to 'quit his Right to the whole, that he might be acknowledged 'the Proprietor of ſome Part; they entered into agreements, 'and the War ceaſed. Thus the two Principles weary of this 'Chaos wherein each confounded and overthrew what the o'ther attempted to do, came at laſt to an Agreement; each 'of them yielded ſomething, each had a ſhare in the Production of Man, and the Laws of the Union of the Soul: The 'good Principle obtained thoſe which procure to a Man a thou'ſand Pleaſures, and conſented to thoſe which expoſe him to 'a thouſand Pains; And if he conſented that Moral Good 'ſhould be infinitely leſs in Mankind than Moral Evil, he re'paired the Damage in ſome other kind of Creatures, wherein 'Vice ſhould be much leſs than Virtue. If many Men in this 'Life have more Miſery than Happineſs, this is recompenced 'in another State; what they have not under a human Form, 'they find under another. By means of this Agreement, the 'Chaos became diſembroiled, the Chaos, I ſay, a paſſive Prin'ciple, which was the Field of Battle between theſe two active 'ones. The Poets ‡ have repreſented this diſentangling under 'the Image of a Quarrel ended. You ſee what *Zoroaſter* might 'object, valuing himſelf upon it that he does not throw any 'imputation upon the good Principle of having with full pur'poſe produced a Work, which was to be ſo wicked and mi'ſerable; but only, after he had found by Experience that he 'could do no better, nor more effectually oppoſe the horrible 'Deſigns of the Evil Principle. To render his Hypotheſis the 'leſs offenſive he might have denyed that there was a long War 'between the two Principles, and lay aſide all thoſe Fights and 'Priſoners which the *Manicheans* ſpeak of. The whole might 'be

‡ *Hanc Deus & Melior* Litem *Natura diremit*. Ov. Met. l. 1. V. 21.

V. And there are ſome ſtill who think this Difficulty unanſwerable. They confeſs, indeed, the Sup-

There are ſome who are of opinion that it is unanſwerable, and that the *Manichees* offered a better ſolution, by ſuppoſing two Principles, than the *Catholics* do by owning only One.

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be reduced to the certain Knowledge of the two Principles 'that one could never obtain from the other but ſuch and ſuch 'Conditions: an eternal Agreement might have been made up-'on this Foot.'

For a farther Explication and Amendment of their Hypotheſis, and Replies to ſeveral Arguments urged againſt it, ſee the Words *Manicheans*, *Marchionites*, *Paulicians*, *Origen* and *Zoroaſter*, in the abovementioned Dictionary.

That there is no *Occaſion* for any Hypotheſis of this kind, will be ſhewn in the following Chapters. Let it ſuffice in this Place to point out ſome of the Abſurdities of the Hypotheſis itſelf. And firſt, it may be obſerved, that the Suppoſition of an *abſolute* and *infinitely Evil Principle* (if theſe Words mean ſuch a Being as is totally oppoſite to the good One) is an expreſs Contradiction. For as this Principle oppoſes and reſiſts the infinitely good One, it alſo muſt be independent and infinite: It muſt be infinite or abſolute in Knowledge and Power. But the notion of a Being infinitely Evil, is of one infinitely Imperfect; its Knowledge and Power therefore muſt be infinitely imperfect; *i. e.* abſolute Ignorance and Impotence, or no Knowledge and Power at all. The one of theſe Beings then is abſolutely perfect, or enjoys all manner of poſitive Perfections, conſequently the other, as it is directly the Reverſe, muſt be purely the Negation of it, as Darkneſs is of Light; *i. e.* it muſt be an *infinite Defect*, or *mere nothing*. Thus this *Evil* Being muſt have ſome *Knowledge* and *Power*, in order to make any oppoſition at all to the *Good* One: but as he is directly oppoſite to that Good or Perfect One, he cannot have the leaſt Degree of *Knowledge*, or *Power*, ſince theſe are *Perfections*: therefore, the Suppoſition of ſuch an Exiſtence as this implies a Contradiction.

But ſuppoſing theſe Men only to mean (what any underſtanding Perſon among them muſt mean) by this Evil Principle, an abſolutely *malevolent* Being of equal Power, and other natural Perfections with thoſe of the *Good* one. 'It would be to 'no purpoſe (ſays ABp. *Tillotſon*, ‡) to ſuppoſe two ſuch op-'poſite Principles — For admit that a Being infinitely miſchie-'vous, were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it 'could do no Evil, becauſe the oppoſite Principle of infinite 'Goodneſs being alſo infinitely wiſe and powerful, they would 'tie up one another's Hands: So that upon this Suppoſition, 'the Notion of a Deity would ſignify juſt nothing, and by 'virtue of the Eternal Oppoſition and Equality of theſe Prin-'ciples,

‡ 2. Vol. of Serm. Fol. p. 690.

Suppoſition of a double Principle to be abſurd, and that it may be demonſtrated that there is but one

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'ciples, they would keep one another at a perpetual Bay, and 'being an equal Match for one another, inſtead of being two 'Deities, they would be two Idols, able to do neither Good nor 'Evil.'

I ſhall only produce one Argument more as to Moral Evil, out of *Simplicius*'s Comment on *Epictetus*, which, by the Confeſſion of *Bayle* himſelf, ſtrikes home the Doctrine of Two Principles, though it be conſidered with the greateſt Simplicity.

He ſays, ‖ '*It entirely deſtroys the Liberty of our Souls and* '*neceſſitates them to Sin, and conſequently implies a Contradiction.* '*For, ſince the Principle of Evil is eternal and incorruptible, and* '*ſo potent that God himſelf cannot conquer him, it follows that* '*the Soul of Man cannot reſiſt the Impulſe with which he moves* '*it to Sin. But if a Man be invincibly driven to it, he com-* '*mits no Murder or Adultery*, &c. *by his own Fault, but by a* '*ſuperior external Fault, and in that caſe he is neither guilty* '*nor puniſhable. Therefore there is no ſuch thing as Sin, and con-* '*ſequently this Hypotheſis deſtroys itſelf; ſince if there be a Prin-* '*ciple of Evil, there is no longer any Evil in the World. But* '*if there be no Evil in the World, it is clear there is no Prin-* '*ciple of Evil; whence we may infer, that thoſe who ſuppoſe* '*ſuch a Principle, deſtroy, by neceſſary Conſequence, both Evil and* '*the Principle of it.*'

More of this may be ſeen in *Bayle*'s Explanation concerning the *Manichees* at the End of his Dictionary, p. 66, *&c.* See alſo *Gurdon*'s *Boyle*'s *Lectures*, Serm. 5. or *Stillingfleet*'s *Orig. Sacræ*, B. 3. C. 3. § 10, 12. or *Sherlock* on *Judgment*, 1ſt Ed. pag. 173.

Neither does *Bayle*'s amendment of this Hypotheſis free it from the Difficulty. He ſuppoſes the two Principles to be ſenſible of the above mentioned Conſequence ariſing from their Equality of Power, and therefore willing to compound the Matter, by allowing an equal Mixture of Good and Evil in the intended Creation. But if the Quantity of Good and Evil in the Creation be exactly equal, neither of the Principles has attained or could expect to attain the End for which it was ſuppoſed to act. The Good Principle deſigned to produce ſome abſolute Good, the Evil One ſome abſolute Evil; but to produce an equal Mixture of both, would be in effect producing neither: One would juſt counterballance and deſtroy the other; and all ſuch Action would be the very ſame as doing nothing at all: And that ſuch an exact Equality of Good and Evil muſt be the Reſult of an agreement between them is plain: For as they are by

‖ P. 152. *Ed.* Lond. 1670.

one Author of all things, abſolutely perfect and good; yet there is evil in things, this they ſee and feel; but whence, or how it comes, they are entirely ignorant; nor can human Reaſon (if we believe them) in any meaſure diſcover. Hence they take Occaſion to lament our Unhappineſs, and complain of the hard Fate attending Truth, as often as a Solution of this Difficulty is attempted unſucceſſfully. The *Manicheans* ſolve the Phenomena of things a hundred times better (as theſe Men think) with their moſt abſurd Hypotheſis of two Principiples, than the Catholics do with their moſt true Doctrine of one perfect, abſolutely powerful and beneficent Author of Nature. For the *Manicheans* acquit God of all manner of Blame as he was compelled by the contrary Principle to ſuffer Sin and Miſery in his Work, which in the mean while he oppoſes with all his Power. But according to the Catholics, as their Adverſaries object, he permits theſe voluntarily, nay is the Cauſe and Author of them. For if, as theſe Men argue, there be but one Author of all things, Evils alſo ſhould be referred to him as their Original; but it can neither be explained nor conceived how infinite Goodneſs can become the Origin of Evil. If God could not hinder it, where is his Power? If he could, and would not, where is his Goodneſs? If you ſay that Evil neceſſarily adheres to ſome particular Natures; ſince God was the Author of them all, it would have been better to have omitted thoſe with the con-

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by Suppoſition perfectly equal in *Inclination*, as well as *Power*, neither of them could poſſibly concede, and let its oppoſite prevail: The Creation therefore cannot be owing to ſuch a Compoſition.

But the beſt Confutation of this Scheme may be found in the Chapter before us; where our *Author* ſhews that it does not at all anſwer the end for which it was introduced. This completes the abſurdity of it.

concomitant Evils, than to have debaſed his Workmanſhip with an allay of theſe Evils. (16.)

This Difficulty has exerciſed the Philoſophers and Fathers of the Church; and ſome deny that it is anſwered yet.

VI. It is well known, that this Difficulty has exerciſed both the ancient Philoſophers and Fathers of the Church: (17.) And there are ſome who deny that it is yet anſwered; nay, who undertake to refute all the Solutions hitherto offered; nor do I promiſe a complete one in every Reſpect, though

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(16.) Since this Objection contains all that can be ſaid upon Evil in general; and it appears to me abſolutely neceſſary for every Man to do Juſtice to Objections, who expects that others ſhould receive any Satisfaction from his Anſwers, I ſhall inſert it, as it is propoſed in its full Force by *Cudworth*. ‖ 'The ſuppoſed Deity and Maker of the World, was either 'willing to aboliſh all Evils, but not able; or was able and 'not willing: Or, thirdly, he was neither willing nor able: Or 'laſtly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the on'ly thing that anſwers fully to the Notion of a God. Now, 'that the ſuppoſed Creator of all things was not thus both able 'and willing to aboliſh all Evils, is plain, becauſe then there 'would have been no Evils at all left. Wherefore, ſince there 'is ſuch a Deluge of Evils overflowing all, it muſt needs be that 'either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then 'he was *impotent*; or elſe he was able and not willing, and 'then he was *envious*; or laſtly, he was neither able nor willing, 'and then he was both *impotent* and *envious*.'

Almoſt the ſame occurs in *Lactantius* ‡, and is cited, and ſufficiently refuted by our Author in C. 5. § 5. *Subſect.* the laſt: See alſo *Prudentius* in *Hamartigenia*. v. 640, *&c.*

The Subſtance of all *Bayle*'s Objections may be ſeen in a late Book called *Free Thoughts on Religion*, &c. C. 5. p. 104, *&c.* The Anſwers to them follow in their proper Places.

(17.) Any one that wants to be acquainted with the Antiquity of this Diſpute, or the Perſons engaged in it, or the way of managing it made uſe of by the *Fathers*, may conſult the Beginning of Dr. *Clarke*'s Enquiry into the Cauſe and Origin of Evil; and *Bayle*'s Dictionary, in the Articles *Manicheans*, Remark *B. Marcionites*, Remark *F.* and *FΔ. Paulicians*, Remarks *K.* and *KΔ.* and *Zoroaſter*, Remark *E.* Or *Cudworth*, from p. 213, to 224. or *Stillingfleet*'s *Origines Sacræ*, B. 3. C. 3. § 8, 9, 11, 12, *&c.* or *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* v. 5. p. 287. or his *Delectus Argumentorum, &c.* C. 15.

‖ *True Intell. Syſt.* p. 78, 79.

‡ *De Ira Dei*, C. 13. p. 435. Edit. Cant.

I hope to ſhew in the following Part of this Treatiſe that it is not wholly unanſwerable.

There is more Good than Evil in the World.

VII. It is manifeſt that though Good be mixed with Evil in this Life, yet there is much more Good than Evil in Nature, and every Animal provides for its Preſervation by Inſtinct or Reaſon, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its Life, with all the Evils annexed, to be much preferable to Non-exiſtence. This is a Proof of the Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power of God, who could thus temper a World infeſted with ſo many Miſeries, that nothing ſhould continue in it which was not in ſome Meaſure pleaſed with its Exiſtence and which would not endeavour by all poſſible Means to preſerve it. *

'Tis no leſs repugnant to Infinite Goodneſs to have created thoſe things which he ſaw would be corrupted by another, than ſuch as would corrupt themſelves.

VIII. Neither does the Suppoſition of an Evil Principle help any thing towards the Solution of this Difficulty. For the Aſſerters of two Principles maintain that the great and good God tolerates Evil purely becauſe he is forced to it by the Evil One, and that either from an Agreement between themſelves, or a perpetual Struggle and Conteſt with each other. For ſince the beneficent Author of Nature was hindered by the Evil Principle from producing all the Good he was willing to produce, he either made an Agreement with it to produce as much as he was allowed, but with a Mixture of Evil, according to the Agreement: or elſe there is a Mixture of Good and Evil proportionable to the Power which prevails in either of them. Hence they think the good God excuſable, who conferred as many Bleſſings on the World as his Adverſary permitted, and would have tolerated no manner of Evil, unleſs compelled to it by the adverſe Power. So that he muſt either create no Good at all, or ſuffer an Allay of Evil.

The Suppoſition of a double Principle is therefore of no Service toward the Solution of this Difficulty.

All which very great Abſurdities have this farther Inconvenience, that they do not anſwer the very

* See Note Z.

very End for which they were invented. For he is no leſs culpable who created any thing which he knew would be rendered miſerable by another, than if he had made that which he foreſaw would bring Miſery upon itſelf. If therefore God might conſiſtently with Goodneſs, create Things which he knew the Evil Principle could and would corrupt, as the *Manicheans* aſſerted; then he might, conſiſtently with the ſame Goodneſs, have created Things that would corrupt themſelves, or were to periſh in a Tract of Time. If then, according to the Defenders of this Hypotheſis, God ought to have omitted, or not created thoſe Beings, in whoſe Natures Evil or Contrariety is inherent, he ought alſo to have omitted thoſe, whoſe Natures he foreſaw the Evil Principle would corrupt. And if there was ſo much Good in theſe, as made him think it better to create them, though they were to be corrupted ſome time or other by the oppoſite Principle, he might alſo judge it preferable to produce the ſame, though they were at length to periſh by their own inherent Evils. Nor will God be forced to tolerate Evil in his Works more according to the *Manicheans*, than the *Catholics*. For as he might have not made thoſe Beings which have Evils neceſſarily adhering to them, ſo he might alſo have not made thoſe which he foreknew the contrary Principle would corrupt. After the ſame manner in both Caſes he would have prevented Evil, and ſince he could, why did he not?. The Suppoſition of two Principles conduces nothing at all therefore to the Solution of this Difficulty. (B.)

IX.

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(B.) To this it has been objected, Firſt, that the Recrimination is not juſt becauſe there is a great Difference between a Cauſe that doth not prevent an Evil which he could not prevent, and another that ſuffers one which he could have prevented; that it is agreed amongſt all orthodox Chriſtians that God could have prevented the *Fall* of *Adam*, and therefore the

Blame

IX. But if we can point out a Method of reconciling theſe Things with the Government of an

If it can be ſhewn that it does no contradict infinite Power and Goodneſs to permit Evil, or that theſe neceſſarily ariſe from the exerciſe of them, then may the Difficulty be anſwered.

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Blame of it lies on him; Whereas according to the Syſtem of two Principles he could not hinder it, and therefore is excuſed this way, but not the other.

But I anſwer, it is plain that the Objector does not underſtand the Force of the Argument. For according to it, God could have prevented this Evil. He foreſaw the ill Principle would corrupt Mankind, and he was under no Neceſſity to make ſuch a Creature as Man, and thereby to gratify his Enemy, who, he ſaw, would make him miſerable. He could therefore have prevented this Evil by not creating *Man*, and is full as blameable for making him that he foreſaw the ill Principle would involve in Sin and Miſery, as if thoſe had befallen Man by his own ill uſe of his *Free will*.

But 2dly. Who are thoſe Orthodox that agree God could have prevented the Fall of Man? Thoſe that I am acquainted with repreſent the Matter otherwiſe. They ſay that conſidering the Nature of Man and the Station he held in the World, and the Inconveniencies that muſt have happened to the whole Syſtem of free Beings, by hindering *Adam* from the Uſe of his free Will, his fall could not have been prevented without more hurt than good to the whole Creation. There was no Neceſſity on him to ſin, but there was a Neceſſity on God to permit him the Uſe of his free Will in that Caſe, and the Conſequence of that being his Sin, God was under a Neceſſity notwithſtanding his infinite Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs to permit his Fall. He could have prevented it 'tis true by taking away Free Will from Man, that is by not making ſuch a Creature as Man, according to the *Catholics*; and he could have prevented it the ſame way according to the *Manichees*; for according to them he was under no Neceſſity to make ſuch a Creature; and 'tis as hard for one to give an Account why he did make him when he knew he would fall, as for the other; ſo far as I ſee, the Difficulty is equal on both Suppoſitions, and both muſt have recourſe to the ſame Anſwer; *viz.* that the Wiſdom of God judged it better to have Man with his Sin, than the World ſhould want ſuch a Creature.

But 3dly. 'Tis objected that the *Manichees* have in reality three Principles, two active, a good and a bad one, and a third paſſive or indifferent, that is *Matter*: ‖ Though they vouchſafed the Name of Principles only to the active. That this indifferent Principle was the Prey of the firſt Occupier, and the Evil one ſeized it as ſoon as the Good, and would not ſuffer him to make good out of it, without a mixture of Evil.

‖ This *Bayle* calls *Chaos*. See N. 15.

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an abſolutely perfect Agent, and make them not only conſiſtent with infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power, but neceſſarily reſulting from them (ſo that theſe would not be Infinite, if thoſe did not or could not poſſibly exiſt) then we may be ſuppoſed to have at laſt diſcovered the true Origin of Evils, and anſwered all the Difficulties and Objections that are brought upon this Head, againſt the Goodneſs, Wiſdom, Power, and Unity of God. Let us try therefore what can be done in each kind of Evil; and firſt, concerning the *Evil of Imperfection.*

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But this is nothing to the Purpoſe; for it ſuppoſes a demonſtrable Falſhood, that Matter is ſelf-exiſtent, whereas there is nothing plainer than that Matter has a Cauſe ‖; and to build Hypotheſes on manifeſt Falſhoods is unworthy a Philoſopher.

2dly. Even in this way the good Principle might have prevented Evil; for he might have let the evil Principle alone with his Matter, and then he could never have made any thing of it; for his Productions muſt all have been abſolutely evil, and whatever is ſo muſt immediately deſtroy itſelf, or rather in truth nothing could have been produced by ſuch a Being.

All his works muſt have contained in them all imaginable Evil and Repugnancy; all the Parts of them muſt have been incongruous and inconſiſtent, and conſequently have deſtroyed themſelves and one another. Nay, ſuch a Being could have properly no *Power* at all; for if he produced any thing which was conſiſtent, it would be ſo far good, and ſo good wou'd proceed from a Principle abſolutely Evil, which is no leſs a Contradiction than that Evil ſhould be produced by one abſolutely Good: Which if it be allowed, there's no farther Occaſion to enquire after the Origin of Evil at all. For that may proceed from an infinitely good Being, as well as good can from one infinitely evil. From hence it is evident that the bringing in of two Principles does not in the leaſt account for the Origin of Evil.

‖ See Remark d.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.
Of the Evil of Defect.

AS for the Evil of *Imperfection*, it is to be conſidered, that before the World was created God exiſted alone, and nothing beſide him. All things therefore are out of nothing and whatſoever exiſts, has its Exiſtence from God; neither can that Exiſtence be different either in Kind or Degree from what he gave.* Things can be no otherwiſe than as God pleaſed.

II. Secondly, God, though he be omnipotent, cannot make any created Being *abſolutely perfect*, for whatever is abſolutely perfect, muſt neceſſarily be ſelf exiſtent. But it is included in the very Notion of a Creature, as ſuch, not to exiſt of itſelf, but from God. An abſolutely perfect Creature therefore implies a Contradiction. For it would be of itſelf and not of itſelf at the ſame time. (18.) Abſolute Perfection is therefore peculiar to God, and if he ſhould communicate his own peculiar Perfection All created things are neceſſarily imperfect, ſince they do not exiſt of themſelves.

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(18.) A *perfect Creature* is a Contradiction in terms. For if it be *perfect* it is *independent*; and if it be independent it is no *Creature*. Again; to ſuppoſe a created Being *infinite* in any reſpect is to ſuppoſe it *equal* to its Creator in that reſpect; and if it be equal in one reſpect, it muſt be ſo in all; ſince an infinite Property cannot inhere in any finite Subject, for then the Attribute would be more perfect than its Subject, all which is abſurd. Granting therefore this one Principle, which cannot be denyed, (*viz.* that an Effect muſt be inferior to its Cauſe) it will appear that the Evil of Imperfection, ſuppoſing a *Creation*, is neceſſary and unavoidable; and conſequently, all other Evils which neceſſarily ariſe from that, are unavoidable alſo. What our Author has advanced upon the following Head ſeems perfectly concluſive.

* See *Scott* in Note 32.

tion to another, (C.) that other would be God. The *Evil of Imperfection* muſt therefore be tolerated

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(C.) This Poſition ſeems very agreeable to the Catholic Faith, which teaches that the *Father* did communicate his Nature and his Perfections to the *Son*; and with him to the *Holy Ghoſt*. Each of them therefore is very God under a different Subſiſtence. The Divine Nature which is inherent in them may be conceived to be of itſelf, but the *Modus* of Exiſtence cannot. Now the Church looks upon the Nature thus ſubſiſting as a Perſon. Not that it is a Perſon in the ſame manner as the human Nature ſubſiſting by itſelf, but by Reaſon of a certain Similitude and *Analogy* which they have between them. Since Divine Matters are not Objects of the Senſes, they cannot be known by Marks impreſſed upon us by Senſation; they are therefore conceived by Similitude, Relation, Proportion, or Connection with ſenſible things: The Paſſions, Affections, Intellect, and Will, are the Principles of our Actions, and therefore we attribute theſe to God. For if we were to do thoſe things which God performs, theſe would be the Principles and Cauſes of them: We attribute therefore to God ſomething analogous or equivalent to theſe, but we know that it is as diſtant as finite is from infinite. Nay, 'tis demonſtrable that neither Will, nor Love, nor Anger, nor Juſtice, nor Mercy, are in God after the ſame manner, as they exiſt in and are conceived by us.* But we muſt make uſe of theſe Words becauſe we have no better, and they ſufficiently anſwer the End for which God would have us to know him. Now after the ſame manner we point out the Diſtinction declared in Scripture between the *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*, by the Word *Perſon*, becauſe we have nothing nearer to compare them by; and the Repreſentation under this *Analogy* ſhews us very well what we may hope for from each of them, and what Worſhip we ought to pay them. Tho' at the ſame time we are certain that theſe differ no leſs from human Perſons, than the Divine Intellect does from human, or the Principles of Divine Actions from human Paſſions; for inſtance, Anger, Hatred, and the like. 'Tis ſtrange therefore that Men who would be eſteemed learned, ſhould diſpute againſt a Plurality of Perſons in the Deity after the very ſame Way of Reaſoning with which *Cotta* in *Cicero* argues againſt the Intelligence, Prudence, and Juſtice of God,† namely, becauſe they cannot be in God after the ſame *manner* as we conceive

* See *Wollaſton*, p. 115, 116. and *Epiſcopius* Inſt. Theol. L. 4. C. 22. p 310. or our Author's Sermon on Predeſtination, &c.

† *Qualem autem Deum*, &c. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* § 15. Ed. Lond. *See our Author's Serm.* § 37.

rated in Creatures, notwithſtanding the Divine Omnipotence and Goodneſs: For Contradictions are

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ceive them to be in Men; forgetting, in the mean time, that theſe are attributed to God by a kind of *Analogy* and Accommodation to our Capacity, and rather from the Reſemblance of things done by God, to thoſe done by us, than of the Principles from which they proceed. But the Scriptures and the Church have ſufficiently forewarned us to beware of their erroneous Way of Reaſoning. For when God is deſcribed under theſe Figures, Similitudes, and Analogies, leſt we ſhould take Images of things for the things themſelves, and ſo fall into abſurd Reaſonings about them, the ſame things are denyed of God in one Senſe, that are affirmed of him in another. Thus God is often ſaid to repent; and in another Place 'tis denied that he repents as a Man. Thus Light is aſcribed to God, as his Habitation; and elſewhere, thick Darkneſs. He is often ſaid to be ſeen, and yet is called inviſible. The Father is God and Lord, and alſo the Son and the Holy Ghoſt; and yet it is ſaid there is but one God and Lord. All which and more of the ſame kind, we muſt believe to be thus expreſſed for no other Reaſon but to hinder us from imagining them to be aſcribed to God in the ſame manner as they are in us, ‖ but Smatterers in Learning reject and ridicule theſe Forms of Speech as Ænigmas, being ignorant of both the Sacred and Eccleſiaſtical Dialect, which they refuſe to learn, though we muſt make uſe of it in Divine Matters, or elſe entirely refrain from all reaſoning about them. For ſince they are known no otherwiſe than by Similitude and Analogy, they cannot be deſcribed otherwiſe, as any one will find who tries. But it is no wonder if theſe Men, while they take ſimilies for the things themſelves, ſhould eaſily imagine that they diſcover abſurdities in them. If they do this on purpoſe, cunningly, and with an ill Intent, they are Villains; but if through Ignorance or Error, they deſerve pity, if they did not ſwell with a proud Conceit of Science, and exalt themſelves above the Vulgar; who yet are much wiſer than theſe Philoſophers. For they fear the Anger of God, love his Goodneſs, embrace his Mercy, adore his Juſtice, and give Glory to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and yet believe in and worſhip one God, moſt perfect, and free from Paſſions. Whereas the Smatterers in Science have got nothing to place in the Room of theſe, which they themſelves, much leſs the-

Vulgar

‖ *This is a good Inference from theſe and the like Expreſſions, but can hardly be ſuppoſed to have been the principal Deſign, much leſs the* only Reaſon, *of them. For more Inſtances of this Kind, ſee the forementioned Sermon,* § 23, 37.

are Objects of no Power. God might indeed have refrained from creating, and continued alone, ſelf-ſufficient, and perfect to all Eternity, but his infinite Goodneſs would by no Means allow it: thus obliged him to produce external things; which things, ſince they could not poſſibly be perfect, the Divine Goodneſs preferred imperfect once to none.

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Vulgar, can underſtand; or which can equally excite the Affections of the Mind, or promote Piety. (D.)

(D.) It has been objected againſt the foregoing Paragraph and Note, that the Author by his Principles neceſſarily introduces Imperfection into the Godhead. For he owns whatever is not of itſelf is imperfect, but the Subſiſtences of the Son and Holy Ghoſt, that is their *Perſonalities*, as he confeſſes, are not from themſelves, and therefore muſt be imperfect. To this I anſwer, that we may conſider the Attributes of God, and likewiſe the *Perſonalities* in the Divine Nature, either abſtractly, *i. e.* as diſtinguiſhed in our Minds from the Nature; or as they are identified with it. If we conſider them abſtractly it is true they are not from themſelves, but from the Nature: So the *Wiſdom* and *Power* of God are not from themſelves but from the Divine Nature which neceſſarily includes Wiſdom and Power: And ſo the *Perſonality* of the Son and Holy Ghoſt are not from themſelves, but from the Divine Nature which neceſſarily includes the Father's begetting his Son, and the Holy Ghoſt's proceeding from both. But if we conſider theſe as *in re* the ſame with the Nature, then they are from themſelves; the ſame Nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, and the three Perſonalities neceſſarily ariſe out of that Nature, and therefore may be ſaid to be neceſſary and from themſelves. I do confeſs the Perſonality of the Son is from the Father and that of the Holy Ghoſt from the Father and Son; but this is ſtill by the Neceſſity ariſing from the Nature. The Father begets the Son, not out of Choice, but Neceſſity of Nature; and that Nature is in the Son, and therefore his Subſiſtence and Perſonality is from his own Nature, that is from himſelf, and he is αὐτόθεος. The Perſonality of the Son is indeed from the Father, but that doth not hinder it to be from the Nature in the laſt reſort; and neceſſarily too, though *mediante Perſona Patris*. When therefore it is ſaid that the Divine Nature which is inherent in them may be ſaid to be of itſelf, but not the *Modus ſubſiſtendi*, it is not meant that the *Modus ſubſiſtendi* doth not proceed from the Nature which is in the Son and Holy Ghoſt, and ſo is in that Senſe *ex ſe*, but that it is not immediately from it, but *mediante Patris Subſiſtentia*.

(E.)

none at all. Imperfection then aroſe from the Infinity of Divine Goodneſs. Had not God been infinitely Good, perhaps he might not have permitted imperfect Beings; but have been content in himſelf, and created nothing at all.

III. *Thirdly*, There are infinite Degrees of Perfection between a Being *abſolutely perfect* and *Nothing*: Of which, if Exiſtence be conceived as the Firſt, every thing will be ſo many Degrees diſtant from Nothing, as there are *Perfections* to be found in it joyn'd with Exiſtence. In this Scale then God will be the *Top*, and Nothing the *Bottom*; and how much farther any thing is diſtant from nothing, it is ſo much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much any thing can reſemble God in Perfection, or how nearly approach to him (E.) we know not; but we are certain that there is always an infinite Diſtance between them. It muſt have been determin'd therefore by the Will of God, where he would ſtop, ſince there is nothing but his own Will to bound his Power. Now it is to be believ'd that the preſent Syſtem of the World was the very beſt that could be, with regard to

'Tis to be determined by the Divine Pleaſure what Degrees of Perfection every thing muſt have, ſince all things are neceſſarily at an infinite diſtance from the higheſt Perfection.

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(E.) Suppoſing the World to be infinite, there would be, as far as appears to us, infinite Orders of Creatures deſcending gradually from God to Nothing: But ſince neither our Underſtanding can comprehend, nor does the Nature of Quantity and Motion ſeem to admit of Infinity or Eternity; 'tis better to refer the Matter to the Divine Will. For if any Infinity in Creatures be impoſſible, 'tis the ſame thing wherever we ſtop: Since all Finites are equally diſtant from Infinite. If therefore God had created twice, or a thouſand thouſand times as great, and as many Beings, and a thouſand thouſand Ages ſooner than he has, the ſame Objections might be made, Why not before? Why not more? The World therefore muſt either have been created infinite and from Eternity, which the very Nature of the thing ſeems not to allow, or it is all one when and how great it might be, and not determinable by any thing beſides the Divine Pleaſure. See Chap. 5. §. 1 Subſ. 4. and *S. Clarke* on *Nat. Evil.* p. 90. 93, 280, &c.

(19.) In

to the Mind of God in framing it. (19.) It might have been better perhaps in ſome Particulars,

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(19) In order to confirm this belief, and come to a right Knowledge of the whole Queſtion before us, it is neceſſary to enquire a little into the meaning of theſe Words; to conſider (with reverence) what this Mind of God might be in framing the World, and what was the moſt proper Method of anſwering it. Now it appear'd from the Concluſion of the firſt Chapter and Note 13. that the ſole Deſign of Almighty God in creating the Univerſe, was to impart Felicity to other Beings: and in the beginning of this Chapter it was proved that any Happineſs thus communicated could not be *infinite*. His Deſign then is completely anſwer'd, if the greateſt Degree of Happineſs be imparted of which created Beings are capable, conſiſtent with one another; or when the utmoſt poſſible Good is produced in the Univerſe collectively. This alſo ſhews us what we are to underſtand by *the very beſt Syſtem*, viz. one that is fitted for, and productive of the greateſt abſolute *general Good*: The *Manner* of effecting which comes next under conſideration. As to this, it is queried in the firſt place whether all Animals ought to have been created equally perfect; or ſeveral in different Ranks and Degrees of Perfection; and ſecondly, whether God may be ſuppoſed to have placed any Order of Beings in ſuch a fix'd unalterable condition as not to admit of advancement: to have made any Creatures as perfect at firſt as the Nature of a created Being is capable of. The former of theſe doubts is fully diſcuſs'd in this and the following Chapter, §. 2. The latter ſeems not ſo eaſy to be determin'd. They who hold the affirmative argue from our notion of infinite or *abſolute Goodneſs*, which muſt excite the Deity always to communicate all manner of *Happineſs* in the very higheſt Degree, for the ſame reaſon that it prompts him to communicate it ever in any degree. But this, ſay they, he has not done, except he at firſt endow'd ſome Creatures with all the Perfection a Creature could poſſibly receive, and gave to every ſubordinate Claſs of Beings*, the utmoſt *Happineſs* their ſeveral Natures were capable of. Neither can this Opinion be comfuted from Holy Scripture, which declares that God made innumerable glorious Orders of *Cherubim* and *Seraphim*, all far above our Comprehenſion, and ſome, for any thing that we know, in the very next Step to the *Top* of the great *Scale* of *Beings*, and only *Second* to the Almighty. Thoſe that hold the contrary Opinion diſtinguiſh between Happineſs and Perfection, and think that theſe do not either neceſſarily imply, or inſeparably attend each other. They deny therefore the conſequence of the former Argument,

* *Concerning theſe* Claſſes, *ſee* Notes 22, *and* 24.

but not without ſome new, and probably greater inconveniencies, which muſt have ſpoiled the Beauty either of the whole, or of ſome chief Part.

IV. *Fourthly,*

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Argument, and aſſign this Reaſon for it, *viz.* becauſe a being produced in the higheſt degree of natural Perfection which a Creature is capable of and ſtill continuing in the *ſame*, will not receive as much *Happineſs* in the main, as others that were placed in a much inferior State at the firſt. This, tho' it may appear ſomething like a Paradox, yet upon farther conſideration will perhaps be judg'd not improbable. Thus, for a Creature conſcious of no deficiency of any thing neceſſary to its well-being, to meet with a perpetual acceſſion of new, unknown Pleaſure, to reflect with comfort on its paſt Condition, and compare it with the preſent, to enjoy a continued Series of freſh Satisfaction and Delight, and be always approaching nearer and nearer to Perfection, this muſt certainly advance the Sum of its *Happineſs*, even above that of others, whoſe condition is ſuppoſed to have begun and to continue in that degree of perfection where this will end (if there could be any end in either) and which never knew defect, variety, or increaſe. A finite Being fix'd in the ſame State, however excellent, muſt according to all our Conceptions (if we be allow'd to judge from our preſent Faculties, and we can judge from nothing elſe) contract a kind of *Indolence* or *Inſenſibility* (*i. e.* cannot always be equally affected by an equal degree of Good in the Object) which Inſenſibility nothing but alteration and variety can cure. It does not therefore ſeem probable that God has actually fixed any created Beings whatſoever in the very higheſt degree of Perfection next to *himſelf*. Nay, it is impoſſible to conceive any ſuch higheſt Degree, and the Suppoſition is abſurd, ſince that which admits of a continual addibility, can have no *higheſt*. Since then the Creation cannot be infinite; and finites, how much ſoever amplified, can never reach Infinity or abſolute Perfection *, we can ſet no manner of bounds to the creating Power of God: But muſt refer all to his Infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs: Which Attributes we know can never be exhauſted, nor will, we believe, produce any Beings in ſuch a State as ſhall not leave room enough for them to be ſtill growing in Felicity, and for ever acquiring new Happineſs, together with new Perfection.

This notion of a growing Happineſs, is embraced by moſt Divines, and affords the ſtrongeſt Motive for endeavouring to improve and excell in every Chriſtian Grace. 'Tis beautifully touch'd by Mr. *Addiſon*. Spectator N°. 111. "*There is not,*

* *See* Note E. *or* Q. *or*. Dr. Bentley's *Boyle's Lect*. Serm. 6. P. 236, 237. 5th Edit.

All things could not be equally perfect, since some are Parts of others.

IV. *Fourthly*, From hence it appears alſo that all Beings cannot have equal Perfections, For the World muſt neceſſarily be compoſed of various *Parts*, and thoſe *parts* of *others*, and ſo on. But a Part

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" *not, in my Opinion, a more pleaſing and triumphant Conſidera-*
" *tion in Religion, than this of the perpetual Progreſs which the*
" *Soul makes toward the Perfection of its Nature, without ever*
" *arriving at a Period in it. To look upon the Soul as going on*
" *from Strength to Strength, to conſider that She is to ſhine for*
" *ever with new Acceſſions of Glory, and brighten to all Eterni-*
" *ty; that She will be ſtill adding Virtue to Virtue, and Know-*
" *ledge to Knowledge, carries in it ſomething wonderfully agree-*
" *able to that Ambition which is natural to the Mind of Man.*
" *Nay, it muſt be a Proſpect pleaſing to God himſelf, to ſee his*
" *Creation for ever beautifying in his Eyes, and drawing nearer*
" *to him by degrees of Reſemblance.*"

That the *Happineſs* of *Saints* and *Angels* may be continually increaſing, ſee *Tillotſon*'s 77th *Sermon*, Vol. 2d. Fol. p. 578, *&c.*

From theſe Conſiderations, and ſome which follow in the remainder of this Note, it may perhaps ſeem probable that in us, and all Beings of the like nature, changes from worſe to better muſt be attended even with greater degrees of Pleaſure than ſettled permanence in any the higheſt State conceivable of Glory or Perfection, and conſequently become neceſſary to the completion of finite Happineſs.

But in Oppoſition to all this, *Bayle* urges that Encreaſe or Alteration is not in the leaſt requiſite to a laſting Felicity even in ourſelves.

" That 'tis no ways neceſſary that our Soul ſhould feel E-
" vil, to the end it may reliſh what is Good, and that it
" ſhould paſs ſucceſſively from Pleaſure to Pain, and from
" Pain to Pleaſure, that it may be able to diſcern that Pain is
" an Evil, and Pleaſure is a Good. We know by Experi-
" ence that our Soul cannot feel, at one and the ſame time,
" both Pleaſure and Pain; it muſt therefore at firſt either
" have felt Pain before Pleaſure, or Pleaſure before Pain. If
" its firſt Senſation was that of Pain, it found that State to be
" uneaſy, altho' it was ignorant of Pleaſure. Suppoſe then
" that its firſt Senſation laſted many Years, without Interrup-
" tion, you may conceive that it was in an eaſy Condition, or
" in one that was uneaſy. And do not alledge to me Experi-
" ence; do not tell me that a Pleaſure which laſts a long time
" becomes inſipid, and that a long Pain becomes inſupporta-
" ble: For I will anſwer you, that this proceeds from a Change

" in

Part muſt needs come ſhort both of the *Divine Perfection*, and the Perfection of the *Whole*. For it is nothing with regard to all the Perfections which it has not, whether theſe be Divine, or created; and ſince

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" in the Organ which makes that Pain, which continues the " ſame as to kind, to be different as to Degrees. If you have " had at firſt a Senſation of ſix Degrees, it will not continue " of Six to the end of two Hours, or to the end of a Year, " but only either of one Degree, or of one Fourth Part of a " Degree. Thus Cuſtom blunts the Edge of our Senſations: " their Degrees correſpond to the Concuſſions of the parts of " the Brain, and this Concuſſion is weakened by frequent Re- " petitions: From whence it comes to paſs that the Degrees " of Senſation are diminiſhed. But if Pain or Joy were com- " municated to us in the ſame Degree ſucceſſively for an hun- " dred Years, we ſhould be as unhappy, or as happy in the " hundredth Year, as in the firſt Day; which plainly proves " that a Creature may be happy with a continued Good, or " unhappy with a continued Evil, and that the *Alternative*, " which *Lactantius* ſpeaks of *, is a bad Solution of the Diffi- " culty. It is not founded upon the Nature of Good and " Evil, nor upon the Nature of the Subject which receives " them: nor upon the Nature of the Cauſe which produces " them. Pleaſure and Pain are no leſs proper to be communi- " cated the ſecond Moment than the firſt, and the third Mo- " ment than the ſecond, and ſo of all the reſt. Our Soul is alſo " as ſuſceptible of them after it has felt them one Moment, as " it was before it felt them, and God who gave them, is no " leſs capable of producing them the ſecond Moment than " the firſt †."

As this is one of the ſtrongeſt Objections, and applicable to all kinds of Evil, I have quoted it at length (tho' ſome parts may not relate immediately to our preſent purpoſe) and ſhall endeavour to give a full anſwer to it in the following Notes. It will be conſider'd with reſpect to Moral Good and Evil, in Notes, 68, 83, 84. Let us confine ourſelves at preſent to Natural Good, which may be divided into ſenſitive and intellectual. As to the former, we perceive that the Mind, for the Augmentation of its Happineſs, is endowed with various Senſes, each of which is entertain'd with a variety of Objects: now, any one of theſe Senſes can convey ſo much Pleaſure for ſome time as is ſufficient to fill our preſent narrow Capacity, and engroſs the whole Soul. She can be entirely happy in the Satisfaction ariſing from the Sight, Hearing, &c. or from the

* See Note 79. P. 447. † *Critical Dict.* p. 2486.

ſince one Part is not another, nor the *whole*, 'tis plain that every Part wants the Perfections not only of the whole, but of other Parts alſo. And that the *whole* is more perfect than a *part*, is evident

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the Memory, or any other Mode of Perception by itſelf. If therefore any one of theſe Organs could (as *Bayle* ſuppoſes) continue to communicate the ſame Degree of Pleaſure to us for an hundred Years, all the reſt would be unneceſſary: But an All-wiſe Being, who cannot act in vain, has implanted this Variety of Senſes in us; this then is a good Argument (to thoſe who allow ſuch a Being, upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) that none of theſe particular Senſes could continue in its preſent State, and always communicate the ſame Degree of Happineſs. Farther, his Suppoſition will appear to be impoſſible, from conſidering the Nature and Properties of that Matter of which the ſenſitive Organs are compoſed. If there be (as *Bayle* maintains) ſo cloſe a Connection between the Soul and certain Modifications of Matter, as that the Degrees of ſenſitive Pleaſures are diminiſhed by a *Change* in the Organ, by weakening the Concuſſion of ſome parts of the Brain *by frequent Repetitions*; then we ſay, 'tis plainly impoſſible that the ſame Degrees ſhould be continued by this Organ, which, as it is material, is perpetually expoſed to this *Change*, and liable to Diſſolution, and neceſſarily weakened by theſe *frequent Concuſſions*. Every Motion in it muſt in time be ſtopped by contrary ones, as our Author has fully ſhewn in Chapter 4. §. 1.

If he ſuppoſes that the ſame Degree of Pleaſure may ſtill be communicated tho' the Organ alters, he ſuppoſes that there is no ſuch Connection between any Portion or Poſition of Matter and our Spirit; which is directly contrary to his former Suppoſition, and alſo to truth, as will perhaps appear from the following Chapter. If then *Bayle* imagines that the ſame or different Matter, when moved or at reſt; or when moved in different Directions, may ſtill affect the Mind in the very ſame manner, he muſt either take it for granted that the Affections of Matter are no Cauſes of the Senſations of the Mind, that is, contradict his former Suppoſition; or elſe he muſt ſuppoſe the ſame Effect to proceed from different Cauſes; either of which will tend equally to advance his Syſtem. But in reality, this Decreaſe of Pleaſure, in Familiarity and Cuſtom does not perhaps entirely depend on any Change of the corporeal Organs, but on the original Faculties of the Soul itſelf, as may be gathered from ſome ſuch Obſervations as this which follows. View a delightful Landſkip, a pleaſant Garden,

hence, that it neceſſarily includes the multiplied Perfection of every part; and beſides, the parts when

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den, or any of the Figures which appear moſt *beautiful*, renew the Proſpect once, or twice, to Day, to Morrow, and at ſeveral diſtant Periods; it ſhall afford a great degree of Pleaſure for ſome time, while any *Novelty* may be ſuppoſed to remain; but that Pleaſure periſhes together with this Novelty, tho' the external Organs of Viſion ſtill continue perfect, and your Senſations are moſt evidently the ſame the laſt Day as the firſt. You are able to behold the ſame Scenes over again, with the ſame eaſe and acuteneſs, but not with the ſame Intenſeneſs of Delight. To attempt a Mechanical Solution of this by a ſuppoſed alteration of ſome imaginary *Traces* in the Brain (which yet, if they were allowed, cannot mend the matter a jot, as was juſt now ſhewn) will only throw us into ſtill greater Difficulties, as any one that attentively conſiders the whole of that chimerical Hypotheſis muſt conclude, and of which *Bayle*, who ſoon perceived the Defects and Abſurdities of moſt other Syſtems, was undoubtedly convinc'd. It ſeems to me much more properly reſolvable into a native Property of the Soul itſelf. Is it not probable that the Mind of Mind is originally framed with a Diſpoſition for, or Capacity of being delighted with *Variety?* That it cannot be always on the ſame Bent, but as it is endow'd with different Faculties, ſo theſe relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional Pleaſure from the *Novelty* of thoſe Objects about which it is converſant; and that by this means it enjoys a greater Sum of Happineſs than it could other ways attain to? See the *Spectator*, N°. 590. N°. 625. or N°. 411. or *Watts* on the *Paſſions*, §. 4.

I ſhall only add an Obſervation on this Head from the Author of the *Vindication of God's Moral Character*, p. 21. which ſhews us the Neceſſity for this variety or increaſeableneſs of Perfection, in order to our *Intellectual Happineſs*, ſince moſt of that ariſes from our paſt Defects. ' *By* Intellectual Happineſs, *I mean the* ' Diſcovery and Contemplation of Truth, *with regard to which* ' *I have this to obſerve, that all the Pleaſures we taſte of this* ' *Kind are owing either to our preceding* Ignorance, *to the Care* ' *and Pains we take in the Diſcovery of Truth, or to the* Degree ' *of our* Knowledge, *when we attain to a* greater meaſure *than* ' *other Men. All Truth, when conſider'd ſeparate from theſe,* ' *is alike* [illegible] Truth *(tho' not of the like Importance to us) the* ' *Object of the Underſtanding, and as ſuch, it muſt afford the* ' *ſame Delight. If we all could, with equal Eaſe and Clear-* ' *neſs, ſee all the Relations of things, they muſt all in the Nature* ' *of the things equally affect us. We ſhould taſte as much Plea-*

when joined together and connected, acquire a new and peculiar Perfection, whereby they anſwer their

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' *ſure in knowing or contemplating that two and tw*
' *as in knowing or contemplating any Propoſition w*
' *pears the moſt* difficult, *and ſo affords the moſt P*
' *rather, we ſhould not have Pleaſure from any of t*
' *if this be the Caſe, then is it evident that the C*
' *have for taſting this kind of Pleaſure renders us c*
' *contrary. We could not be delighted in the Diſco*
' *templation of Truth, if we were not capable of being ignorant,*
' *and of the Unhappineſs which ariſes from it.*'

This is the Conſequence we would draw from all that went before: But of this more at large under the Head of *Moral Evil.*

We reply then to *Bayle*, that this *Alternative* or variety of either Good or Evil, ſo far as concerns the preſent Argument is founded on the Nature of the *Subject which receives them*, and that our Soul in its preſent State, is not ſo ſuſceptible of them after it has felt them two or three times as at firſt. What it might have been made capable of, is nothing to the Purpoſe, ſince (as it was obſerved before, and muſt often be repeated) we are to conſider Man as we find him at preſent; and draw all our Arguments, not from ſuch Faculties as are perhaps in other Beings, but from theſe only which we perceive and experience in him. If theſe cannot be alter'd and improved conſiſtently with each other *, nor ſubjected to any general Laws more ſuitable to his preſent Circumſtances, and productive of more good to the whole Syſtem †, then, all Arguments built on this Topic againſt the Divine Attributes muſt fall to the Ground. Theſe and the like Suppoſitions therefore, *viz. that the ſame Degree of Pleaſure might be communicated to us ſucceſſively for a hundred Years*; — if underſtood of one uniform Cauſe producing it: *That our Pleaſures*, (meaning *ſenſitive* ones) *might not depend on the Fibres of the Brain*,— and *That theſe Fibres ſhould not wear out at all* ‡, — or, if theſe Fibres did wear out, *that the Pleaſure ſhould never decay*, — are all unreaſonable Suppoſitions: They offend againſt the Rule laid down above, and always to be remember'd, of taking the whole human Nature as it is; of conſidering our preſent Body and Spirit, and the obvious Properties of each, and the known Laws of their Union together. All ſuch Objections therefore are beſide the Queſtion; and founded upon the old abſurdity of reducing us to a different *Claſs* of Beings, when

* See Note 28. † See Note 25.

‡ See *Bayle's* Dict. p. 2487.

proper Ends, which they could not do aſunder; they defend themſelves much better, and aſſiſt each other. The Perfection of the whole therefore, is not only more *extenſive* than that of the Parts, by the accumulation of many Parts, perhaps equal to one another; but more *intenſe* alſo, by the Addition of certain *Degrees*, whereby the whole muſt of Neceſſity excell the Parts. As therefore we have proved that an abſolutely perfect Creature is an Impoſſibility, ſo it may be proved from hence that all cannot have an *equal Degree* of Perfection. For the World conſiſts of Parts, and thoſe again of others, perhaps diviſible *in infinitum:* But that every ſingle Part ſhould have the Perfection of all, or many, is impoſſible; and we are not to arraign the Power or Goodneſs of God for not working Contradictions. There muſt then be many, perhaps infinite (20.) Degrees of Perfection in the Divine Works; for whatever ariſes from *Nothing* is neceſſarily imperfect; and the leſs it is removed from nothing (taking *Exiſtence* for one Degree, as we ſaid before) the more imperfect it is. There is no Occaſion therefore for an Evil Principle to introduce the Evil of Defect, or an Inequality of Perfections in the Works of God: For the very Nature of created Beings neceſſarily requires it, and we may conceive the Place of this malicious Principle to be abun-

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when (as will appear preſently) all conceivable Claſſes and Orders are already full.

Thus much for one Query about the manner of creating things, *viz.* whether any ſhould have been *fix'd immutably* in a certain Degree of Perfection: Our Author proceeds to examine the other, *viz.* Whether all Things could and ought to have been at firſt in the *ſame* Degree of Perfection?

(20.) That is *indefinite*, or greater than any given Number; for neither the Univerſe itſelf, nor any thing that belongs to it, can be properly and abſolutely Infinite, as our Author maintains in his Note E, and we have largely proved from *Cudworth*, *&c.* in the former Chapter.

abundantly ſupplied from hence, that they derive their Origin from *Nothing*. (21.)

V. *Fifthly*, 'Tis plain, that Creatures are not only unequally imperfect in reſpect of their *Parts* and *Under-parts*, and ſo on, which by continual ſubdiviſion, approach in a manner to nothing; but a neceſſary inequality ariſes among them alſo in reſpect to

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(21.) It is ſcarce neceſſary to obſerve, that this muſt all along be underſtood only *Materially*, i. e. that theſe things were not produced from any Matter *pre-exiſtent*, but were made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and brought into Being from mere *Non-Exiſtence*.. For the Poſſibility of which, and the Opinion of the Antients on this Subject ſee *Cudworth*, C. 5. §. 2. p. 738, &c. The other Senſes of the Words, *viz.* That any thing can come from nothing *cauſally*, or be produced *by* nothing, or *by itſelf*, or *without* an *Efficient Cauſe*, are manifeſtly abſurd, as is demonſtrated at large in the ſame excellent Section. For an Illuſtration of our Author's Notion before us, ſee *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 1. C. 6. §. 2. p. 446, 447, 1ſt. Edit. 'God is the *Cauſe of Perfection* only, 'but not of Defect, which ſo far forth as it is *natural* to *created Beings* hath no *Cauſe* at all, but is merely a *Negation* or 'Non-entity. For every created thing was a *Negation* or *Non-entity* before ever it had a *poſitive* Being, and it had only ſo much of its *primitive* Negation *taken away* from it, as it had 'poſitive Being conferred upon it; and therefore, ſo far forth as *it is*, its *Being* is to be attributed to the *Sovereign Cauſe* that produced it; but ſo far forth as it *is not*, its not Being is to be attributed to the *Original Non-entity* out of which it was produced. For that which was once Nothing, would *ſtill* have been Nothing, had it not been for the *Cauſe* that gave *Being* to it, and therefore that it is ſo far Nothing ſtill, *i. e. limited* and *defective*, is only to be attributed to its own *primitive* Nothingneſs. As for inſtance, If I give a poor Man a hundred Pounds, that he is worth *ſo much* Money is wholly owing to *me*, but that he is not worth a hundred *more* is owing only to his own Poverty; and juſt ſo, that I have ſuch and *ſuch Perfections* of Being is wholly owing to *God* who produced me out of Nothing; but that I have ſuch and *ſuch Defects* of Being is only owing to that *Non-entity* out of which he produced me.'

The ſame Notion is largely diſcuſſed in *Eilhardi Lubini Phoſphorus*, &c. Chap. 6, 7, and 17. From whom it appears, that moſt of the antient Philoſophers meant no more than this by their *Evil Principle*.

(22.) From

unequal Perfections with regard to their Attributes; but it is agreeable to the higheſt Goodneſs to create thoſe which are leaſt perfect, if they are no hindrance to the Number or convenience of the more perfect ones

to their *Attributes*. For a conſcious or thinking Subſtance is more perfect than one that wants Senſe or Underſtanding. If it be aſked, How is it agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have created theſe alſo? I anſwer, If the Creation of theſe be no impediment to the Production of the more perfect; if neither the Number nor Happineſs of the more perfect be diminiſhed by the Creation of thoſe that are leſs perfect, why will it be unfit to create theſe too? Since God does what is beſt to be done, nothing more or greater can be expected from the moſt benevolent and powerful Author of Nature. If therefore it be better, *cæteris paribus*, that theſe more imperfect Beings ſhould exiſt, than not, it is agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs that the beſt that could be ſhould be done. If the Production of a leſs perfect Being were any hindrance to a more perfect one, it would appear contrary to Divine Goodneſs to have omitted the more perfect and created the leſs; but ſince they are no manner of hindrance to each other, the more the better. (22.)

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(22) From the Suppoſition of a Scale of Beings gradually deſcending from *Perfection* to *Non-entity*, and compleat in every intermediate Rank and Degree [for which ſee Note 24.] we ſhall ſoon perceive the Abſurdity of ſuch Queſtions as theſe, Why was not Man made more perfect? Why are not his Faculties equal to thoſe of Angels? Since this is only aſking why he was not placed in a quite different Claſs of Beings, when at the ſame time all other Claſſes are ſuppoſed to be already full. From the ſame Principle alſo we gather the Intent of the Creator in producing theſe ſeveral inferior Orders under our View. They who imagine that all things in this World were made for the immediate Uſe of Man alone, run themſelves into inextricable Difficulties. Man indeed is the Head of this lower Part of the Creation, and perhaps it was deſigned to be abſolutely under his Command. But that all things here tend directly to his own uſe, is, I think, neither eaſy nor neceſſary to be proved. Some manifeſtly ſerve for the Food and Support of others, whoſe Souls may be neceſſary to prepare and preſerve their Bodies for that Purpoſe, and may at the ſame time be happy in a Conſciouſneſs of their own Exiſtence. 'Tis pro-

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This confirm'd by an Inſtance of Matter, which is no Impediment to pure Spirits.

VI. An Inſtance will make this more clear. Suppoſe that God made the World *finite*; ſuppoſe that *Spirits*, or pure immaterial thinking Beings, are the *moſt perfect* Species of Subſtances: Suppoſe in the laſt Place, that God created as many of this ſort as were convenient for the Syſtem he had made, ſo that if there were more, they would incommode one another; yet there would be no leſs Room for Matter, then if there were none at all. (F.) This Suppoſition is by no means abſurd; for

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bable that they are intended to promote each others Good reciprocally: Nay, Man himſelf contributes to the Happineſs, and betters the Condition of the Brutes in ſeveral Reſpects, by cultivating and improving the Ground, by watching the Seaſons, by protecting and providing for them, when they are unable to protect and provide for themſelves *. Others, of a much lower Claſs, may, for ought we know, enjoy themſelves too in ſome Degree or other; and alſo contribute to the Happineſs even of ſuperior Beings, by a Diſplay of the Divine Attributes in different Ways, and affording ample Matter of Reflection on the various Ranks and Degrees of Perfection diſcoverable in the animal World; wherein the higheſt Order may with Pleaſure contemplate numberleſs Species infinitely below them; And the lower Claſs can admire and adore that Infinity of Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs and Power which ſhines forth in ſo many Beings ſo much above them. They may conduce to the Beauty, Order, and Benefit of the whole Syſtem, the general Good of which was the Aim of its Creator, and with regard to which every Part is chiefly to be eſtimated †. They may have ten thouſand Uſes beſide what relates to Man, who is but a very ſmall Part of it: Several Inſtances might be given which would make this very probable; at leaſt the contrary, I think, cannot ever be proved. See C. 4. §. 2. Subſ. 4, 5.

(F.) If any one had a mind to fill a certain Veſſel with Globes of various Magnitudes, and had diſtinguiſhed them into their ſeveral Degrees, ſo that thoſe of the ſecond Degree might have Place in the Interſtices left by thoſe of the firſt; and

* *See* Chubb's *Sup. &c.* p. 12. *and* Dr. J. Clarke, p. 284, 285.

† *See* Cudworth, p. 875, 876. *or* Tillotſon, *Serm.* 91. P. 683. 2d Vol. Fol. *or* Ray *on the Creation*, Part 2. p. 423. 4th Edit. or Note G.

for ſince theſe may be conceived without *local Extenſion*, and have no relation to *Space* or *Place*, as Bodies have *, in whatever Number they were created, they would contribute nothing at all either to the filling up of Space, or excluding Bodies out of it, yet they would have a certain *Syſtem* or *Society* among themſelves, which might require a determinate Number, which if it were exceeded, they muſt become troubleſome to one another by too great a Multitude in a finite World. Nay, if the World were ſuppoſed to be *infinite*, and as many ſuch Spirits created as were poſſible, yet would they be no impediment to Matter, or Matter to them, neither would their Number be leſs, nor their Conveniences fewer, becauſe Matter did or did not exiſt. Since then material and immaterial Beings conſiſt ſo well together, is it not agreeable to the greateſt Goodneſs to have created both? Let Matter be ſtupid and devoid of Senſe as it is; let it be the moſt imperfect of all Subſtances, and next to nothing, (ſince not to perceive its Exiſtence is little different from Non-exiſtence) 'tis better to be even ſo, than not at all; for Exiſtence is, as we ſaid, the Foundation, or firſt Degree

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and thoſe of the third Order in the interſtices of the ſecond, and ſo on. 'Tis evident that when as many of the firſt Magnitude were put in as the Veſſel could contain yet there would be Room for thoſe of the ſecond. Neither could any wiſe Man aſk why the whole Veſſel was not filled with the greater Globes, or why all of them were not of the ſame Magnitude.

This Inſtance may afford an Anſwer to ſuch as demand why God has not given a different and more perfect Nature to Animals. *viz.* There was no room in the mundane Syſtem for Beings of a more perfect Nature. But when as many Creatures were made of the ſuperior Order as the Syſtem of the World was able to contain, whether you ſuppoſe it finite or infinite; nothing hinder'd but that there might be room for others of a lower Degree: As when as many Globes of greater Mag-

 nitude

* See Note 7.

Degree of Perfection, and the next as it were to this, the ſecond is perception of Exiſtence. But you'll ſay, Why did not God add this Second Degree to Matter? I anſwer, if that could, it is probable it would have been done: But ſince we ſee that Matter is in itſelf a paſſive, inert Subſtance, we muſt believe that its Nature would not admit of *Senſe*, or if it had been capable of Senſe, that greater Inconveniences would have flowed from thence, than if it had been made inſenſible, as it is. (23.) However, without this there would be a kind of *Void* in the Univerſe, and ſomething want-

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nitude were put into the Veſſel as it could hold, yet there was ſtill a Space for others of a leſs Dimenſion; and ſo on *in infinitum*. When therefore any aſk why God did not make all of the ſame Perfection with the *Angels:*

We anſwer, that after as many Angels had been made as were convenient, there was a Place left for inferior Animals, and after as many Animals of a more perfect Nature were made as the Syſtem required, there was ſtill room for other more imperfect ones; and ſo perhaps *in infinitum*.

If you aſk why God does not immediately tranſplant Men into Heaven, ſince 'tis plain they are capable of that happier State: Or why he detains them ſo long from that Happineſs, and confines them on the Earth as in a darkſome Priſon where they are forced to ſtruggle with ſo many Evils.

I anſwer, Becauſe the Heavens are already furniſhed with Inhabitants, and cannot with convenience admit of new ones, till ſome of the preſent Poſſeſſors depart into a better State, or make room ſome other way for theſe to change their Condition. See Note Y.

(23.) *Matter*, as ſuch, and in itſelf, is at preſent incapable of Thought and Self-motion, it is therefore in a Degree below Animals, or (as our Auther ſays) next to Nothing. But yet, ſuch as it is, 'tis firſt, abſolutely neceſſary to many Animals, and ſecondly, would not be ſo convenient for their Uſes if it could think. It is the *Baſis* or *Support* of Animals in this our Syſtem; it is, as we may ſay, the *Caſe* and *Covering* of their ſeveral Souls; it ſerves for the *clothing* of that Caſe, for their *Food*, their *Defence*, and various uſes. But were it all Life, or conſcious (not to inſiſt on the Abſurdities of ſuch a Suppoſition in itſelf) what Miſery and Confuſion would ariſe? If all were Animals, what muſt theſe Animals ſubſiſt on? If they were of

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wanting which might exiſt: But it was better that there ſhould be Matter than nothing at all, and ſince one ſide was to be choſen, the Divine Goodneſs prefer'd Matter, becauſe that was the greater Good. For ſince it it no hindrance to the Multiplication or Convenience of thinking Beings, nor diminiſhes the Number of the more perfect, 'tis plain it adds to the Perfection of the Univerſe, and whatever it be, though the moſt imperfect thing in Nature, 'tis gain to the whole. It was therefore agreeable to the greateſt Power and Goodneſs to have created this alſo; nor need we the *Demiurgus* of the antient Heretics to produce it, as if unworthy of the great and good God. The Evils of Imperfection then muſt be permitted in the Nature of things; an inequality of Perfections muſt be permitted alſo, ſince it is impoſſible that all the Works of God ſhould be endowed with equal Perfections. (G.)

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the ſame Nature with ſuch as we are acquainted with, they muſt alſo be ſuſtained after the ſame manner, *i. e.* they muſt live by *Food*, and conſequently live upon, and continually torment and conſume one another; and conſequently more Happineſs would be loſt than got by ſuch Life, which is as plentiful at preſent, ‖ as ſeems agreeable to the Syſtem. If Matter as Matter, were endowed with the Power of *Self-Motion*, what Uſe could we put it to? What Clothing or Habitations? What Inſtruments or Utenſils could we make of it? But this, I think, needs no farther Explanation. Matter then, in its preſent State, as united with and ſubſervient to ſuch Spirits as we conceive ours to be, is in general more conducive to the Good and Happineſs of the whole, than it would be in any other conceivable manner of Exiſtence. To aſk yet why ſome certain Portions or Syſtems of it might not have been made more perfect, or why it was not farther ſublimated, refined, and ſo unaccountably modified as to be rendered capable of Thought; is the abſurd Queſtion above mentioned, *viz.* Why was it not made ſomething elſe, or removed into a higher Claſs? When at the ſame time there appears ſo much Reaſon for the Exiſtence of ſuch a thing as this now is; and all ſuperior Claſſes are concluded to be full What Reaſon there is for this laſt concluſion may be ſeen in Note 24.

(G.) The Author has been blamed here for making any Difficulty about ſuch Evils as theſe of Imperfection, which are properly

‖ See Note 26.

'Tis leſs agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have omitted, than to have created theſe more imperfect Beings.

VII. If you ſay, God might have omitted the more imperfect Beings, I grant it, and if that had been beſt he would undoubtedly have done it. But it

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properly ſpeaking no Evils at all. 'Tis trifling, ſay the Objectors, ſince we ſee that the Perfection of any Structure or Machine conſiſts in this, that the Parts thereof have different Powers and Offices, and therefore we can eaſily conceive it to be no Imperfection in the Machine of the World that its Parts are of unequal Perfections; for thoſe that ſeem to have the leſs Perfection would not anſwer their Deſign, nor fill their Places if they were not ſo unequal. And as for inanimate things they are neither capable of Good nor Evil; it ſignifies nothing where they are placed, or to what Motions they are ſubjected, ſince they cannot complain or be ſenſible of their Condition. Conſequently there is no ſuch thing as the Evil of *Imperfection*, but all is properly *Natural*.

To all which we anſwer *1ſt*. The World and every Part of it is in its own Nature imperfect, for whatſoever is naturally perfect, is ſelf ſufficient, and does not ſtand in need of the Combination of more Parts or the Aſſiſtance of other things; for that Complication of parts which is obſervable in Machines is neceſſary upon this account only, that one may ſupply the Defects of another.

2dly. From hence it is evident, that the Perfection of the Parts is not to be eſtimated from their own private Convenience alone, but from the Relation which they have to the whole. And there's a great deal of Difference between relative and abſolute Perfection; a thing may perfectly anſwer the Office it bears with regard to the whole, without any Convenience to itſelf, nay to its own Deſtruction.

3dly. It appears that notwithſtanding the Infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, Creatures muſt neceſſarily labour under the Evil of Imperfection; and that this Imperfection is to be conſidered two Ways, the one with regard to the whole, the other in reſpect of particulars.

4thly. The Good of the whole cannot be in every thing at all times conſiſtent with the Good of each Particular. For as every Part is in its own Nature imperfect and limited, 'tis poſſible for it not to be Self-ſufficient, and that it may have as much Occaſion for external Aſſiſtance, as reaſon to aſſiſt others. The Poſſibility of ſuch a State follows from the very Nature of Limitation and Imperfection. For ſuppoſing more things than one of a limited Nature, if they have any intercourſe together, they muſt neceſſarily affect each other. And it belongs to the Divine Goodneſs ſo to frame them, that they ſhall aſſiſt and relieve each other. Now limited Natures ought to have

it is the part of infinite Goodneſs to chuſe the very beſt; from thence it proceeds therefore, that the more

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have limited Powers and Acts, nor can all Faculties agree to every Nature, ſince they may be different, diſtinct and oppoſite. And though theſe Agents which have contrary Faculties cannot promote each others Benefit immediately; yet by taking a Compaſs, and conſpiring to act in concert, they may conduce to the good of the whole and of each other. But ſince created things are almoſt infinite, and endowed with an infinite diverſity of Powers and Properties, and ſince an intercourſe is eſtabliſhed between all of them ſo that they may act upon, and be acted on by each other, it is impoſſible but that ſome Oppoſition and Contention ſhould ariſe among the parts, which nevertheleſs may make for the Benefit of the whole; neither can theſe Oppoſitions and Contentions be any bar to the Divine Power and Goodneſs, ſince they proceed not from any Defect in the Creator, but from the neceſſary Imperfection of ſuch things as are in their own Nature limited and finite, but which are neceſſary to the Good of the whole Syſtem, the general Benefit whereof is to be preferred to the Good of ſome particulars whenſoever they are inconſiſtent. There muſt then be Defects, or want of Perfection in ſeveral parts of the Creation, and this Want of Perfection muſt of Neceſſity bring many Inconveniencies on the Perſon whoſe Lot it is to fill that Part of the Univerſe, which requires a Creature of ſuch an imperfect Nature. For Example, a Man has no Wings, a Perfection granted to Birds. 'Tis plain, that in his preſent Circumſtances he cannot have them, and that the Uſe of them wou'd be very miſchievous to Society; and yet the Want of them neceſſarily expoſes us to many Inconveniencies.

A Man falls from a Precipice or into a Pit; Wings wou'd ſave him from the Fall, and relieve him from his Impriſonment; whereas now he breaks his Bones, or ſtarves by his Confinement. A thouſand Inſtances may be given where the Evil of Imperfection neceſſarily ſubjects us to Diſappointment of Appetite, and ſeveral other natural Evils; which yet are all neceſſary for the Common good.

If it be aſk'd why God, as he is of Infinite Power and Wiſdom, did not order things in ſuch a Manner that the good of the whole ſhould in all caſes and at all times conſpire with that of each particular. Or if theſe Evils neceſſarily ariſe from the mutual Intercourſe of Parts of a different and contrary Kind, why did he ordain ſuch an Intercourſe? Could he not have created all Things in ſuch a State of Perfection, that they ſhould find their Happineſs in themſelves without the Help

more imperfect Beings have Exiſtence; for it was agreeable to that not to omit the very leaſt Good that

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Help of any thing external? At leaſt he ſhould have made thoſe things, which he himſelf had the Framing of, in ſuch a Manner as to have no Intercourſe with any Being but himſelf. For they might have had enough to exerciſe their Faculties upon in the Contemplation and Love of the Divine Nature: which would have been ſufficient for their Happineſs, without any Commerce with or dependence upon other Creatures; eſpecially ſuch as would incommode them. Why therefore did God chooſe ſuch a Syſtem as made room for other imperfect, miſerable Beings.

We anſwer, that granting ſuch Creatures as thoſe abovemention'd to be poſſible, God has actually created as many of that Kind as the Syſtem wou'd admit, inſomuch that if there had been more it wou'd have been more inconvenient. Nor is it of any conſequence whether we ſuppoſe this Syſtem to be Finite or Infinite. If Finite, 'tis plain that a certain Number may fill it ſo that there will be no room for more. If Infinite, infinite Creatures of the ſame Kind will equally fill an infinite Syſtem, as a finite Number will fill a finite One; for there's the ſame Proportion. In this then as well as the former Syſtem there will be no Place for more. But yet when this Syſtem or Order of Creatures is filled up, there wou'd be room left for the other leſs perfect Orders, whoſe Natures and Faculties might have a mutual Relation to each other and whoſe Happineſs might require their mutual Help and Aſſiſtance. 'Tis certain that many and various Orders and Degrees of this Kind were poſſible; neither would they, if created, be any Impediment to the more perfect Order, which is already compleated, and the Number of which could not be increaſed without Damage to the Syſtem; neither would the Addition of theſe inferior Orders and Degrees, leſſen the Number of the prior and more perfect Ones.

What therefore was to be done? Let us now ſuppoſe God deliberating with himſelf (as a Man wou'd do) whether he ſhould create any of the inferior Order. If he does, 'tis manifeſt that he will introduce unneceſſary Imperfections into his Works. Nay, ſince ſome of theſe may have Natures and Powers contrary to each other, it will be poſſible for Claſhing and Oppoſition to ariſe among his Creatures. If he does not create them, he will appear unkind in grudging and refuſing them a Benefit, which he was able to communicate without Detriment to the Syſtem: For I ſuppoſe theſe inferior Ones not to be ſo very imperfect, but that their Exiſtence wou'd be deem'd a great and valuable Bleſſing.

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that could be produced. *Finite* Goodneſs might poſſibly have been exhauſted in creating the greater Beings,

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Who does not ſee what way the Divine Goodneſs wou'd incline in this Debate? For ſince it was better that theſe ſhou'd be, than not, is it not agreeable to infinite Goodneſs to chooſe the beſt? At leaſt ſuch a Choice could be no Injury to the greateſt Goodneſs.

Whatever Syſtem God had choſen, all Creatures in it could not have been equally perfect, and there could have been but a certain determinate Multitude of the moſt Perfect, and when that was compleated, there wou'd have been a Station for Creatures leſs perfect, and it wou'd ſtill have been an Inſtance of Goodneſs to give them a Being, as well as others: And therefore whatever Syſtem had been choſen, it would have come to what we ſee, perhaps it wou'd have been worſe. Since therefore whatever God had choſen, there muſt have been Degrees of Perfection, and one Creature muſt have been more imperfect and infirm than another, ought we not to conclude that our preſent Syſtem is at leaſt equal to any other that we could have expected?

Hence it appears why God created ſuch Beings, as muſt neceſſarily have an Intercourſe with each other, and how agreeable it was to the Divine Goodneſs not to deny them Exiſtence. There could be no reaſon to aſk why he did not make them of a more perfect Order, ſince as many of that Kind are made already as the Syſtem could receive, of what Kind ſoever that Syſtem were ſuppoſed to be. Neither could the Benefit of the whole be render'd abſolutely, in all Caſes, and at all times conſiſtent with that of Particulars. For tho' this might perhaps be effected in the more perfect Orders, yet it is plainly impoſſible in the leſs perfect ones, ſuch as have a Connection with Matter, that is neceſſarily ſubject to Contrariety and Diſſolution; and eſpecially thoſe which have ſolid and hard Bodies. Either therefore no ſuch Animals as theſe were to have been created, or theſe Inconveniencies tolerated: Suppoſing always that their Exiſtence is a Bleſſing to them notwithſtanding theſe Inconveniences, and that more Good than Evil accrues to them from the Poſſeſſion of it.

From hence it will appear how fruitful a Source of Evils this Imperfection of Creatures may be, and that from this Head there flows a Poſſibility of Evil among the Works of God, notwithſtanding Infinite Power and Goodneſs. How every particular Evil may be reduced to this Origin, ſhall be ſhewn (God willing) in the Sequel.

In the Interim who can doubt whether this Source of all Evils be itſelf to be call'd an Evil? Evil is by many defined

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Beings, but *infinite* extends to all. The infinite Power and Goodneſs of God then were the

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a Privation of Good. In this it agrees with Defect or Imperfection, and a Man is called Evil, or an Action Evil, which brings us into Inconveniences, or is prejudicial to the Author or any other Perſon. With how much more reaſon then may Imperfection be called an Evil, ſince 'tis the Origin of all the Evils we endure, or which ariſe in the Mundane Syſtem.

But inanimate Things, you ſay, are capable of neither Good nor Evil, and therefore it does not ſignify in what Condition they be placed, ſenſible Things only can be miſerable. I anſwer, 'tis true inanimate Creatures are not capable of ſome kind of Evils, *viz.* Pain, Grief, or undue Elections; but are there no other Evils which they may be ſubject to? Who wou'd not think himſelf ill dealt with, if he ſhould be reduced to the State of an inanimate Creature? He wou'd feel no Inconveniences, ſay you. I grant it, but this very not feeling is dreaded by us as one of the greateſt of all Evils. This Deprivation of Senſe therefore, is far from being deſirable, and conſequently far from being good. To be deprived of Senſe is what we call an Evil of *Loſs*, tho' it be not a ſenſible one.

If any one ſhould take away a Man's Feeling by a blow or any other way, nay if he did not reſtore it to him when he had this in his Power, wou'd he not be miſchievous and injurious to him, tho' the Sufferer be not at all ſenſible of the Injury? Now who can affirm that God cou'd not have endowed every thing with Senſe, at leaſt have join'd a ſenſitive Soul to every Particle of Matter? May we not complain therefore that he has not done it? Is it not equally diſadvantageous for inanimate things never to have had Senſe, as for animated Beings to be deprived of it?

And yet ſome are ſo perverſe that they will not have this Imperfection called an Evil, tho' it really be as great an one as the other.

However, we muſt obſerve that inanimate Things are not made for themſelves, but for the Uſe of ſuch as are endowed with Senſe and Reaſon, they have therefore a relative good or Evil, both in regard to God, and to thoſe Creatures for whoſe Uſe they were deſign'd, and as far as they anſwer the End they were made for we eſteem them good, ſuch as do otherwiſe are Evil: Of which Good or Evil there is no other ground but their Perfection or Imperfection.

The Origin of Evil is the ſame therefore in both ſenſitive and inanimate Beings, *viz.* the Abſence of Perfection.

the Cauſe why imperfect Beings had Exiſtence to gether with the more perfect. 'Tis plain therefore that the Syſtem of the World may be the *Work of a Deity*, tho' it *has this Fault*. Nay, that it was created is evident for this very Reaſon, becauſe it is *imperfect*; for if it were *Self-exiſtent*, it would be *abſolutely perfect*. (24.)

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(24.) The chief Argument of the foregoing Chapter is beautifully illuſtrated by Mr. *Addiſon* in the *Spectator*, N°. 519. As frequent uſe will be made of this Obſervation concerning the *Scale* of *Beings*, I hope the Reader will excuſe my tranſcribing ſo much of the abovemention'd Paper as is neceſſary to explain it.

'Infinite Goodneſs is of ſo communicative a Nature, that 'it ſeems to delight in the conferring of Exiſtence upon eve- 'ry Degree of perceptive Being. As this is a Speculation 'which I have often purſued with great pleaſure to my ſelf, 'I ſhall inlarge farther upon it, by conſidering that part of 'the *Scale* of *Beings* which comes within our Knowledge. 'There are ſome living Creatures which are raiſed juſt above 'dead Matter. To mention only the Species of Shell-Fiſh, 'which are formed in the Faſhion of a Cone, that grow to 'the Surface of ſeveral Rocks, and immediately die upon 'their being ſever'd from the place where they grow. There 'are many other Creatures but one remove from theſe, which 'have no other Senſes beſides that of Feeling and Taſte. 'Others have ſtill an additional one of Hearing, others of 'Smell, and others of Sight. It is wonderful to obſerve, by 'what a gradual progreſs the World of Life advances thro' 'a prodigious variety of Species, before a Creature is formed 'that is compleat in all its Senſes; and even among theſe 'is ſuch a different Degree of Perfection, in the Senſe which 'one Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that tho' 'the Senſe in different Animals be diſtinguiſh'd by the ſame 'common Denomination, it ſeems almoſt of a different Nature. 'If after this we look into the ſeveral inward Perfections, Cun- 'ning and Sagacity, or what we generally call *Inſtinct**, we 'find them riſing after the ſame manner imperceptibly one a- 'bove another, and receiving additional Improvements ac- 'cording to the Species in which they are implanted. This 'Progreſs in Nature is ſo very gradual, that the moſt perfect 'of an inferior Species comes very near to the moſt imperfect 'of

* To which we may add, *Will* and *Liberty*. See *Bayle*'s Dict. p. 2609. 2610.

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'of that which is immediately above it. The exuberant and 'overflowing Goodneſs of the ſupreme Being, whoſe Mercy 'extends to all his Works, is plainly ſeen, as I have before hint-'ed from his having made ſo little Matter, at leaſt what falls 'within our Knowledge, that does not ſwarm with Life: 'Nor is his Goodneſs leſs ſeen in the Diverſity than in the 'Multitude of living Creatures. Had he only made one 'Species of Animals, none of the reſt would have enjoy'd 'the Happineſs of Exiſtence, he has therefore ſpecified in his 'Creation every degree of Life, every Capacity of Being. 'The whole Chaſm in Nature, from a Plant to a Man, is fil-'led up with diverſe kinds of Creatures, riſing one over ano-'ther, by ſuch a gentle and eaſy aſcent, that the little Tran-'ſitions and Deviations from one Species to another, are al-'moſt inſenſible. This intermediate Space is ſo well huſ-'banded and managed, that there is ſcarce a Degree of Per-'fection which does not appear in ſome one part of the World 'of Life. Is the Goodneſs or Wiſdom of the Divine Being 'more manifeſted in this his Proceeding? There is a Con-'ſequence, beſides thoſe I have already mentioned, which 'ſeem very naturally deducible from the foregoing Conſide-'rations. If the Scale of Being riſes by ſuch a regular Pro-'greſs, ſo high as Man, we may, by a parity of Reaſon, ſup-'poſe that it ſtill proceeds gradually thro' thoſe Beings which 'are of a ſuperiour Nature to him; ſince there is an infinitely 'greater Space and Room for different Degrees of Perfection 'between the ſupreme Being and Man, than between Man 'and the moſt deſpicable Inſect. This Conſequence of ſo great 'a variety of Beings which are ſuperior to us, from that vari-'ety which is inferior to us, is made by Mr. *Locke*, in a Paſ-'ſage which I ſhall here ſet down, after having premiſed, that 'notwithſtanding there is ſuch infinite Room between Man 'and his Maker for the creative Power to exert itſelf in, it 'is impoſſible that it ſhould ever be filled up, ſince there will 'be ſtill an Infinite Gap or Diſtance between the higheſt crea-'ted Being and the Power which produced him.'

The fine Paſſage there cited from Mr. *Locke*, occurs in the 3d Book of his Eſſay, Chap. 6. §. 12.

See alſo Notes, K. and 26.

From the foregoing Obſervation, that there is no manner of *Chaſm* or *Void*, no Link deficient in this great Chain of Beings, and the Reaſon of it, it will appear extreamly probable alſo that every diſtinct Order, every Claſs or Species of them, is as full as the Nature of it would admit, and God ſaw proper. There are (as our Author ſays) perhaps ſo many in each Claſs as could exiſt together without ſome *inconvenience* or *uneaſineſs* to each other. This is eaſily conceivable in Mankind, and may be in ſuperior Beings, tho' for want of an exact Knowledge

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Knowledge of their ſeveral Natures and Orders, we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; only this we are ſure of, that neither the Species, nor the Individuals in each Species, can poſſibly be Infinite; and that nothing but an *Impoſſibility* in the Nature of the thing, or ſome greater *Inconvenience*, can reſtrain the Exerciſe of the Power of God, or hinder him from producing ſtill more and more Beings capable of Felicity. When we begin to enquire into the Number of theſe and the Degrees of their Perfection, we ſoon loſe ourſelves, and can only refer all to the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs: From our previous Notices of which Attributes, we have the higheſt Reaſon to conclude that every thing is as perfect as poſſible in its own kind, and that every Syſtem is in itſelf full and compleat.

CHAP. IV.
Concerning Natural Evil.

SECT. I.
Of Generation and Corruption.

A Creature cannot complain of its Fate, though it be leſs perfect than others.

IT appears from the foregoing Obſervations that created Beings muſt neceſſarily be *defective*, i. e. ſome muſt want the Perfections which others have, and that it was impoſſible for them to enjoy either an abſolute or equal Perfection; alſo, that there is no Occaſion for an Evil Principle oppoſite to infinite Goodneſs and Power. And from hence we may affirm that God, though infinitely good and powerful, could not ſeparate things from the concomitant Evils of Imperfection, and did not eſteem it unbecoming himſelf to create the Good, though that brought ſome Evils along with it, ſo long as theſe Evils are leſs than the Good with which they are connected. Nor can the Creature juſtly complain of its Condition, if it have not all, or equal Perfection with ſome others; ſince 'twas neceſſary that it ſhould fill the Station wherein it was placed, or none at all. This we have ſhewn ſufficiently, I think, in the former kind of Evils, *viz.* thoſe of *Imperfection*.

The Origin of things from Matter, is the ſource of Natural Evils, as their riſe from Nothing is the Cauſe of thoſe of Imperfections.

II. The ſame muſt be attempted in the ſecond kind, *viz.* the *Natural*. Now, as all created Beings are made out of *Nothing*, and on that account are neceſſarily imperfect; ſo all natural things have a Relation to, or ariſe from *Matter*, and on this account

count are neceſſarily ſubjected to natural Evils : Nor is the riſe of all created Beings from Nothing a more fruitful and certain Cauſe of the Evils of Imperfection, than the riſe of all natural things from Matter is of all natural Evils. (H.) If therefore we

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(H.) The Objection againſt this Poſition ſtands thus. Not only Generation and Corruption are natural Evils, but likewiſe Pains of Body and Diſſatisfaction of Mind, Diſappointments of Appetite and Death. Now it is manifeſt that all material Beings are not ſubject to theſe, particularly Man in Paradiſe as to his Body was material, and yet free from Death, and all natural Evils, and the ſame is true of the Bleſſed in Heaven. Since therefore material Beings may be free from all natural Evils, it follows that they are not neceſſarily ſubject to ſuch becauſe they are Material, and conſequently we muſt look for another Origin of natural Evils diſtinct from Matter.

The Anſwer to this Objection, that ſeems to have ſo great force in it, is not difficult. 'Tis manifeſt from the Book that when it affirms all material Beings are liable to natural Evils, it is not meant that they are always actually affected by them, but that they are capable of being ſo affected at certain Times, and in certain Circumſtances ; and yet their Circumſtances may perhaps be ſo ordered that they ſhall be always free from them.

For Example, Man in Paradiſe was naturally Mortal, and though we do not know what ſort of Body he had, yet we are ſure that he had an Appetite to eat and drink, and needed theſe to ſupport him.

How then could he avoid Pain, Diſappointment of Appetite and Death ? I anſwer by being placed in ſuch Circumſtances that he ſhould always have ſufficient Proviſion ready to ſatisfy his Hunger and Thirſt, and ſuch Knowledge of all things that could hurt him, that he might eaſily avoid them. His Blood was inflamable then as well as now, and conſequently he was ſubject to a Fever. His Limbs might be broken and disjointed then as well as now, and that muſt diſable him to manage his Buſineſs, and diſappoint a natural Appetite of moving where his Occaſions required. But God gave him the Tree of Life as a Remedy againſt all natural Diſtempers and Decays of Body, and either ſuch a Proſpect of what could hurt him as might enable him to avoid the Occaſion, or elſe if that happened he was reſtored by the uſe of the ſame Tree of Life. After all it doth not appear from Scripture, that Man in his Innocency was ſecure from all natural Evils, but only from ſuch as might deprive him of Life, or make that Life uncomfortable to him. If any Divines have gone farther it is mere

we can ſhew that theſe Evils are ſo neceſſarily connected with this Origin that they cannot be ſeparated from it, it follows that the Structure of the World either ought not to have been framed at all, or that theſe Evils muſt have been tolerated without any Imputation on the Divine Power and Goodneſs. But it is better that they ſhould be as they are, ſince they could not be more perfect. Let us examine the particular Sorts of natural Evils, and if there be nothing in them which could be removed without greater Damage to Nature, and introducing a larger Train of Evils, the Divine Goodneſs may ſecurely applaud itſelf, ſince it has omitted no manner of Good nor admitted any Evil which could poſſibly be prevented, *i. e.* hath done in every thing what was beſt.

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conjecture, and no part either of the Faith taught in Scripture, or conveyed to us by the Catholick Church. The Author of the Origin of Evil has given his Thoughts concerning the Eſtate of our firſt Parents more fully in a Diſcourſe on *Gen.* ii. 17. Where he founds himſelf on the Word of God and ſpeaks conformably to the Senſe of the Primitive and reformed Churches, but it were too long to inſert here. ‖

From what has been ſaid already I ſuppoſe it is manifeſt, that the Happineſs of Man in Paradiſe is no Argument againſt the Poſition in the Book, that all things material are liable to natural Evils, to Corruption and Diſſolution, and if united to a Spiritual Subſtance that has Senſe or Reaſon, they make it likewiſe capable of Pain, and of the Diſſatisfaction that ariſes from the Diſappointment of Appetites.

As to the Bleſſed in Heaven, their Caſe is much more eaſy to be accounted for, and I think thoſe Words of the 4th Ch. S. 3. Subſ. 2. are ſufficient. 'I anſwer, theſe Bodies are not 'therefore immortal, becauſe they are naturally incorruptible '(for that would be inconſiſtent with the Nature of that Mat-'ter whereof they are compoſed) but becauſe they are put in-'to ſuch Places and Circumſtances by the Deity, that they 'can even with Pleaſure foreſee, and prevent all ſuch things 'as tend to introduce either *Corruption* or *Pain*. 'I am apt to think the Objector either never read, or did not conſider this when he made the Objection.

III.

‖ See the *Sermon* annexed.

III. God has accompliſhed this in the Creation of *Matter*, as we ſaid before, nor has he been leſs beneficent in what relates to the *Motion* of Matter. In the firſt Place, Matter, though in itſelf unactive, is neverthelefs capable of Action, *viz. local Motion*, which is the Action that belongs to Matter. But 'tis better that it ſhould act as far as it is capable, than be entirely ſtill and ſluggiſh: If it were without Motion, rigid and fixed in the ſame Place, we cannot conceive what Benefit it could be of either to itſelf or any thing elſe: But when 'tis put into Motion, it may be of uſe, as is plain from Experience; though not always without a Mixture of Evils: But Action is *cæteris paribus*, preferable to Inactivity; it is therefore agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to produce Motion in Matter, if the Good ariſing from thence do not overballance the Evil, and ſo long as no Evils are permitted which are ſeparable from Motion, nor ſuch as can affect Spirits, which ate purely immaterial.

Matter is uſeleſs except it have Motion.

IV. Now, if it be granted that God could, conſiſtently with his Goodneſs, both *create Matter* and put it into *Motion*, it neceſſarily follows that its Motions muſt interfere with one another. If you ſay that Matter might move uniformly and all together, either in a *direct Line* or a *Circle*, and the contrariety of Motions by that means be prevented: I anſwer, The whole Maſs of Matter would be no leſs rigid and uſeleſs with ſuch a Motion as this, than if it were entirely at reſt; it would neither be more fit for Animals, nor more adapted to the uſes which it now anſwers. Such a Motion therefore was to be excited in it, as would ſeparate it into parts, make it fluid, and render it an Habitation fit for Animals. But that could not be without contrariety of Motion, as any one that thinks of it at all will perceive: And if this be once admitted in *Matter*, there neceſſarily follows a *Diviſion* and *Diſparity* of Parts, *Claſhing* and *Oppoſition*,

Such Motion was to be raiſed in Matter, as might ſeparate it into parts. Hence the Generation and Corruption of Bodies.

Comminution, *Concretion* and *Repulſion*, and all thoſe Evils which we behold in *Generation* and *Corruption*. God could indeed have removed all theſe from Matter, by taking away its Motion, but they are either to be tolerated, or Matter muſt remain fix'd and immoveable in the ſame Situation. Some may aſk, why God would not produce ſuch Motion in Matter as might render all its Concretions ſo perfect as not to be liable to *Diſſolution* or *Corruption*. For ſince the Power of God is infinite, nothing on his ſide hinders this from being done; what hinders therefore on the ſide of Matter? I anſwer, Its *Motion* and *Diviſibility*. For if you ſuppoſe any ſort of Motion in Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be either *uſeleſs*, as we ſaid before, or in *oppoſite Directions*. The mutual claſhing of theſe Concretions could therefore not be avoided, and as they ſtrike upon one another, whether we ſuppoſe them hard or ſoft, a Concuſſion of the Parts and a Separation from each other would be neceſſarily produced: But a Separation or Diſſipation of the parts is *Corruption*. This therefore could not be avoided without violence done to the Laws of Motion and the Nature of Matter. For to hinder moveable things from ever interfering, and the Parts which are naturally ſeparable from ever ſeparating by mutual impulſes, would require a *perpetual Miracle*. (25.)

V. Secondly,

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(25.) That is, there could be no general pre-eſtabliſh'd *Laws of Nature*, but God muſt continually interpoſe and effect every thing by his own direct and immediate Power: The bad conſequences of which are very obvious. There could be no *Arts* or *Sciences*, no *Skill* or *Induſtry*; no regular Methods of providing for our Bodies, or improving our Minds in the Knowledge of things. All which evidently preſuppoſe and are entirely founded on ſome ſettled, certain Laws of the Univerſe diſcoverable by us.

'We are ſo far acquainted (ſays the Author of the *Religion of Nature delin.* p. 96.) with the *Laws* of *Gravitation* and *Motion*, 'that

V. Secondly, Since it is proper that Matter ſhould be put into Motion, 'tis better that this ſhould be done according to ſome certain Laws and in an orderly Courſe, than at random, and as it were by chance. For by this Means the Syſtems compoſed of Matter will have both more durable and more regular Periods. The firſt Evil ariſing from Matter was, we ſaid, the *jarring* of Elements; from hence comes this Corruption and Diſſolution, Inſtability and Viciſſitude. It may be ſurprizing, that all theſe ſhould proceed from a ſtable, fix'd and uniform Good. But we have made it appear that Matter could not move at all without theſe, and it was more eligible that the World ſhould be liable to them, than deſtitute of Animals. And that theſe Evils ſhould not multiply beyond Neceſſity the Divine Goodneſs has taken care, by reſtraining its Motion under certain Laws, ſo as to make it ſteady, and as conſtant as could be; ſo that the Machines compoſed of it might be as little ſhock'd with contrary Motions as poſſible, and endure for a long time; nay ſome of them in certain Places and Circumſtances for ever. For if no parcels of Matter were directed by any certain and determinate Rule, ſuch a confuſed Motion would jumble every thing together, nor could any thing laſt for ever ſo ſhort a time. On this account God eſtabliſh'd certain Laws of Motion, and perpetual Rules; and framed the great Maſs of Beings into certain Machines and Syſtems, which have ſuch an exact Correſpondence as

Motion under certain Laws tends more to the preſervation of things, than if it were left atrandom: Hence God diſtributed Bodies into various Syſtems.

NOTES.

'that we are able to calculate their Effects, and ſerve ourſelves 'of them, ſupplying upon many Occaſions the defect of Power 'in ourſelves by *Mechanical* Powers, which never fail to anſwer 'according to the Eſtabliſhment, *&c.*' Concerning the Neceſſity of the preſent Laws of Motion, and the Fitneſs of them to attain the intended Ends, ſee Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 92, *&c.* and 150, 158.

as to contribute their mutual Aſſiſtance towards preſerving the Motion and Order preſcribed by the Deity. (L.) Neither was it convenient that Matter ſhould every where conſiſt of the ſame kind of Parts; but rather that it ſhould be in one place very fluid, ſimilar and homogeneous, ſuch as we believe the *Æther* to be; in another, ſolid and compact, as the Earth is, and perhaps the Stars; in another, mix'd with heterogeneous Particles, ſuch as we find the Air and Water.

It appears from Light and other Phenomena, that the Syſtems of the Univerſe are very good and beautiful.

VI. We muſt confeſs that ſuch a Maſs as the Earth is, ſeems not ſo beautiful or ſo fit for Motion, as the pure fluid Æther; 'tis alſo more liable to Corruption and Changes; yet it is moſt certain that the Earth was not conſtituted in this manner for no reaſon at all, or unneceſſarily: Perhaps the

NOTES.

(L.) 'Tis objected that the Author avoids the chief Difficulty, and which ſtood moſt in need of an Anſwer. For he ſuppoſes certain general Laws upon the Eſtabliſhment whereof Evils muſt neceſſarily invade the Works of God; but he does not tell us why God eſtabliſhed theſe Laws, which muſt bring ſo great Evils along with them: could not an Omnipotent, All-knowing, and abſolutely Good God have made other Laws free from all theſe Defects? Why did he bind himſelf to ſuch univerſal Rules? Could he not have interpoſed his Omnipotence and diſpens'd with theſe Laws, and thereby prevented every Evil which would ariſe from the Obſervance of them? The Author is ſilent on this Head.

But it is evident that the Author had theſe Difficulties in view, and has given a proper Reply to each. Wherever he has mention'd any univerſal Law, he ſhews that it ariſes from the very Nature and Conſtitution of things, and that a better could not poſſibly be made, nor one which is more neceſſary for the Preſervation of thoſe Beings to which it is given: And that it could not be diſpens'd with, at leaſt frequently, without detriment to the whole *.

If therefore all the Fault muſt needs be laid upon God; yet he is not to be blamed for fixing ſuch general Laws, but rather for making ſuch imperfect Creatures, which neceſſarily required theſe Laws and were incapable of better. This is the true ſtate of the Queſtion, and of this the Author has alſo given an account in the foregoing Chapter. See Note (G.)

* *See* C. 5. §. 5. Subſ. 3.

the *Mundane* Syſtem could no more conſiſt without theſe ſolid Maſſes, than the human Body without Bones. No ſober Man doubts but God could have diſpoſed this Material World into other Syſtems; and of what kind ſoever theſe had been, our reaſon could never have comprehended the contrivance of them. For, ſince our Planetary Syſtem is incomprehenſible to us, much more will the Fabrick of the whole Univerſe be ſo; but as far as we do underſtand the Diſpoſition of it, all is well, elegant and beautiful: and if, among all the Phenomena of Nature, we were only acquainted with Light, that would ſhew us the juſt and admirable Structure of it. It is reaſonable therefore to believe that this is the very beſt, and attended with the leaſt Inconveniencies.

'Tis raſh to affirm that Matter might be diſtributed into better Syſtems, ſince we do not thoro'ly underſtand the preſent.

VII. You'll ſay that ſome particular things might have been better. But, ſince you do not thoroughly underſtand the whole, you have no right to affirm thus much. We have much greater Reaſon to preſume that no one Part of it could be changed for the better, without greater Detriment to the reſt, which it would either be inconſiſtent with, or diſfigure by its Diſproportion *. For we have ſhewn before, that all manner of Inconveniencies could not be avoided, becauſe of the Imperfection of Matter, and the Nature of Motion. That State of things was therefore preferable, which was attended with the feweſt and leaſt Inconveniencies. And who but a very harſh, indiſcreet Perſon will affirm that God has not actually made choice of this? Nay, who can do it with any Shadow of Reaſon, unleſs he throughly underſtands both this and that other which he would prefer to it? Whoever pronounces upon them before this, gives Sentence before he has look'd into the Cauſe, and is at the ſame time both a partial and an incompetent Judge.

It

* *See* Note 28.

It concerned us the more to have this well explained, that being convinced of the Convenience or *Meliority* of the whole Material Syſtem, we may more eaſily perceive the Origin of thoſe Evils which neceſſarily follow from the *Contrariety* of Motion, and the *Corruption* of things.

SECT. II.

Concerning Animals and the Variety of them.

Matter does not ſeem to be made for its own ſake, ſince it is not Self-conſcious, 'tis therefore deſign'd for the Uſe of Animals.

SINCE Matter is not ſelf-conſcious, nor able to enjoy itſelf, nor capable of receiving any Benefit from itſelf, it follows that it was not made for itſelf, but for ſomething elſe, to which it was to be ſubſervient in Senſation, Thought, or Fruition. We find by Experience that Matter can be thus ſerviceable to a thinking Being, tho' ſtupid and inſenſible itſelf: 'Tis probable therefore that God deſigned and directed all Matter to this end as far as was poſſible. Hence comes the Union of ſenſible and thinking Beings with the Particles of Matter, as we experience in ourſelves. The ſame may be ſaid of all its Parts, as far as the order and conſtitution of things allow'd. There is nothing therefore in vain, nothing idle, nor any Region without its Animals. For ſuppoſing, as we ſaid, ſo many pure Spirits ſeparate from Matter, to be made as were convenient; as theſe occupy no Place *, there would be no leſs Room for other thinking ſenſible Subſtances that ſtood in need of Matter for the Exerciſe of their Faculties, and enjoyment

* See Note 7.

joyment of themſelves, which for the future let us call *Souls.* (K.)

II. Now

NOTES.

(K.) The Author has endeavoured to account for this *Variety* of Creatures in the following Manner. All Beings could not be placed in the ſame Degree of Happineſs, or in the ſame order of Perfection, neither could all of the ſame Order be in the ſame Degree, or enjoy the ſame Conveniencies. The good of the whole wou'd not allow it. For inſtance, ſuppoſe a certain Order of intelligent Creatures made by God, which have a mutual Intercourſe, and ſtand in need of each others Aſſiſtance to promote the common Happineſs, which they are obliged to promote with united Powers and Inclinations.

'Tis plain, that there's a Neceſſity for Government among them; for as they have Appetites and Choice, and a limited Underſtanding, 'tis impoſſible for them to adminiſter the Affairs of the Publick (in which the good of all conſiſts) by the ſame means, at the ſame time and with a joint Endeavour, without devolving a Right to determine theſe things on ſome one or more Perſons. Whence ariſes a Neceſſity for Rule or Government among ſuch reaſonable Creatures. Nor could it be avoided where there is both a mutual Intercourſe and a limited Underſtanding. On which account the ſame is obſervable among the Angels themſelves.

But now 'tis plain that thoſe who happen to have this Government over ſuch as are naturally their equals, are in better Circumſtances with regard to externals, than thoſe which have only the Honour of obeying. They may with greater certainty and eaſe, and in more Caſes obtain their Ends, effect their Choice, and accompliſh their Deſires, (*i. e.* be happy) than thoſe which are obliged to poſtpone the Gratification of their Senſes and the Execution of their Deſigns, and abſolutely conform themſelves to another's Will, which they muſt neceſſarily do who are ſubject to the Rule of others.

And yet it is impoſſible that this ſhould be every one's Lot. 'Tis impoſſible all ſhould be Rulers and none Subjects. From this Example we ſee how the Relations which Creatures have to one another, may put a Reſtraint even on infinite Power, ſo that it will be a Contradiction for them while they keep the Nature which they have at preſent, to be in ſome Reſpects otherwiſe diſpoſed than they now are, nor can all of the ſame Order be gratified with the ſame Conveniencies. From hence it follows either that a God of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, is obliged by theſe Attributes to reſtrain his Power from creating any ſuch Creatures, or that he *muſt* aſſign them Stations very diſtant from the higheſt Happineſs which they are capable of.

'Tis probable that Animals vary according to the variety of thoſe regions which they are deſtin'd to inhabit: Therefore the Æther and Air, in all probability, have their proper Inhabitants, as well as the Earth.

II. Now, ſince the Structure of this viſible World conſiſts of various Bodies, *viz.* pure Æther, Air, Earth, *&c.* 'tis highly probable, as we ſaid before, that each of theſe has its proper Inhabitants, *viz.* by the Union of Souls with Parcels of Matter. Without ſuch an Union, we cannot apprehend how there ſhould be either Æthereal or Aerial Animals. For the moſt fluid Bodies if not united to an immaterial Soul, or compacted together, would be immediately diſſolved, and every blaſt of Wind would diſſipate ſuch Animals: Either then theſe vaſt Fields of Air or Æther muſt be entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants, which very few will believe, who behold every clod of Earth ſtock'd with Animals; or furniſhed after ſome ſuch Manner as we conjecture. (26.) If you

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Hence alſo it appears, why all things do not anſwer every one's Appetite. Why we are not enriched with as many Benefits as the Capacity of our Nature ſeems to require. For tho' the infinite Goodneſs of God encourages us to promiſe ourſelves thus much, yet Wiſdom and Juſtice ſet bounds as it were to his Goodneſs, and ſhew that this cannot be done without Detriment to the whole; that either this Inconvenience muſt be tolerated, or no ſuch Creatures made; and that it was better not to give ſome ſo great a Degree of Happineſs as their Natures might receive, than that a whole Species of Beings ſhould be wanting to the World.

If it be aſk'd why God did not make this Species in another and more perfect Manner, ſo as to be free from this Inconvenience. I anſwer, that then it would have belonged to another Species, and been of a different Order of Creatures: And I ſuppoſe as many of the Species to be made already as the Syſtem would admit, but that there was ſtill room for theſe inferior ones, which muſt neceſſarily have had the Nature they now are, of or none at all, as has been often ſaid, and I'm unwillingly obliged to repeat it.

(26.) We have a beautiful Deſcription of our Author's conjecture in the *Spectator*, N°. 519. 'If we conſider thoſe Parts of 'the Material World which lie the neareſt to us, and are therefore ſubject to our Obſervations and Enquiries, it is amazing 'to conſider the Infinity of Animals with which it is ſtocked. 'Every part of Matter is peopled: every green Leaf ſwarms 'with

you ſay, here's Room for pure Spirits. I anſwer; Since theſe do not fill up Place, nor have any Relation to it, 'tis the ſame thing wherever they be, and Material Subſtances have nothing at all to do with them: It is not therefore neceſſary to ſuppoſe ſuch large Tracts of Air or Æther void of Animals, in order to make Room for theſe, for which it would be no leſs commodious, if repleniſh'd with, than if deſtitute of Animals. If then this be granted us, we may affirm that there is as great variety of Souls, as of Animals; and that it is one Species which exerts its Operations by the help of Ætherial Matter,

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'with Inhabitants. There is ſcarce a ſingle Humour in the 'Body of Man, or of any other Animal, in which our Glaſſes 'do not diſcover myriads of living Creatures. The Surface of 'Animals is alſo covered with other Animals, which are in the 'ſame manner the Baſis of other Animals that live upon it; 'nay, we find in the moſt ſolid Bodies, as in Marble itſelf, 'innumerable Cells and Cavities that are crowded with ſuch 'imperceptible Inhabitants, as are too little for the naked Eye 'to diſcover. On the other Hand, if we look into the more 'bulky Parts of Nature, we ſee the Seas, Lakes and Rivers, 'teeming with numberleſs kinds of living Creatures: We 'find every Mountain and Marſh, Wilderneſs and Wood, 'plentifully ſtocked with Birds and Beaſts, and every Part of 'Matter affording proper neceſſaries and conveniencies for the 'Livelihood of Multitudes which inhabit it. The Author 'of the *Plurality of Worlds* draws a very good Argument from 'this Conſideration, for the *peopling* of every Planet; as in-'deed it ſeems very probable from the analogy of Reaſon, 'that if no part of Matter which we are acquainted with, 'lies waſte and uſeleſs, thoſe great Bodies which are at ſuch 'a diſtance from us, ſhould not be deſart and unpeopled, but 'rather that they ſhould be furniſhed with Beings adapted to 'their reſpective Situations. *Exiſtence* is a Bleſſing to thoſe 'Beings only which are endowed with Perception, and is in 'a manner thrown away upon dead Matter, any farther than 'as it is ſubſervient to Beings which are conſcious of their 'Exiſtence. Accordingly we find from the Bodies which 'lie under our Obſervation, that Matter is only made as the 'Baſis and Support of Animals, and there is no more of the 'one than what is neceſſary for the Exiſtence of the other.' See alſo Dr. *Scott*'s Works, Vol. 2. Diſcourſe 15. p. 308, *&c.* Fol.

Matter, and another which ſtands in need of Aerial, and a third of Terreſtrial. Neither will every Element be fit for every Animal, but each will have its proper Inhabitants: Nor can there be any juſt Cauſe of Complaint that they are uneaſy out of their proper Element, that Men cannot live any while commodiouſly in Æther, nor perhaps Ætherial Animals upon the Earth: For 'tis ſufficient if every one nouriſhes its proper Inhabitants, according to the Nature and Conſtitution of each.

The Earth as being the leaſt part of the Mundane Syſtem, is not to be chiefly regarded but yet is not made to no purpoſe, or without deſign.

III. That is a fooliſh Objection therefore of the *Epicurean Lucretius* *, that the World owes not its Original to a Divine Power and Goodneſs, becauſe Mountains, Woods and Rocks, large Fens, and the Ocean cover ſo great a ſhare of it: that the *burning heat*, viz. of the *Torrid Zone*, and the *eternal Froſt*, viz. of the two *Frigid*, take up almoſt two Parts of it; ſince the Sea, the Rocks, Winds and Mountains are not entirely uſeleſs in their preſent Situation; which was requiſite for the good of the Univerſe, and the Order of the Mundane Syſtem. Neither was the Earth or its Inhabitants to be regarded in the firſt Place. For, ſince it is but a ſmall Part of the whole, and almoſt a Point, where would have been the Wonder if it had not been fit for any Inhabitants at all? If it did but promote the good of the whole, while itſelf was barren and empty. If this had been the Caſe, it would not have proved an uſeleſs part of the World, any more than a Nail is of a Man's Body; and it is as abſurd to deſire that all parts of the Univerſe ſhould immediately afford Habitation to Animals, as that every Part and Member of an animated Body ſhould by itſelf conſtitute an Animal; 'tis ſufficient if every particular Member conſpire with the reſt, and exerciſe its own

* See *Bentley*'s Eighth Sermon § 10. p. 329. 5th Edit. or *Bates* on *the Exiſtence of God*, &c. Chap. 1, 2, and 3. or *Cockburn*'s Eſſays, 1ſt Part, Eſſ. 7. par. 5, *&c.* and 2d Part, Eſſ. 4. par. 5, *&c.* and the *Authors* mention'd in Note 38.

own proper Function, and conſequently that the Earth, which is a Member of the Univerſe, have its peculiar uſe in promoting the Good of the whole. If therefore the whole Earth was ſerviceable, not to preſerve Animals, but only Motion, nothing could be objected from thence againſt the Goodneſs of its Author. Neither would it appear ſtrange to any that conſiders the Immenſity of the Works of God, and how minute a Portion of them the Earth is, if it were entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants: Nor would it therefore be in vain. How much more then may we admire the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God therein, who has filled the whole and every part of it with Life.

IV. He knew beſt what Creatures every part of it was fit for, and has aſſigned to each its proper Place, as is evident to every Obſerver: The Mountains, the Woods, the Rocks, the Seas, have their proper Inhabitants, which they ſupply with Nouriſhment. The Syſtem of the World required a Globe of ſolid Matter ſuch as the Earth is, and we have Reaſon to believe that this is, as it were, a Wheel in the great Automaton, without which its Motion would be very imperfect. But beſides this principal End, the Divine Wiſdom ſaw that it might ſerve for Nutriment to ſeveral kinds of Animals, that no manner of Good therefore might be omitted which was conſiſtent with the primary End, he filled it with all thoſe Animals that it was capable of, nor could the Earth afford Suſtenance to any ſuperior or more proper Beings. God has given thoſe Parts to the Brutes which are unfit for Men; and that there might be nothing uſeleſs, which yet could not be alter'd without Detriment to the whole, he has adapted Animals to every Part and Region of it; and ſince the Habitations could not conveniently be converted into any other Form, he provided ſuch Animals as wanted and were agreeable to theſe Ha-

The Earth may be conceived as a Wheel in this Automaton of the World, without which its Motion would be defective: in the interim it affords an Habitation and Food to Animals.

Habitations. Hence Mountains, Woods and Rocks give Harbour to wild Beaſts, the Sea to Fiſhes, the Earth to Inſects. Neither ought we to complain that the whole Earth is not of uſe to Man, ſince that was not the principal End it was made for; but, on the contrary, Man was for this reaſon placed upon the Earth, becauſe it afforded a convenient Receptacle for him. And what if it had been totally unfit for Man? Would it therefore have been in vain? By no means. On the contrary, we are certain that God would have given it other Inhabitants, to whoſe Maintenance it might have been ſubſervient. (27.)

V. Thoſe

NOTES.

(27.) Our Author's Argument here might be carry'd much farther, and the infinite Wiſdom of the Creator demonſtrated not only from his having made nothing in vain, or uſeleſs in *itſelf*, but alſo from the diſtinct and *various* Relations which every thing bears to *others*, and its contribution to the good of the whole: From the double, the *manifold* apparent *Uſes* of almoſt every thing in Nature.

Thus the Mountains mention'd in the Objection of *Lucretius*, and which many Moderns have alſo miſrepreſented as deformities of Nature, have not only their own peculiar Inhabitants, but alſo afford to other Animals the moſt commodious Harbour and Maintenance, the beſt Remedies and Retreats. To them we owe the moſt pleaſant Proſpects, the moſt delicious Wines, the moſt curious Vegetables, the richeſt and moſt uſeful Metals, Minerals, and other Foſſils; and, what is more than all, a wholſome Air; and the Convenience of navigable Rivers and Fountains.

The Occean, beſides the Support of its own Inhabitants (which are, in all probability, as numerous and various as thoſe of the Earth) provides alſo vaſt Quantities of Vapours, which refreſh and fructify the Earth itſelf, and nouriſh and ſupport its Inhabitants, producing Springs, Lakes and Rivers. The leſſer Seas, Fens and Lakes, are ſo admirably well diſtributed throughout the Globe, as to afford ſufficient Vapours for Clouds and Rains to temper the Cold of the Northern Air, to cool and mitigate the Heats of the Torrid Zone, and refreſh the whole Earth with fertile Showers: As is fully proved by *Derham*. *

As

* *Phyſico-Theol.* B. 2. C. 5. & B. 3. C. 4.

V. Thoſe therefore who urge the unfitneſs of certain Parts of the Earth for the Suſtenance of Man, as a Fault and Defect of the Divine Skill in making them, are oblig'd to prove that the Earth was made for the ſake of Mankind only, and not of the Univerſe; and that every thing in the World is uſeleſs which does not immediately tend to the uſe of Man. But this is abſurd, and what no one would object, who is not blinded with Pride and Ignorance*. We ought rather to admire the Power and Goodneſs of God who has ſo temper'd his Works, though they be immenſe and infinitely various, that there is nothing in them which exiſts not in the very beſt manner with reſpect to the Whole, and which he has not repleniſh'd with its proper Inhabitants. And ſince the Variety of

The Earth is made not for Man alone, but for the Univerſe: to think otherwiſe ſavours of human pride.

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As to the variety of Uſes which the ſame thing is render'd capable of and manifeſtly deſigned for by its All-wiſe Author, ſee *Colliber's Impartial Enquiry into the Exiſtence, &c. of God*, p. 80. 'To obtain a great number of Ends by as few 'means as may be, is the higheſt point of Wiſdom. But no-'thing can be imagin'd more admirable in this reſpect than 'the preſent frame of things. Thus tho' the human Body is 'compoſed of a great variety of Parts, yet how much more 'numerous are their Uſes? How many are the Uſes of the 'Hand, which directed by Reaſon is inſtead of all other In-'ſtruments? How many Advantages do we owe to the Eye, 'the Ear, and the Tongue? And if we take a deeper View, 'and look into the minuter parts of which theſe are compound-'ed, what can be more admirable than the Variety of Aims 'and Intentions that may be obſerved in each? The ſeveral 'Uſes of the Structure and Poſition of each ſingle Muſcle have 'been computed by *Galen* in his Book *de Formatione Fœtus* to 'be no leſs than ten. The like may be obſerved with refe-'rence to the Bones and other ſimilar Parts, but eſpecially 'with reſpect to the Members of ſuch as are heterogeneous or 'diſſimular.' p. 81.

The ſame is ſhewn at large by Dr. *Grew*, *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1. C. 5. par. 13, 14, *&c.* or *W. Scott* on *the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God*, Serm. 1. p. 15, *&c.* or Bp. *Wilkins Princ. of Nat. Relig.* C. 6.

* See Note 22.

of the conſtituent Parts and Regions of the Earth is no greater than the Nature of the whole Machine required, nor the Species of Animals fewer than the Food would ſupply, we muſt conclude there is nothing deficient or redundant. (28.)

NOTES.

(28.) Hence I think we may ſafely conclude with our Author in general, that there could have been no *partial* Alteration of this Syſtem, but for the worſe, as far as we know; at leaſt not for the better. They who hold that there might have been a *total* one, that the whole Scheme of Things might poſſibly have been alter'd or revers'd, and that either the direct contrary, or a quite different one, would have been more worthy of God; the Men, I ſay, that hold this, are oblig'd to ſhew the poſſibility of conceiving it, and to explain the manner how it may be, before we are oblig'd to believe them. They muſt ſhew that the ſame things which are now conducive to our Happineſs, and conſequently the Objects of our Love, might as eaſily have tended to our Miſery; and conſequently have been as reaſonably the Objects of our Averſion; that the ſame Paſſions, Objects, Exerciſes, and Inclinations which now create pleaſure in us, might have produced a different, a quite contrary effect, or no effect at all. This they are obliged to do: and when they have done all this, and compleated their Syſtem, and made a total alteration of things, as they imagine, for the better, they are at laſt only got to the above mention'd abſurdity of putting this Syſtem into a higher *Claſs*, whereas all the different Claſſes in every conceivable Degree of Perfection, were ſuppoſed to be entirely filled at the firſt. We muſt therefore take things as they are, and argue only from the preſent Nature of them collectively: In which View we ſhall find no poſſible alteration of any thing, but what would produce the ſame or greater Inconveniences, either in itſelf, or others, to which it bears a ſtrict relation. Inſtances of this kind are every where to be met with: particular Proofs of it in the natural World, occur in *Bentley*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* particularly with regard to the five *Senſes* of the human Body, p. 95, 96. [See alſo *Locke* on *Human Underſtanding*, B. 2. C. 23. §. 12.] with reſpect to the figure and ſtature of it, in *Grew*'s *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 1, C. 5. §. 25, *&c.* and to the ſeveral Parts of it, all over *Boyle**, *Cheyne*, *Derham*, *Nieuwentyt*, *Ray*, *Cockburn*, *Edwards*, *W. Scott*, or *Pelling*.

The

* On *Final Cauſes*.

NOTES.

The ſame might eaſily be ſhewn in the immaterial World, and in the moſt exceptionable Part of it, *viz.* the Soul of Man, its Knowledge, Freedom, Affections †.

I ſhall take the liberty to borrow a Section from Mr. *Maxwell*'s general Remarks on *Cumberland*, C. 5. which ſets this Subject in a very good light. "The *Nature of Things* in the "natural World is ſo exactly *fitted* to the natural *Faculties* "and Diſpoſitions of Mankind, that were any thing in it "otherwiſe than it is, even in Degree, Mankind would be "leſs happy than they now are. Thus the dependence of "all natural Effects upon a few *ſimple Principles*, is wonder- "fully advantageous in many reſpects, The degrees of all "the ſenſible Pleaſures are exactly ſuited to the uſe of each; "ſo that if we enjoy'd any of them in a greater degree, we "ſhould be leſs happy: for our Appetites of thoſe Pleaſures "would by that means be too ſtrong for our Reaſon; and, "as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment "of them, ſo as to prejudice our Bodies. And where we "enjoy ſome of them in ſo high a degree, as that it is in "many caſes very difficult for the ſtrongeſt Reaſon to regulate "and moderate the Appetites of ſuch Pleaſures, it is in ſuch "Inſtances where it was neceſſary to counterpoiſe ſome diſad- "vantages, which are the conſequences of the purſuit of "thoſe Pleaſures. Thus the pleaſing Ideas which accom- "pany the Love of the Sexes, are neceſſary to be poſſeſſed "in ſo high a degree, to ballance the *Cares of Matrimony*, "and alſo the Pains of Child-bearing in the Female Sex. "The ſame may be ſaid of our *Intellectual Pleaſures*. Thus "did we receive a greater Pleaſure from Benevolence, "Sloth would be encouraged by an immoderate Bounty. "And were the Pleaſures of our Enquiries into the Truth "greater, we ſhould be too ſpeculative and leſs active. It "ſeems alſo probable, that the Degree of our Intellectual "Capacity is very well ſuited to our Objects of Knowledge, "and that had we a greater degree thereof, all other things "remaining as they are, we ſhould be leſs happy. More- "over, it is probably ſo adapted to the Frame of our Bodies, "that it could not be greater, without either an alteration in "the Laws of Nature, or in the Laws of Union between "the Soul and Body. Farther; were it much greater than "it is, our Thoughts and Purſuits would be ſo ſpiritual and "refin'd, that we ſhould be taken too much off from the ſen- "ſible Pleaſures: We ſhould probably be conſcious of ſome "Defects or wants in our bodily Organs, and would be

† *See* Sir M. Hale's *Prim. Orig. of Mank.* C. 2. *De Homine*, p. 52.

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" ſenſible that they were unequal to ſo great a Capacity, " which would neceſſary be followed by Uneaſineſs of " Mind. And this ſeems to hold in the Brute Creation: " For, methinks it would be for the diſadvantage of a Horſe, " to be endowed with the Underſtanding of a Man; ſuch " an unequal Union muſt be attended with continual diſ- " quietudes and diſcontents. As for our Pains, they are all ei- " ther Warnings againſt bodily Diſorders, or ſuch as, had " we wanted them, the Laws of Nature remaining as they " are, we ſhould either have wanted ſome Pleaſures we now " enjoy, or have poſſeſſed them in a leſs degree. Thoſe " things in Nature which we cannot reconcile to the fore- " going opinion, as being ignorant of their Uſe, we have " good Reaſon from Analogy to believe, are really advanta- " geous, and adapted to the Happineſs of the Intelligent Beings " of the Syſtem: though we have not ſo full and com- " plete a Knowledge of the entire Syſtem, as to be able to " point out their particular uſes. From theſe Obſervations " we may *conclude*, that all the various Parts of our Syſtem " are ſo admirably ſuited to one another, and the Whole con- " trived with ſuch exquiſite Wiſdom, that were any thing, " in any part thereof, in the leaſt otherwiſe than it is, with- " out an alteration in the whole, there would be a leſs Sum " of Happineſs in the Syſtem than there now is."

See alſo the Ingenious Author of the *Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*, p. 179. 201, 202.

But this will be more fully conſidered in the 4th Section.

SECT. III.

Of Death.

'Tis probable that the Solidity of our Bodies is the cauſe why we move them whither we pleaſe.

WE know by Experience that Souls united to Bodies move them ſome way or other; *viz.* by Thought and Volition: for thus we move our own. And 'tis probable that the Gravity, Solidity, and Hardneſs of our Bodies, together with the Reſiſtence of the adjacent ones, are the Cauſes why we cannot move them every way as we pleaſe.

A ſoul united to

II. A Soul when united to a portion of ethereal, uniform, and perfectly fluid Matter, free from the Impedi-

Impediment of Gravity and Reſiſtance, may in all probability move its Body whitherſoever it pleaſes. Such a Body therefore would be perfectly obſequious to the thought and will of the Soul that inhabits it: and if it receiv'd any detriment from the neighbouring Bodies, it could repair it by its Will alone; at leaſt ſo long as the Æther continued in its Fluidity and Purity. Unleſs the Animal therefore willed the contrary, its Body would be *incorruptible*, and always fit for Union, *i. e. immortal.* If any one object that the Bodies of the Bleſſed, which we call *Celeſtial*, need no Motion or Change of Condition, ſince they enjoy continual Pleaſure; for no one moves or changes his State, but in order to remove ſome preſent Uneaſineſs. I anſwer; Theſe Bodies are not therefore immortal, becauſe they are naturally incorruptible (for that would be incompatible with the Nature of that Matter whereof they are compoſed) but becauſe they are pût into ſuch Places and Circumſtances by the Deity, that they can, even with Pleaſure, foreſee and prevent all ſuch things as might tend to introduce either *Corruption* or *Pain.* Neither does their Pleaſure or Happineſs conſiſt in Reſt properly ſo called, but in Activity, in ſuch Acts and Exerciſe of their Faculties as they chooſe: Now, ſince they may exerciſe themſelves perpetually according to their own Choice, and there is nothing to hinder them, they may be perpetually happy; as will be declar'd below. All which are different in ſolid Bodies.

a portion of Æthereal Matter, &c. can move it whither it will, and preſerve its Union, ſuch a Body therefore is immortal.

III. We cannot certainly determine what Life is in theſe Animals which have ſolid Bodies; but we ſufficiently apprehend *where* it is, from certain Marks and Tokens. For where there is a circular motion of the Fluids, there is a Nutrition and Increaſe, there is, as I conjecture, ſome ſort of Life. Now 'tis evident that this circular Motion may be interrupted by the force of the adjacent Bodies: the

The Body of a terreſtrial Animal is a kind of Veſſel, which may be broke, the humours

may flow out, and the circular motion ceaſe. Such Animals then are naturally mortal.

ſolid Body of an Animal is a kind of Veſſel in which the Humours have a flux and reflux through certain ducts and channels framed by Divine Skill, in the motion of which Life conſiſts. Now this Veſſel may be broke in pieces by the impulſe of other Bodies, ſince by the native imperfection of Matter it is capable of Diſſolution: but when the Veſſel is broken, the Fluids therein contained muſt neceſſarily flow out, the circular motion muſt ceaſe, and together with it animal Life. Such Animals therefore as have ſolid Bodies, are by Nature Mortal, and cannot laſt for ever, without violence done to the Laws of Nature, of Matter, and Motion. There muſt then have been either none at all created, or ſuch as are naturally Mortal. The imperfection of Matter could not ſuffer it to be otherwiſe. For the hard and ſolid parts belonging to theſe Bodies are of ſuch a Frame as muſt neceſſarily be ſhaken and ſeparated by others of the ſame bulk and hardneſs. Every thing therefore that conſiſts of ſuch kind of Parts, may be corrupted and diſſolved. (29.) There-

NOTES.

(29.) This point is very well illuſtrated by Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Natural Evil*, p. 245, *&c.* whoſe Reaſoning is entirely built upon Sir *I. Newton*'s Experiments. "Human Bodies "as well as thoſe of all other Animals, and of Plants, are "compounded of very different Materials, fix'd and vola- "tile, fluid and ſolid; as appears by the reſolution of them "into their conſtituent Parts; and they are nouriſh'd in the "ſame manner, *viz.* by attraction. For as a Spunge by "Suction draws in Water, ſo the Glands in the Bodies "of all Animals draw different Juices out of the Blood, ac- "cording to the particular Nature and Conſtitution of each "of them: So long therefore as the nouriſhment is proper "to aſſimilate itſelf to the ſeveral parts of the Body, as it "approaches them in its ſeveral channels; or ſo long as the "ſolid Particles (ſuppoſe of Salts, which are abſolutely ne- "ceſſary to the preſervation of all Creatures) retain their "form and texture; ſo long is Life preſerv'd and main- "tain'd. And when the nouriſhment becomes unfit to aſſi- "milate; or the ſaline Particles (which towards the Center

"are

Therefore the Divine Power and Goodneſs did the very beſt even in creating Beings that were mortal: for an Animal ſubject to Death is better than none at all.

IV. But God, you'll ſay, created Man at firſt immortal, as we underſtand by ſacred Hiſtory: Mortality is not therefore an inſeparable attendant on ſolid Bodies. I anſwer; It does not appear to us of what ſort the Bodies of Mankind were before the Fall, and conſequently nothing can be argued from thence againſt the neceſſary Mortality of all terreſtrial ones. Farther, we ſhould remember that our firſt Parents were naturally mortal; but that God covenanted with them for Immortality as a matter of Favour, and upon particular Conditions. Not that they ſhould have continued upon Earth for ever; but that God promiſed to tranſlate them at a proper time by his eſpecial Favour, and preſerve them in a place fit for the Enjoyment of Eternity: as we belive he did with *Enoch* and *Elias*. But as ſoon as this Covenant with God was broken by Sin, Man

This Hypotheſis reconcil'd with ſacred Hiſtory, concerning the immortality of the firſt Man.

NOTES.

" are very denſe, and therefore capable of ſtrongly attract-
" ing the Fluids to them) loſe their power of Attraction,
" either by being divided into leſs Particles (as they may be
" by the watry parts inſinuating themſelves into their Pores
" with a gentle heat) or elſe by having thoſe watry Parts
" violently ſeparated from them: in either of theſe Caſes all
" their Motion will ceaſe, and end in Corruption, Confu-
" ſion and Death. And this is abundantly confirm'd by
" Experience, in that every thing which is corrupted or
" putrify'd is of a black Colour; which ſhews, that the
" component Particles are broken to Pieces, and reduced ſo
" ſmall, as to be unable even to reflect the Rays of Light.
" Thus we ſee that *Death*, or the Diſſolution of the Body,
" is the neceſſary Conſequence of thoſe Laws by which it is
" framed and generated: and therefore is not in itſelf pro-
" perly an *Evil*, any more than that Fabric can be ſtiled *ill*,
" the Materials, or manner of building of which, would not
" permit it to laſt a thouſand Years, nor was originally in-
" tended to continue half ſo long."

Man was reſtor'd to his Native Mortality, and ſubjected to thoſe other Inconveniences to which the Order of Nature, and the Chain of Natural Cauſes, render'd ſuch Bodies as theſe of Mankind obnoxious. For though God has not ſo far tied himſelf up to the Laws of Nature, but that he may in many Caſes ſuſpend and ſuperſede them; yet this is not done frequently, nor to be expected for the ſake of Sinners. God can indeed preſerve Man from *actual Death*; but that a ſolid Machine conſiſting of heterogeneous Parts, ſuch as the human Body is, ſhould not be *naturally Mortal*, is impoſſible: 'Tis a Contradiction therefore that Man, in the preſent State of things, ſhould be by Nature immortal. (L.)

NOTES.

(L.) All the Objections brought againſt this Section are, that the Author maintains ſome things in it which deſtroy his own Hypotheſis. 1ſt, He holds that a Soul united to an aetherial, uniform matter, perfectly fluid and without weight or reſiſtance, may tranſport its Body where it pleaſes, and if it receive any damage from the neighbouring Bodies it may repair it again, by the power that the will of ſuch a Creature has over its own Body: ſo if it pleaſe it may be immortal. From whence the Objector concludes, that according to the Author, there is no connection between a Creature made of matter and mortality, or any natural Evils.

But ſurely this is raiſing Objections againſt a Book before one read it. For if he had read it, he might have ſeen that the Author expreſly affirms that thoſe Bodies are not immortal, becauſe incorruptible by Nature; for the Matter of which they conſiſt will not permit them to be ſo; but becauſe they are placed in ſuch Stations and Circumſtances, in which they may foreknow and prevent with pleaſure all thoſe things which cauſe corruption or pain. From whence it is manifeſt that the Author ſuppoſes theſe corruptible, as well as our earthly Bodies, but it does not follow from thence that they muſt be corrupted. There's a great difference between the Power and Act; nor is it a good Conſequence, this is capable of being corrupted, therefore it muſt be actually ſo. The Circumſtances plainly make the difference between Bodies of this ſort and ours that are ſolid, heavy and heterogeneous, ſubject to the ſhock and impulſe of others that are likewiſe hard, heavy, &c.

But

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But then, *2dly*, the Objector alledges that this ought not to be ſo; for how knows any body that ſuch compoſitions as theſe have any more malignity in them than ſubtil uniform Bodies? *Anſw.* If by malignity be meant actual Corruption, every body muſt ſee that theſe are more liable to it than the other: that a heavy Body can't be moved with the ſame facility that a Body exempt from Gravity can; that a certain portion of matter to which the Soul is immediately united, and which it uſes in Senſation, will become unfit for it when it is diſſipated or mix'd with heterogeneous particles, and that in the Earth it muſt meet with ſuch, whereas there are no ſuch particles to mix with it in an uniform Æther.

Our firſt Parents knowledge or Power, if they had continued in their Innocence, could not have prevented all effects of theſe, tho' God out of particular favour wou'd have preſerv'd them from the worſt and moſt miſchievous of 'em, which are reckon'd up in the Book*, and this but for a time, 'till he found it convenient to tranſlate them to a better place. Tho' after all, we know not how the Bodies of our firſt Parents were framed, or what alterations were introduced on their ſinning, and therefore no good Argument can be taken from thence.

But, *3dly*, 'Tis pretended that to ſay, on Man's ſinning God abandon'd him to his natural Mortality, and to the other inconveniences that neceſſarily follow the Laws of Nature, is a ſort of Contradiction. For if there be a natural Neceſſity that Man ſhould be expoſed to Pains and Death, his Innocence could not protect him from them.

But this is ſtill to confute Books without reading them. The Author does not ſay that Death or Corruption neceſſarily follow the Laws of Nature, but only that they are the Effects of theſe ſame Laws when left to themſelves, which God did not think fit to do in all things whilſt Man continued Innocent.

Nor laſtly, does it follow from thence, as pretended, that Matter is indifferent to Diſſolution or Continuance of itſelf, and only determin'd to one or other as the Creator pleaſes. For the Poſſibility of Corruption is inherent in all Matter, but whether it ſhall in all times and places actually be corrupted depends on the Pleaſure of God, and in many Caſes on the Pleaſure of other Agents, and that the Matter of human Bodies in their preſent Circumſtances ſhou'd not be corrupted, is impoſſible.

SECT.

* Sect. 9. par. 5.

SECT. IV.

Of the Paſſions.

Our Souls require Bodies of a peculiar *Craſis*, when that is diſordered or removed, the operations of the Soul are either hindered or deſtroyed.

SUPPOSING the Union of a thinking or ſenſitive Soul with Matter, its Thought and Will muſt neceſſarily be affected by the Motions of that, as Body muſt be again by theſe. For ſince the Soul is of ſuch a Nature as to require Matter of a peculiar *Craſis* and *Figure*, in order to diſcharge its Functions, it follows that when this Diſpoſition is faulty, or quite fails, the Operations of the Soul muſt be impeded, or entirely ceaſe; nor can it poſſibly be otherwiſe while the Soul and Body are of ſuch a Nature as they really are.

The Soul and Body admit of a mutual Sympathy: hence it is the firſt care of the Soul to keep the Body free from harm.

II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the Divine Goodneſs to have aſſigned ſuch a Nature to them, as was ſhewn before; we muſt alſo admit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, if they mutually affect each other, the conſequence will be that it is the principal buſineſs of the Soul to preſerve the Body from harm. In order to this, 'tis neceſſary that the Soul have a perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to the Body; and this could not be more effectually procured, than by providing that thoſe things which tend to its preſervation ſhould communicate an agreeable ſenſation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, a diſagreeable one. For otherwiſe, the firſt thing we met with might deſtroy us, while we were unaware or regardleſs of it; nor ſhould we be ſollicitous to avoid a River or a Precipice.

The ſenſe of Pain is neceſſary to preſerve Life, as alſo the dread of Death.

III. 'Tis neceſſary therefore that the Soul and Body ſhould affect each other mutually; that the Impairing or Diſſolution of the Body ſhould create uneaſineſs, which, by its importunity, might recall the Soul that was indiſpoſed or otherwiſe engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to ceaſe

ceaſe urging, till what was hurtful be removed: without this importunity perhaps the ſtrongeſt Animal would not laſt even a Day. The Senſe then of Pain or Uneaſineſs produced in the Soul upon the Mutilation or Diſſolution of the Body, is neceſſary for the preſervation of Life in the preſent State of Things. It may be proved from the ſame Principles, that the averſion to, or dread of *Death*, is not in vain, ſince it cannot even be conceived how a frail and mortal Body, toſſed by continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, ſhould eſcape Diſſolution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not forewarned to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (M.)

IV.

NOTES.

(M.) Here the Enemies of the Unity of God alledge that they are ſatisfied, that Matter muſt be moveable, that a Body compoſed of ſolid and heavy Parts, as ours are, environed with other Bodies in continual Agitation and perpetually liable to their Shock, muſt be alſo ſubject to be broken and diſſolved; but then why ſhould ſuch Separation and Diſſolution cauſe uneaſy Sentiments in us? 'Tis true, if a Man be benighted in a Wilderneſs and deprived of Light, he may fall into a Pit and break his Bones; if he fall aſleep, the Wind may blow down a Tree on him and cruſh his Body, or cut off a Leg or an Arm; theſe are by the very Nature of Matter eaſily ſeparable; but our Miſery doth not conſiſt in loſing theſe, but in the Trouble and Concern we have for the loſs of them. If the loſing them cauſed no Pain or Vexation to us, we were as happy without as with them. Now they ſuppoſe that the Soul is united to the Body on what Terms God pleaſes, and that he could as eaſily have joined the Senſations of Pleaſure with theſe Impreſſions on our Bodies, as that of Pain, and that an infinitely good God wou'd have done ſo, if a contrary Power had not hindered him.

For ought I find the whole Difficulty concerning natural Evils is reduced to this Point, and methinks 'tis ſtrange that any Streſs ſhould be laid on it; which will appear if we conſider,

1ſt, That the Argument is drawn from a Matter concerning the Nature of which we have no Knowledge, I mean from the Union of the Soul and Body, and from the Manner in which the one affects and operates on the other. We can give no account how one Part of Matter acts on another, how they are united,

The reſt of the Paſſions are connected with theſe.

IV. Now the reſt of the Paſſions are Conſequences of Pain, Uneaſineſs, and Dread of Death; *viz.* Anger, Love, Hatred, *&c.* An Animal in the preſent State of things, muſt therefore either be obnoxious to theſe, or quickly periſh. For 'tis impoſſible that the Soul ſhould have a diſagreeable Senſation, and not be *angry* at the Cauſe which produces it: and ſo of the reſt.

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united, or what it is that makes them ſtick together. Much leſs do we know how a Soul and Body are united to one another, or how it is poſſible that there ſhould be a mutual Action and Re-action between them; and therefore to ſay that this proceeds from an Arbitrary Power, or that it might have been otherwiſe, is to affirm what Nobody either doth or can know. We ſee the Action of one part of Matter on another is neceſſary, and ariſes from the Nature of it: If it had been otherwiſe, it had not been Matter but ſomething elſe, and he that would not have it ſo, would not have God to have created any Matter at all; which, as the Author ſhews, had been to leſſen God's Goodneſs, and to hinder him from doing a thing which was better done than let alone. And how doth the Objector know but 'tis the Nature of Souls, and as neceſſary to them to be affected thus with certain Motions of Matter, as for one Part of Matter to be moved by the Impulſe of another? If then our Souls did not receive theſe Impreſſions from the Motions cauſed in our Bodies by external force, they would not be human Souls, but ſome other Creatures; of which ſort, I ſuppoſe there were as many created as the Syſtem wou'd allow, and therefore there muſt either be wanting in the World this Species of Beings, or they muſt be ſubject to ſuch Impreſſions. If therefore it be better for Men to be as they are, than not to be at all, God has choſen the better Part in giving them a Being, and acted according to his Infinite Goodneſs.

But 2dly, If all the uneaſy Senſations cauſed in us by the Incurſions of external Bodies tend to our Preſervation, and without them we could neither live nor enjoy ourſelves for any time; then they do more good than hurt, and conſequently are a Preſent worthy of God to beſtow on us. Now this is demonſtrated by the Author in his Book, and 'tis confeſſed that as things are now ordered, the Senſe of Pain is neceſſary to oblige us to avoid many Perils.

But then again 'tis urged, that this doth not remove the Difficulty, becauſe it is alledged by the Followers of *Manes* that theſe Pains are from the evil Principle, and as the good

cauſes

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering that the Soul ſhould not be affected by the Motions of the Body; or at leaſt, that every thing done therein ſhould be agreeable: But how dangerous this would be to Animals, any one may underſtand, who recollects how very ſhort their Lives muſt be, if they died with the ſame Pleaſure that they eat or drank or propagate their Species. If on tearing the Body

The Paſſions could not be avoided otherwiſe, than by ordering that the Soul ſhould not be affected with the Motions of the Body: By theſe means Animals would be very ſhort liv'd.

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cauſes the Taſte of Meat on the Tongue to pleaſe, ſo the Evil cauſes the Fire to create Pain in us when it burns us.

2dly, They alledge that there was no Neceſſity for theſe Pains, becauſe *Adam* was without them in Paradiſe. 3dly, We might have been *ſufficiently obliged* to avoid what could hurt us, if we had a perfect Knowledge of its approach, and had been warned to avoid the Danger, not by the Pain or Fear which we now feel, but by withdrawing of the Senſe of Pleaſure on the Approach of what might hurt or deſtroy us. Laſtly, that theſe Warnings are often in vain.

To give this Argument its full Conſideration, I will examine it by Parts. And firſt, as to what is alledged, that the pleaſant Senſations produced in us by external Motions on the Organs of our Senſes are from God, and the painful from the evil Principle. I deſire it may be conſidered, 1ſt, whether any Motion cauſes Pain in us that doth not tend to our Deſtruction, and whether the Pains do not ſerve as a Means to prevent it. And if the Preſerving our Being be a greater Good to us than theſe Pains are a Miſchief, then it is plain 'tis better we ſhould have than want them. But 2dly, Pain ſeems to be nothing elſe but a Senſe that our Being is impairing, and if ſo, it ſeems impoſſible whilſt we love Being and are pleaſed with it, that we ſhould perceive it to decay, and not be diſpleaſed with the Senſe of it, and the Senſe of a thing diſpleaſing to us is Pain. Either therefore in the preſent Caſe our Senſe muſt be taken away, or Pains ſeems unavoidable. For that a certain Motion cauſed in our Organs ſhou'd pleaſe us, becauſe it contributes to ſupport our Being, and the contrary which tends to deſtroy us, ſhould not diſpleaſe us when we feel it, ſeems a Contradiction. God therefore in making us feel the Senſe of Pleaſure by the Firſt has likewiſe made us of ſuch a Nature, that we muſt either not feel the Second at all (*i. e.* the Motion that hurts us) or be uneaſy at it; and let any one judge which of theſe two is moſt for the Advantage of Animals.

There needs not therefore, any ill Principle to introduce a Senſe of Pain at the Preſence of what tends to deſtroy us, for giving

Body the Soul had either no Senſation at all or a pleaſant one, we ſhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, nor would it be any greater injury to kill a Man than to ſcratch him. And thus Mankind would quickly fail. We muſt then either have been armed with theſe Paſſions againſt Death, or ſoon have periſhed: But the Divine Goodneſs choſe that Animals ſhould be ſubject to theſe, rather than the Earth ſhould be entirely deſtitute of Inhabitants.

It is not contrary to the Divine Goodneſs to permit theſe Inconveniences, ſince they could not be avoided without greater.

VI. Behold now how Evils ſpring from and multiply upon each other, while infinite Goodneſs ſtill urges the Deity to do the very beſt. This moved him to give *Exiſtence* to Creatures, which cannot exiſt without *Imperfections* and *Inequality*. This excited him to create *Matter*, and to put it in *Motion*, which is neceſſarily attended with Separation and Diſſolution, Generation and Corruption. This perſuaded

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giving us the Senſe of Pleaſure at the Preſence of what ſupports us of Neceſſity infers the other.

And 'tis remarkable, as the Author of the Book obſerves, that when the Pain exceeds the Pleaſure of Being, the Senſe of both ceaſe, that is when our Being ceaſes to be a Benefit God takes it from us.

As to the 2d Objection, that theſe Pains on the Preſence of deſtructive Motions attacking us are unneceſſary, becauſe *Adam* in Paradiſe was without them; I have already accounted for it, and ſhewed that it doth not appear that he was altogether without Pain or Paſſion; and that he was only ſecured from ſuch Pains as might cauſe his Death, and that for a time, till removed to a better place.*

As to the 3d Objection, that if we had a perfect Knowledge of the Approach of every thing that could hurt us, and had only felt a withdrawing of Pleaſure when any ſuch thing was nigh, we might by this means have been obliged to avoid it as effectually as the Senſe of Pain could do it. I anſwer,

1ſt, The withdrawing of pleaſure or diminiſhing it, is a greater Evil to us than the pains we feel on ſuch Occaſions; Which plainly appears from this, that we rather chooſe to endure theſe pains than loſe the pleaſure our Senſes afford us; which is manifeſt in ſo many Inſtances, that I hardly need mention them. The Gout is one of the moſt tormenting Diſeaſes

* See Note H, and the Sermon annexed.

ſuaded him to couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the reſt of the Paſſions; yet all of them, as we have ſeen, are neceſſary.

VII. For, as *created Exiſtence* neceſſarily includes the Evil of Imperfection, ſo every Species of it is ſubject to its own peculiar Imperfections; that is, to Evils. All the Species of Creatures then muſt either have been omitted, or their concomitant Evils tolerated: the Divine Goodneſs therefore put the Evils in one Scale and the Good in the other; and ſince the Good preponderated, an infinitely good God would not omit that, becauſe of the concomitant Evils; for that very Omiſſion would have been attended with more and greater Evils, and ſo would have been leſs agreeable to infinite Goodneſs.

God therefore compared the Good in Things with the Evils which neceſſarily attend them; and tolerated thoſe Evils which were inſeparable from the Good.

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Diſeaſes that attend us; and yet who would not rather endure it, than loſe the Pleaſure of Feeling? Moſt Men are ſenſible that eating certain Meats, and indulging ourſelves in the uſe of ſeveral Drinks, will bring it; and yet we ſee this doth not deter us from them, and we think it more tolerable to endure the Gout, than loſe the Pleaſure that plentiful Eating and Drinking yields us. What pains will not a Man endure rather than loſe a Limb, or the advantage that a plentiful Fortune yields? This expedient therefore is very improper: for it would be an exchange for the worſe; deprive us of a greater Good, to prevent a leſſer Evil.

But, 2dly, Either this Diminution of the Pleaſure would be a more ſenſible loſs to us than Pain is now, or otherwiſe. If it were more uneaſy to us than Pain, the exchange, as before, would be for the worſe. If it were not, it would not be ſufficient: for we plainly ſee that in many caſes the greateſt pains and cleareſt proſpect of them are not ſufficient to divert us from what may be hurtful, when it comes in competition with a Pleaſure. We have therefore no Reaſon to complain of God, who has given us warning by Pain of what might deſtroy us, ſince a leſs effectual means could not have ſecured us. In ſhort, this is God's way; and for us to think we could have found a better, is pride and impudence; and there needs no more to give us a ſenſible proof of it, than to conſider the folly of the expedient propoſed by the Objector.

But

The Axiom about not doing Evil for the ſake of Good, does not take place where the leaſt Evil is choſen.

VIII. The leaſt Evil, you'll ſay, ought not to be admitted for the ſake of the greateſt Good. (For to affirm that God does Evil that Good may come of it, is Blaſphemy.) Neither does the Diſtinction between

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But then it is urged that here is a farther Degree of our Miſery, and an argument that an ill Principle had a hand in framing us, that we cannot avoid one Evil but by the fear of a worſe, and that we do not endure the pains and fears that accompany Life but on account of the greater fear we have of Death; and the imprinting in us ſo great a Love of Life which has ſo little Good in it, and in truth much leſs than it has Evil, muſt be the Work of a malignant and miſchievous Author. But I anſwer, I have ſhewed ‖ that it is the Good we feel in Life that makes us love it and afraid to loſe it, and we only apprehend the loſs of Life, and flee it, becauſe we fear the loſing ſo good a thing. The love of Life is no otherwiſe imprinted in us but by the ſenſe we have of its Goodneſs, and then the Quarrel againſt God is, that he has given us ſo good a thing that we are unwilling to part with it, and chuſe to endure ſuch pains as tend to preſerve it, and without which we could not long enjoy it. Is is a moſt wicked thought to imagine that God is like a Tyrant that delights to torture and torment his Creatures. The contrary is plain by his ſubjecting them to Pain in no caſes but where that ſenſe is neceſſary to preſerve a Good to them that counterbalances it.

But then, in the 4th Place, the Objector urges, that theſe Pains are in many caſes fruitleſs, and no way tend to help us. 'Tis alledged that the Gout and Gravel, and many acute Pains, are of no uſe, nor do they any ways contribute to prolong our Lives. I reply, the Gout, Gravel, *&c.* are diſtempers of the Body, in which the Humours or ſolid Parts are out of order: The Queſtion then is, whether it would be better for us to be inſenſible of this Diſorder, or to feel it. Let us ſuppoſe then a Man in a Fever (*i. e.* that his Blood and Humours ſhould be in ſuch a Ferment as is obſervable in that Diſtemper) and that he ſhould feel no Pain or Uneaſineſs by it; the conſequence would be that he would die before he were aware. He would not avoid thoſe things that increaſe it, or take thoſe Remedies that allay it: He would not know how near he were to Death, or when he was to avoid the Air or Motion, either of which would deſtroy him. There are Diſeaſes that take away our Senſes and become mortal, without giving us warning: None are more terrible than theſe, and moſt would chuſe to die of the moſt painful Diſtemper rather than be thus ſurpriſed;

‖ See Note Z.

between *Moral* and *Natural* Evil help any thing toward the Solution of this Difficulty: For what we call *Moral* Evil, as ſhall be ſhewn below, is that which is forbidden; now nothing is forbidden by God

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priſed: We may judge then how it would be with us if all Diſtempers were of the like Nature. I doubt whether we could ſurvive one fit of the Gout, Gravel, or Fever, if the Pain we feel in them did not warn us and oblige us to give ourſelves that Quiet, Eaſe, and Abſtinence that are neceſſary to our Recovery. Thus fooliſhly they reaſon that go about to mend the work of God.

But, 2dly, we find that Providence has joined a certain train of Thoughts and Senſations with certain motions in our Body, and it is as impoſſible that all motions ſhould beget the ſame Thoughts in us, as that the ſame Letters ſhould expreſs all Words, or the ſame Words all Thoughts. If therefore only ſome Motions in our Body occaſion pleaſing Thoughts and Senſations, then the Abſence of theſe Motions muſt *likewiſe* deprive us of the Pleaſure annexed to them, which is ſo great an Evil that we are ready to prevent it with a great deal of Pain. And the contrary Motions muſt by the ſame Rule occaſion contrary Senſations, that is unpleaſant.

If therefore, a Fever or Gout deprive us of theſe grateful Motions in the Body that give Pleaſure, and be contrary to them, it is a clear Caſe, that uneaſy Senſations on ſuch an Occaſion cannot be avoided, except Man were ſomething elſe than he is, *i. e.* no Man. Either therefore God muſt not have made Man in his preſent Circumſtances, nor given him a Body that is apt to be put out of order by the impulſe of thoſe neighbouring Bodies that ſurround him, or elſe he muſt ſuffer him to be ſometimes diſturbed by them, and let that Diſturbance be accompanied with Pain.

If it ſhould be alledged that God might have put Man into ſuch Circumſtances that no impulſe of other Bodies ſhould have cauſed ſuch Motions in his as procure Pain. I anſwer, this might have done if the very Motion of his Joints and Muſcles, and the Recruiting of the Liquids of his Body did not continually wear and deſtroy the Organs, and alter and corrupt the Blood and other Juices; and laſtly, if there were no Bodies in his Vicinity that could hurt or alter theſe: But as the Frame of the World now is with ſolid and heterogeneous Bodies in it, and which the good of the whole required there ſhould be, and whilſt theſe are all in Motion, and there is a continual Change of the Vicinity of theſe Bodies to the Bodies of Men: whilſt there is variety of Bodies on the Earth, and

God but generally, at leaſt, on account of the *Inconveniencies* attending the forbidden Actions: Theſe *Inconveniencies* are *Natural* Evils; therefore *Moral* Evils are prohibited on account of the *Natural* ones, and for that reaſon only are Evils, becauſe they lead to *Natural* Evils. But that which makes

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theſe neceſſarily ſend out different and contrary Effluvia, that mix with the Juices of our Bodies: Laſtly, whilſt not only new Bodies move toward us, but we move from place to place, without which Power we ſhould be very imperfect, and uncapable of the greateſt part of the Happineſs we now enjoy; 'tis inconceivable that we ſhould not meet with things that by the Laws of Matter neceſſarily diſturb and diſorder our Bodies; and therefore, either the Earth muſt be void of Inhabitants, or they muſt be content to ſubmit to and ſuffer theſe Diſturbances; and I have already ſhewed that theſe muſt neceſſarily occaſion uneaſy Senſations in us, which I take to be the Definition of Pain.

To Sum up this Head. For ought I can ſee, the Fundamental Objection concerning natural Evils, is that God has given us mortal Bodies, for which I think the Book fully accounts; and if it once be confeſſed that it is not contrary to the Goodneſs of God to make ſome mortal Animals, I do not ſee how we can imagine ſuch Animals ſhould apprehend the Approach of Death and not fear it; or feel the Decay of their Bodies and not be uneaſy at it; eſpecially when that Fear ſerves to preſerve them, and the Senſe of that Uneaſineſs puts them on proper Methods to ſupport themſelves. I do not deny but the Infinite Wiſdom of God might have found other means, but I deny that there could be any better; and he that undertakes to prove that there might be better, muſt underſtand all the Circumſtances of theſe Animals as they are now, and all the Conſequences that muſt happen in an infinite ſeries of times, in purſuance of the Method he propoſes; but it is impoſſible any one ſhould know theſe things; and therefore, as the Book concludes, no Man has any Right to make uſe of ſuch an Objection.

[For a particular account of all the *Paſſions* and their final Cauſes, and the Neceſſity of each, ſee Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s Eſſay on the *Nature and Conduct* of them, § 2. p. 48, 50, *&c.* and § 6. p. 179. or Dr. *Watts* on the *Uſe and Abuſe* of them, § 13. or *Chambers*'s Cyclopædia under the Word *Paſſion*, or *Scott*'s Chriſtian Life, p. 2. C. 1. § 2. par. 23. or the *Spectator*, N°. 255, 408. or Dr. *J. Clarke* on Natural Evil, p. 256, *&c.* or Dr. *More*'s Enchiridion Ethicum, B. 1, C. 8, 9, 10, 11.]

any

any thing to be ſuch, is itſelf much *more ſuch*: therefore the *Natural*, you'll ſay, are greater Evils than the *Moral*, and cannot with leſs Blaſphemy be attributed to God.

Granting all this to be true, yet though Evil is not to be *done* for the ſake of Good, yet the *leſs* Evil is to be choſen before the *greater*: And ſince Evils neceſſarily ſurround you whether you act or not, you ought to prefer that ſide which is attended with the leaſt. Since God was therefore compelled by the neceſſary Imperfections of created Beings, either to abſtain from creating them at all, or to bear with the Evils conſequent upon them: and ſince it is a leſs Evil to permit thoſe, than to omit theſe, 'tis plain that God did not allow of Natural Evils for the ſake of any *Good*; but choſe the leaſt out of ſeveral Evils, *i. e.* would rather have Creatures liable to *Natural Evils*, than no Creatures at all. The ſame will be ſhewn hereafter Concerning Moral Evils.

SECT. V.

Of Hunger, Thirſt, *and* Labour.

A Terreſtrial Animal muſt, as we have ſaid neceſſarily conſiſt of mixed and heterogeneous Parts; its Fluids are alſo in a perpetual Flux and Ferment. Now 'tis plain that this cannot be without the Expence of thoſe Fluids, and Attrition of the Solids; and hence follows *Death* and *Diſſolution*, except thoſe be repaired: a new Acceſſion of Matter is therefore neceſſary to ſupply what flies off and is worn away, and much more ſo for the Growth of Animals.

The parts of the Body fly off: it ſtands in need therefore of Reparation, *viz.* by Food.

Choice muſt be had in Food, ſince all things are not equally proper.

II. But Animals have particular *Conſtitutions*, and cannot be nouriſhed by any ſort of Matter: ſome *Choice* therefore muſt be made of it, to which they are to be urged by an Importunity ſtrong enough to excite their endeavours after it. Hence *Hunger* and *Thirſt* come to affect the Soul; Affections that are ſometimes indeed troubleſome, but yet neceſſary, and which bring more Pleaſure than Pain along with them.

The Materials of Food are ſoon corrupted: they cannot therefore be procured without Labour.

III. But why, ſay you, are we obliged to *labour* in queſt of Food? why are not the Elements themſelves ſufficient? I anſwer, they are ſufficient for ſome Animals: but Mankind required ſuch a Diſpoſition of Matter as was to be prepared by various Coctions and Changes, and that daily, becauſe 'tis ſoon liable to Corruption, and if kept long would be unfit for nouriſhment. Hence Labour becomes neceſſary to provide Victuals in this preſent ſtate of things: neither could Hunger, or Thirſt, or Labour,* (which are reckoned among *Natural* Evils) be prevented without greater Inconveniencies. The Divine goodneſs therefore had the higheſt Reaſon for affixing theſe to Animals.

Every Animal is placed by God where it may have its proper Nouriſhment; hence almoſt every herb maintains its proper Inſect.

IV. Now as Animals require different ſorts of Food, as was ſhewn, according to their different Conſtitutions, ſo God has placed every one of them where it may find what is proper for it: on which account there is ſcarce any thing in the Elements but what may be Food for ſome. Every Herb has its Inſect which it ſupports. The Earth, the Water, the very Stones, ſerve for Aliment to living Creatures.†

Some Animals are produced for Food to others, and would not have exiſted on any other terms.

V But ſome ſtand in need of more delicate Food: Now God could have created an *inanimate* Machine, which might have ſupplied them with ſuch Food; but one that is animated does it much better and with more eaſe. A Being that has Life is (*cæteris paribus*) preferable to one that has not: God

* See Note 33. † See Notes 24, and 26.

God therefore animated that Machine which furniſhes out proviſion for the more perfect Animals; which was both graciouſly and providently done: for by this means he gained ſo much Life to the World as there is in thoſe Animals which are Food for others: by this means they themſelves enjoy ſome kind of Life, and are of ſervice alſo to the reſt. An Ox, for inſtance, or a Calf, is bred, nouriſhed and protected for ſome time in order to become fit Food for Man. This certainly is better and more eligible, than if the Matter of its Body had been converted into an inanimate Maſs, ſuch as a Pompion, or continued in the ſtate of unform'd Clay. Nor is it hardly dealt withal, by being made for the Food of a more noble Animal, ſince it was on this Condition only that it had Life given, which it could not otherwiſe have enjoyed. Matter which is fit for the Nouriſhment of Man, is alſo capable of Life; if therefore God had denied it Life, he had omitted a Degree of Good which might have been produced without any Impediment to his principal Deſign, which does not ſeem very agreeable to infinite Goodneſs. 'Tis better therefore that it ſhould be endowed with Life for a time, though it is to be devoured afterwards, than to continue totally ſtupid and unactive. The common Objection then is of no force, *viz.* That inanimate Matter might have been prepared for this Uſe; for 'tis better that it ſhould be animated; eſpecially as ſuch Animals are ignorant of Futurity, and are neither conſcious nor ſolicitous about their being made for this Purpoſe. So that ſo long as they live, they enjoy themſelves without anxiety; at leaſt they rejoice in the preſent Good, and are neither tormented with the Remembrance of what is paſt, nor the Fear of what is to come; and laſtly, are killed with leſs Pain than they would be by a Diſtemper or old Age. Let us not be ſurpriſed then at the Univerſal War as it were among A-

nimals, or that the Stronger devour the Weaker; for theſe are made on purpoſe to afford Aliment to the others. (30.)

VI.

NOTES.

(30.) What is here laid down will upon Examination be found to be perfectly conſiſtent with our Obſervation in Note 23.

As the Point before us is ſet in a very good Light by Dr. *J. Clarke*, ‖ I ſhall not ſcruple to tranſcribe the whole Paragraph. 'If we conſider the Effect of Animal Creatures being 'thus made Food for each other, we ſhall find that by this 'means there is the more Good upon the whole: For under 'the preſent Circumſtances of the Creation, Animals living in 'this manner one upon another, could not have been prevent-'ed but a much greater Evil would have followed. For then 'there could not have been ſo great a Number, nor ſo great a 'Variety of Animals as there are at preſent, ſome of which are 'ſo very minute, and the Quantity of them ſuch, that mixing 'themſelves with Herbs and Plants, and Grain on which, 'themſelves feed, and with the Water and Liquids which they 'drink, they muſt neceſſarily be devoured by larger Animals 'who live upon the ſame Food, without ſo much as being ſeen 'or any way perceived by them. It is therefore much better 'upon the whole, that they ſhould live upon one another in 'the manner they now do, than that they ſhould not live at all. 'For if ſuch Animal Life is to be eſteemed ſuperior to not 'exiſting at all, or to a vegetable Life; and the more there 'is of ſuch Animal Life, the more of Good there is in the 'World; it is evident that by this means there is Room for 'more whole Species of Creatures, at leaſt for many more in-'dividuals of each Species, than there would otherwiſe be; 'and that the Variety of the Creation is hereby much enlarg-'ed, and the Goodneſs of its Author diſplayed. For the Con-'ſtitution of Animal Bodies is ſuch as requires that they ſhould 'be maintained by Food: Now if this Food can be made 'capable of Animal Life alſo, it is a very great Improvement 'of it. A certain Quantity of Food is neceſſary for the Pre-'ſervation of a determinate Number of Animals: Which Food, 'were it mere vegetable, would perhaps ſerve for that Purpoſe 'only: But by being ſo formed as to become Animal, though 'it be in a lower Degree, and the Enjoyment of Life in ſuch 'Creatures leſs, yet it is more perfect than unformed Clay, or 'even than the moſt curious Plant. Thus the Animal Part of 'the Creation has its ſeveral Degrees of Life, and as much 'Variety in it as is to be found in the inanimate and vegetable 'Part; ſo that in this reſpect there is ſo far from being any 'juſt ground of Complaint, that the Wiſdom and Contriv-'ance

‖ Diſcourſe concerning Natural Evil, p. 289.

VI. As for the *Difficulty* of procuring Food, and the *Want* of it in ſome Places, 'tis to be obſerved that the ſtate of the Earth depends upon the light and heat of the Sun; and though we do not perfectly underſtand the Structure of it, yet we have reaſon to conjecture that it is carried about its Axis by a *Diurnal*, and about the Sun by an *Annual* Motion: that its Figure is a Spheroid deſcribed by the Revolution of a Semi-Ellipſe about a conjugate Axis; and that this proceeds from the Laws of Motion and Gravitation. Now in ſuch a Situation, ſome Parts of it muſt neceſſarily be unfit for ſuch Inhabitants as Men, ſince the Paralleliſm of its Axis is preſerved in the annual Motion, and the Revolution about the ſame Axis in the diurnal. If theſe ſhould undergo the very leaſt Alteration, the whole Fabric of the Earth would be diſordered; the Ocean and dry Land would change Places to the Detriment of the Animals. Since therefore neither the annual nor diurnal Motion of the Earth could be altered without harm; 'tis plain that ſome parts of the Earth muſt neceſſarily be leſs convenient for the Habitation of Mankind, namely thoſe about the Poles; and that others muſt require much Labour to make them convenient, as we find by Experience in our own Climate; but it will evidently appear to any conſidering Perſon that in what Situation or Motion ſoever you ſuppoſe the Earth to be, either theſe or worſe Evils muſt be admitted; 'tis in vain therefore to complain of theſe Inconveniencies, which cannot be avoided without greater. (31.)

All parts of the Earth could not have afforded Nouriſhment and Reception for Men, whatever Situation they had been placed in.

VII.

NOTES.

'ance of the Animal World is admirable, and plainly ſhews 'the Excellency of the whole, and Subſerviency of all the 'Particulars in order to obtain the greateſt Good that they are 'capable of.'

See alſo the Beginning of the *Spectator*, N°. 519.

(31.) Thus if the *Figure* of the Earth were changed into a perfect *Sphere*, the Equatorial Parts muſt all lie under Water.

Of *Earth-quakes, Lightning* and *Deluges.*

VII. Neither are *Earth-quakes*, *Storms*, *Thunder*, *Deluges* and *Inundations* any ſtronger Arguments againſt the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God. Theſe are ſometimes ſent by a juſt and gracious God for the Puniſhment of Mankind; but often depend on other natural Cauſes, which are neceſſary, and could not be removed without greater Damage to the whole. Theſe Concuſſions of the Elements are indeed prejudicial, but more Prejudice would ariſe to the Univerſal Syſtem by the Abſence of them. What the genuine and immediate Cauſes of them are I dare not determine: They ſeem in general to derive their Origin from the unequal heat of the Sun, from the Fluidity, Mutability, and Contrariety of things. To theſe we may add the Aſperity and Inequality of the Earth's Surface, without

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If it were of a *Cubic*, *Priſmatic*, or any other *Angular* Figure, it would neither be ſo *capacious* for Habitation, nor ſo fit for *Motion*, nor ſo commodious for the reception of *Light* and *Heat*, for the Circulation of the *Winds*, and the *Diſtribution* of the *Waters*; as is obvious to any one that is acquainted with the firſt Elements of Natural Philoſophy, and is at large demonſtrated by *Cheyne*, *Derham*, *Ray*, &c. If its Situation were removed, its Conſtitution muſt be altered too, or elſe, if placed conſiderably farther from the Sun, it would be frozen into Ice, if nearer, 'twould be burnt to a Coal. If either its annual or diurnal Motion were *ſtopped*, *retarded*, or *accelerated*, the uſeful and agreeable Viciſſitudes of *Summer* and *Winter*, *Day* and *Night*, would ceaſe, or at leaſt ceaſe to be ſo uſeful and agreeable as they now are. The immoderate Length or Shortneſs of the Seaſons would prove pernicious to the Earth, and the ſtated times of Buſineſs and Repoſe would be as incommodious to its Inhabitants; as diſproportionate to the common Affairs of Life, and the various Exigences of Mankind. ‖ If, in the laſt place, we alter the *Inclination of the Earth's* Axis, the like Inconveniencies will attend the *Polar* Parts: If we deſtroy the *Paralleliſm* of it, beſides deſtroying at the ſame time the uſeful Arts of Navigation and Dialling, we bring upon us much worſe Conſequences. A Deſcription of ſome few of them from Dr. *Bentley*'s Sermon above cited may perhaps not be diſagreeable. 'We all know, from the very Elements of Aſtronomy, 'that

‖ See *Bentley*'s laſt Sermon, p. 315. 5th Edit.

without which nevertheleſs the whole Earth, or the greateſt part of it, would be uninhabitable. For inſtance, we complain of the Mountains as Rubbiſh, as not only disfiguring the Face of the Earth, but alſo us uſeleſs and inconvenient; and yet without theſe, neither Rivers nor Fountains, nor the Weather for producing and ripening Fruits could regularly be preſerved. * In Mountanous Countries we blame Providence for the Uncertainty of the Weather, for the frequency of the Showers and Storms, which yet proceed from the very Nature of the Climate, and without which all the Moiſture would glide down the Declivity, and the Fruits wither

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'that this inclined Poſition of the Axis, which keeps always 'the ſame Direction, and a conſtant Parallelism to itſelf, is the 'ſole Cauſe of theſe grateful and needful Viciſſitudes of the 'four Seaſons of the Year and the Variation in Length of 'Days. If we take away the *Inclination*, it would abſolutely 'undo the Northern Nations, the Sun would never come nearer 'us than he doth now on the 10th of *March*, or the 12th of *September*. But would we rather part with the *Parallelism*? Let 'us ſuppoſe then that the Axis of the Earth keeps always the 'ſame Inclination towards the Body of the Sun: This indeed 'would cauſe a variety of Days, and Nights, and Seaſons, on 'the Earth; but then every particular Country would have 'always the ſame diverſity of Day and Night, and the ſame 'Conſtitution of Seaſon, without any alteration. Some would 'always have long Nights and ſhort Days, others again perpetually long Days and ſhort Nights: One Climate would 'be ſcorched and ſweltered with everlaſting *Dog-Days*, while 'an eternal *December* blaſted another. This ſurely is not quite 'ſo good as the preſent Order of Seaſons. But ſhall the Axis 'rather obſerve no conſtant Inclination to any thing, but vary 'and waver at uncertain times and places? This would be a 'happy Conſtitution indeed! There would be no Health, no 'Life, nor Subſiſtence in ſuch an irregular Syſtem: By thoſe 'ſurprizing Nods of the Pole, we might be toſſed backward 'or forward, in a Moment, from *January* to *June*, nay poſſibly from the *January* of *Greenland*, to the *June* of *Abiſſinia*. 'It is better therefore upon all accounts that the Axis ſhould 'be continued in its preſent Poſture and Direction; ſo that this 'alſo is a ſignal Character of the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs.' See alſo *Cheyne's Phil. Princ.* C. 3. § 24, 25, 26, *&c.*

(32.)

* See Note 33.

wither away. The Earth then muſt either not be created at all, or theſe things be permitted. (32.)

VIII.

NOTES.

(32.) The ſeveral Objections mentioned in this Paragraph, are ſolidly refuted by Dr. *J. Clarke* in his Treatiſe on *Natural Evil*, part of which I ſhall take the liberty to inſert as uſual, and refer the Reader to the Book itſelf for the reſt.

Having deſcribed the Nature and Uſe of the Air's *Elaſticity*, and the *acid nitrous*, and *ſulphureous* Particles with which it is impregnated, which are the Cauſe of *Fermentation*, he proceeds to account for Earthquakes, &c. p. 190. 'Thus the internal 'Parts of the Earth being the only proper Place for containing 'ſo large a ſtore of Sulphur and Nitre and Minerals, as is re-'quired for ſo many thouſand Years as the Earth in its preſent 'State has, and may yet continue; it muſt neceſſarily be, 'that when the *Fermentation* is made in ſuch ſubterraneous Ca-'verns as are not wide enough for the Particles to expand 'themſelves in, or have no open Paſſage to run out at, they 'will, by the fore-mentioned Law, ſhake the Earth to a con-'ſiderable diſtance, tear thoſe Caverns to pieces; and accord-'ing to the depth of ſuch Caverns, or Quantity of Materials, 'contained in them, remove large pieces of the Surface of the 'Earth, from one place to another, in the ſame manner, tho' 'to a much higher degree than artificial Exploſions made under 'ground; the effect of which is ſenſible to a great diſtance. 'If it happens that thoſe Fermentations are in places under the 'Sea, the Water mixing with theſe Materials increaſes their 'Force, and is thereby thrown back with great violence, ſo 'as to ſeem to riſe up into the Clouds, and fall down again 'ſometimes in very large drops, and ſometimes in whole *Spouts*, 'which are ſufficient to drown all that is near them. If the '*Fermentation* be not ſo violent, but ſuch only as raiſes large 'Vapours or Steams, which can find their way through ſmall 'occult paſſages of the Earth, thoſe near its Surface, by their 'continual Exſpirations, are at firſt the Cauſe of gentle Winds; 'and thoſe afterwards by their continual Increaſe, become per-'haps Storms, and Whirlwinds, and Tempeſts which many 'times deſtroy the Fruits, tear up the Trees, and overthrow 'the Houſes: But if they be ſtill more gentle, there being 'always ſome ſulphureous Exhalations, eſpecially if the 'Earth be dry, they then aſcend along with the lighter Va-'pours, into the upper Regions of the Air, where, when a 'large Quantity of them is gathered together, they ferment 'with the acid Nitre, and taking fire cauſe Thunder and 'Lightning, and other Meteors. This, as far as can be ga-'thered from Experience and Obſervation of the Works of 'Nature, is the Origin and Cauſe of thoſe Imperfections and

VIII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of the *Lakes* and *Ocean*. For 'tis manifeſt, that Fruits, Vegetables, *&c.* which are the Food of Animals, depend upon Moiſture, and that this is exhaled from the Sea, and watry places, by the Sun; and ſince the Showers and Dews thus elevated, are not more copious than ſuffice for the Vegetation of Plants, 'tis plain that the Seas and Lakes do not exceed what is neceſſary, and could not be diminiſhed without Detriment to the whole. Vain therefore is the Complaint of *Lucretius*, who arraigns all theſe as *faulty*. Neither was the Earth too narrow nor needed it too much Labour to ſuſtain its Animals: For it was ſufficient for thoſe Animals which God had given it. † But when they multiply above the Proportion

The Number of Animals to be proportioned to the Food and not the Food to the Animals.

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'Evils, which the preſent Conſtitution of the Air, and the 'Laws of Motion obſerved by thoſe Particles mixed with it, 'unavoidably ſubject it to. They are the natural and genuin 'effects of the Regulation it is under, and without altering 'the primary Laws of it (that is making it ſomething elſe 'than what it is, or changing it into another Form: the Re'ſult of which would be only to render it liable to Evils of 'another kind, againſt which the ſame Objections would e'qually lie) or in a ſupernatural manner hindering it from 'producing ſuch Effects, it is impoſſible to prevent them. 'And if we add to this, that theſe Evils are the feweſt that in 'the Natnre of things could be, without hindering a much 'greater Good: That they are in the moſt convenient Parts, 'and the moſt guarded againſt doing Miſchief that could be; 'and that there are alſo good Uſes to be made of them: we 'ſhall have no Reaſon to complain of or find fault with them. 'Were the Quantity of Sulphur and Nitre much diminiſhed, 'there would not be ſufficient to fill the Region of Air for 'the purpoſes of Vegetation and Life; but the Ground would 'grow barren, and the Animals would waſte and die: And if 'there were a much greater Quantity, the contrary Effect 'would happen, the Earth would be too fat, the Plants would 'grow too groſs, and the Animals would be ſuffocated and 'choaked. The Temperature is therefore as exact as it could 'be, all Circumſtances conſidered; and the ſmall Inconveni'encies are nothing compared with the general Good.' See alſo the Word *Earth-quake* in *Chambers*'s *Cyclopedia*.

(33)

† See *Derham*'s Phyſ. Theol. B. 4. C. 11.

portion of their Food, 'tis impoſſible that it ſhould be ſufficient; it would not be enough if it were all converted into Food. For a certain Proportion is to be obſerved between the Proviſion and the Eaters, which if the Number of Animals exceed, they muſt at length neceſſarily periſh with Hunger. Want of Proviſion then ought not to be made an Objection: for if the Number of Creatures to be provided for be enlarged above this Proportion, the greateſt Plenty would not ſuffice; if this Proportion betwixt the Food and Animals be kept up, the leaſt would be ſufficient. 'Tis our own fault therefore, not God's, if Proviſions fail; for the Number of Men may be confined within the Bounds preſcribed by Nature, as might eaſily be ſhewn, if it were worth our while.

The hundredth part of Mankind which might live upon the Earth, does not yet inhabit it: vain therefore is the complaint about Seas and Deſarts.

IX. But there's no need of Artifice on this occaſion; for by our fault things are come to this paſs, that even the hundredth part of thoſe Eatables which might be had, don't meet with any to conſume them. The Divine Beneficence has therefore dealt bountifully with Mankind in reſpect of Proviſions.

'Tis abſurd for any one to deſire a different place or ſtation from that which is allotted him; ſince he was made to fill that place, and would otherwiſe have had none at all.

X. 'Tis to be obſerved in the laſt place, that Animals are of ſuch a Nature as to delight in Action, or the Exerciſe of their Faculties, nor can we have any other Notion of Happineſs even in God himſelf.* Since then the Faculties of both Body and Mind are to be exerciſed in order to produce Pleaſure, where's the wonder if God deſtined that Exerciſe in part for procuring of Food, and connected this Pleaſure with it. (33.) The infinite Power

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(33.) Beſide the Neceſſity there is for Labour, in order to reſtrain Man in his preſent State from an Exceſs of Folly and Wickedneſs, (which our Author conſiders in the two laſt Paragraphs of this Chapter) the uſe and advantage of it appears alſo from the manifeſt tendency it has to preſerve and improve the

* See Ch. 1. § 3. par. 9. and Ch. 5. § 1. Sub. 4.

Power of God was able to produce Animals of ſuch Capacities; and ſince the Creation of them was no Inconvenience to other Beings who might

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the Faculties of both Body and Mind. If uſed in a moderate degree, it preſerves our Health, Vigour, and Activity; gives us a quick Senſe and Reliſh of Pleaſure, and prevents a great many Miſeries which attend Idleneſs. This is well deſcribed by the *Guardian*, N°. 131. and the *Spectator*, N°. 115. 'I conſider the Body as a Syſtem of Tubes and Glands, or, to uſe a more ruſtic Phraſe, a bundle of Pipes and Strainers, fitted to one another after ſo wonderful a manner, as to make a proper Engine for the Soul to work with. This Deſcription does not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, Tendons, Veins, Nerves, and Arteries, but every Muſcle, and every Ligature, which is a Compoſition of Fibres, that are ſo many imperceptible Tubes or Pipes interwoven on all ſides with inviſible Glands or Strainers. This general Idea of a human Body, without conſidering it in the Niceties of Anatomy, lets us ſee how abſolutely neceſſary *Labour* is for the right Preſervation of it. There muſt be frequent Motions and Agitations, to mix, digeſt, and ſeparate the Juices contained in it, as well as to clear and cleanſe the Infinitude of Pipes and Strainers of which it is compoſed; and to give their ſolid Parts a more firm and laſting Tone. Labour or Exerciſe ferments the Humours, caſts them into their proper Channels, throws off Redundancies, and helps Nature in thoſe ſecret Diſtributions, without which the Body cannot ſubſiſt in its Vigour, nor the Soul act with Chearfulneſs. I might here mention the Effects which this has upon all the Faculties of the Mind, by keeping the Underſtanding clear, the Imagination untroubled, and refining thoſe Spirits that are neceſſary for the proper Exertion of our Intellectual Faculties, during the preſent Laws of Union between Soul and Body. It is to a Neglect in this Particular that we muſt aſcribe the Spleen which is ſo frequent in Men of ſtudious and ſedentary Tempers, as well as the Vapours to which thoſe of the other Sex are ſo often ſubject.'

He proceeds to illuſtrate both the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, from his having fitted and obliged us to this Labour and Exerciſe, which is ſo neceſſary to our well-being: which Obſervation will help us to account for the ſecond and third Evil ariſing from the *Fall* mentioned in §9. par. 5. The Fitneſs of a State of Labour for fallen Man is ſhewn at large by *Sherlock* on *Judgment*, C. 1. §8. p. 179. and *D'Oyly* in his *firſt Diſſertation*, C. 9. p. 98, &c. 2d Edit.

exerciſe

exerciſe themſelves in a more noble manner, may not the infinite Goodneſs of God be conceived to have almoſt compelled him not to refuſe or envy thoſe the benefit of Life? Some of this kind were to be created, ſince there was Room left for them in the Work of God, after ſo many others were made as was convenient. But you may wiſh that ſome other Place and Condition had fallen to your Lot. Perhaps ſo. But if you had taken up another's Place, that other, or ſome elſe, muſt have been put into yours, who being alike ungrateful to the Divine Providence, would wiſh for the Place which you have now occupied. Know then that it was neceſſary that you ſhould either be what you are, or not at all. For ſince every other Place and State which the Syſtem or Nature of Things allowed was occupied by ſome others, you muſt of neceſſity either fill that which you are now in, or be baniſhed out of Nature. For do you expect that any other ſhould be turned out of his Order, and you placed in his room? that is, that God ſhould exhibit a peculiar and extraordinary Munificence toward you to the prejudice of others. You ought therefore not to cenſure, but adore the Divine Goodneſs for making you what you are. You could neither have been made otherwiſe, nor in a better manner; but to the Diſadvantage of ſome others, or of the whole.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Concerning Propagation *of the Species,* Childhood, *and* Old-Age.

FROM what has been ſaid it appears, that Animals which have ſolid Bodies are naturally mortal; though the Earth therefore were at firſt fully ſtock'd with them, yet their Number being continually diminiſh'd by Death, it would at length be quite deſtitute of Inhabitants. There might, it ſeems, have been a threefold Remedy for this Evil: Firſt, if God by his Omnipotence ſhould prevent the natural Effects of the mutual Percuſſion of Bodies, *viz.* the Corruption and Diſſolution of themſelves, and the Change or Effuſion of their Fluids. For from theſe the Deſtruction of Animals neceſſarily ariſes, as theſe do from the Compoſition of Bodies, and their acting on each other. Secondly, by leaving Nature to itſelf, and letting it act by univerſal Mechanic Laws; and when theſe brought on a diſſolution of Animal Bodies, that others be ſubſtituted in their room by Creation. Thirdly, by ordering that an Animal ſhould generate its like, and provide another to ſupply its Place when it declin'd.

Animals may be repair'd three ways; 1ſt, If Death were prevented by Omnipotence; 2dly, by Creation; 3dly, by Propagation.

II. Who does not ſee that this laſt is the beſt Method of preſerving a conſtant Number of Inhabitants upon the Earth? For 'tis the ſame thing, *cæteris paribus*, with regard to the Syſtem, whether the Earth have theſe Inhabitants which it has at preſent, or others equal in Number and Perfection: but it is not the ſame thing whether the Laws of Nature be obſerv'd or violated *. In the former Methods God muſt have interfered every Moment

This third Method is the beſt, becauſe it can be effected without doing violence to the Laws of Nature.

* *See* Note 25.

ment by his abſolute Power, he muſt have done infinite violence to the Laws of Nature, and confounded all the Conſtitutions and Orders of things, and that without any Benefit; nay, with extraordinary detriment to the whole. For ſince the univerſal Laws of Motion are the beſt that could poſſibly be eſtabliſh'd, they would ſeldom be revers'd without damage to the whole. Neither does it become the Wiſdom of God to have left his Work ſo imperfect as to want continual mending even in the ſmalleſt Particulars. 'Twas better therefore for it to be made in ſuch a manner as we ſee it is, *viz.* that a new Offspring ſhould be propagated out of the Animals themſelves, and by themſelves.

The Divine Goodneſs and Wiſdom admirable in the contrivance of it.

III. And herein we may admire the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, which hath ſo prudently and effectually contrived this End. For it has implanted in all Creatures (as we ſee) a ſtrong and almoſt irreſiſtable appetite of propagating their Kind, and has render'd this act of propagation ſo uſeful and agreeable to them who perform it, that Poſterity becomes dearer to many than Life itſelf; and if it were left to their choice, they would rather die than loſe their Offspring and the Rewards of Love: nay there is ſcarce any one that is not ready to protect its Young at the hazard of its Life. God has therefore by one ſingle Law and a Sort of Mechaniſm, repleniſh'd the Earth with living Creatures, and provided that a ſufficient Number ſhould never be wanting, without the Intervention of a Power, which would be irregular and an Imputation on the Skill and Wiſdom of the Architect. Who would not prefer ſuch a piece of Mechaniſm, where one Machine generates another, and continually produces a new one in its turn, without any new and extraordinory Intervention of the Artificer, before one which would immediately

mediately and every Day require his Aſſiſtance and Amendment?

IV. This Method, you'll ſay, is fit enough for the Brutes, many of which muſt neceſſarily die not only by the Law of their Nature, but alſo for the ſake of others, for whoſe uſe they were created to ſerve as Food. Neither is Death the greateſt of Evils to them, ſince they live without being ſenſible of their Mortality. But Man is hardly dealt withal, who from his very Infancy is troubled with Fear and Dread more bitter even than Death; and who frequently foretaſtes, and by ruminating thoroughly digeſts, whatever Bitterneſs there is in Death itſelf. Neither does the Hope or Care of Offspring, nor the Enjoyment of theſe Pleaſures, compenſate for ſo many Miſeries and Evils: The Divine Goodneſs might therefore have either concealed from Man his Mortality, or elſe removed that innate Terror ariſing in our Minds from the proſpect of Death, which is always dreadful. (34.)

Why Men are tormented with the continual dread of Death while Brutes are not at all concerned about it.

V. 'Tis

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(34.) A ſufficient Anſwer to this Objection may be found in the laſt Chapter of Dr. *Sherlock*'s admirable Treatiſe on *Death*. I ſhall inſert a little of it. 'There are great and wiſe Reaſons 'why God ſhould imprint this Averſion to Death on human 'Nature; becauſe it obliges us to take care of ourſelves, and 'to avoid every thing which will deſtroy or ſhorten our Lives: 'This in many Caſes is a great Principle of Virtue, as it pre-'ſerves us from fatal and deſtructive Vices; it is a great Inſtru-'ment of Government, and makes Men afraid of committing 'ſuch Villanies as the Laws of their Country have made capi-'tal: and therefore ſince the natural Fear of Death is of ſuch 'great Advantage to us, we muſt be contented with it, tho' it 'makes the Thoughts of Dying a little uneaſy; eſpecially if we 'conſider, that when this natural Fear of Death is not encreaſed 'by other Cauſes, it may be conquer'd or allay'd by Reaſon and 'wiſe Conſideration.' p. 329. 4th Edit.

For a farther Account of both the rational and irrational Fear of Death, what it is, and what it ought to be: the Ends and Effects, and alſo the Remedies of it. See *Norris*'s Diſcourſe on *Heb.* 2. 15.*

* *Practical Diſcourſes*, Vol. 4th.

This is a ſign that the preſent Life is a prelude to a better.

V. 'Tis to be confeſſed indeed, that theſe are Indications that Man has ſome Relation to Immortality, and that the State in which he is placed at preſent is not entirely natural to him, otherwiſe he would not be uneaſy in it, nor aſpire ſo eagerly after another. The preſent Life of Man is therefore either aſſign'd him for a time, by way of Puniſhment, as ſome think, or by way of *Prelude* to, or *Preparation* for a better, as our Religion teaches, and our very Nature perſuades us to hope and expect. This is preſumed, you'll ſay, and not proved. Be it ſo. But if by the Suppoſition of a future State this Difficulty may be ſolv'd, and Providence vindicated, when it is arraign'd as dealing hardly with Mankind, who is ſo fooliſh as to be willing to call in queſtion the Power and Goodneſs of God, rather than admit of ſo probable an Hypotheſis? To which we may add, and believed by almoſt all Mankind. But if it were not ſo, God has beſtowed other Benefits of Life upon us, which in our own Judgments are not all inferior to the Preſervation of Life; and this appears from hence, that we often prefer theſe Benefits to Life itſelf, which we ſhould never do, if we did not ſometimes eſteem them dearer to us. To come to a Concluſion: Without an univerſal confuſion of Nature, without violence offer'd to the Laws and Order of it, the ſame Animals could not prolong their Life for any conſiderable time, it remained therefore that ſome ſupply the Place of others ſucceſſively, and that the *Species* be perpetuated, ſince the *Individuals* could not, leſt the whole Animal kind ſhould prove a thing of but one Age's Duration.

'Tis expedient for Men to be born helpleſs; hence the Foundation of ſocial Life, &c.

VI. From hence it appears that the Race of Mortals is to be perpetuated by the Propagation of their Species; and ſince every Animal is in a perpetual Flux, and may either increaſe or decay, it was proper to proceed from leſs Beginnings to greater; by this means the new Offſpring would be leſs burthenſome

ſome to the Parents, and the *Young* and *Old* agree better together. I confeſs indeed Men are born defenceleſs and unable to protect themſelves, and leſs qualified to provide for themſelves than any other Animals: But God has aſſign'd us Parents, Guardians, and faithful Guides, ſo that we are never more happy than when under their protection. Hence *Childhood*, bleſſed with the ſimple Enjoyment of good things, and void of Care, becomes more pleaſant to us than any other Age. Hence alſo comes Reverence and Relief to the Aged; hence proceeds Comfort to the *Mature*, and Support to the *Decrepit*. Nay the Seeds and Principles of Social Life are all laid in this appetite of Generation. To this propenſion we owe almoſt all the Benefits of Society. Nothing therefore could be more deſirable to Creatures mortal (as we are by the neceſſary Condition of terreſtrial Matter) and obnoxious to Miſeries, than to be born after ſuch a manner as in the firſt part of Life, while we are tender, unacquainted with things, and put under the Guardianſhip of others, to enjoy the Sweets without the Care; in the *middle*, to pleaſe ourſelves as much in taking care of others; and in the *Decrepit*, feeble Age, to be aſſiſted in our turn by others whom we have educated. This part of the Divine Oeconomy is ſo far therefore from needing an Apology, that it is rather a *Demonſtration* of his Goodneſs. The Race of Men was to be repair'd, ſince Death could not be prevented without a greater Evil; and that Reparation is order'd in ſo wiſe and beneficent a way, that nothing can be more worthy of the Divine Power and Goodneſs, nothing deſerve greater Admiration.

VII. Now theſe two Appetites, *viz.* of *Self-preſervation*, and the *Propagation* of our Species, are the primary, the original of all others. From theſe ſpring Pleaſure and an agreeable Enjoyment of things; from theſe comes almoſt every thing that is ad-

The chief Appetites are thoſe of Self-preſervation, and Propagation of the Species.

advantageous or desirable in Life. But all these are mingled with some Evils, which could not be avoided without greater.

SECT. VII.

Of Diseases, Wild-Beasts, *and* Venomous Creatures.

Bodies are liable to dissolution, and humors to corruption; hence Pains and Diseases.

WE must observe (as before*) that our Bodies consist of solid and fluid Parts, and that these solid Members may be either cut or broken to pieces, disjointed, or otherwise render'd unfit for Motion: Whence *Weakness*, *Languishing* and *Torments*: that the Fluids also are liable, not only to Consumption, but Corruption too; to Ebullition by too intense Heat, or Stagnation by Cold: whence proceed various Maladies and Diseases.

The strength of poisons &c. arises from the contrariety of things, which could not be removed without taking away Motion.

II. Now there are certain Juices in the Earth which we inhabit, from a mixture of which arise Changes and Coagulations. There are other Bodies also which fly asunder with greater Violence when mix'd. Thus Milk, by the infusion of a little Acid, turns to Cheese and Whey: Thus Spirits of Wine and Gun-powder, when touch'd by the Fire, run into Flame; and there is nothing to hinder the same from coming to pass in the Blood and Humors of a human Body. Now those things, which being mix'd with them suddenly dissolve, coagulate, or render them unfit for Circulation, we call Poisonous. And if we consider those contraries by which we are nourish'd, and in the Struggle or Opposition of which Nature consists, 'tis scarce conceivable but that these things should often happen. Nor can all contrariety be taken away, except Motion

* Sect. 3.

tion be taken away too, as we have ſhewn; nor could all theſe things that are contrary to our Conſtitution be removed, except ſome Species of Creatures were extinct, or never created; that is, our Security muſt have been purchaſed at too dear a rate. For if every thing that is in any reſpect repugnant to us were removed, it would coſt either the whole Syſtem, or ourſelves more Evil than we receive from thence at preſent, as will ſufficiently appear to any one that enumerates the Particulars.

Of epidemical Diſeaſes.

III 'Tis to be obſerv'd that the Parts of this mundane Syſtem which are contiguous to us, *viz.* the Air, Waters, and the Earth itſelf, are liable to changes; nor could it poſſibly be otherwiſe, if the whole Machine, of which theſe are but ſmall Parts, be thoroughly conſider'd: nor could theſe Changes, eſpecially the ſudden ones, always agree with the Temperature of the Humours of a human Body. For they enter into the very conſtitution of the Body, and infect its Fluids according to the Laws of Nature: whence it is that the due Craſis of the Blood and Health of the Body depend upon the Temperature of the Air and Weather. Hence ariſe *peſtilential* and *epidemical* Diſeaſes; nor could they be avoided, unleſs the Animals had been made of a quite different Frame and Conſtitution. Nay, whatever State they had been placed in, they would have been ſubject either to theſe or others no leſs pernicious. For Marble, and the very hardeſt Bodies, are diſſolv'd by the Viciſſitudes of Heat and Cold, Moiſt and Dry, and the other Changes which we are inſenſible of; how much more the Humours and animal Spirits of Man, on a right Temperature of which Life depends? God might indeed, by a Favour peculiar to us, have expell'd all the Contagions ariſing from theſe alterations, or provided that they ſhould not hurt us. But what reaſon have ſuch Sinners as we now are, to expect it?

it? 'Tis more agreeable to the Juſtice of God to leave the Elements to themſelves, to be carried according to the Laws of Motion for our Puniſhment. (35.) Neither ought we to wonder that God denies the Guilty a Favour, which even the Innocent have no right to: nay, we ought to think that he has inflicted a very light penalty on rebellious Men: For ſince the natural Evils we are forc'd to ſtruggle with are for the moſt part of ſuch a nature as could not be warded off, but by the particular extraordinary favour of the Deity, God ſhould ſeem rather to have reſumed a free Gift, than inflicted a puniſhment, when he is pleaſed to permit them.

Rocks and Deſarts are given not to Man but other Animals for their habitation.

IV. If the Earth had been made for the uſe of Man alone, we might have expected that there ſhould be nothing in it that was prejudicial or uſeleſs to him; but ſince it was made, as we have obſerved *, for the Benefit of the Univerſe, Man is placed therein, not becauſe it was created for him only, but becauſe it could afford him a convenient Habitation: for God muſt be ſuppoſed in this caſe not

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(35.) Our Author's Argument here ſeems to be framed rather in compliance with the common Method, than in ſtrict conformity to his own Scheme of the τὸ βέλτιον, or abſolute *Meliority* in things; which Syſtem maintains that God is ſtill infinitely beneficent, or as kind as poſſible to all, or diſpenſes every thing for the very beſt in the Main. Tho' what is here introduced by way of Puniſhment, may, if rightly underſtood, be defended as an Inſtance of the greateſt poſſible Kindneſs; ſince the only End of all the Divine Judgments is either the Correction and Amendment of the Offenders themſelves, or Admonition to others, or both: and conſequently is a means of the greateſt Good to Mankind in general, and the very beſt diſpenſation towards them in this degenerate corrupt Eſtate, and the moſt proper method of fitting them for, or directing and drawing them to a better. And if all this can be effected by the ſame general Laws of Nature, which alſo bring Plenty, Health and Happineſs to the World, here is a double demonſtration of the abſolute Wiſdom and Goodneſs of its Author.

* Chap. 3. Note 22.

not to have adapted the Place to the Inhabitants, but the Inhabitants to the Place. If therefore Man can dwell commodiouſly enough in theſe Regions of the Earth which are fit for his purpoſe, he muſt allow God in his Goodneſs to give the Earth as many other Inhabitants as it can ſuſtain conſiſtently with the Good of Men. Neither ought he to repine that the Rocks and Deſarts, which are of no uſe to Men, ſupply the *Serpents* and *Wild-Beaſts* with Coverts. But theſe, you'll ſay, ſometimes invade the Countries which are moſt delightful, and beſt ſtored with conveniencies for human Life; deſtroy the Fruits and cultivated Fields, and kill the Men themſelves by *Bites* and *Poiſons*. I grant it; but it may be queſtion'd whether it has been always ſo.

V. For in the firſt place, this Evil might have had its Origin from Man himſelf; *viz.* Rage might be given to the Lion, and Venom to the Serpent, for the puniſhment of Mankind; and this antient Hiſtories, both ſacred and prophane, declare. But ſince this Queſtion was firſt moved by ſuch as either denied reveal'd Religion, or at leaſt were ignorant of it, I would not call that in to our aſſiſtance, or make any other uſe of it than as a bare Hypotheſis.

Antient Hiſtories declare, that Wild-Beaſts and venomous Creatures were made for the puniſhment of Mankind.

VI. We may affirm then in the ſecond place, that thoſe things happen through the fault of Men, who by Wars and Diſcord make fruitful and rich Countries void of Inhabitants to till them, and leave them to the poſſeſſion of Wild-Beaſts and venomous Inſects: Since therefore they neither cultivate them themſelves, nor allow other perſons to do it, what wonder is it if God, for the reproach of Men, give them up to be inhabited by Brutes, Wild-Beaſts, and Inſects? Thoſe Parts which we have deſerted belong by right to them, nor do they otherwiſe multiply more than is proper.

'Tis the fault of Mankind that theſe multiply: Countries laid waſte by War, &c. to the diſgrace of Man, of right belong to them.

We may more eaſily avoid Wild-Beaſts and venomous Creatures than other Inconveniencies of Life, about which we never quarrel with Providence.

VII. Thirdly, 'Tis no more repugnant to the Divine Goodneſs to have made an Animal, by the Bite of which a Man might be deſtroy'd, than a Precipice. There's nothing in the whole Earth but what may hurt or kill a Man, if it be not uſed with caution: Meat, Drink, Water, Fire. Muſt theſe then not be created, becauſe they may hurt a Man? Nor is it more difficult to be aware of Poiſons and Wild-Beaſts, than of theſe: Nay, ſcarce one is killed by Poiſon or torn by Wild-Beaſts of a thouſand that die by the Sword; and yet we don't at all blame the Divine Goodneſs for this. It may be ſaid, that Iron, Earth, Water, Meats and Drinks, are neceſſary, and on that account the Evils attending them may be tolerated. And who will undertake to aſſure us that venomous Animals and Wild-Beaſts are not neceſſary? Muſt we reckon them entirely uſeleſs, becauſe we do not know the uſe of them? Muſt we ſay that every Wheel in a Clock is made for no manner of purpoſe, which a Ruſtic underſtands not the Deſign of? But ſuppoſe we grant that theſe are of no ſervice to us, yet may they not pleaſe and enjoy themſelves? *

All Animals are under the Divine Care: to think otherwiſe ſavours of Pride.

VIII. You may urge, that theſe are not worth the notice of the Divine Providence. Thus indeed proud Mortals, admirers of themſelves alone, deſpiſe the Works of God: But 'tis not ſo with the Divine Goodneſs, which choſe that ſome Inconvenience ſhould befal Mankind rather than a whole Species be wanting to Nature.

Beaſts and venomous Creatures are of uſe to Men.

IX. If you inſiſt, that a Lion might have been made without Teeth or Claws, a Viper without Venom; I grant it, as a Knife without an Edge: But then they would have been of quite another Species, and have had neither the nature, nor uſe, nor genius, which they now enjoy. In ſhort, I ſay once for all, they are not in vain. The very Serpents

* See Note 22.

pents, though a Race hateful to us, have their uſes; among the reſt they may ſerve to gather Poiſon out of the Earth. (36.) Nor is the Country leſs habitable where they are, than where they are not. Now, *cæteris paribus*, Animals ought to multiply; for Life is a perfection: and ſince it is as noble a one as Matter will admit of, 'tis preferable to none at all. 'Tis therefore the Work and Gift of God wherever he has beſtow'd it, and does not ſtand in need of an *Evil Principle* for its Author.

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(36.) For an account of the various ends and uſes of theſe noxious Animals, poiſonous Plants, &c. ſee *Derham*'s Anſwer to the abovemention'd Objection, in his *Phyſ. Theol.* B. 2. Ch. 6. with the References; and *Ray* on the *Creation*, Part 2. p. 432, &c. 4th Edit. Or *Chambers*'s *Cyclopædia*, under the Word *Poiſon*.

SECT. VIII.

Concerning the Errors and Ignorance of Man.

Human Underſtanding is neceſſarily ignorant of many things.

SINCE Man (nay every created Being) is neceſſarily of a limited Nature *, 'tis plain that he cannot know every thing. The moſt perfect Creatures therefore are ignorant of many things: Nor can they attain to any other Knowledge than what is agreeable to their Nature and Condition. Innumerable Truths therefore lie hid from every created Underſtanding: For perfect and infinite Knowledge belongs to God alone; and it muſt be determin'd by his pleaſure what degree every one is to be endow'd with: for he only knows the nature and neceſſity of each, and has given what is agreeable thereto. *Ignorance* is therefore an *Evil of Defect*, and no more to be avoided than the other kind

* See Note 18.

kind of *Imperfection*; for an imperfect Nature (as that of all Creatures is) underſtands alſo imperfectly.

We are ſometimes forced to make uſe of conjectures, therefore we may not only be ignorant, but alſo miſtaken.

II. As to human Knowledge, 'tis confeſſed that we acquire it by the Senſes; and that certain Characters denote, not ſo much the *Nature*, as the *Uſes* and *Differences* of things. Now, ſince things very different internally, have ſometimes the ſame external Marks, we muſt of neceſſity be often doubtful and ſometimes deceiv'd by the ſimilitude of the Marks.

Neither is it ſufficient to the avoiding of Error that we ſuſpend our aſſent in doubtful Caſes; for 'tis often neceſſary for us (eſpecially if we have to do with other Perſons) to act upon conjecture, and reſolve upon action, before we have thoroughly diſcuſs'd the Point or diſcover'd the Truth: on which account it is impoſſible that we ſhould totally avoid Errors. God muſt therefore either have made no ſuch Animal as Man is, or one that is liable to Errors. As Contrariety reſults from Motion, which is as it were the action of Matter; ſo a poſſibility of Error is conſequent upon the Action of a finite Being.

God cou'd not always guard us from Errors without violence done to Nature.

III. If any one reply, that God can immediately reveal the Truth to us in ſuch Caſes: I anſwer, he may ſo, nor can it be denied that he has done and will do it ſometimes: But that this ſhould be done always, would be a violence repugnant to the Nature and Condition of Man, and could not poſſibly be done without more and greater Evils ariſing from an Interruption of the Courſe of Nature. Now we muſt diſtinguiſh between thoſe Errors which we fall into after our utmoſt diligence and application, and ſuch as we are led into by careleſneſs, Negligence, and a depraved Will. Errors of the former kind are to be reckon'd among Natural Evils, and not imputed to us; For they ariſe from the very State and Condition of the Mind of Man, and are not to be avoided,

ed, unleſs God would change the Species of Beings, and order that different things ſhould not affect the Senſes in the ſame manner, that is, that there ſhould be no more Species nor Individuals than there are Senſations in us: for if the Number of theſe exceed the Diſcrimination of our Senſations, variety of them muſt neceſſarily produce either the very ſame Senſations in us, or none at all, and a great many anſwer to the ſame Senſation; ſo that we muſt certainly be ſometimes impoſed upon by the ſimilitude of things. Either then the Diſtinctions of our Senſations muſt be multiplied *in infinitum*, or the infinite variety of ſenſible Objects taken away. But 'tis evident that neither could have been done in this preſent State. We muſt therefore bear the Inconvenience not only of being ignorant of innumerable things, but alſo of erring in many Caſes.

Man is not therefore miſerable becauſe expoſed to Errors.

IV. To this it may be replied, That Error is a Defect in that part of Man, in the perfection of which his Happineſs chiefly conſiſts: If therefore he may naturally fall into Errors, it follows that Man may be naturally miſerable without his fault. But I anſwer: Any particular Evil does not bring Miſery upon us; otherwiſe every Creature would be miſerable, as of neceſſity labouring under the Evils of *Imperfection*. He only therefore is to be denominated *miſerable*, who is oppreſſed with more and greater Evils than his Good can requite with Happineſs; ſo that upon balancing the Conveniencies and inconveniencies of Life, it were better for him not to be, than to be.

Thoſe Errors we fall into without our fault are ſeldom pernicious.

V. 'Tis to be obſerv'd alſo, that God has in his Wiſdom and Goodneſs ſo temper'd our preſent State, that we very ſeldom, if ever, fall into grievous and pernicious Errors without our own fault. But if this ever comes to paſs, as ſoon as the Evil preponderates, Life is taken away together with the

the Benefits of Nature. Now 'tis to be eſteem'd an Happineſs, and an Argument of the Divine Goodneſs, that the Natural Benefits of Life cannot be taken from us, but Life is taken from us alſo. Life then can be a burden to none; nor is it neceſſary that any one ſhould withdraw himſelf from natural Evils by voluntarily putting an end to his Life. For if theſe Evils be ſuch as take away the Benefits of Life, they alſo bring it to an end. God produced all things out of nothing, and gave us Being without our Advice; he ſeems therefore oblig'd in juſtice not to ſuffer us to be reduced to a State that is worſe than Non-entity. (37.) When therefore any State is overwhelmed with Evils which outweigh the Good, 'tis reaſonable that God ſhould remit us to our former State; that is, let us return to nothing. Neither ought we to accuſe the Divine Power and Goodneſs, which has beſtow'd as many Bleſſings and Benefits upon us, as either the whole Univerſe or our own Nature would admit of; and ſince it was impoſſible but that ſome time or other, upon the increaſe of Evils, his Gift (*viz.* Life) muſt become burdenſome; when this happens he breaks off its thread.

Our Knowledge is adapted to our State.

VI. But Man, you'll ſay, is ignorant of thoſe things which it was his greateſt Intereſt to know, namely, of Truths that are neceſſary to the attainment of Felicity. It was convenient for our preſent State to underſtand theſe; and who will affirm that God has not beſtow'd upon us all the Knowledge that is agreeable to our State? We ought therefore never to be deceiv'd about ſuch Truths as theſe, while we apply all our diligence to

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(37.) It would be ſo indeed if this were our only State; but as it is at preſent, I fear many have nothing but the hopes and expectations of another to ſupport them under almoſt complete Miſery; to comfort and encourage them to undergo Evils

to the Search. I anſwer; If this be underſtood of the Happineſs due to us in this Life, 'tis very true; nor is our Underſtanding ever ſo far miſtaken as not to inform us of the Truths neceſſary to this kind of Happineſs, if proper care be not wanting. But ſuch Happineſs ought to ſuffice us, as may ſerve to make Life a Bleſſing, and better than the abſence of it. A greater indeed was promiſed to the firſt Man by a *gratuitous Covenant*, (38.) but when

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Evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of Life; Evils which make Life itſelf an Evil, and (as our Author ſays) put them into a State worſe than nothing. Witneſs the long and acute Torments of numerous Martyrs, the Pains of Confeſſors, the Labours of common Gally-Slaves, *&c.* (this is granted by the Author, *vid.* Serm. on the *Fall*, p. 77. 4 laſt lines, and p. 81. l. 2.) But the leaſt hint of this is ſufficient, and the common Anſwers to it very ſatisfactory; as will perhaps appear from the References to the laſt Chapter of the Appendix, where this Queſtion comes more properly under conſideration.

(38.) Though the firſt Man might have been created more perfect in all his Faculties than any of his Poſterity (which, as ſome think, cannot be eaſily proved from the account we have of him in *Geneſis* *) though his Knowledge might have been much clearer, as coming entire and adult from the immediate hand of his Creator; yet it ſeems highly probable that this could not have been propagated in a natural way, that is, by any general preeſtabliſh'd Laws, as our preſent Faculties are; but Mankind, as a ſucceſſive Body, muſt neceſſarily have been left to the known Laws of Propagation, and the preſent Method of improving their Intellects, and deriving all their Notice from the common Sources of Senſation and Reflection. And ſo our bountiful Creator may be ſuppoſed to have deprived Mankind of no Bleſſings he could, conſiſtent with his other Attributes and the Order of the Creation, poſſibly have beſtow'd. Nay, why may not he be thought to have converted even this neceſſary, unavoidable Imperfection in us, compared with the firſt *Adam*, into a greater Perfection ariſing both from our Notions of his Fall, and the conſequences of it, and of the wonderful Remedy prepared for it and promiſed

* *See* Bayle *under the Word* Adam, *Remark* D. Taylor *on Original Sin.* p. 170. *&c.* Curcellæi *Inſtit. Relig. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 8. p. 108, *&c. And diſſert. de Pecc. Orig.* §. 11. *Or* Epiſcop. *Inſtit. Theol.* L. 4. C. 6, 7. p. 358, 359. *Or our Author's Sermon on the* Fall.

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when that was once broken by Sin, he and his Poſterity were remanded to thoſe imperfect Notices which could be had from an imperfect Underſtanding, and the Information of the Senſes; which yet are not in the leaſt to be deſpiſed: neither had Man a Right, nor could he naturally attain to a greater Perfection. For when the Faculties of our Souls were injur'd, and the Health and Vigour of our Bodies impair'd by our own Vices, as well as thoſe of our Parents, our natural Perfections muſt neceſſarily be impaired alſo. For ſince our Knowledge is to be acquired by Care, Induſtry, and Inſtruction, if Mankind had continued innocent, and with diligent care communicated true Notions of things

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in the ſecond *Adam?* We ſeem to be made more highly ſenſible of the infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, and more thankful for our Condition, from our knowledge of his juſt permiſſion of ſo deſerv'd a Fall, and his gracious undeſerv'd *Exaltation* of us again to a ſuperior State, than if we had conceiv'd the Miſery attending human Nature to be (as perhaps moſt of it was) a neceſſary conſequence of our being created in this inferior Claſs. But whether this Notion be allow'd or not, the Scheme of Providence relating to *Paradiſe*, &c. as deliver'd in Holy Scripture, if taken all together, can be no juſt Objection againſt the moral Attributes of God. He created Man entirely innocent, and abſolutely free, which Freedom was abſolutely neceſſary to his Happineſs (as will appear under the Head of Moral Evil) He gave him the Means and Abilities to complete his Happineſs, and placed him in a World every way ſuited to his Condition. This Liberty made it poſſible for him to loſe that Innocence, though he had but one ſingle opportunity of doing it*, and it was highly reaſonable and neceſſary that he ſhould have that†. This one Opportunity he embraced (which it does not ſeem poſſible for God himſelf, though he foreſaw it, to have prevented, con-

* *See* Nichols's *Conference with a Theiſt*, p. 220, 221. *1ſt. Edition.*

† *See Dr.* J. Clarke *on Moral Evil*, p. 211, &c. *and* Limborch *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 2. §. 2. *and* Jenkins's *Reaſon. of the Chriſt. Relig.* Vol. 2. C. 13. p. 253. *5th. Edit.*

ſift-

things to their Poſterity; and had not infected their Offspring by Example, Inſtruction, or any Contagion attending Propagation, we ſhould have been leſs liable to Errors; nay, free from pernicious ones; and have enjoyed a more perfect Knowledge of things. For our native intellectual Faculty would have been ſtronger; and being better furniſhed both with the means and principles of Science than we now are, we ſhould more eaſily have prevented the Occaſions of Error. All pernicious Errors therefore, at leaſt in Matters of Neceſſity, are to be imputed to our own Guilt, or that of our Parents.*

VII. If any be ſo ungrateful as to murmur ſtill, and affirm that he would not accept of Life on theſe Conditions, if he might have his Choice; and

We prefer Life, with all its inconveniencies, before Death.

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ſiſtently with that Freedom he had for good Reaſons given him and determined thus to exerciſe) and ſo altered his Nature and Circumſtances, and conſequently made it neceſſary for God alſo to change his Place and Condition, and to withdraw ſuch extraordinary favours as his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs might otherwiſe have thought proper to beſtow. Thus with his Innocence Man loſt all Title to a Continuance in Paradiſe, and of conſequence became naturally liable to the common Evils and Calamities of a tranſitory Life, and the Pains attending its Concluſion. Thoſe that deſcended from him and partook of the ſame Nature, muſt neceſſarily partake of the ſame Infirmities; in particular, they muſt inherit *Corruption* and *Mortality*. Which Evils, though we now lament them as the chief parts of our Fore-father's Puniſhment, yet could they not in the preſent Circumſtances of things be prevented, nor indeed, were ſuch a Prevention poſſible, would it be in the main deſirable, as will appear from the following Section, par. 6, 7. Nay theſe, by a moſt wonderful Scheme of Providence, are infinitely outweighed, and made the means of bringing us to much greater Happineſs, by Faith in him who was promiſed from the beginning, and hath in theſe latter Days brought *Life* and *Incorruptibility* to light. See more on this Subject in Note (X.) and Note 81.

* *For what relates to the Doctrine of* Original Sin, *&c. See the latter End of the next Section, and Note* 40.

and that himſelf is the beſt Judge of his own Intereſt, and he no Benefactor that obtrudes a Gift upon a Man againſt his Will; that conſequently he owes no thanks to God on account of a Life which he would willingly refuſe: We muſt reply, that thus indeed impious Men and Fools are uſed to prate; but this does not come from their Hearts and Conſciences. For none are more afraid of Death, none more tenacious of Life than they that talk thus idly. A great many of them profeſs that they don't believe a future Life; and if ſo, they may reduce themſelves to the wiſh'd-for ſtate of Annihilation as ſoon as they pleaſe, and caſt off that *Exiſtence* which is ſo diſagreeable. No Perſon therefore, except he be corrupted in his Judgment and indulge himſelf in Error, can ſeriouſly prefer Non-exiſtence to the preſent Life. (39.)

Some put themſelves to Death, not on account of natural, but voluntary Evils.

VIII. But if any one think ſo from his Heart, he is not fallen into this Opinion from any natural Evil, but from others which he brought upon himſelf by *wrong Elections*. We ſee many Perſons weary of Life, but 'tis becauſe of their bad Management, leſt they ſhould be ridiculous for miſſing of Honour, of Riches, or ſome empty End which they have unreaſonably propoſed to themſelves. But very few

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(39.) 'Self-Murder is ſo unnatural a Sin, that 'tis now-a-'days thought reaſon enough to prove a Man diſtracted. We 'have too many ſad examples what a diſturbed Imagination 'will do, if that muſt paſs for natural Diſtraction; but we 'ſeldom or never hear that mere external Sufferings, how 'ſevere ſoever, tempt Men to kill themſelves. The *Stoics* 'themſelves, whoſe Principle it was to break their Priſon 'when they found themſelves uneaſy, very rarely put it into 'practice: Nature was too ſtrong for their Philoſophy. And 'though their Philoſophy allowed them to die when they 'pleaſed, yet Nature taught them to live as long as they could; 'and we ſee that they ſeldom thought themſelves miſerable 'enough to die.' *Sherlock* on *Providence*, C. 7. p. 249, 252. 2d Edit. See alſo Note (Z.)

have

have been excited to Self-murder by any natural and abſolutely unavoidable Evil or Error. Life therefore, of what kind ſoever it is, muſt be looked upon as a benefit in the judgment of Mankind, and we ought to pay our grateful acknowledgments to God, as the powerful and beneficent Author of it. Nor will it be any prejudice to the Divine Goodneſs, if one or two throw Life away in deſpair. For it is to be ſuppoſed that this proceeds not from the greatneſs of any natural Evil, but from Impatience ariſing from ſome depraved Election; of which more hereafter. For none of the Brutes which are deſtitute of Free-will, ever quitted its Life ſpontaneouſly, through the uneaſineſs of Grief, or a Diſtemper. If any Man therefore has killed himſelf voluntarily, we muſt conclude that he did this, as all other wicked Actions, by a depraved Choice.

Thoſe Errors which we fall into by our own fault, are to be reckoned among Moral Evils.

IX. As to the ſecond ſort of Errors into which we are led, not by nature, but careleſſneſs, negligence, curioſity, or a depraved will, the number of theſe is greater and their effects more pernicious: nay, 'tis theſe only which load and infeſt Life with intolerable Evils, ſo as to make us wiſh that we had never been. But ſince they come upon us through our own fault, they are not to be reckoned among *Natural Evils*, but belong to the third kind, *viz.* the *Moral*, to which we haſten: But muſt firſt ſum up what has been delivered in this Chapter.

SECT. IX.

Containing the Sum of what has been ſaid on Natural Evils.

The whole Univerſe one Syſtem, of which every thing is a part.

IN order to give the Reader a better view of what has been ſaid, we muſt conceive this whole World as one Syſtem, whereof all particular things are the parts and Members, and every one has its place and office, as the Members have in our own Body, or the Beams in a houſe; the Doors, Windows, Chambers and Cloſets: Neither is there any thing uſeleſs or ſuperfluous in the whole. And in order to unite all more cloſely together, nothing is ſelf-ſufficient; but as it is qualified to help others, ſo it ſtands in need of the help of others, for its more commodious Subſiſtence. And though in ſo immenſe a Machine, we do not ſo clearly perceive the connection or mutual dependence of the parts in every reſpect, yet we are certain that the thing is ſo. In many Caſes 'tis ſo evident, that he will be eſteemed a Mad-man who denies it. Since therefore the World is to be looked upon as one Building, we muſt recollect how many different parts, and how various, ſo grand, ſo magnificent an Edifice ſhould conſiſt of. We may deſign a Houſe divided into Halls, Parlours and Cloſets; but unleſs there be a Kitchen too, and places ſet apart for more ignoble, more uncomely Offices, 'twill not be fit for Habitation. The ſame may be affirmed of the World and the frame of it. God could have filled it all with Suns: but who will engage that ſuch a Syſtem would be capable of living Creatures, or proper to preſerve Motion? He could have made the Earth of Gold or Gems: But in the

the mean while *deſtitute* of *Inhabitants*. He that has lived a Day or two without Food, would prefer a *Dunghill* to ſuch an Earth. God could have created Man *immortal*, without Paſſions, without a Senſe of Pleaſure or Pain; but he muſt have been without a *ſolid Body* alſo, and an inhabitant of ſome other Region, not the Earth. He could have made the whole human *Body* an *Eye*, but then it would have been unfit for Motion, Nutrition, and all the other functions of Life. He could have taken away the contrariety of *Appetites*, but the contrariety of Motions (nay Motion itſelf) muſt have been taken away with it. He could have prevented the fruſtrating of Appetites, but that muſt have been by making them not *oppoſite*; for 'tis impoſſible that contrary Appetites, or ſuch as deſire what is at the ſame time occupied by others, ſhould all at once be ſatisfied. He could, in the laſt place, have framed Man *free from Errors*, but then he muſt not have made uſe of Matter for an Organ of Senſation, which the very Nature of our Soul requires.

If the whole and all its parts be taken together, none could be changed but for the worſe.

II. In ſhort, if the mundane Syſtem be taken together, if all the Parts and Periods of it be compared with one another, we muſt believe that it could not poſſibly be better: if any part could be changed for the better, another would be worſe; if one abounded with greater Conveniencies, another would be expoſed to greater Evils; and that neceſſarily from the Imperfection of all Creatures. A Creature is deſcended from *God*, a moſt *perfect Father*; but from nothing, as its *Mother*, which is Imperfection itſelf. All finite things therefore partake of nothing, and are nothing beyond their Bounds. When therefore we are come to the bounds which nature has ſet, whoever perceives any thing, muſt neceſſarily perceive alſo that he is deficient, and ſeek for ſomething without himſelf

to ſupport him. Hence come Evils, hence oppoſition of things, and as it were a mutilation in the Work of God. Hence for the moſt part Men fear and deſire, grieve and rejoyce. Hence Errors and Darkneſs of the Mind. Hence Troops of Miſeries marching through human Life: whether theſe grow for the puniſhment of Mortals, or attend Life by the *neceſſity* of Nature; that is, whether they proceed from the conſtitution of Nature itſelf, or are external and acquired by our Choice. Nor need we the bloody *Battle* of the *Ancients*, nor the *malicious* God of the *Manichees* for Authors of them. Nor is it any Argument againſt the Divine Omnipotence, that he could not free a Creature in its own Nature neceſſarily imperfect, from that native Imperfection, and the Evils conſequent upon it. He might, as we have often ſaid, have not created mortal Inhabitants, and ſuch as were liable to Fears and Griefs: nor, as will be declared below, ſuch as by their depraved Elections might deſerve Puniſhment: but with regard to the Syſtem of the whole 'twas neceſſary that he ſhould create theſe or none at all: either the Earth muſt be repleniſhed with theſe, or left deſtitute of Inhabitants. Nor could any of the foregoing particulars be omitted, but that very Omiſſion would bring along with it much greater Evils.

Hence the Error of the *Epicureans* who knew only the leaſt and worſt part.

III. From hence ſprang the Error of the *Epicureans*, who pretended that this World was unworthy of a good and powerful God. They, we may believe, knew only the leaſt part, and as it were the Sink of the World, *viz.* our *Earth*. They never conſidered the good and beautiful part of Nature, but only contemplated the Griefs, Diſeaſes, Death and Deſtruction of Mortals, when they denied that God was the Author of ſo many Evils: In the interim they forgot that the Earth is in a manner the Filth and Offscouring of the *Mundane Syſtem*:

Syſtem: and that the Workmanſhip of God is no more to be condemned for it, than a Judgment is to be formed of the beauty of an Houſe from the Sink or Jakes. They were ignorant alſo that the Earth was made in the manner it now is, not for itſelf alone, but in order to be ſubſervient to the good of the whole; and that it is filled with ſuch Animals as it is capable of, with a due Subordination to the good of the Univerſe, and the Felicity of Souls that inhabit the purer and brighter Parts of this Fabric, *viz.* the *Æther* and the *Heavens*. Theſe are as it were the Gardens, Parks, and Palaces of the World; this Earth the *Dunghill*, or (as ſome will have it) the Workhouſe. Nor is it a greater wonder that God ſhould make theſe, than the *Inteſtines*, and leſs comely, but yet neceſſary Parts of a human Body. Laſtly, they are unmindful that more and greater Good is to be found here than Evil, otherwiſe they themſelves would reject Life: and he that has more good than Evil is not miſerable except he will. If therefore we could compare the Good things with the Evil; if we could view the whole Workmanſhip of God; if we thoro'ly underſtood the Connection, Subordinations, and mutual Relation of things, the mutual aſſiſtance which they afford each other; and laſtly, the whole ſeries and order of them; it would appear that the World is as well as it could poſſibly be; and that no Evil in it could be avoided, which would not occaſion a greater by its abſence.

Hence a reply to the Difficulty, *Whence comes Evil?* Since it ariſes from the very nature of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction.

IV. We have endeavoured to clear up theſe Points, and I hope effectually, as to this kind of Evil. For upon the ſuppoſition of our Principles, (which by the way, are commonly acknowledged,) ſome natural Evils muſt inevitably be admitted; and if even one could ariſe in the Work of an infinitely wiſe and good God, there's no occaſion for the *Bad Principle*, as the Origin of Evil, for Evil might

might have exiſted notwithſtanding the Divine Omnipotence and infinite Goodneſs. The difficult Queſtion then, *Whence comes Evil?* is not unanſwerable. For it ariſes from the very nature and conſtitution of created Beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. And though we be not able to apply theſe Principles to all particular caſes and circumſtances, yet we are ſure enough that they may be applied. Nor ſhould we be concerned at our being at a loſs to account for ſome particulars; ſince this is common in the Solution of almoſt all natural Phenomena, and yet we acquieſce. For preſuppoſing ſome Principles, ſuch as Matter, Motion, *&c.* though we are ignorant what Matter and Motion are in any particular Body, yet from the variety of theſe we take it for granted that various Compoſitions and Qualities proceed. In like manner we are perſuaded, that from the various kinds of Imperfection neceſſarily inherent in things, various Species of Evils ariſe, though in ſome the manner in which this comes to paſs does not appear; agreeably to what we experience in Light and Colours. We are certain that Colours ariſe from the different diſpoſition, refraction and reflection of Light; but yet none can certainly tell how it is reflected or refracted when it forms a blew, a green, or any other Colour: So that I dare affirm that the Origin of natural Evil is more eaſily aſſigned, and more clearly and particularly ſolved, than that of Colours, Taſtes, or any ſenſible Quality whatſoever.

This reconciled with the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, which does not attribute all kinds of natural Evil to the fall of the firſt Man.

V. I confeſs, that according to this Hypotheſis, Natural Evils proceed from the original Condition of things, and are not permitted by God, but in order to prevent greater; which ſome perhaps may think repugnant to ſacred Hiſtory and the Doctrine of *Moſes*. For they will have it, that the abuſe of Free-will was the cauſe of all natural Evils, and that when God created every thing good and perfect

fect in its kind, it was afterwards corrupted by Sin, and ſubjected to natural Evils: But this is aſſerted without Proof. For the Scripture no where teaches that there would have been no manner of natural Evil, if Man had not ſinned. God indeed made all things good and perfect in their kind, that is, he created and ſtill preſerves every thing in a ſtate and condition ſuitable to the whole Syſtem of Beings, and which it need have no Reaſon to repent of except it will. But neither the Goodneſs of God, nor the Perfection that belongs to the Nature of things, required that all natural Evils ſhould be removed: ſome created Beings have Evils inherent in their very Natures, which God muſt of neceſſity either tolerate or not create thoſe things in which they do inhere. If therefore the ſacred Hiſtory be carefully examined, it will appear that ſome kinds of Evil are attributed to the Sin of the firſt Man, but others not. Of the former kind are, *firſt*, the *Mortality* of Man, who would otherwiſe have been immortal by *Grace*. *Secondly*, the *Barrenneſs* of the Earth, and growth of *noxious* and *unprofitable Plants* in the Room of ſuch as were fit for *Food*, for the puniſhment of Mankind. *Thirdly*, that hard *Labour* neceſſary for providing Food, which is a conſequence of the former. *Fourthly*, that *impotent Affection* and Neceſſity of Obedience whereby *Women* are made ſubject to *Men*. *Fifthly*, the pains of *Child-birth*. *Sixthly*, the *Enmity* between Man and the Serpentine kind. *Seventhly*, Baniſhment out of Paradiſe, *i. e.* as appears to me, an Expulſion out of that State of Grace, in which the Favour of God had placed Man above what was due to his Nature. Theſe, and ſome others, are expreſly enumerated as puniſhments of the Firſt Fall. (40.) But beſides theſe there

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(40.) For an account of the Scripture Hiſtory relating to the Fall of *Adam*, and the conſequences of it, both upon himſelf and

there are many conſequent upon the neceſſity of Matter, and concerning which the Scripture has nothing to induce us to believe that they aroſe from Sin.

The Evils which ariſe from thence are permitted for the good of the Univerſe, and alſo of Man himſelf.

VI. 'Tis to be obſerved farther, that theſe are not permitted by God to no purpoſe, but for the good of the Univerſe, and at the ſame time of Man himſelf. For as to Mortality, it was by no means expedient for the Syſtem, that a ſinful Creature ſhould enjoy Immortality, which was not owing to its nature, but granted by an extraordinary favour of the Deity. Nay, God ſeems to have forbidden our firſt Parents the uſe of the Tree of Life out of mere Compaſſion, leſt if their Life ſhould by virtue of it be prolonged, they ſhould live for ever miſerable. Even this Puniſhment, as all others, contributes to the reſtraint of bad Elections, and the preparation of a new way to Happineſs. For when Man tranſgreſſed, and a perverſe abuſe of his Free-Will was once introduced, there would have been no end of Madneſs if the Divine Goodneſs had continued to preſerve Life, Underſtanding, an eaſy Food, and other Gifts of the Primeval State, to the abuſers thereof, as well as to the Innocent. 'Tis notorious how exorbitant bad Elections are even amongſt the Cares and Labours which Mortals undergo in providing the Neceſſaries of Life; and how pernicious ſtrength of Parts becomes, when upon a corruption of the Will

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and his Poſterity, ſee *Ibbot*'s *Boyle*'s *Lect.* Serm. 5. 2d. Set. *Rymer*'s *General Repreſentation of Revealed Religion*, Part 1. C. 4. and Dr. *J. Clarke* on *Moral Evil*, p. 224, *&c.* or *D'Oyly*'s four Diſſertations, C. 1. p. 3. Note b. and C. 9. p. 97, *&c.* or Bp. *Taylor*'s *Polemical Diſcourſes*, p. 614, 615, 623. See alſo *Limborch*'s *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 3. C. 3, 4, 5. or *Epiſcopius de Libero Arbitrio*, *&c.* or *Curcellæi Rel. Chriſt. Inſtit.* L. 3. C. 14, 15, 16. and his *Diſſert. de Pecc. Originis*, or our Author's Sermon on the *Fall*.

Will it degenerates into Cunning. How much more intolerable then would it be, if the Fear of Death were away; if the ſame facility of procuring Food, the ſame vigour of intellect, which our Firſt Parents enjoyed, were continued to their corrupt Poſterity? (*)

VII. Nay, to confeſs the truth, it could not poſſibly continue; for let there be never ſo great plenty of Proviſion, it might be corrupted by the voluntary Act of one Man. When our Firſt Parent had therefore once tranſgreſſed, what hopes could he conceive of his Poſterity? Or, by what Right could they claim the ſupernatural Gifts of God? certainly by none. All then are made mortal, not only through the *Juſtice*, but the *Goodneſs* of God. For while Men are obliged to ſtruggle with Hunger, Thirſt, Diſeaſes and Troubles, few of them are at leiſure to run quite mad, and leap over all the bounds of Nature by their depraved Elections. 'Tis better therefore for us to undergo all theſe Inconveniences, than to be left to ourſelves without reſtraint in this corrupt Eſtate. For by that means we ſhould bring upon ourſelves ſtill greater Evils. But theſe things belong to revealed Religion, and this is not a proper Place to treat on them at large. (41.)

Mortality Hunger, Thirſt, Diſeaſes, &c. are for the good of the World in this corrupt Eſtate.

NOTES.

(41) Thus our Author has, I think, ſufficiently accounted for all ſorts of Natural Evil, and demonſtrated the τὸ βέλτιον, or Meliority of things in the Univerſe, taking the whole (as we always ought) together: at leaſt, he has laid down ſuch Principles as may eaſily and effectually be applied to that End. He has clearly proved, and cloſely purſued this one ſingle Propoſition through all the abovementioned Particulars, *viz.* that *not one of thoſe Evils or Inconveniences in our Syſtem could poſſibly have been prevented without a greater:* which is an ample Vin-

* See *Sherlock* upon *Death*, C. 2. § 1. and C. 3. § 3. As to the Vigour of our firſt Parent's Intellect, ſee the Authors referred to in the beginning of Note 38, particularly Mr. *D'Oyly*'s firſt Diſſertation, C. 9.

NOTES.

Vindication, an evident Proof of all the Divine Attributes, in the original Frame and Government thereof. And indeed this ſeems to be the beſt and moſt convincing, if not the only proper Method of handling the Argument and examining the Works of God, ſo as to attain a due ſenſe of, and regard for the Author of them. Which Maxim therefore, we conclude from the numberleſs inſtances of its apparent Validity, ought to be allowed, and may be ſafely inſiſted on, though by reaſon of our great ignorance of Nature, it cannot always be ſo clearly applied. However it has been applied ſucceſsfully to the Solution of the moſt material Difficulties in the preſent Queſtion, as may appear more fully from the Authors referred to in the foregoing Chapter.

CHAP. V.
Of MORAL EVIL.

INTRODUCTION,
Containing the Subſtance of the Chapter.

HAVING given ſome Account of *Natural Evils*, the *Moral* come next under Conſideration: we are now to trace out the Origin of theſe, and ſee of what kind it is, whether they flow from the ſame Source with the Natural, *viz.* the neceſſary *Imperfection* of created Beings; or we are to ſeek for ſome other entirely different from it.

By *Moral* Evils, as we ſaid before, are underſtood thoſe Inconveniencies of Life and Condition which befall ourſelves or others through wrong Elections. For it is plain that ſome Inconveniencies happen without our Knowledge, or againſt our Wills, by the very Order of natural Cauſes; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a manner with our Conſent (when we chooſe either theſe themſelves, or ſuch as are neceſſarily connected with them.) The Moral are to be reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies: and he muſt be eſteem'd the Cauſe of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, brings them either upon himſelf or others by a depraved or fooliſh Choice.

But

But in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully underſtood, we muſt conſider in the

1ſt Place, *What the Nature of Elections is.*

2dly, *That our Happineſs chiefly depends upon Elections.*

3dly, *What kind of Elections may be ſaid to be made amiſs, or* fooliſhly.

4thly, *How we come to fall into depraved or* wicked *Elections.*

5thly, *How ſuch Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodneſs of God.*

SECT. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

SUBSECT. I.

A View of their Opinion, who admit of Freedom from Compulſion only, but not from Neceſſity.

That it is not eaſy to underſtand or give a true repreſentation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Compulſion

I. IF there be any thing obſcure and difficult in Philoſophy, we are ſure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no Point about which the Learned are leſs conſiſtent with themſelves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an eaſy Matter to underſtand them, or to give a certain and true repreſentation of their Opinions. I think they may be diſtinguiſh'd into two Sects, both admitting of Liberty, the one from ex-

external *Compulſion*, but not from internal *Neceſſity*; the other from both.

only, others from Neceſſity alſo.

II. As far as I can underſtand the Opinion of the former, it is this: Firſt, they obſerve that there are certain *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature, which are not to be eſteem'd *uſeleſs*, but contributing toward our Preſervation, as was ſhewn before; and that ſome things are naturally agreeable, ſome contrary to theſe Appetites: that the *former*, when preſent, pleaſe and impreſs a delightful Senſe of themſelves; the *latter* diſpleaſe and create uneaſineſs. Theſe therefore are called incommodious, troubleſome and Evil; and thoſe commodious, convenient and Good.

The Authors of the former Opinion ſuppoſe Appetites implanted in us by Nature; what is agreeable to theſe is called good; the contrary, Evil.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us *Reaſon*, a *Mind* or *Intellect*, to diſtinguiſh Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And ſince this may be conſidered by the Mind in a threefold Reſpect, hence alſo ariſe three kinds of Good and Evil; namely *Pleaſant*, *Profitable* and *Honeſt*.

Things are agreeable to the Appetites in a threefold reſpect. Hence three kinds of good.

IV. For if Good be conſidered as preſent with regard only to the Appetite which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquieſces in it, 'tis called *Pleaſant*.

That which is actually agreeable is called Pleaſant.

V. If it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itſelf, but only *connected* with ſomething elſe which is of itſelf agreeable, or produces Pleaſure, and on that account only deſirable; then 'tis called *Profitable*. For though the Appetite cannot come at the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes uſe of it in order to procure thoſe things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is eſteem'd *convenient*, *i. e.* Good.

That which is connected with ſomething which is of itſelf agreeable, is called Profitable.

VI. But

That which is judged by the Underſtanding to be the beſt, all things conſidered, is abſolutely good, and called Honeſt.

VI. But ſince that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or leſs agreeable to others; and that which pleaſes now, may have ſome things connected with it which may be diſpleaſing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, to procure an abſolute Good, *i. e.* one which, all Appetites and Times conſidered, will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleaſure or Delight as poſſible. For this End therefore was the Mind or Underſtanding given us, that we might be able to determine what appears fitteſt to be done upon a view of all ſuch things as create Pleaſure or uneaſineſs for the preſent or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Underſtanding to be the beſt, if there be no Error in the Caſe, muſt be look'd upon as *Honeſt*. For that is *Honeſt* which is agreeable to a rational Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reaſon itſelf directs, that, all things conſider'd, we ſhould prefer that which brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advantages.

Inſtances in Health Medicines and ſuch things as are agreeable to the Rational Appetite.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon theſe kinds of Good to be *Moral*, ſo far as they reſpect Man, becauſe they fall under the Government of Reaſon. But ſince all things cannot be always had together, a compariſon muſt be made between them, and that embraced which appears to be the beſt. Now the kinds may be compared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For inſtance, Health is a thing pleaſant in itſelf, and deſirable above all things that relate to the Body; but for the preſervation of it Medicines muſt be ſometimes taken, which of themſelves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to an End which in itſelf is delightful, they are ſaid to be profitable, and on that account fit to be choſen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than thoſe of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the loſs of Health,

Health, or even Life, right Reaſon dictates, that Health, or even Life be deſpiſed in regard to theſe. For this appears to be the moſt convenient, all things conſider'd, and on that account is *honeſt:* and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, ſo may alſo particulars of the ſame kind, as any one will find that conſiders it.

VIII. As to *Liberty*, the Men of this Sect will have it to conſiſt in this, that among all thoſe Goods, an Agent can embrace that which pleaſes him beſt, and exert thoſe Actions which his own Reaſon approves: For, according to theſe Men, he that can follow his own *Judgment* in Matters is free. For Example, he that is ſound in Body, and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at Liberty to walk: for he can if he *will*, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to theſe Men.

IX. But as to the Actions of the *Will* itſelf, namely, to *will*, or to *ſuſpend* the Act of Volition, they think that it is determined to theſe, not by itſelf, for that is impoſſible; but from without. If you aſk from whence? They anſwer, from the *Pleaſure* or *Uneaſineſs* perceived by the Underſtanding or the Senſes; but rather, as they imagine, from the preſent or moſt urgent *Uneaſineſs:* ſince therefore theſe are produced in us *ab extra*, not from the Will itſelf, and are not in its power, but ariſe from the very things; 'tis manifeſt, according to theſe Men, that we are not free (at leaſt from *Neceſſity*) to *will* or *not* will, that is, with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will. Some of them therefore expreſly deny, that *Liberty* belongs to Man with regard to theſe Acts, or that an Election can be ſaid to be free, or Man himſelf in that Reſpect: They will have it therefore, that *Liberty* belongs to us properly with reſpect to the *inferior* Faculties, which are ſubject to the Government of the Will, and diſcharge their Functions when the Man himſelf

But we are determin'd to chooſe either from the goodneſs or diſagreeableneſs of objects perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senſes; and therefore not free as to the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are ſubject to its determination.

ſelf has willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleaſes; but not to will; for he receives the Will to walk from elſewhere: nevertheleſs, he that can *do* what he wills, according to them, is free, even tho' he be neceſſarily determin'd to will. (42.)

X. If

NOTES.

(42.) The moſt remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, ſeem to be *Hobbs*, *Locke*, (if he be conſiſtent with himſelf*) *Leibnitz*, *Bayle*, *Norris*, the *Authors* of the *Philoſophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, and of *Cato's Letters*. But in order to have a more diſtinct Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all profeſſing to treat of *Human Liberty*, *Free-will*, &c. Let us in the firſt Place recite the ſeveral Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and obſerve to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. — Theſe are commonly diſtinguiſh'd into *Perception*, *Judgment*, *Volition* and *Action*. The two former are generally *neceſſary*, at leaſt always *paſſive*: For I cannot help ſeeing a Light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Propoſition; though I may hinder that Perception by ſhutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refuſing to think of the Propoſition. The Will then may properly enough be ſaid to influence or impede theſe†; but this doth not make them leſs *paſſive* in themſelves; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are ſo. The third will appear to be the exerciſe of a *Self-moving Principle*, and as ſuch cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing elſe. The laſt is the Exerciſe of the *inferior Powers*, the actual Production of Thought or Motion: this is generally directed by, and an immediate conſequence of Volition, on which account ſeveral Authors have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly diſtinct ones; the *Will* is an ability of chooſing ſome particular Thoughts or Motions, *Agency* is a power of producing theſe Thoughts or Motions purſuant to the Act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful diſtinction between theſe will help us to judge of all ſuch Authors as have either uſed them promiſcuouſly or been content to treat of the laſt only, as moſt of thoſe Perſons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*.

Theſe two laſt then being the only *active Powers*, or rather the only *Powers* at all, are the only proper ſubjects of Liberty: to which again it is variouſly apply'd. With regard to the *Will*,

* See Note 45. † See Note 58.

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there is no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly neceſſary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or ſuſpend the Act of Volition, the Men whom we are ſpeaking of, give up Liberty with reſpect to theſe, while they af-

If this be ſo, all our Actions are abſolutely neceſſary.

NOTES.

Will, ſome content themſelves with aſſerting its Freedom from external *Compulſion* only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination. And indeed it would be very ſtrange to ſuppoſe it otherwiſe: For to ſay that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to ſay, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing againſt his Will, or be obliged to will what at the ſame time he does not will: but then ſuch a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwiſe than they do perceive or judge, otherwiſe than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the moſt neceſſary, nay the more neceſſary the better. Others therefore have contended for an abſolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Byaſs or Phyſical Inclination, from all internal neceſſity, ariſing either from its own frame and conſtitution, the impulſe of ſuperior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reaſons, Motives, *&c.* which appear'd to them the very eſſence of human Liberty, the ſole Foundation of Morality. And indeed theſe ſeem to be the only Perſons that ſpeak out, and to the Point, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Notes.

Laſtly, A great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to *Action* only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion, or ſtopping it, according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of ſmall conſequence, ſince we are conſcious that in *fact* all ſuch Actions, ſuppoſing the Organs to be rightly diſpoſed, follow the determination of the Will; and alſo, that *in reaſon* they are no farther *moral*, nor we accountable for them than as they do ſo; we muſt therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty; and the main Queſtion will be, Whether Man is free to think or reſolve upon, to will or chooſe any thing propoſed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in conſequence of ſuch Reſolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth diſputing, and wherein all *Moral* Liberty muſt conſiſt; and indeed if it be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be abſolutely determin'd to chooſe in a certain

aſſert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion that when any thing is propoſed by the Underſtanding to be done, we either will it, or ſuſpend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the proſpect of Happineſs or importunity of the Uneaſineſs which appears to the Mind, in the preſent State and Circumſtances; by theſe therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd.

XI. But

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manner in any given Circumſtances, its other ſubordinate Faculties will immediately operate, and the ſeveral Actions which depend thereon all follow by neceſſary conſequence. Nay, upon this Hypotheſis there is properly no ſuch thing as Choice or Action in Man; but all are Paſſions propagated in a chain of neceſſary Cauſes and Effects. And indeed all who ſuppoſe any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a neceſſary and irreſiſtible one) whether they place it in the *Deſire of Good*, *Anxiety* for the abſence of it, or the *laſt Determination of the Judgment*, are involv'd in the ſame Conſequence, how many Steps ſoever they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be neceſſary, wherever that Neceſſity be placed. 'Tis the ſame thing whether I be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Cauſe, or drawn on by ſeveral ſucceſſively. Suppoſe, v. g. that I am neceſſitated to obey the laſt reſult of my own *Judgment*. From the *Exiſtence of things* follow certain *Appearances*, thoſe *Appearances* cauſe certain *Perceptions*, theſe *Perceptions* form a *Judgment*, this *Judgment* determines the *Will*, and this *Will* produces *Action*. All this is fix'd and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally neceſſary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as good to take them from the firſt as laſt, from the Exiſtence of outward Objects as from my own Will; ſince the ſuppoſed choice or action is in reality as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the exiſtence of external things. 'Tis eaſy to obſerve how deſtructive this and the like Schemes muſt prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which muſt ſtand and fall together, and can, I think, only be ſecured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See alſo Mr. *Chubb*'s Reflections on *Natural Liberty*. *Collection of Tracts*, p. 379, &c. or Notes 45, 48, 58.

That human Actions are free, not from Neceſſity, but Compulſion.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect what we will, then they ſay we are free in reſpect of ſuch Actions, not from Neceſſity, but only from Compulſion; for it is plain that nothing but our will is wanting to the exertion of them, and ſuppoſing us to will them, they neceſſarily follow. For inſtance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, ſuppoſing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he muſt walk, nor can he reſt while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are neceſſary (as being determin'd from without, *viz.* by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumſtances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no leſs neceſſary, for they will depend on the ſame circumſtances and acts of the Will, which, as they are neceſſary, theſe actions will be neceſſary alſo. (43.) Though, according to them, therefore, there be no *Compulſion* of the Will, yet there is *Neceſſity*, from which Neceſſity nothing in the World will be free; nay, a great many of them openly profeſs to believe that this is the Caſe.

XII. Now,

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(43.) To call an Action *neceſſary*, is properly ſpeaking to affirm that it is no Action. For by the Word *Action* we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically ſtiled a *Self-moving Power*: or the exercise of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine a particular train of *Thought* or *Motion*. Now the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of ſuch exerciſe of it, is directly repugnant to that of *Neceſſity*, which ſuppoſes the *Thought* or *Motion* to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by ſomething elſe, and conſequently implies a Negation of any ſuch Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exerciſe by this Being in the Caſes abovementioned. 'To be an *Agent* (ſays Dr. *Clarke* *,) ſignifies to have a *Power of beginning Motion*, and *Motion* cannot 'begin *neceſſarily*, becauſe *Neceſſity of Motion* ſuppoſes an Efficiency ſuperior to, and irreſiſtible by the thing moved, and 'conſequently the *beginning of Motion* cannot be in that which 'is

* *Remarks on the* Philoſophical Enquiry, p. 6.

According to their Opinion there is no *contingency* in things, nor could any thing be done otherwiſe than it is.

XII. Now, from this Hypotheſis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries ſeem deducible. Firſt, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwiſe than it is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected together by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly ſo called: *Contingency* then is removed out of Nature.

XIII. Se-

NOTES.

'is moved neceſſarily, but in the ſuperior Cauſe, or in the 'efficiency of ſome other Cauſe ſtill ſuperior to that, till at 'length we arrive at ſome *Free Agent*.' Where, though the Doctor's Definition of Agency ſeems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the Power of beginning reflex *Thought* as well as *Motion* (which are two diſtinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together and comprehended under the ſame general term) yet it ſhews us an evident contradiction in theſe two Words *neceſſary Agent*, in either Senſe: Unleſs he uſes the Word *Agent* in both Senſes together, and then his Reaſoning will be falſe, ſince what is acted on and determined by another in regard to its *Will*, or *Thought*, and in that Senſe *moved by a ſuperior Efficiency*, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different ſort of Action) in conſequence of ſuch pre-determined Will, or Thought, and in that ſenſe be an *Agent*, though not a moral one. But whatever the Doctor might mean by the Word *Agent*, his Argument will hold in either of theſe two Senſes ſeparate, *viz.* that nothing can be ſaid to *act* either in thinking or moving, which does not properly *begin* the train of Thought or Motion, but is put into Thought or Motion by ſomething elſe; and alſo, that every thing cannot be ſo put either into Thought or Motion; and therefore that there muſt be ſome firſt Cauſe of both.

And will not the ſame Argument hold equally for ſome firſt Cauſe of *Exiſtence?* If the Doctor can ſuppoſe a firſt Cauſe of all Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very reaſonably) why may he not alſo ſuppoſe a firſt Cauſe of all *Exiſtence*; and ſo entirely exclude that *antecedent Neceſſity* which he has often Recourſe to as a kind of ſupport of the exiſtence of the firſt Cauſe, but is obliged to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or Firſt Cauſe, may *exiſt* without any antecedent Neceſſity, than how it can *will* or *act* without any?

But

XIII. Secondly, That nothing more can be underſtood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elector or ſome others; which Senſe is very remote from the vulgar one; for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Neceſſity, and becauſe they are made otherwiſe than they ought to have been: In this Hypotheſis then there is no Election made amiſs. (44.) Nor can any thing be ſaid to be done otherwiſe than it ought to be: for what could not poſſibly be done otherwiſe, is certainly done as it ought; ſince it is done according to the exigence and neceſſary order of things.

By Evil they underſtand nothing more than hurtful.

XIV. Thirdly, By the ſame Principle all Evil wou'd be in the ſtricteſt ſenſe *Natural*, for it would derive its Origin from natural and neceſſary Cauſes. The diſtinction then would be loſt between natural and moral Evil, as commonly underſtood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckoned Moral by the common conſent of Mankind, of which the Man himſelf is properly the Cauſe: but no body looks upon himſelf as properly the Cauſe of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was neceſſitated by natural Cauſes, and ſuch as were antecedent to the Will. For every

Villanies are to be placed the account of human Miſery, and not looked upon as Crimes, properly ſo called.

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But to return to the chief Deſign of this Note. We ſee how neceſſary it is to fix the preciſe meaning of the Word *Action* in a Controverſy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allowed, then neceſſary Action is the ſame as paſſive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.

(44) *Leibnitz* declares it to be his ſettled Opinion, ‡ 'That 'whenever we reſolve or will contrary to an evident Reaſon, 'we are carried by ſome other Reaſon ſtronger in appearance.' If this be always the Caſe, we certainly can never will amiſs or unreaſonably, ſince that Reaſon which appears to be the ſtrongeſt muſt and ought always to determine us.

‡ *Remarques ſur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal.* p. 483.

very one blames himſelf only on this account, becauſe he was of himſelf unneceſſarily the Cauſe of Evil to himſelf or others. Thoſe Inconveniencies which come by Neceſſity, he looks upon as Miſeries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himſelf, and whatever we eſteem baſe in Villanies (as well as the diſgrace and puniſhment attending them) muſt be placed to the account of human Miſery and Unhappineſs, but by no means reckoned criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Juſtice, Purity or Goodneſs, than Heat or Cold.

A Malefactor is reproved, not becauſe he deſerved it, but becauſe reproof may drive him from Evil.

XV. Fourthly, When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjured Perſon, when thoſe Crimes are arraigned as ſcandalous; this is not done becauſe they have deſerved it, or becauſe theſe things are in themſelves really ſhameful or culpable; but becauſe that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Perſons or others from the like Elections. And this is the only Reaſon why we reproach a Thief, *&c.* and not a ſick Perſon, with Infamy; becauſe Reproach may cure a Thief, *&c.* but can do no Good to a ſick Perſon.

Puniſhments are applyed as Medicines to the Sick; neither are Laws uſeleſs, ſince they prevent Vice.

XVI. Fifthly, Malefactors are puniſhed not becauſe they deſerve Puniſhment, but becauſe it is expedient, and Laws are uſed to reſtrain Vices, as Phyſic to remove Diſeaſes; Men ſin therefore after the ſame manner as they die, *viz.* becauſe an effectual Remedy was not applyed. And yet Laws are not entirely uſeleſs, ſince they prevent ſome Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths of ſome diſeaſed Perſons: and a Perſon infected with the Plague may be as juſtly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (*)

XVII.

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(*) All this, and a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe, is expreſly aſſerted (as indeed 'tis a neceſſary conſequence of their Hy-

XVII. Sixthly, We are obliged to repay good Offices, ſince by being thankful we may excite the Benefactor to continue or increaſe his Benevolence, and alſo induce others to do us Service. And hence it comes to paſs, that we are obliged to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horſe, becauſe God and Men may be excited by thanks to ſome farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horſe cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit received, but only to one that may be received; nor are we obliged to be grateful to the moſt generous Benefactor for what is paſt, but only for the proſpect of what is to come. All ſenſe of gratitude then, as commonly underſtood, is deſtroyed; for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Perſon, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

We are obliged to be grateful only in proſpect of a future Benefit.

XVIII. Seventhly, If this Opinion be true, we muſt deſpair of human Felicity, which will not in the leaſt be in our own Power, but entirely depend upon external Objects. Our happineſs (if there be any) muſt, according to them, be conceived to ariſe from the perfect enjoyment of thoſe things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to theſe are preſent, or the agreeable ones abſent, we muſt neceſſarily be uneaſy, and while we ſtruggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. According to this Hypotheſis therefore it follows, that our Happineſs neceſſarily requires ſuch an Enjoyment as we have ſpoken of, and that this is at the ſame time impoſſible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) ſhould be ſo tempered as in every reſpect to anſwer his Wiſhes, ſo

According to this Opinion, human Happineſs is impoſſible, ſince it depends upon things which are not in our Power.

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Hypotheſis) by *Hobbs** and by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, † and much the ſame by *Bayle*. ‡ The bare recital of ſuch Principles is a ſufficient refutation of them.

* *See his Treatiſe on* Human Liberty, *or* Bp. Bramhall's *Works*, p. 678. † P. 91, *&c.* ‡ *Crit. Dict.* p. 2609, *&c.*

ſo as never to want what he deſires, or to be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happineſs ariſes from the Enjoyment of thoſe things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Deſire by their innate, or at leaſt apparent Goodneſs; if alſo the Will is neceſſarily determined to theſe, according to the Judgment of the Underſtanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every man muſt neceſſarily want a great many things which he has choſen, and bear a great many which he would not, than which nothing is more inconſiſtent with Felicity. For we cannot poſſibly conceive any State of Life wherein all things anſwer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happineſs, if it depend upon external Objects. (*N.*)

XIX.

NOTES.

(*N.*) Againſt the Argument here urged 'tis objected that it is lame in all its Feet; 1*ſt*, there is no conſequence in it. 2*dly*, the Concluſion may be granted; and 3*dly*, the Argument may be retorted againſt the Author.

To begin with the laſt; It is alledged that Men are never the happier, or more independent of the accidents of Fortune, by having a *power to chooſe without Reaſon.*

To which I reply, that the Author has no occaſion to aſſert any ſuch power; all that he pleads for, is that the will ought not to be determined by the Judgment of the Underſtanding concerning things antecedently agreeable or diſagreeable to our natural Appetites; becauſe all the good of a Man does not lie in them; If it did, there would be no need of a will at all, but we ought to be abſolutely determined by them. But the will is a faculty that by chooſing a thing can make it agreeable, though it had no Agreement with any natural Appetite, nay, were contrary to them all; and for the will to chooſe a thing in order to pleaſe itſelf in the choice, is no more to chooſe without reaſon, than to build a Houſe in order to preſerve one from the inclemency of the Weather, is to act without reaſon.

But 2dly, 'Tis aſked, will Men be any happier, or leſs dependent on the accidents of Fortune by having ſuch a Faculty? Yes, ſure a great deal; for no accident of Fortune can take this Liberty from them, or hinder their being pleaſed with their choice; and in the midſt of ſickneſs, pain and torment, if they have this faculty, they will find pleaſure and ſatisfaction in it, and make the moſt adverſe Fortune eaſy to them; (as we ſee

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XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, muſt ſeem hard and repugnant to the common Notions of Men, and cannot be believed without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confeſs indeed that, for the moſt part, one cannot argue

Its conſequences hard, and tho' the Argument from conſequences be generally a bad one, yet theſe bring ſome prejudice againſt an Opinion which ſeems attended with them, eſpecially if they be acknowledged.

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wiſe Men frequently do,) at leaſt, more eaſy than ſuch circumſtances would be without it.

3dly, 'Tis objected, that it muſt be impoſſible to give agreeableneſs to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. For to do ſo we muſt have a power either to change our taſte of things, or the things themſelves; but that wou'd almoſt be the ſame as to ſay to a piece of Lead be thou Gold, or to a Flint be thou a Diamond, or at leaſt produce the ſame effect on me. To which the anſwer is eaſy; Good is not an *abſolute* thing, but *relative*, and conſiſts in the agreeableneſs of one thing to another, as ſuppoſe between the Appetite and Object; if then theſe be diſagreeable to one another, the one is Evil to the other, and to make them agreeable, one of them muſt of neceſſity be changed, and the change of either will cauſe it. Although therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by any act of my Free-will, yet I can contemn Gold as much as if it were Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as if it were Gold. Thouſands make this uſe of Free-will, and ariſe to this pitch of Happineſs by the help of it: It is an old Rule *Si res haberi non poteſt, deme aliquid de cupiditatibus.* If you can't have Wealth or Honour reſolve, that is *chooſe*, to be ſatisfied without it, and experience will teach you that ſuch a Choice is much to your Eaſe and Happineſs. To ſay that this is impoſſible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals and Divinity: Of ſo great moment is ſuch a power of making things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices ſuppoſe us to have it, or elſe they are not ſenſe.

But 4thly, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make a thing agreeable by chooſing, ſuch a power would be *infinite*, and might make a Man happy in all circumſtances, even in *Hell*. For if it can give ſix degrees of Pleaſure to an Object, it may as well give infinite; ſince it is without reaſon that it gives theſe Six. I anſwer, all created Powers and Pleaſures are limited, and no ſubject is capable of more than ſuch a certain Degree, therefore there is likewiſe a limitation of the pleaſure ariſing from the uſe of Free-will, as well as from the uſe of ſeeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite; and as the Will is an Appetite, ſo the Pleaſure of it bears ſome proportion to the Pleaſure ariſing from the ſatisfaction of other Appetites; but in what degree we cannot preciſely determine,

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argue well againſt an opinion from its conſequences, ſince a great many things are true which have conſequences hard enough: not to mention how eaſily we miſtake in deducing conſequences. But yet when

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any more than we can ſettle the proportion between the Pleaſures of ſeeing and hearing; which yet we know are neither of them infinite. Though therefore we cannot preciſely determine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently croſs all our natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by means of it bear up againſt the ſtrokes of adverſe Fortune, and a flood of natural Evils.

But 5thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this Power of making things agreeable or diſagreeable by choice, we need not trouble ourſelves how our other Appetites were ſatisfied, for we might be abſolutely happy in ſpite of all the accidents of Fortune.

He that objects this, aſſuredly did not conſider the deſcription given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having it doth not deſtroy our other Appetites; and that when it chooſes things contrary to them, it neceſſarily creates a great deal of pain, uneaſineſs and torment; which abates *ſo far* the pleaſure we take in our Elections, that the pleaſure we obtain by ſuch a choice is little or nothing in reſpect of what it might be if we did not chooſe amiſs. Theſe things are ſo plainly and frequently repeated in the Book, that it ſeems ſtrange how any one could imagine that becauſe we have a Faculty to pleaſe our ſelves by chooſing, that therefore we may be abſolutely happy in ſpite of all the Accidents of Fortune.

If by Happineſs be meant a ſtate more eligible than nothing, I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally ſpeaking be ſo far happy, and that is ſufficient to juſtify God's putting us into our preſent Circumſtances. But if by Happineſs be meant, as it ought to be, a ſtate wherein we have a full and free exerciſe of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power of chooſing is but one Faculty, though ſuperior to all the reſt, the exerciſe of it alone can never make us abſolutely and compleatly happy, though it may in ſuch a degree as is very deſirable.

6thly, The Concluſion of the Argument is granted, and it is looked on as no inconvenience that our Happineſs ſhould in ſome caſes depend on things without us, and not in our own Power. But the concluſion is quite another thing. The words are, *If this Opinion be true, we muſt deſpair of human Happineſs, for it will not be in the leaſt in our own power, but entirely depend upon external Objects.*

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when theſe are acknowledged by the Authors themſelves; and, if believed, would prove detrimental to Morality, they bring no ſmall prejudice againſt an Opinion which is attended with them, and recommend us to ſome other as more probable, tho' it be not ſupported by any ſtronger Reaſons.

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The accidents of Fortune, ſuch as an Earthquake may ſink a Man and all his concerns, and though in that extraordinary caſe, as it is put, my choice be not able to prevent my death, yet my Happineſs in the general management of Life may be very much in my own power, and not altogether in the power of foreign Accidents. And even in the caſe of an Earthquake, a good Man that had fixed his Election to ſubmit to ſuch a death and circumſtances as it ſhould pleaſe Providence to aſſign him, wou'd not be without ſome pleaſure, even in ſuch an accident: at leaſt not ſo unhappy as another that had made no ſuch Reſolution or Election. But if ſuch an Election can make him no eaſier or do him no good, it were to no purpoſe to make it. He can have no proſpect or deſign in making it, if the Good or Evil reſulting from the Agreement or Diſagreement of what happens to his natural Appetites be the only Conſiderations that can determine his will. 'Tis plain that in ſuch a caſe he muſt be miſerable, if outward things happen croſs to his Appetites; whereas if he can make them agreeable or diſagreeable in any meaſure by his own choice, he is ſtill maſter of his Happineſs, and the conſideration that he can make them ſo is a good reaſon for chooſing. So far is he from chooſing *without Reaſon*, as is falſly objected.

But 7thly, 'Tis urged, that if the will were not moved but by the Repreſentation of antecedent Good and Evil in the things that happen, it would not indeed be in our power to be happy, ſuppoſing there were no God, and that all things were governed by Matter and Motion: But God has ſo ordered it, that to be virtuous is ſufficient to make a Man happy. If therefore the Soul follows Reaſon and the Orders God has given her, ſhe is ſure to be happy, although ſhe cannot find enough to make her ſo in this Life.

To which I anſwer, 1ſt, That this is giving up the Happineſs of this Life, and acknowledging that God has not provided any Natural means to make us happy here, which is a Confeſſion that one who is zealous to defend the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God will not eaſily grant.

2dly, I have no other Notion of *Virtue* than that of an Election within the limits preſcribed by God and Nature; I think the definition of it is *Habitus cum ratione* electivus *in mediocritate*

All those who declare that the Will is passive in its Operations must be of the same Opinion with the former, and pressed with the same consequences.

XX. 'Tis to be observed also, that among the foregoing Authors I reckon those who declare that the Will is determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding,* which has taken with a great many Philosophers; and in short, all who maintain that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For these must be esteemed to have the same Sentiments of Liberty with the former, which way soever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that most of them expresly deny that *Indifference* belongs to the Nature of Freedom; so that their Opinion is attended with the same consequences as the former. (45.)

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diceritate consistens; if then to be virtuous is enough to make us happy, it is plain that our Happiness consists in our *Election*, which is the very thing I plead for: but if our Election make the things elected neither better nor worse, neither more nor less agreeable, it is inconceivable how our Happiness should consist at all in Virtue. If the meaning be that God will reward us hereafter; that is to confess we are miserable for the present, but shall be happy some other time. I own indeed that *Hope* is a great cause of Pleasure, but except we *choose* the crossing our natural Appetites for the present out of prospect to the future, it will no ways render our present suffering tolerable. Nor will such a prospect, how clearly soever offered by our Understanding, yield us this Pleasure, except the will consent. For then it would do so to all to whom the offer is made; whereas we see one perseveres by means of it, and another in much more advantageous Circumstances yields to the present Temptation, and knowingly loses the Reward.

(45.) As Mr. *Locke* has particularly laboured the point before us, and seems to defend by turns the several Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we shall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having first of all defined Liberty to be 'A Power in any Agent 'to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the De'termination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them 'is preferred to the other.'† He takes a great deal of Pains to prove that such Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his sense of Liberty to be the only one, since by his Definition it is evidently subsequent to the choice or

* *Against this Notion see* Sect. 5. Subsect. 2. par. 13.

† C. *Of Power*, § 8.

SUBSECT. II.

An Opinion is propoſed in general, aſſerting a Freedom from Neceſſity as well as Compulſion.

THIS Opinion determines almoſt the ſame with the former concerning the Goodneſs or Agreeableneſs of Objects to the Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the diſtinction

This agrees with the former in moſt caſes eſpecially in thoſe relating to the Appetites, to Good, Pleaſant, Profitable and Honeſt; but makes this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, *viz.* that the one is determined by its bodily Appetite, the other by himſelf.

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or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of ſuch choice by an inferior faculty. † But then, beſides this Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the preſent Queſtion, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itſelf; and may be called its Power of *determining* to do or forbear any particular Action, or of *preferring* one to another; and if Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of theſe *Powers* ‡ as he has conſtantly attributed it, why may it not with equal propriety be applied to the other? He proceeds therefore to ſtate the Queſtion concerning the latter, which he would not have put, whether the Will be free? but whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think amount to the ſame thing with common Underſtandings, ſince in the firſt place we only aſk, Whether this Will be properly an *active* power of the Mind (*i. e.* as oppoſed to Mr. *Locke*'s *paſſive* Power) and in the ſecond, Whether the Mind be *active* or indifferent in exerting this Power called Will? and both which will be equally improper Queſtions with regard to his former ſenſe of the Word *Free*, i. e. as only applicable to the *Actions* ſubſequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the ſecond place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free 'To Will or not to Will, when any Action is once propoſed 'to his Thoughts, as preſently to be done.' In which reſpect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, becauſe he cannot forbear Willing or *preferring* the one to the other: ‖ which tho' it be ſcarce conſiſtent with his other Notion of *Suſpenſion*, whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the caſe, and continues in the ſame ſtate he is in [not by virtue of a preſent Determination of his Will, but of ſome precedent one] or elſe wills ſomething different from either the exiſtence or non exiſtence of the Action propoſed*, and tho' it ſhould con-

† See Note 42. ‡ § 16. ‖ § 23, 24. * See Note 48.

ſtinction of Good into Pleaſant, Profitable, and Honeſt: Except that it refers Honeſt to the Duty which a Mans owes to God, himſelf, and other Men, as a Member of an intelligent Society, rather than

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comprehend, as he ſays it does, moſt caſes in Life, yet ſtill it is not of the leaſt Importance. For what does it ſignifiy to me that I muſt neceſſarily take one ſide or the other, right or wrong, ſo long as I can chooſe either of them indefferently? If I can will or chooſe *either of the two*, here's full room for the exerciſe of Liberty; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. *Locke*'s next Queſtion. The Anſwer to which ſeems pretty eaſy, tho' perhaps not ſo reconcileable with his Hypotheſis. However, inſtead of meddling with it, he ſlips this abſurd Query into its Room, *viz.* Whether a Man be at Liberty to will *which of the two he pleaſes?* or which is the ſame, Whether he can Will what he Wills? Sect. 25.† And then, inſtead of ſhewing whether the Will be naturally determin'd to one ſide, in any or all caſes, or whether the Man be always free to *will* this way or that; (as might have been expected) he tells us ſomething very different, *viz.* that we can't always *act* in that Manner, or that Liberty of *acting* does not require that a Man ſhou'd be able to do any Action or its contrary: then he goes on to give us another Explanation of the word Liberty, which is ſtill confined to Action, and conſequently foreign to the preſent Queſtion.

In the next place he defines the Will over again.‖ 'Which 'ſays he) is nothing but a power in the Mind to direct the 'operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reſt, as far as they 'depend on ſuch direction'. By which Words if he mean, that this Power of directing the operative Faculties, is properly *active* (in the ſenſe abovemention'd) or Phyſically *indifferent* to any particular manner of directing them, *i. e.* is an ability to direct them either to Motion or Reſt, without any natural Byaſs to determine it (or to determine the mind to determine it) toward one ſide always rather than the other: If, I ſay, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of Will, then may Freedom be juſtly predicated of that ſame Will, (or of the Mind in the exerciſe of it,) not indeed his kind of Freedom, *i. e.* that of *acting*, which belongs to another Faculty; but Freedom in our ſenſe of the Word, *i. e.* a certain Indifference, or Indeterminateneſs in its own exerciſe; which is what moſt Men underſtand by *Liberum Arbitrium*; and whether there be ſuch a Liberty as this in human Nature, would here have been a pro-

† See *Strutt*'s Remarks on *Locke*'s Chapter of Power, p. 38. &c.

‖ Sect. 29.

than to the natural Appetites; and thinks that we are to judge of the Agreeableneſs of things from that, rather than from theſe. As to the Election which the Will makes on account of theſe, it aſſerts that

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a proper Queſtion. For if there be, then we have got an abſolutely ſelf-moving Principle, which does not want any thing out of itſelf to determine it; which has no phyſical connection with, and of conſequence, no neceſſary occaſion for that grand Determiner *Anxiety*, which he has afterwards taken ſo much pains to ſettle and explain, and which ſhall be conſider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and inſtead of determining this, which is the main point of the controverſy, and wherein Liberty muſt be found or no where [as we obſerv'd in Note 42.] I ſay, inſtead of ſtating and determining this great Queſtion, Whether the Will or Mind be abſolutely independent upon, and phyſically indifferent to all particular Acts, Objects, Motions, *&c.* or neceſſarily require ſome foreign Mover; he ſeems to take the latter for granted, and immediately proceeds to the following Queſtion, *What determines the Will?* The Meaning of which, ſays he *, is this, 'What moves the Mind 'in every particular inſtance to determine its general power of 'directing to this or that particular Motion or Reſt?' This Mr. *Locke* calls, for ſhortneſs ſake, *determining the Will*; and declares that what thus determines it either firſt to continue in the ſame ſtate or action, is only the preſent *Satisfaction* in it: or ſecondly to change, is always ſome *Uneaſineſs* †. By which Words if he only meant that theſe Perceptions are the common *Motives*, *Inducements*, or *Occaſions* whereupon the Mind in fact exerts its power of willing in this or that particular Manner; though in reality it always can, and often does the contrary, as he ſeems to intimate by ſpeaking of a *Will* contrary to Deſire ‡ of *raiſing* Deſires by due Conſideration ‖ and *forming* Appetites ⸸, of a Power to *ſuſpend* any Deſires, to moderate and reſtrain the Paſſions, and hinder either of them from determining the Will and engaging us in Action: ¶ Then, as we ſaid before, he is only talking of another Queſtion, and what he has advanced on this head may readily be granted, at leaſt without any prejudice to human Liberty. For in this ſenſe to affirm that the Will or Mind is determin'd by ſomething without it, is only ſaying that it generally has ſome *Motives* from without, according to which it determines the abovemention'd Powers, which no Man in his Senſes can diſpute.

But

* Sect. 29. † Ibid. ‡ Sect. 30. ‖ Sect. 46.
⸸ Sect. 53. ¶ Sect. 47, 50, 53.

that this proceeds from the Will itſelf, and that a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural Bodies by external Impulſes, or like Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man

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But if he intended that theſe Motives ſhould be underſtood to rule and direct the Will abſolutely and irreſiſtibly in certain Caſes:—That they have ſuch a neceſſary influence on the Mind, that it can never be determin'd without or againſt them; — in ſhort, that the Soul of Man has not a *phyſical Power* of willing independent of, and conſequently indifferent to all Perceptions, Reaſons and Motives whatſoever; — which the general drift of his Diſcourſe ſeems to aſſert, particularly §. 47, 48, 49, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the Judgment with the exertion of the ſelf-moving Power throughout. As alſo §. 52. where he aſſerts, That all the Liberty we have, or are capable of, lies in this, 'that we can *ſuſpend* 'our Deſires, and hold our Wills undetermin'd, till we have 'examin'd the Good and Evil of what we deſire; what fol-'lows after that follows in a Chain of Conſequences link'd 'one to another, all depending on the laſt Determination of 'the Judgment.' And when he ſpeaks of Cauſes not in our Power, operating for the moſt part *forcibly* on the Will, §. 57, *&c.*

If from theſe and the like Expreſſions, I ſay, we may conclude this to have been his Opinion, *viz.* that all the Liberty of the Mind conſiſts ſolely in directing the Determination of the Judgment, (though if the Mind be always determin'd from without, we muſt have a *Motive* alſo for this *Direction*, and conſequently ſhall find no more freedom here than any where elſe) after which Determination all our Actions (if they can be called ſuch *) follow neceſſarily: then I believe it will appear, that at the ſame time that he oppoſed the true Notion of Free-Will, he contradicted common Senſe and Experience, as well as himſelf. For in the firſt place, is it not ſelf-evident, that we often do not follow our own preſent Judgment, but run counter to the clear conviction of our Underſtandings; which Actions accordingly appear vicious, and fill us immeditately with regret and the ſtings of Conſcience? This he allows, [§. 35, 38.] to make Room for his *Anxiety*. But, upon the foregoing Hypotheſis, How can any Action appear to be irregular? How can any thing that is conſequent upon the final Reſult of *Judgment*, (if this Word be uſed in its proper Senſe) be againſt Conſcience, which is nothing elſe but that

* *See* Note 42.

Man and the Brutes, that theſe are determin'd according to their bodily Appetites, whence all their Actions are neceſſary, but Man has a different Principle in him, and determines himſelf to Action.

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that final Judgment?* Nay, upon the ſuppoſition of our being inviolably determin'd in willing by our Judgment (and, according to Mr. *Locke*, our Conſtitution puts us under a neceſſity of being ſo, §. 48.) it would be really impoſſible for us to will amiſs or immorally, let our Judgments be ever ſo erroneous; 'The Cauſes of which (as he alſo obſerves, §. 64.) 'proceed from the weak and narrow conſtitution of our Minds, 'and are moſt of them out of our Power.' Either therefore we can will without and againſt a preſent Judgment, and therefore are not neceſſarily (*i. e.* phyſically) determin'd by it; or we cannot be guilty of a wrong Volition: whatever proves the one, by neceſſary conſequence eſtabliſhes the other. Farther, there are innumerable *indifferent* Actions which occur daily, both with reſpect to abſolute chooſing or refuſing, or to chooſing among things abſolutely equal, equal both in themſelves, and to the Mind, on which we evidently paſs no manner of Judgment, and conſequently cannot be ſaid to follow its Determination in them. To will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former; to chooſe one out of two or more Eggs apparently alike, is a proverbial Inſtance of the latter; both which are demonſtrations of an active or ſelf-moving Power; either way we determine and act when the Motives are entirely equal, which is the ſame as to act without any Motive at all. In the former Caſe I perceive no previous Inclination to direct my Will in general, in the latter no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; and in the preſent Caſe, not to perceive a Motive is to have none; (except we could be ſaid to have an Idea without being conſcious of it, to be anxious and yet inſenſible of that Anxiety, or ſway'd by a Reaſon which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither is it neceſſary to a true Equality or Indifference here, that I be ſuppoſed to have no Will to uſe *any Eggs at all* (as the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry* abſurdly puts the Caſe.) For granting in the firſt Place, that I have not a will to uſe any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed nonſenſe to ſuppoſe after-

* *See* Limborch. *Theol. Chriſt.* L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 16. *and for an Anſwer to the latter part of* Locke's 48th Sect. *ſee the ſame* Chap. Sect. the laſt.

Though therefore the Will follows ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding, yet it is not neceſſarily determin'd by it.

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propoſed which is not the Chief, the Will can *ſuſpend** the Action, and command the Underſtanding to propoſe ſome other thing, or the ſame in ſome different view: which may be always done, ſince every thing except the chief Good is of ſuch a Nature, that the Underſtanding may apprehend ſome reſpect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Notwithſtanding therefore that the Will always does follow ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding, which is made about the ſubſequent Actions, yet it is not neceſſarily determin'd by any, for it can ſuſpend its Act, and order ſome other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either exert or ſuſpend its Act, it is not only free from Compulſion, but alſo indifferent in itſelf, with regard to its Actions, and determines itſelf without neceſſity.

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ferring us to the minute and imperceptible Cauſes abovemention'd; or obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word *Chance* inſtead of a Phyſical Cauſe, which is ſaying nothing at all. How hard muſt Men be preſs'd under an Hypotheſis, when they fly to ſuch evaſive ſhifts as theſe! How much eaſier and better would it be to give up all ſuch blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulſes, and own, what common Senſe and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self-moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only Source of both Volition and Action!

With regard to Mr. *Locke*'s Inconſiſtencies, I ſhall only add one Obſervation more, *viz.* that he ſeems to place the Cauſe (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of the Will after the Effect. The Cauſe of that Determination is, according to him, *Anxiety*; this he ſometimes makes concomitant, ſometimes conſequent upon Deſire; and Sect. 31. he ſays, 'the one is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from the other.

But this ſame Deſire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itſelf; what we abſolutely deſire we always will, and *vice verſa*; whether it be in our Power to purſue that Will, and produce it into Act, or not: and indeed Deſire ſeems to be no otherwiſe diſtinguiſhable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which the

* See Note 48.

IV. It muſt be confeſs'd, that this Opinion does eſtabliſh Liberty, and on that account is more agreeable to reaſon, experience, and the common ſenſe of Mankind, yet ſome things in it ſeem to be preſum'd upon and not ſufficiently explain'd.

This Opinion eſtabliſhes Liberty, but yet there are ſome things not ſufficiently explained in it.

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the former is conſider'd without. This I think is all the Diſtinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: Nor do his Inſtances in §. 30. prove that there is any Difference between them. Thus when I am oblig'd to uſe perſuaſions with another, which I wiſh may not prevail upon him: or ſuffer one Pain to prevent a greater: here are two oppoſite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a ſtronger: and we might as well ſay, Deſire is oppoſite to Deſire, as to Volition. I will, or deſire, that this Man may not be prevailed upon, but yet I will, or deſire more powerfully and effectually to uſe theſe perſuaſions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual Deſire or Will in the Caſe, and the other is only hypothetical. Thus I ſhould will to be cured of the Gout, if that Cure would not throw me into greater Pain: but in the preſent Circumſtances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may ſerve to remove it: nay, in this Caſe, I will or deſire to bear the Gout rather than a worſe Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that wherever there is pain, there is a deſire to be rid of it, is not abſolutely true.

Again, I ſhould refuſe a painful Remedy or diſagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifeſtly cannot, I chooſe the leaſt Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly ſaid to chooſe or deſire both in the preſent Circumſtances, or to will one and deſire the contrary; ſince I know that only one of them is poſſible: which therefore I now certainly will or deſire, though I ſhould certainly have willed the contrary had it been equally poſſible. Theſe then, and the like Inſtances are not ſufficient to prove any oppoſition between Will and Deſire; except the latter be only taken for a mere paſſive Appetite; in which Senſe the Words *chooſe*, *prefer*, &c. muſt then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. *Locke* here ſets the Word *Deſire* to ſignify what we commonly mean by the *Will*, as he does in Sect. 48. where 'tis call'd the *Power of preferring*: and puts Volition into the place of *Action*; as ſeems probable from his deſcription of Willing in the 16th, 28th and 30th Sections, as alſo, C. 23. Sect. 18. where he defines the Will to be a *Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought*. And the ſame Notion, I think, runs through all his Letters to *Limborch*.

Such a Liberty as this ſeems to be of more prejudice than benefit to Mankind.

V. For in the firſt place, 'tis ſaid that the Will *determines itſelf*, but we are not inform'd how that is poſſible, nor what uſe ſuch a Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it ſeems rather prejudicial than advantageous to Mankind. For that Goodneſs which it is ſuppoſed to purſue, is in the things themſelves, and ariſes from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but diſcovered by the Underſtanding. If then the Underſtanding performs its Duty right, it will diſcover what is beſt: but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is beſt: it had therefore been better for Man if Nature had given him up abſolutely to the Determination of his own Judgment and

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Upon a Review of this Chapter of Mr. *Locke*'s Eſſay, and comparing the firſt Edition of it with the reſt, I find a remarkable Paſſage omitted in all the following ones, which may ſerve to ſhew us upon what Ground he at firſt ſuppoſed the Will to be determin'd from *without*, and why upon altering part of his Scheme, and leaving the reſt, he was obliged to take that for granted, and let his former Suppoſition ſtand without its Reaſon. It begins at Sect. 28. "We muſt remember that *Volition* or "*Willing*, regarding only what is in our power, is nothing but "*preferring* the doing of any thing to the not doing of it; "Action to Reſt and *contra*. Well, but what is this preferring? It is nothing but the *being pleaſed more with one thing* "*than another*. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleaſed or not "pleaſed more with one thing than another? Is it in his Choice, "whether he will or will not be better pleaſed with one thing "than another?

"And to this I think every one's Experience is ready to "make anſwer, No. From whence it follows, that the Will "or Preference is determin'd by ſomething without itſelf; "let us ſee then what it is determin'd by. If willing be but "the being better *pleaſed*, as has been ſhewn, it is eaſy to know "what 'tis determines the Will, what 'tis pleaſes beſt; every "one knows 'tis *Happineſs*, or that which makes any part of "Happineſs, or contributes to it, and that is it we call *Good*. "—— *Good* then, *the greater Good, is that alone which deter-* "*mines the Will.*"

From hence we may obſerve, that as he here makes the Will a mere *paſſive Affection* of the Mind, a power of being *pleaſed* with ſome things more than others, (which Definition will with-

equal

and Underſtanding, and not allowed that Judgment to be ſuſpended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtained his End with greater certainty and eaſe. I grant, that if a Man were abſolutely determin'd in his Actions to the beſt, there would be no room for virtue, properly ſo called; for virtue, as it is commonly underſtood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reaſon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleaſes; (For thus it would be impoſſible to attain the end of chooſing, *i. e.* to pleaſe ourſelves, without Liberty, ſince that very thing which pleaſes in Action, *viz.* Liberty, would be

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equal propriety take in all the *Senſes* too) he was naturally led to enquire after the Ground of theſe its different Pleaſures, which could only be the different Natures of external Objects acting differently upon it; (as they do alſo on the Senſes.) For what is only *acted* upon, muſt have ſomething *without* itſelf to act upon it; and to be pleaſed in a different manner by the Action of different Objects is only, in other Words, to receive different Degrees of *Happineſs* from them. Upon this Scheme we muſt always be unavoidably determin'd by the greateſt apparent Good, or neceſſarily prefer what ſeems productive of the higheſt Degree of Happineſs; which is indeed ſufficiently intelligible, and he purſued it throughout conſiſtently. But upon ſecond Thoughts, finding this not very reconcileable with matter of Fact, (as he obſerved in Sect. 35, 38, 43, 44, 69, &c. of the following Editions, where he has fully ſhewn that we do not always prefer or chooſe the greater apparent Good) and ſtill ſuppoſing the Will to be *paſſive* or determin'd from *without*, he alters his former Hypotheſis ſo far as to make the Will be determin'd, not by the greater *Good* immediately, but by that *Uneaſineſs*, which is founded in the *Deſire*, which ariſes from the proſpect of ſome *Good*. But it being likewiſe evident that all things do not raiſe our Deſire in proportion to their apparent Goodneſs; He endeavours to account for this, by ſaying, that "We do not look on them to make a part of that Happi-"neſs wherewith we in our preſent Thoughts can ſatisfy our-"ſelves, Sect. 43." *i. e.* We can be *content* without them; or, in our Author's Language, they do not abſolutely pleaſe us, becauſe we do not *will* them. He proceeds therefore to mend his Hypotheſis farther, by making the Mind in ſome ſort *active* in

be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Underſtanding can diſcover, be the very beſt before or independent of our Choice, it were proper for us to be neceſſarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howſoever obtained, would make us happy, and be ſo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not depend upon *Chance*, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner ſuppoſed to do: nor need we much regard the *Glory* ariſing from a well-made Choice; ſince the fruition of the greateſt Good would give us Happineſs without it; nay, ſuch Glory would be empty and deſpicable in competition with the greateſt Good. Hence it appears, that the Free-will, according to this Hypotheſis, cannot be reckon'd any Advantage.

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contemplating, in embracing or rejecting any kinds of apparent Good, by giving it a power of *raiſing*, improving or *ſuſpending* any of its *Deſires*, of governing and moderating the Paſſions, and forming to itſelf an *Appetite* or *Reliſh* of things; Sect. 45, and 53. All which is exactly agreeable to our Author's Principles, as well as Truth, and 'tis a wonder one that ſo attentively conſider'd the Operations of the Mind ſhould not be led on to that other part of its Liberty which is equally confirm'd by Experience, *viz.* of chooſing arbitrarily among different kinds and degrees of Pain, of over-ruling any ordinary Deſire of obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, and by conſequence of its Will being properly *active* or *phyſically indifferent* with regard to either. But though he has inſerted ſeveral Paſſages in the ſubſequent Editions, which come near to Liberty, yet he takes in the greateſt part of his firſt paſſive Scheme, and generally mixes both together. This has occaſioned that great confuſion in the Chapter abovemention'd, which cannot but be obſerv'd by every Reader.

Dr. *Clarke*'s Argument for abſolute Freedom, becauſe all Motives or Senſations are mere abſtract Notions, and have no phyſical power ¶, ſeems not concluſive, or at leaſt not clear. For who knows, ſay the Fataliſts, how far reaſons, motives, &c. may affect a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Subſtance determine another by means of *Thought*, as well as a material one can move another by means of *Impulſe*? Nay; his

¶ *Remarks on the* Philoſophical Enquiry, p. 10.

VI. Secondly, If it be ſaid, that the Underſtanding is dubious in many Caſes, and ignorant of what is the beſt, and in theſe Liberty takes place; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to be done be Good or Evil in themſelves, but unknown to the Intellect, there's no help in the Will; nor does its Liberty aſſiſt us in diſcovering or obtaining the better Side; if they be indifferent, it is no matter what we do, ſince the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in theſe Caſes, it will be of no uſe or Importance to Life or Happineſs: Nay, it muſt be eſteemed an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfection of the Underſtanding. For if the Underſtanding could certainly determine what were the beſt to be done, there would be no room for Liberty. (46.)

It only takes place in doubtful matters, and then 'tis of no uſe or importance.

VII. Third-

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his adherent Mr, *Jackſon* grants ¶, "That abſtract Notions will "by a forcible and irreſiſtible impulſe, compel the Mind to "move the Body whether it will or no." Which impulſe, if it were conſtant, would ſufficiently acquit the Maintainers of Neceſſity. But that there can be no ſuch forcible impulſe, will, I hope, appear below, where it will be ſhewn to be both agreeable to reaſon to ſuppoſe that there are active or ſelf-moving Beings, which, as ſuch, muſt have a phyſical power of reſiſting what we call the moſt cogent Motives: and to be confirm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert ſuch a Power; which is ſufficient for our purpoſe. For an Explanation of the true Notion of Liberty, ſee the following Subſections of this Chapter, and Note 58.

(46.) Theſe, with ſome of the following conſequences attending ſuch a confuſed Hypotheſis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. *Locke* (though I think they return upon himſelf) in his *Chapter of Power*, Sect. 48, 49, 50. and in the *Philoſoph. Enquiry*, p. 63, &c. and ſeem to be unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of our Author; who ſuppoſes, that in moſt Caſes the Goodneſs of an Act or Object entirely depends upon, and is produced merely by our chooſing it; and of conſequence Liberty, or a power of chooſing, is according to his Prin-

¶ *Defence of human Liberty*, p. 198.

We are left in doubt concerning the Way to Happineſs, and can have no help from Liberty.

VII. Thirdly, Theſe men are not well agreed what this *Chief Good* is, from the connection with which the Underſtanding muſt judge of the Goodneſs of other things, as may appear from their various and contradictory Opinions about it. (47.) We muſt neceſſarily therefore be wavering and ſollicitous, and even rebel againſt Nature itſelf, which has neither fixt a certain End, nor granted any certain Means to attain it, but left us in anxiety and doubt about the way which leads to Happineſs; neither is there any help here in our Liberty, ſince it is blind, and can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right way.

Since that is good which is agreeable, and this is to be judged of by the Underſtanding, if the Will follow this Judgment, it is not free, if it does not, it acts againſt reaſon. We had better therefore be without ſuch Liberty.

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confeſs'd by all, that Good in general is what is univerſally agreeable,' and what all deſire. Every Good therefore anſwers to ſome Appetite, and according to theſe Authors, Objects are good on account of a natural and neceſſary ſuitableneſs

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Principles, ſo far from being unneceſſary, or an Imperfection, that it is our nobleſt Perfection, and conſtitutes the greateſt part of our Happineſs: For an Explanation of this, ſee Sect. 2. of this Chapter.

(47.) This uncertainty about the *Summum Bonum* is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. *Locke*, B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 55. "Hence it was that the Philoſophers of old did in vain enquire whether *Summum Bonum* conſiſted in Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation. And they might have as reaſonably diſputed whether the beſt reliſh were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nutts, and have divided themſelves into Sects upon it. For as pleaſant Taſtes depend not on the things *themſelves*, but their agreeableneſs to this or that particular *Palate*, wherein there is great variety; ſo the greateſt happineſs conſiſts in the having thoſe things which produce the greateſt Pleaſure, and in the abſence of thoſe which cauſe any diſturbance, any pain. Now theſe to different Men are very different things." To the ſame purpoſe are the 3d and 4th obſervations in the *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 33, which may ſerve to confirm the Notion which our Author propoſes in the next Subſection, *viz.* that moſt of the Good or Agreeableneſs in things ariſes not from their own *Natures*, but our *Choice* of them; or that Objects are not choſen becauſe they are good, but are generally good only becauſe choſen.

ableneſs which they have to our Appetites. The Underſtanding therefore does not make good, but finds it in the things themſelves: and when it judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, muſt neceſſarily be in reſpect of ſome natural Appetite. All the Good then which is in things will be the Object of ſome Faculty or Appetite, *i. e.* of the Underſtanding, Senſe, *&c.* But all theſe are determin'd by Nature in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, *i. e.* in regard to their *Pleaſantneſs*, or Agreeableneſs; and as to the relation which they bear to each other, *i. e.* as to their *Profitableneſs* and *Honeſty*, they are to be judg'd of by the Underſtanding, and directed when and in what manner they muſt give place to each other, or afford their mutual aſſiſtance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of uſe; for if it certainly follow the decree of reaſon, it is not free, at leaſt from neceſſity, ſince that very reaſon which it follows is not free: if it does not neceſſarily follow that, we had better be without it, ſince it perverts every thing, and confounds the Order of Reaſon, which is beſt; ſuch a Liberty as this would therefore be prejudicial to Mankind; it would make them liable to do amiſs, and produce no kind of Good to compenſate for ſo great an Evil.

If the Will could ſuſpend its act contrary to the Judgment of the Underſtanding, it would run directly into Evil; it ſeems therefore neceſſary for it to act at the time and in the manner which the Underſtanding directs.

IX. Fifthly, It is ſuppoſed that the Judgment of the Underſtanding concerning the Goodneſs of any thing, is a condition without which the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert or ſuſpend its act about any Good whatſoever. Let us ſuppoſe then that the Underſtanding has determined it to be good to exert ſome certain Action and evil to ſuſpend it; while this Judgment continues, if the Will can ſuſpend its Act, it chooſes Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll ſay, it can command the Underſtanding to change its Judgment: be it ſo. But it is evident, that the Man

Man ſuſpends his Action before he can command the Underſtanding to change its Judgment, *i. e.* he ſuſpends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to ſuſpend; and of conſequence chooſes that directly which his Reaſon judges to be Evil; which ſeems to overthrow their whole Hypotheſis. (48.)

X.

NOTES.

(48.) Farther, if the Mind can ſuſpend the Satisfaction of any urgent deſire (which Mr. *Locke* allows * and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as eaſily quite ſtop, or run counter to any natural Appetite; ſince no greater Power ſeems to be requiſite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determined by any deſire of abſent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raiſe an oppoſite deſire able to counterballance it, as our Author has ſhewn that we can; then we ſhall be equally able to prevent its following the ultimate determination of the Judgment, even without any reaſon for ſo doing; after any Determination of the Judgment, it will be ſtill as undetermined, and indifferent towards *Volition*, as Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes the operative Powers to be in regard to *Action*†, and conſequently Good, whether abſolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Cauſe, nor a neceſſary Means to the determination of the Will. This act of *Suſpenſion* therefore muſt either be ſolely founded in the ſelf-moving Power of the Mind, and of conſequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reaſons, *&c.* and an inſtance of the Mind's abſolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. *Locke*'s general Hypotheſis; or elſe itſelf muſt be determined by ſome Motive or external Cauſe; and then it will be difficult to make it free in any ſenſe. Let us obſerve how Mr. *Locke* endeavours to reconcile theſe two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general abſolute Inclination of the Mind to Happineſs, which obliges us to ſuſpend the Gratification of our Deſire in particular caſes, till we ſee whether it be not inconſiſtent with the general Good. "The ſtronger Ties, ſays he, Sect. 51. "we have to an unalterable purſuit of Happineſs in general, "which is our greateſt Good, and which, as ſuch, our Deſires "always follow, the more are we free from any neceſſary de- "termination of our Will to any particular Action, and from "a neceſſary compliance with our Deſire ſet upon any parti- "cular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly "examined whether it has a tendency to, or be inconſiſtent "with

* Book 2. C. 21. Sect. 47. and 50. † See Note 49.

X. I confeſs, they offer ſome Solutions here, but ſuch as are ſo ſubtle, ſo obſcure, and ſo much above the comprehenſion of the Vulgar, that moſt Perſons have taken a diſtaſte to them, given up the cauſe of Liberty as deſperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one will undertake either to give a more clear and full Explication of the common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thoſe Difficulties which occur in it, he will find me ſo far from being his Adverſary, that he may expect my aſſent, encouragement and aſſiſtance. This indeed were very much to be wiſhed, but in the mean time I ſhall endeavour to ſee whether theſe things cannot be explained more clearly in another manner.

There are Anſwers offered to theſe difficulties, but they are far from being clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

NOTES.

" with our real Happineſs." And again, Sect. 52. " Whatever Neceſſity determines to the purſuit of real Bliſs, the " ſame neceſſity, with the ſame force, eſtabliſhes Suſpenſe, " Deliberation and Scrutiny of each ſucceſſive deſire, whether " the ſatisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happi- " neſs and miſlead us from it." If by the Word *Neceſſity* he means abſolute *phyſical Neceſſity* (which it muſt be, if it be any thing to the preſent purpoſe) he has diſcovered a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happineſs in general, be abſolute and irreſiſtible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and conſequently prove as bad a ground for *Suſpenſion* as for Liberty. But in truth this Suſpenſion is neither founded in any Neceſſity of purſuing Happineſs in general, nor is itſelf an original Power of the Mind diſtinct from that of Volition, but only one particular exerciſe or Modification of it. " 'Tis willing (as the Author of the " *Philoſophical Enquiry* rightly obſerves) to defer willing a- " bout the matter propoſed," and is no way different from the common caſes of willing and chooſing, except that it is the moſt evident demonſtration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and ſo obvious that Mr. *Locke* could not get over it, and therefore ſtiles it the ſource of all our Liberty, and that wherein conſiſts *Free-will.* Sect. 47. Though he ſoon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his Syſtem. That this Power of *Suſpenſion* is not ſufficient to denominate a Man *free*, See *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 44.

SUB-

SUBSECT. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election propoſed.

The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End, by Exerciſe, which is the greateſt perfection of them, and their beſt Eſtate.

IN order to make my meaning better underſtood, we muſt obſerve, in the *firſt* place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are deſigned for Action; and when theſe exert their proper Actions about Objects, they produce a grateful and agreeable Senſation in us. The exerciſe of them therefore pleaſes us; and from hence probably all our Pleaſure and Delight ariſes; conſequently our Happineſs, if we have any, ſeems to conſiſt in the proper exerciſe of thoſe Powers and Faculties which Nature has beſtowed upon us: for they appear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the uſe and exerciſe of them thoſe things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reſt, or enjoy themſelves any otherwiſe than as thoſe things are produced by or in them, for the production or reception of which they are deſigned by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the proſecution of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exerciſe, which muſt be eſteemed the greateſt Perfection, and moſt happy State of any Being.* For that is a State of Happineſs, if any ſuch can be conceived, wherein every thing is done which pleaſes, and every thing removed which is diſpleaſing: neither doth it ſeem poſſible to imagine a more happy one.

There is a certain agreement fixt by Nature between ſome Appetites, &c. and their Objects, whereby they act upon the preſence of them, and ceaſe from Action upon their Removal.

II. Secondly, It is to be obſerved, that among our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, ſome are determined to their Operations by objects peculiar to themſelves. For upon the preſence of their Objects they neceſſarily exert their Actions, if rightly diſpoſed, and ceaſe from Operation upon their abſence, and

* See *Scott*'s Chriſtian Life. Vol. 1. pag. 8, 9.

and have no tendency towards any other Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but Light, Colours, *&c.* and upon the Removal of these, its Action * ceases. The Understanding itself distinguishes those Objects which are communicated to it by the Senses, or perceived by reflection, from one another; disposes and repositis them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: and so of the rest. There is therefore a certain natural Fitness, a fixt conformity between these Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions upon the presence of the Objects, and delight themselves in Exercise: but are uneasy at the presence of those things which hinder it. If then there be any natural force in any Object to promote or hinder the exercise of any Power or Faculty, that Object in regard to it is to be esteemed Good or Evil.

Liberty would be of disservice to an Agent endowed with such Appetites, *&c.* as these only.

III. Those Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are sufficiently distinguished from each other by the Power or Faculty itself; those that are absent or future, are judged of by the Understanding, and what the Mind determines to be the best in them, that we are obliged to pursue. He that does otherwise disobeys the Law of Reason. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus determined to their proper Objects, it would seem an Imperfection for Man to be free, and he would have been much more happy without such a Liberty: for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greatest Evils, *viz.* a Power of doing amiss.

We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other agreeableness but what may arise from the Determination of the Power itself.

IV. It seems not impossible to conceive a Power of a quite different Nature from these which may be

NOTES.

* It may be observed here once for all, that our Author seldom uses this Word *Action* in a strict Philosophical Sense (according to which these should rather be called *Passions*) but generally takes the vulgar expressions, when they will serve to explain his meaning.

be more indifferent in reſpect of the Objects about which it exerciſes itſelf.* To which no one thing is naturally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fitteſt to which it ſhall happen † to be applyed: Between which and the Object, to which it is determined, by it ſelf or by ſomething elſe, there ſhould naturally be no more ſuitableneſs or connection than between it and any other thing; but all the *Suitableneſs* there is, ſhould ariſe from the *Application* or *Determination* itſelf. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right ariſes from that very Occupation; ſo there may poſſibly be a Power to which no Object is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become ſuitable to it, if it happen to be applyed; ſince its Suitableneſs proceeds from the Application, as we ſaid before. Now it does not ſeem any more abſurd for a Power to create an Agreeableneſs between itſelf and an Object, by applying itſelf to that Object, or that to itſelf, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, ſome things are forbidden becauſe they are inconvenient, others are inconvenient and Evil becauſe forbidden; ſo it may be in Powers, Faculties and Appetites; *viz.* ſome may be determined by the natural Suitableneſs of the Objects, and in others, the Suitableneſs to the Objects may ariſe from the Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally inclined to exerciſe, and one Exerciſe be more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitneſs of one more than another, but from the Application of the Faculty itſelf; ſince another would often be no leſs agreeable, if it had happened to be determined to that. Nothing therefore ſeems to hinder but that there

NOTES.

* See Sect. 5. Subſect. 2. par. 12. and 15.

† *That this Word is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by* Chance, *ſee* par. 18.

there may be ſuch a Power or Faculty, at leaſt with reſpect to very many Objects. (49.)

V.

NOTES.

(49.) Our Author's Notion of *Indifference* has been groſly miſunderſtood by all his Adverſaries, who have accordingly raiſed terrible Outcries againſt it, as deſtroying the eſſential and immutable diſtinction between Good and Evil; ſubverting Appetites, making Reaſon and Judgment uſeleſs, and confounding every thing. We ſhall juſt obſerve here, that it cannot be applyed to the *whole Man*, nor was deſigned by our Author to include all manner of external Objects, Actions, and Relations of things, as they ſeem to have underſtood it. For every Man in his Wits muſt be ſufficiently ſenſible that all things don't affect him in the ſame manner, even before he has willed any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Reſt, when I am hungry, thirſty, or weary. Some natural Objects are agreeable, and produce pleaſure in me, and others the contrary, whether I will or no; and the ſame may be ſaid of the *moral Senſe*. Nay our Author every where allows their full force to what he calls the *Appetites*; and aſſerts that whatever contradicts them muſt be attended with Uneaſineſs. 'Tis not an abſolute indifference therefore of the *Man* or Mind in general, nor of the *Senſes*, Perception or Judgment, which he contends for; but it relates wholly to that *particular Power* of the Mind which we call *Willing*, and which will appear to be in its own Nature, or *phyſically*, *indifferent* to acting or not acting in any particular manner, notwithſtanding all theſe different Affections or Paſſions of the Mind raiſed by the different Objects. Let a thing ſeem never ſo pleaſant and agreeable, never ſo reaſonable, fit and eligible to us, yet there is ſtill a natural poſſibility for us to will the contrary; and conſequently the bare *Power of willing* is in itſelf indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now ſuch an Indifference as this Mr. *Locke* allows to be in the *operative* Powers of Man, though he confines it, I think, improperly to them alone* "I have "the ability, ſays he, to move my hand, or to let it reſt; "that operative Power is indifferent to move or not to move "my hand: I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My Will "determines that operative Power to reſt; yet I am free, be"cauſe the Indifferency of that my operative Power to act or "not to act ſtill remains; the Power of moving my hand is "not at all impaired by the Determination of my Will, which "at preſent orders reſt; the Indifferency of that Power to "act is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if the Will puts "it to the trial, by ordering the contrary." The ſame, I think,

* B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71.

Such a Power as this cannot be determined by *Goodneſs* in Objects, ſince the Goodneſs of them depends upon its determination.

V. Fourthly, if then we ſuppoſe ſuch a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endowed with it cannot be determined in its Operations by any pre-exiſtent Goodneſs in the Object; for ſince the agreeableneſs between it and the Objects, at leaſt in moſt of them, is ſuppoſed to ariſe from the Determination, the agreeableneſs cannot poſſibly be the Cauſe of that Determination on which itſelf depends.

NOTES.

think, may be applyed to the *Will* itſelf in regard to Motives, *&c.* with much more Juſtice than to theſe operative Powers. Nay theſe can ſcarce be called indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow inſtantly (as we obſerved in Note 42) in moſt Caſes when they are in their right State. What I will or reſolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the ſame Will or Reſolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never conſtitute Morality (as was obſerved in the ſame place) ſince their Operations are no farther moral then as they are conſequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There muſt then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable ſenſe. Concerning this *antecedent indifference*, Mr. *Locke* enquires whether it be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the *Underſtanding*, as well as to the Decree of the *Will?* ‖ We anſwer 'tis antecedent to and independent on any particular Thought or Judgment, and continues equally independent after them; it remains after the Determination of the Judgment in the very ſame ſtate as he ſuppoſes that of the operative Powers to be after the Determination of the Will. Its Liberty is placed, as he ſays, in a *State of Darkneſs*; and ſo is that of the operative Powers; which he allows: 'Tis indeed in itſelf (as it is commonly ſtiled) a *blind Principle*, and ſo is every Principle in Nature but the *Underſtanding*: and though the Exerciſe of the *Will*, as well as of the *operative Powers*, be generally accompanied with *Intelligence*, without which there can be no *Moral* Liberty: yet theſe are, I think, very different Faculties and often exerciſed ſeparately, and therefore ſhould always be conſidered diſtinctly; *Freedom* is one thing, *Intelligence* another; a *Moral* or accountable Being conſiſts of both.

For a more complete View of this Queſtion, ſee *Epiſcop. Inſtit Theol.* L. 4. C. 6. and *Tract. de Libero Arbitrio.* There's alſo a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in *Limborch, Theol. Chriſt.* L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 20, *&c.*

‖ Ibid.

pends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodneſs in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at leaſt in thoſe Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embraced it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodneſs and the Cauſe of it, this Power cannot be determined by that Goodneſs in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exiſt, cannot be determined by any *Uneaſineſs* ariſing from the things about which it is converſant. For it is ſuppoſed to be indifferent, not only in reſpect of external Objects, but alſo of its own Operations, and will pleaſe itſelf, whether it accepts the thing or rejects it; whether it exerts this Act or another. Theſe Objects then will neither pleaſe nor diſpleaſe till this indifference be removed; but it is ſuppoſed to be removed by the Application or Determination of the Power itſelf; therefore Anxiety does not produce but pre-ſuppoſe its Determination. Let us ſuppoſe this Power to be already determined (it matters not how) to embrace a certain Object, or to exert the proper Actions relating to it, *Deſire* manifeſtly follows this Determination, and Deſire is followed by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object purſuant to the Application of the Power. But if any thing ſhould hinder or ſtop this endeavour, and prevent the Power from exerting thoſe Operations which it undertook to diſcharge in relation to the Object, then indeed Uneaſineſs would ariſe from the hindrance of the Power. *Anxiety* would therefore be the *Effect* of the Determination of this Power, but by no means the *Cauſe* of it.* Nor by any *Uneaſineſs*.

VII.

NOTES.

* Obſerve what follows from Mr. *Locke*, "There is a "Caſe wherein a Man is at Liberty in reſpect of *willing*, and "that is the chuſing a remote Good as an End to be purſued.

Not by the *Underſtanding.*

VII. Sixthly, Suppoſing ſuch an Agent as this to be endowed alſo with Underſtanding, he might uſe it to propoſe Matters fit to be done, but not to determine whether he ſhould do them or not. For the Underſtanding or Reaſon, if it ſpeak Truth, repreſents what is in the Objects, and does not feign what it finds not in them: Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are ſuppoſed to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worſe than another; the Underſtanding, if it performs its Duty right, will repreſent this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than another; For the Underſtanding directs a thing to be done no otherwiſe than by determining that it is better; as therefore the Goodneſs of things, with reſpect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, and they are for the moſt part good if it embrace, and evil if it reject them, 'tis manifeſt that the Judgment of the Underſtanding concerning things depends upon the ſame, and that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodneſs or Badneſs of them, till it perceives whether the Power has embraced or rejected them. The Underſtanding therefore muſt wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can paſs a Judgment, inſtead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Underſtanding before it can be determined.

Yet ſuch an Agent has need of Underſtanding in order to diſtinguiſh poſſible things from impoſſible.

VIII. Seventhly, But though this Power cannot be determined in its Operations by any Judgment of the Underſtanding, yet the Underſtanding is neceſſary, in order to propoſe Matters of Action, and to

NOTES.

" Here a Man may *ſuſpend* the act of his Choice from being " determined for or againſt the thing propoſed, 'till he has ex- " amined whether it be really of a Nature in itſelf, and Con- " ſequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once " *choſen* it, and *thereby* it is become a part of his Happineſs, it " raiſes *Deſire*, and this proportionably gives him *Uneaſineſs*, " which determines his Will, and ſets him at work in purſuit " of his Choice on all occaſions that offer. B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 56.

to diſtinguiſh poſſible ones from thoſe that are impoſſible. For though the Goodneſs of things with reſpect to the Agent, proceeds from the Determination, yet the Poſſibility or Impoſſibility is in the things themſelves, and there is need of the Underſtanding to diſtinguiſh between Objects, leſt this agent falling upon Abſurdities, procure to itſelf Uneaſineſs. Not that an Object is therefore Good becauſe 'tis poſſible; for if it be rejected it will be Evil; nor will it be immediately diſagreeable becauſe impoſſible, for attempting an Impoſſibility may be pleaſing to us, as we may prefer the exerciſe of this Power, (which is the thing that pleaſes us, as we ſaid before) but he that makes this Attempt, muſt neceſſarily be unhappy in the Event; for ſince the thing which the Power undertakes is impoſſible to be done, Uneaſineſs muſt neceſſarily follow the hindrance of its Exerciſe, and the final Diſappointment of its End.

IX. This then muſt be aſſigned as the *firſt Limitation* of ſuch a Power, *viz.* that it confine itſelf to Poſſibilities, and there needs no other, if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of its End.

If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation.

X. Eightly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need alſo to conſult its Abilities, and not determine itſelf to any thing which may exceed them, otherwiſe it will be as much diſappointed in its Endeavour as if it had attempted abſolute Impoſſibilities. And this is the *ſecond Limitation* of this Power. It is impoſſible, you'll ſay, for an Appetite to purſue ſuch things as the Underſtanding evidently declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I anſwer, the Senſes and natural Appetites are gratified with their Objects, and pleaſe themſelves, though Reaſon remonſtrate againſt them, and condemn that pleaſure as pernicious. How much more eaſily then may this *factitious Appetite*, which ariſes in the Agent from Application only, be con-

But an Agent of finite Power muſt alſo conſult his Abilities.

ceived to delight in its good, though the Underſtanding oppoſe it, and condemn that Delight as fooliſh and of ſhort Duration. Why Nature granted ſuch a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the Good of the whole, will be ſhewn afterwards.

Such an Agent cannot be determined by his other Appetites.

XI. Hitherto we have either conſidered this Power alone in the Agent, or as joined with the Underſtanding. But the Agent endowed with it, may alſo have other Powers and Appetites which are determined to their Objects by a natural Congruity; yet neither can it be determined in its Operations by them. We muſt diſtinguiſh between the *Operations* of theſe Appetites, and the *Pleaſure* which ariſes from the Exerciſe of them. Theſe, when rightly diſpoſed, muſt neceſſarily exert their Operations upon the preſence of their Objects; but it is not at all neceſſary that they ſhould delight and pleaſe themſelves in theſe Operations. For inſtance, a bitter and nauſeous ſavour is diſagreeable to the Taſte: but though this be felt, yet urgent Hunger makes it pleaſant, the craving of the Appetite overcoming the Diſagreeableneſs of the Taſt. This Pleaſure indeed is not pure, but mixed and diluted proportionably to the Exceſs of the prevailing Appetite. For, ſuppoſe that there are three Degrees of Uneaſineſs from the Hunger, and two from the Bitterneſs; the Agent, to avoid three, muſt neceſſarily bear two; which being deducted, there remains only one Degree of ſolid Pleaſure; whereas if he had met with ſuitable and ſweet Food, there would have been three.

This Power is ſuperior to all the Appetites, and ſubdued by none.

XII. Since therefore the Pleaſure which ariſes from the Satisfaction of theſe natural Appetites may be overcome by a ſtronger Appetite, there's no Reaſon to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Objects may overcome all the other Powers and Appetites. For all theſe are limited by their Objects, and therefore have certain Bounds, but this

Power

Power has no Bounds,* nor is there any thing wherein it cannot pleaſe itſelf, if it does but happen to be determined to it. Now ſince the natural Appetites themſelves may be contrary to each other (as we have ſhewn) and one of them be overcome by the Exceſs of another, how much more eaſily may this power be conceived to go againſt theſe Appetites, and ſince it is of a very different and ſuperior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer all others, and be itſelf ſubdued by none.

XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that the Agent might have wherein to pleaſe itſelf, when thoſe things which are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very often happens. As the natural Powers, and Appetites receive Pleaſure and Pain from Objects, they muſt neceſſarily be deprived of Pleaſure and undergo Pain, according to the Laws of Motion, and the order of external things. Since then they are often fruſtrated, they muſt render the Agents poſſeſſed of them liable to Miſery, as well as make them capable of Happineſs; But the Agent can have this always to delight itſelf in; and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the other Appetites, and pleaſe itſelf in reſtraining them, or acting contrary to them. For ſince every Faculty is ſatisfied in its exerciſe, the Strength of this cannot be more ſignally diſplayed in any thing, than in running counter ſometimes to all the Appetites. For this muſt either be ſometimes done, or the Agent muſt be deſtitute of all manner of Good, and remain entirely miſerable; ſince by the Laws of Nature, things contrary to the Appetites† muſt be endured.

It ſeems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have ſomething to delight in when the natural Appetites muſt neceſſarily be fruſtrated.

This Power, by its acceſſion, encreaſes the pleaſure of the other Appetites; by oppoſition removes, or at leaſt alleviates the pain.

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how deſirable ſuch a Power as this would be: for if it happen to be determined to ſuch things as are a-

* i. e. *in its* Objects, *ſee the next* Note.

† viz. *In painful Remedies, diſagreeable Potions,* &c. *ſee* Sect. 5. par. 9.

greeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoyment; but if it ſhould be determined to undergo thoſe things which are repugnant to the Appetites, and which muſt neceſſarily be born ſometimes, it might diminiſh, nay quite remove the Uneaſineſs, or convert it into Pleaſure. (50.)

XV.

NOTES.

(50.) This is not much more than what Mr. *Locke* aſſerts * in anſwer to the Enquiry, "Whether it be in a Man's power "to change the Pleaſantneſs and Uneaſineſs that accompanies "any ſort of Action? And to that, ſays he, 'tis plain in many "caſes he can. Men may and ſhould correct their Palates, and "give a reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. "The reliſh of the Mind is as various as that of the Body; and "like that too may be altered; and 'tis a miſtake to think that "Men cannot change the diſpleaſingneſs or indifference that is "in Actions into Pleaſure and Deſire, if they will but do "what is in their Power.' But it is objected by *Leibnitz*, againſt our Author's Notion, that if it could create Pleaſure by an arbitrary Determination and bare Election, it might for the ſame reaſon produce Happineſs *in infinitum* † and then how could we be ever miſerable except we choſe to be ſo? Which Argument ſeems to be founded on a miſtake of our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to aſſert that all the good and agreeableneſs in every thing or action, proceeds abſolutely and entirely from our Will: and alſo, that this will is as unlimited in its *Exerciſe* as in its *Objects*, and conſequently that we might have any way, and at any time, as much Happineſs as we pleaſed, purely by willing it; all which Propoſitions are as falſe as they are foreign to the Intention of our Author, who inſiſts only upon this, that the act of willing, like the exerciſe of all our other Faculties, is in itſelf delightful to a certain Degree: This, when applyed to an Object which is itſelf agreeable, muſt add to the Pleaſure ariſing from it; when determined to a contrary one (both which kinds of Objects he always ſuppoſes) muſt deduct from the Pain; when to an indifferent one it muſt make that poſitively agreeable, by conferring ſo much abſolute and ſolid Happineſs.

But ſtill this exerciſe of the Will, and of conſequence the Pleaſure attending it, muſt in all finite Creatures be eſſentially and neceſſarily *finite*, as well as the exerciſe of all their other Powers: and though it has no bounds as to the number and kind of its Objects, yet it muſt be limited as to its own Nature and the degree of its Exerciſe. This appears to me eaſily conceivable,

* B 2. C. 21. Sect. 69. † *Eſſais de Theodice*, p. 466, 467.

XV. It muſt be confeſſed that ſome kind of ſtruggle will be hereby excited in this Agent; but a ſtruggle attended with ſome Pleaſure, though it be qualified and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under abſolute Miſery. Nay, the conſciouſneſs of a Power to pleaſe itſelf againſt the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may cauſe a greater Pleaſure than could ariſe from the fruition of thoſe things which would, if preſent, gratify theſe Appetites. Yet this Agent is obliged to have ſome regard to the Appetites, and not to diſturb them unneceſſarily, nor reſtrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. He that does this will bring upon himſelf uneaſineſs, and a needleſs conteſt. Though therefore it be not at all proper that ſuch a Power ſhould be abſolutely determined by the natural Appetites, yet it is fit that they ſhould perſuade it, and that ſome regard be had to them in its Determinations. And this may be reckoned its *third Limitation*. The reſt of the Appetites are not to be baulked unneceſſarily.

XVI. Ninthly, An Agent poſſeſſed of ſuch a Principle as this would be *Self-active*, and capable of being determined in its Operations by itſelf alone. Now there is ſometimes an abſolute neceſſity for it to be determined; for when any thing is propoſed to be done immediately, it muſt neceſſarily either act or ſuſpend its Action: one of them muſt neceſſarily be; but when either of them is done, the Power Such an Agent as this is Self-active.

NOTES.

able, and Matter of experience. We find ourſelves generally able to turn our Thoughts to any Object indifferently, but does any Perſon from hence imagine that he can fix his thoughts upon any particular Object with an unlimited Intenſeneſs, or think *infinitely?* granting the Word Intenſeneſs to be applicable here in any tolerable ſenſe: which will perhaps upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it is evidently no good conſequence to infer, that becauſe I can will or chooſe a thing abſolutely and *freely*, therefore I can will it in *infinitum*. May I not as juſtly be ſaid to perceive or underſtand a thing *in infinitum*, becauſe I perceive or underſtand it at all? See Note A.

Power is determined by that very act: and no leſs force is requiſite to ſuſpend than to exert the act, as common Senſe and Experience may inform any one.* A determination then about a thing once propoſed to be done, is unavoidable; and ſince it can neither be determined by any Good or Evil pre-exiſtent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objects; it muſt of neceſſity either continue undetermined, or elſe determine itſelf. But though it be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires that it ſhould be determined on every particular occaſion; and ſince there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itſelf. We ſhall call this Determination an *Election*; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will pleaſe itſelf in electing one before another.

Is determined by himſelf, and things are not choſen becauſe they pleaſe him, but pleaſe him becauſe they are choſen.

XVII. Nor is it a proper Queſtion to aſk, What determines it to an Election? For if any ſuch thing were ſuppoſed, it would not be indifferent; *i. e.* 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent that there ſhould be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a *paſſive Power*,* which has a natural and neceſſary connection with the Object, the preſence of which determines it to act, we may reaſonably enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any particular action; but it is not ſo in an *active* Power, the very Nature of which is to *make* an Object agreeable to itſelf, *i. e.* good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodneſs of the Object does not precede the act of Election, ſo as to excite it, but Election makes the Goodneſs in the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable becauſe choſen, and not choſen becauſe agreeable: We cannot therefore juſtly enquire after any other cauſe of Election than the Power itſelf.

Yet he is not determined by Chance.

XVIII. If theſe things be true, you'll ſay, this Agent will be determined by *Chance*, and not by *Reaſon*;

* See Note 43. † See *Locke*, Chap. 21. Sect. 2.

Reaſon; but in reality here's no room for Chance, if by Chance be underſtood that which happens beſide the Intention of the Agent: for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impoſſible that a Man ſhould intend beſide his Intention. As for *Reaſon*, he that prefers a leſs Good to a greater, muſt be judged to act unreaſonably; but he that makes that a greater Good by chooſing it, which before his choice had either no Good at all in it, or a leſs, he certainly chooſes with reaſon. You may urge that *Contingency* at leaſt is to be admitted; if by this you mean that this Agent does ſome things which are not at all neceſſary, I readily own ſuch a Contingency, for that is the very Liberty I would eſtabliſh.

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that ſuch an Agent as this, if it be allowed that there is ſuch an one, is the true *Cauſe* of his Actions, and that whatever he does may juſtly be imputed to him. A Power which is not Maſter of itſelf, but determined to act by ſome other, is in reality not the *efficient* Cauſe of its actions, but only the *inſtrumental* or *occaſional*, (if we may uſe the term of ſome Philoſophers) for it may be ſaid that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it does the thing itſelf. No Perſon therefore imputes to himſelf, or eſteems himſelf the Cauſe of thoſe actions to which he believes himſelf to be neceſſarily determined: If then any inconvenience ariſe from them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime; and whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be angry with himſelf, unleſs he be conſcious that it was in his power not to have done them: but he cannot be conſcious of this (except through ignorance and error) who is determined by another. For no others ought to be looked upon as true Cauſes, but ſuch as are *free*. Thoſe that operate neceſſarily, are to be conceived as *paſſive*, and we muſt recur to ſome other which impoſes

Is the true Cauſe of his Actions.

impoſes that neceſſity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we muſt ſtop. Since then the Agent endowed with this power, is determined by himſelf and no other, and is free in his Operations, we muſt acquieſce in him as a real Cauſe, and he ought to be eſteemed the Author of whatever he does, well or ill. (O.)

XX.

NOTES.

(O.) Againſt this 'tis objected that the quite contrary follows. For to hit on a good action by a Motion abſolutely indifferent and not in conſequence of ſome antecedent Good or Evil Qualities in the Agent is to fall on it blindly, by mere *Chance*, and ſo Fortune not the Agent is to be thanked or blamed. He rather is to be blamed or praiſed that owes his good or ill Actions to his antecedent good or ill Qualities.

To which I anſwer, that this is to deny and diſpute againſt the Concluſion, without anſwering one word of the Premiſſes, which are ſo plain and evident that I can't reckon the Argument other than a Demonſtration; whereas that which is oppoſed to it is againſt the common Senſe of Mankind.

For thoſe good or bad Qualities that oblige him to do a good or bad Action are either from himſelf, that is his choice; or proceed from outward Agents that produced them in him: if from his own Choice, then it agrees with the Author's Opinion; but if from ſome outward Agent, then it is plain the good or Evil is to be imputed to that Agent only. *Quod eſt cauſa Cauſæ eſt etiam Cauſa Cauſati.*

I can't better explain this than by an Example. Suppoſe I am in diſtreſs, and there is one Man that by the Commands of his Prince, by his own Intereſt, and Politic Conſiderations is obliged to relieve me, and is in ſuch Circumſtances that he cannot poſſibly avoid doing it; the other is under no manner of Obligation, may do it or let it alone, yet ſeeing my Misfortune he chooſes and pleaſes himſelf in doing me a good Office. Let any one of Senſe judge to which of theſe I owe the greateſt Obligation; or if the World wou'd with Patience hear me excuſe my Ingratitude by ſaying, Sir, there was no Obligation on you to help me, you might have done it, or let it alone, therefore it was mere *Chance*, that determined you. Would not the Reply be naturally, the leſs Obligation was on him that relieved you, the greater your Obligation is to him for his kindneſs? If it be ſaid that the Relief proceeded from Compaſſion and good Nature, which were antecedently in the Benefactor, and therefore it was valuable; Suppoſe the Perſon that did this Office had always before been remarkable for cruelty and ill nature, ought the obliged Perſon to value the

Kind-

XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeſt that ſuch an Agent as this is capable of *Happineſs*. For that Perſon muſt be happy who can always pleaſe himſelf, and this Agent can evidently do ſo. For ſince things are ſuppoſed to pleaſe him, not by any neceſſity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to chooſe this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endowed with this Power may always chooſe ſuch things as it can enjoy, and refuſe, *i. e.* not deſire, or not chooſe thoſe things which are impoſſible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that agreeableneſs by which things pleaſe the Appetites, be eſtabliſhed by Nature, or effected by the Agent himſelf. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature and be inherent in Objects, ſo as to render them agreeable or diſagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happineſs of this Agent will alſo depend upon them; and unleſs the whole Series of things be ſo ordered, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he muſt fall ſhort of Happineſs. For his Appetites will be diſappointed, which is the very thing we call Unhappineſs. But if Objects derive their agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may alway enjoy the thing choſen, (unleſs he chooſe Impoſſibilities, *&c.*) and never have his Appetite fruſtrated, *i. e.* be always happy. Not that *all* things are indifferent with reſpect to this Power, for it admits of ſome Limitations, as was obſerved, Is capable of Happineſs.

NOTES.

Kindneſs leſs for that? Quite contrary; it was rather a greater Favour to him that it was ſingular. But ſuppoſe it proceeded from a general Compaſſion and good Nature, that had nothing of *Choice* in them, ſo that the Perſon cou'd not help doing it; ought I not to thank him for it, and give him the Praiſes due to the Action? I ought to praiſe and commend him for his uſeful Qualities, as I do the Sun: but if I were ſure that there was nothing of choice in them, I had no more reaſon to thank him than the Tyrant whoſe impoſthume was cured by the Wound deſigned to kill him, had reaſon to thank the Aſſailant.

obſerved, by chooſing beyond which it muſt neceſſarily fail of Happineſs.

An imperfect underſtanding is ſufficient for his happineſs, if he do but diſtinguiſh between poſſibilities, and impoſſibilities, things agreeable and diſagreeable to the ſenſes, and conſult his Abilities.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obſerved that Agents, whoſe Felicity depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, ſtand in need of a perfect and almoſt infinite Knowledge to comprehend diſtinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and conſequences of things; if they come ſhort of it, it is impoſſible but that they muſt often fall into pernicious Errors, and be diſappointed of their Deſires, that is, be often miſerable: Hence anxiety and diſquiet of Mind muſt neceſſarily ariſe, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and uncertainty, leſt what they chooſe ſhould not prove the beſt. Theſe Agents then were either to be created without a proſpect of Futurity, or to be endowed with a perfect Underſtanding; if neither were done, they muſt of neceſſity be very miſerable; for we can ſcarce conceive a greater Miſery than to be held in ſuſpenſe about Happineſs, and compelled to chooſe among Objects not ſufficiently known, in which nevertheleſs a Miſtake would be attended with unavoidable Miſery. There's none but is ſufficiently apprehenſive how anxious, how ſolicitous, how miſerable it muſt be to hang in ſuch a doubt as this; but if the agreeableneſs of things be ſuppoſed to depend upon *Election*, a very imperfect underſtanding will ſerve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but diſtinguiſh poſſible things from impoſſible, thoſe things which are pleaſant to the Senſes from them that are unpleaſant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties, from what is diſagreeable, and conſult his own Abilities, *viz.* how far his Power reaches; (all which are eaſily diſcovered) he will know enough to make him happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very beſt; for if the Election be but made within theſe bounds, that will become beſt which is choſen.

XXII. He that enjoys the Principle of pleaſing himſelf in his Choice cannot reaſonably complain of Nature, though he have but a very imperfect Underſtanding; for there will always be Objects enough ready to offer themſelves within theſe bounds, upon which he may exerciſe his choice, and pleaſe himſelf: that is, he may always enjoy Happineſs. Though Free-will then be of no uſe, as was ſaid before, to an Agent capable of being determined only by the convenience of external things, nay, though it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reaſon and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whoſe convenience does not depend upon the things, but the choice, it is of the greateſt Importance, and as we have ſeen, the ſure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how deſirable ſuch an active Principle as this would be.

Though Liberty would be a prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a ſure foundation of Happineſs to this, whoſe convenience depends not on Objects, but Election.

XXIII. All this ſeems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and eaſy to be underſtood, tho' ſome may look upon it as a little too ſubtle. It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypotheſis without any Foundation in fact, or there is really ſuch a Principle to be found in Nature. (51.)

Theſe things are clear enough, though they may appear to be a little too ſubtle.

NOTES.

(51.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of *Indifference*, above what has been ſaid in Note 49. and will be enlarged on in Note 58. we ſhall only obſerve here, that moſt of the objections brought by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, p. 69, *&c.* are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as applyed to the Mind, in reſpect of its Self-determining Powers of *willing* or *acting*, with another, which is falſly referred to the paſſive Powers of *Perception* and *Judgment*. With reſpect to the former Faculties all things are phyſically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another; with regard to the latter, moſt things are not indifferent, but neceſſarily produce Pleaſure or Pain, are agreeable or diſagreeable, whether we chooſe them or not: Our Author is to be underſtood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, though he often uſes general terms.

SUB-

SUBSECT. IV.

That there is an Agent who is pleas'd with Objects only because he chooses them.

God is such an Agent as this.

WE have seen in the former Subsection, that some things are adapted to the Appetites by the constitution of Nature itself, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodness or Agreeableness in the things, by conforming itself to them, or adapting them to it: hence things please this Agent, not because they are good in themselves, but become good because they are chosen. We have demonstrated before, how great a perfection, and of what use such a Power would be, and that there is such a Power in Nature appears from hence, *viz.* we must necessarily believe that *God* is invested with it.

Because nothing external is either good or bad to him before Election.

II. For in the first place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore absolutely *indifferent* to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then should determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing *without* him; therefore he determines himself, and creates to himself a kind of Appetite by choosing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has chosen, as if he were excited to this Endeavour by a natural and necessary Appetite. And he will esteem such things as tend to accomplish these Elections, Good; such as obstruct them, Evil.

Because his own Will is

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Cause of Good in the Creatures, and upon it they depend, as almost every one acknowledges. For created

Beings

Beings have all that they have from the Will of God; nor can they be any thing elſe than what he willed. 'Tis plain then that all theſe agree and are conformable to his Will, either efficient or permiſſive, and that their original Goodneſs is founded in this Conformity. And ſince all things proceed from one and the ſame Will, which cannot be contrary to itſelf, as it is reſtrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wiſdom, 'tis alſo certain that all things are conſiſtent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poſſible to the preſervation of itſelf and the whole Syſtem; which we muſt reckon their *ſecondary Goodneſs*. All the Goodneſs then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it; for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themſelves, ſince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will: and they were as far from being good with regard to God himſelf, till upon willing their Exiſtence he by that act of Election both conſtituted them Good in relation to him; and by an unity of Will made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Caſes, by his Goodneſs and Wiſdom; but it proceeds immediately from his Will that things pleaſe God, *i. e.* are *Good*. For many things are not agreeable to his Goodneſs and Wiſdom purely becauſe he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing it cannot be good.

the Cauſe of Goodneſs in the Creatures.

From whence it appears undeniably that his Will could not be determin'd to Election by any Goodneſs in the Creatures. For before that Election, which is declared to be the Cauſe of Goodneſs in created Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad; but when the Election is made, that only is Evil which obſtructs the execution of it, and that Good which promotes it. The Goodneſs of things is therefore to be determin'd by their

agreeableneſs to the Divine Will, and not that by the agreeableneſs or goodneſs of things. *(P.)*

IV.

NOTES.

(P) The Objections here are 1ſt, that if this be true, before God determin'd to create the World he cou'd ſee nothing better in Virtue than in Vice.

It were a ſufficient anſwer to this objection to ſay there is no harm in it, if it were true; for we muſt conſider that God from all Eternity determin'd to create the World, and therefore there neither was any thing, nor can any thing be conceived before that Determination; and therefore he might always ſee ſomething better in Virtue than Vice.

But 2dly, We ought to remember that Virtue and Vice ariſe from the Congruity of Things created by God; what is agreeable to a reaſonable Nature is Virtue, what is contrary Vice, and that there is no other Cauſe why one Nature is reaſonable and another without Reaſon, but the Will of God, and therefore Vice and Virtue muſt entirely depend on that Will. The plain Reaſon of Mens miſtake in the Caſe is this: They firſt ſuppoſe God has willed that a Nature ſhould be reaſonable and then forgetting that this depends entirely on his Will, they ſuppoſe this Nature to be of itſelf, and then argue that the Congruity or Incongruity of things to it, cannot depend on the Will of God, becauſe he can't make what is congruous to it incongruous; that is in reality his Will can't be contrary to itſelf.

But 2dly, 'Tis objected, that this Opinion leaves no difference between natural and poſitive Laws: for a poſitive Law is what depends on the Will of God; and according to this poſition Natural Laws depend on the ſame, and ſo the diſtinction between them is taken away.

But the anſwer to this is ſo eaſy, that 'tis a wonder any ſhou'd ſtumble at it. For it is plain that the Natures of things have their Being from the Will of God, and whilſt that Will continues none can deſtroy them, and the Congruity of things to theſe Natures reſults from the Natures themſelves, and is included in the ſame act of Will, that gave the things a Being: ſo that as long as it pleaſes God to continue their Beings ſuch as he has made them, the Congruity and Incongruity of things neceſſarily remain and reſult from that act of Will, which made them what they are; inſomuch that the Divine Will muſt be contrary to itſelf, if it went about to ſeparate them (*i. e.* the Nature from the Congruity) and therefore theſe are join'd together by a *Natural* Law. But when God by a new act of Will ſubſequent to the Being of any thing requires ſomething to be done by it which was not included in that firſt act of

Will

IV. Thirdly, We muſt not therefore attend to ſuch as declare that God chooſes things becauſe they

NOTES.

Will which gave it a Being, then that is ſaid to be enjoin'd by a *poſitive* Law; and as this was requir'd by an act ſubſequent to the Being, ſo it may be again removed by another without deſtroying the Being itſelf on which it is impoſed, or without any contrariety in God's Will. Hence Natural Laws are indiſpenſable, and can't be abrogated, whilſt the Natures to which they belong continue; whereas the poſitive Laws are diſpenſable and may be repealed.

But 3dly, 'Tis urg'd that this opinion leads us ſtraight to *Pyrrhoniſm*, and makes God not only free as to Virtue, ſo that he may make it either good or bad; but likewiſe to the truth or falſhood of Things, ſo that he may change their Nature and make three and three not to be ſix.

'Twere a ſufficient anſwer to this, to ſay the Caſe is not parallel; for the Goodneſs of Things is ſuppoſed to ariſe from the Will of God, which is free; but the truth of them from his Intellect, which is a neceſſary Faculty; and therefore tho' the one might be arbitrary, yet the other cannot. But the Truth is, Goodneſs is a conformity to the Will of God, and the reaſon that God can't will Evil is becauſe it is always contrary to ſome other act of his Will, and his Will can't be contrary to itſelf: and at the ſame rate, Truth is a conformity to his Intellect, and the Reaſon that a Propoſition is true, is becauſe it is ſo conformable; and ſince it is ſo, to ſuppoſe it not conformable is to ſuppoſe a contradiction. God in making or conceiving ſix, made and conceived three and three; and therefore to ſuppoſe that three and three do not make ſix, is to ſuppoſe a Contradiction. In effect it is to ſay God conceives it wrong; and to ſay that his Power can make it otherwiſe, is to ſay that his Power can falſify his Underſtanding.

Theſe things are ſo eaſy that there can be no doubt about them, if Men will not be perverſe.

But 4thly, Is not this to make the *Eſſence* of things *arbitrary*, and ſo fall in with ſome *Carteſians?* I anſwer the Author is not concern'd with the opinions of *Carteſians*, or any other, farther than he thinks them true. If by making the Eſſence of things arbitrary, be meant that God inſtead of making a Man, might have made a Stone, or planted the world with Muſhrooms inſtead of Herbs and Trees; he verily believes he might. If you mean that when God has made a Man and planted the World with variety of vegetables, that the man continuing what he is ſhou'd yet be a Stone, or the ſeveral Plants continuing in their variety ſhou'd all be Muſhrooms, this he thinks impoſſible. For a Man is a Creature that is not a Stone, and there-

they are Good, as if Goodneſs and the greater Good which he perceives in Objects, could determine

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therefore to ſay he is a Stone, or to make him one, is to make him no Man. Six is a Number conſiſting of three and three, and to ſay that a Number doth not conſiſt of three and three is to ſay that it is not ſix. Man is a Creature obliged to be juſt, *&c.* by the very Conſtitution of his Nature, and to ſay that he is not obliged to be ſo, is to ſay that he is not a Man. If it be aſk'd, can't God will him to do ſuch things as we reckon unjuſt *&c.*? I anſwer he may, but it muſt be by making him ſomething elſe, by cauſing him to ceaſe to be a Man; in ſhort by taking away his Nature from him, and then neither the notion of Manhood, nor Injuſtice will belong to him. The material acts that we call unjuſt might ſtill be perform'd by him, but the formal Reaſon of injuſtice would ceaſe, becauſe that ariſes from the acts, not as conſider'd in themſelves, but as they proceed from a Nature to which they are unſuitable.

Thus a Man that owes me no Money may give me 1000*l.* but can't be ſaid to pay me a Debt, becauſe the paying a Debt ſuppoſes that he owes it; and therefore tho' a Debtor, and one that owes nothing may each give me 1000*l.* yet they differ in this, that the one is Payment of a Debt, the other a free Gift. And ſo it is in all thoſe Actions that we call unjuſt, *&c.* when they are done by a Man, they are Crimes, becauſe againſt his Nature; but when another Creature that has not Reaſon does them, they can't be call'd unjuſt, *&c.* For Example, if a Man kills one that no ways injures him, and roſts and eats him, he commits Murder, and is guilty of an horrid Immorality; but if a Lyon unprovoked kill and eat a Man it is no Crime or Wickedneſs in him. But in as much as Men in their way of thinking repreſent to themſelves a Nature with all its Parts and Properties, and find that they can't remove any of them from that Nature, they conclude that the Natures of created Beings are what they are independently on the Will of God; forgetting in the mean time that it is only the Divine Will that gave or can give a Being to any Creature with certain Parts and Properties, and that inſtead of that Creature he cou'd make another without them all, that ſhould have quite different parts and attributes. 'Tis therefore merely from his Will that Creatures are what they are; but that Will having given them a Being, or being conceived to have given it, no part or property belonging to them can even in thought be taken from them: and this ſeems to me a full account of the certainty of thoſe things we call *Eternal Truths* †.

† See the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 50, 51.

mine his Will *. If the Matter had ſtood thus, it does not ſeem poſſible for the World to have been

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I have inſiſted the longer on this Point becauſe I ſee ſome indifferent Perſons as to the main Diſpute have thought the Author miſtaken in his aſſerting the Goodneſs of Things to depend immediately on the Will of God. Let me add farther, that the Author does not ſay that the Goodneſs of Things depends *ſolely* on God's Will; but that his Wiſdom and Power are likewiſe concern'd in them: we muſt not ſeparate God's Will from theſe attributes; on the contrary his Will is limited by the one and executed by the other.

But laſtly it is urged that according to theſe Principles Virtues are not good antecedently to God's Choice, and would not be good if God did not chooſe them, nay if he choſe Vices in their ſtead, they would be good both morally and phyſically. For Obedience to God is Good, and if God had commanded Vice it would have been Man's Duty to obey him; and perhaps Goodneſs might this way have been as effectually brought into the World, as by thoſe Virtues that ariſe from the exigence of our Nature, as God has now framed it. And from hence they infer that God is as free to make his *ſecond* Choice, as we conceive him to be in making his *firſt*.

But to all this I anſwer, 1ſt, I acknowledge that antecedently to God's Choice there can be nothing good or bad, becauſe there can't be any thing at all: the very moment we conceive a thing to be, we muſt conceive and ſuppoſe that God wills it to be what it is, and that he wills it ſhould by its Nature and Conſtitution have certain parts and properties, and that as long as the thing continues what it is, God's Will continues alſo to preſerve it ſo: to ſuppoſe therefore that he Wills at the ſame time it ſhou'd be without thoſe parts and properties, is plainly to ſuppoſe two contradictory Wills in God. Now an Obligation to Virtue is a Property neceſſarily reſulting from the Nature of Man, and therefore to ſuppoſe God to command him not to be virtuous when he has given him ſuch a Nature, is a Contradiction.

If any would in earneſt ſhew that the Goodneſs of Things doth not depend upon the Will of God, the true way of doing it is to give an inſtance of ſomething that is good, which doth

* This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. *Clarke* in his *Demonſtration of the Divine Attributes*, Prop. 12. and afterwards explain'd, as far as it ſeems capable of Explanation, in his *Evidences of Natural and Reveal'd Religion*, Prop. 1. The ſame is inſiſted on by *Leibnitz*, *Grotius*, *Ruſt*, Mr. *Chubb*, and many others. We have enquired a little into it already in R i. See more in Note 52.

been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to be the Author of it, confeſs alſo, that he is abſolutely and completely happy in himſelf, and does not ſtand in the leaſt need of other things. Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of uſe to God, who comprehends in himſelf all things which tend to perfect Happineſs. He muſt of neceſſity therefore be indifferent to all external Objects, nor can any reaſon be aſſign'd, with regard to the things themſelves, why he ſhould prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that things are made by God with Goodneſs, that is, with a certain congruity to his own Nature; but they are ſo far from being made on account of any agreeableneſs antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on the contrary, they are neceſſarily agreeable and pleaſant becauſe they are made by his free Choice. For ſince they are nothing in themſelves, they muſt of neceſſity have both their Exiſtence and their agreeableneſs from that Will, from which they ſolely proceed; and it is impoſſible but that they ſhould be conformable to the Will which effected them: For God, by willing, makes thoſe things pleaſing to him which were before indifferent.

If he had not a power of pleaſing himſelf in Election, he could never havemade any thing.

V. Unleſs therefore we attribute to him ſuch a Power as has been deſcribed (namely, an ability to pleaſe himſelf, by determining himſelf to action, with-

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doth not ſuppoſe an act of God's Will, or an Example of ſomething Evil, that is not manifeſtly contrary to ſome act of it.

In ſhort, the Congruity of things is their Goodneſs, and that Congruity ariſes from their Natures, and they have thoſe Natures from the Will of God, and thoſe Natures muſt have a Congruity becauſe they proceed from one Will, which cannot be contrary to itſelf, becauſe it is conducted by infinite Wiſdom. All this is ſufficiently laid down in the Book, and for any one to urge theſe Conſequences, and take no Notice of the Solutions given them muſt either proceed from not having read the Book, or a worſe Reaſon, which I am unwilling to believe.

without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, than that it is poſſible) it ſeems impoſſible that ever he ſhould begin to effect any thing without himſelf. For, as far as we can apprehend, there can be no reaſon aſſign'd why he ſhould create any thing at all *, why a World, why the preſent, why at that particular time when it was created, why not before or after, why in this and no other Form; he receiv'd no advantage or diſadvantage from theſe, no benefit or harm; in ſhort, nothing that could move him to chooſe one before another. Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining himſelf in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occaſion, and of pleaſing himſelf in that Determination according to his Choice; he would do nothing at all, he would be for ever indolent in regard to all external things, and the World could not poſſibly have been made, ſince no reaſon could be imagin'd, why a God abſolutely perfect in himſelf, and abſolutely happy, ſhould create any thing without himſelf. (Q.)

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(Q.) To this is it objected, that the Underſtanding of God contains Ideas of all Things poſſible, by means whereof all Things are eminently in him. That theſe Ideas repreſent all the Good and Evil, the Perfections, Imperfections, Order and Diſorder, the Agreements and Diſagreements that are poſſible, and his ſuperabundant Goodneſs makes him chooſe the moſt advantageous: Now theſe Ideas are independent of the Will of God, and therefore the Perfection or Imperfection that they repreſent in Things is antecedent to any act of his Will, at leaſt in *Ordine Naturæ*, tho' not of time: v. g. Is it not rather from the Nature of Numbers than the Will of God, that one Number is capable of receiving more Diviſions than another? And can any think that the Pains and Inconveniencies that attend ſenſitive Creatures, eſpecially the Happineſs or Miſery of intelligent Beings, are indifferent to God? And yet 'tis pretended that the Hypotheſis of God's Will being the cauſe of Goodneſs in the Creature muſt infer all theſe Abſurdities.

2dly,

* i. e. *No reaſon drawn from the Nature of the thing to be treated. See the two following Notes.*

If he were moved by the Goodneſs of things to create the World, he would be a neceſſary Agent.

VI. Fourthly, If we ſuppoſe that there was a reaſon, and that God was moved by it to produce external

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2dly, 'Tis urged that God acts for an end; that it is true, he has no need of the Creatures, but yet his Goodneſs induced him to create them, and therefore there was a reaſon prior to his Will: that it is neither by accident nor without a cauſe that he produced them, nor was it of neceſſity; but he was induced to it by Inclination, and his Inclination always leads him to the beſt. He was not indifferent therefore to create or not create the World, and yet Creation is a free act.

Laſtly, that God is infinitely wiſe, good and powerful, and as his Wiſdom ſhewed him what was beſt, ſo his Goodneſs obliged him to chooſe, and his Power enabled him to execute his Will: and in as much as infinite Worlds are poſſible, amongſt all theſe his Wiſdom diſcovered to him which was beſt, and his Goodneſs muſt oblige him to will it.

Theſe are the Objections that ſeem of greateſt force, and I have given them all the Advantage with which I find them propoſed. In anſwer to them I obſerve,

1ſt, as to what is ſaid of the Underſtanding of God, that Ideas of all things poſſible are in it, 'tis plain that all Arguments drawn from the *Manner* of God's Underſtanding things muſt be inconcluſive, becauſe we are utterly ignorant whether he Underſtands by *Ideas* or not. 2dly, becauſe our conceiving God to act this way is only taken from our way of acting, which we aſcribe to the Deity by *Analogy* and Proportion, as we do our Virtues and Paſſions, becauſe we have no better way of conceiving the Principles of his acting: which method nevertheleſs will run us into many Difficulties and Miſtakes. But of this I have ſpoke more fully in the Sermon annex'd.

2dly, the whole ſtrength of the Argument depends on this that God's Underſtanding repreſents to him among infinite ways in which things may be done, which is the beſt, and his Goodneſs obliges him to what is ſo. Now if this reaſoning hold, and amongſt infinite Schemes there is only one beſt, I do not ſee how it is poſſible to avoid making God a neceſſary Agent. For in a chain of Cauſes, where every Link is neceſſarily and infallibly connected, the whole muſt likewiſe be neceſſary. If then there be but one beſt in Nature, and if God neceſſarily and infallibly knows that beſt, and his goodneſs obliges him neceſſarily to chooſe it, I think the Caſe is plain. all his Actions are link'd and tyed together by a fatal and infallible neceſſity.

Againſt this therefore I lay down the following Poſition 1ſt, That there is no Creature or Syſtem of Creatures ſo good but that a better is poſſible, and conſequently there is none abſolutely

external things, 'tis manifeſt, that according to this all things will proceed from him neceſſarily. For

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ſolutely beſt. There is indeed a beſt of Beings, *viz.* God; but there can be no beſt of Creatures. To prove this, we need only conſider that there is an infinite diſtance between God and his Creatures, and how perfect ſoever we conceive any Creature or Syſtem of Creatures, yet the diſtance between that and God is not leſſen'd, but ſtill continues infinite; and therefore except we can imagine a laſt in infinity, there neither is nor can be any ſtop. Hence it follows that the Nature of God and his Omnipotence is ſuch that whatever Number of Creatures he has made he may ſtill make more, and howſoever good or perfect, he may ſtill make others better and more perfect. And ſince in this Caſe whatever he was pleaſed to create was ſtill infinitely ſhort in goodneſs and perfection of what he could create, 'tis plain his Underſtanding cou'd put no limits to his Power, nor direct him whether he ſhould create this Syſtem or another, whatever he choſe being infinitely ſhort of what he might have done; he cou'd never have pleaſed himſelf in this method or determin'd what World he ſhou'd have made, and conſequently there cou'd never have been any World at all. For if only the beſt determin'd him, and there be no beſt, as appears; then 'tis impoſſible he ſhou'd ever be determin'd.

This was in effect the Argument made uſe of in the Book * to prove that there was properly Free-will in God, that is a Power to pleaſe himſelf by chooſing one thing before another, where the things were perfectly indifferent to him. According to which Principle, if it be allow'd, tho' there be no beſt in Nature antecedent to the Will of God, yet by chooſing one thing before another he will make that the beſt to him, becauſe his own choice will pleaſe him beſt.

But here I muſt obſerve that moſt of this Diſpute, and the Embaraſment of Men's Underſtandings about it, ſeems to proceed from their taking theſe words, *good*, *better* and *beſt* for abſolute Qualities inherent in the nature of Things; whereas in Truth they are only Relations ariſing from certain Appetites. They have indeed a foundation, as all Relations have, in ſomething abſolute, and denote the thing in which they are founded; but yet they themſelves imply nothing more than a Relation of Congruity between ſome Appetite and its Objects, as appears from hence, that the ſame Object when applied to an Appetite to which it has a Congruity is good, and *vice verſa*, bad. The Earth and Air to terreſtrial Animals are good Elements, and neceſſary to their Preſervation; the Water is bad, which

* C. 3. Par. 3.

For he that is determin'd *ab extra* to do any thing, acts by neceſſity; he is paſſive, and muſt neceſſarily

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which yet affords the beſt receptacle for Fiſhes. The nature of the Earth, Air, and Water continue the ſame; and ſhall God be ſaid, to have made ſomething ill, when he made the Water pernicious to Men, the Air to fiſhes? And this alſo ſhews the natural and unavoidable neceſſity of Evil in the World; becauſe all Creatures being imperfect and limited, they muſt likewiſe have limited and different Appetites, and conſequently proper and peculiar Objects ſuited to their ſeveral Appetites: when therefore the Object proper to one Appetite happens to be apply'd to the contrary, It is impoſſible but it ſhould be incongruous to it, that is, Evil.' Nor is it poſſible in a World, where all Things are and muſt neceſſarily be in a continual flux, and every Animal changing its Situation, as it is in the material World, but ſuch miſapplication of Objects to Appetites ſhould happen; and therefore Evils are neceſſary in it, and either God muſt have made no ſuch World, or permitted ſome ſuch Evils in it. There is no way of conceiving how the preſent World cou'd have been better'd, but either by making more Creatures, or 2dly, more variety, or 3dly, giving the Creatures that are made more and ſtronger Appetites: for the good and ſatisfaction of a Creature is always proportionable to the ſtrength of the Appetite, with which it enjoys its Object. But it plainly appears that in any of theſe three ways as there may be more good, ſo there will be more Evil in the World: For Creatures being multiplied, the neceſſity of claſhing of Appetites, and the hazard of Miſapplication of Objects will be the greater; and the greater variety, ſtill the greater Danger and Difficulty to avoid diſagreeable Objects, and the harder always to find agreeable: as the greater the Crowd, the harder it is to meet one's Friends: And laſtly, the increaſing the Appetites cou'd no ways contribute to the ſure diſcovery of proper Objects; the Diſappointment would be the more intolerable, the more vigorous we conceive the Appetite; and the greater number of Appetites, the more liable would they be to continual Diſappointment. But to return, As there is no *beſt* in Nature, or in the Divine Intellect antecedent to the Divine Will, which can be ſuppoſed to determine that Will to create one World rather than another: ſo in the ſecond Place, there is no World ſo good, but infinite Worlds may be conceived poſſible in all reſpects as good as it. Good then being relative to Appetite, that is to be reckon'd the beſt Creature by us, which has the ſtrongeſt Appetites and the ſureſt means of ſatisfying them. And tho' the ſubſtance in Creatures is chiefly to be regarded as contributing

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rily both do and ſuffer, not what he himſelf, but what the determining Cauſe has effected in him: But

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to their Perfection, yet we have no way of meaſuring the Perfection of the ſeveral Subſtances but by their Qualities, that is by their Appetites, whereby they become ſenſible of Good and Evil, and by their Powers, whereby they are able to procure thoſe Objects whence they receive that Senſe of things which makes them happy.

'Tis plain therefore that whatever Syſtem we ſuppoſe in Nature, God might have made another equal to it, his infinite Wiſdom and Power being able to make other Creatures equal in every reſpect to any we know, and to give them equal or ſtronger Appetites, and as certain or more certain ways of ſatisfying them. We ſee in many Caſes that very different means will anſwer the ſame End. For Example, a certain Number of regular Pyramids will fill a Space, and yet irregular ones will do it as well, if what we take from the one be added to another; and the ſame thing may be done by Bodies of the moſt irregular and different Figures in the ſame manner: and therefore we may very well conceive that the anſwering of Appetites, which is all the natural Good that is in the World, may as well be obtained in another Syſtem as in this, if we do but ſuppoſe that where their Appetites are chang'd, the Objects are alſo ſuited to them, and an equal Agreeableneſs among the Parts of the whole introduced; and in an infinite Number of poſſible Worlds I do not ſee why this may not be done in infinite Ways by infinite Power and Wiſdom.

If then it be acknowledged that there might have been infinite other Worlds, or even but one, equal to this in all reſpects as to goodneſs, there cou'd be no Obligation in Nature on God to create one rather than the other, and therefore nothing cou'd make one more agreeable to him, that is, better, than another but his Choice. We muſt either own that there cou'd be no ſuch World at all, or that God muſt for ever deliberate which of the poſſible Worlds he ſhould chooſe; or elſe his Determination muſt proceed from his own arbitrary choice, and he muſt be allow'd the Liberty to pleaſe himſelf by chooſing.

In ſhort, it is eaſy to ſee that Men who propoſe ſuch Schemes, wou'd drive all Liberty out of the World, and pin down God in all his Actions to a fatal neceſſity. They allow no Cauſe but what is neceſſarily either Agent or Patient, which if it be to allow a God, 'tis ſuch an one as is a mere Machine, and can neither help himſelf nor his Adorers. 'Tis plain if this were ſo there could be no ſuch thing as moral Good or Evil in the World, the very Eſſence and Idea of it is loſt, and we ſhould

But this Goodneſs (which is ſuppoſed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine

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ſhould be no more obliged to a God that acts neceſſarily for the good we receive from him, than we are to the Sun for the benefit of its Light and Heat.

I know 'tis urged that where there is no external motive to determine the Will, there only *Chance* muſt do it, which is to admit an effect without a Cauſe. I anſwer, that it is the Nature of a free Agent to be the Cauſe of its own Actions, without being impell'd by any thing without itſelf. The chooſing a thing gives it the goodneſs to this Being, and it chooſes a thing, not becauſe it was antecedently an Object apt to pleaſe it, but becauſe it intends to *make* it ſo. When it is objected that ſuch an Agent chooſes without reaſon, I anſwer, itſelf is the reaſon to itſelf of its acting; that is, it acts to exerciſe its Faculties, the exerciſe of which cauſes the Senſe of Pleaſure; and where there are ſeveral ways of exerciſing its Faculties and all indifferent, to ſhow the Dominion over its own Actions, that is its Liberty, it takes the way it chooſes; nor is it reaſonable to expect it ſhould lie idle till it find a Reaſon why it ſhould act one way rather than another, when in truth there is no ſuch Reaſon, the Objects being to the Agent abſolutely indifferent; and therefore amongſt infinite poſſible Worlds, there was no Reaſon poſſible or imaginable to determine God to make this rather than any other, beſide his Will; he choſe it, and therefore it pleaſes him, and he may deſtroy it when he will, and that will likewiſe pleaſe him.

If it be aſk'd, is there then nothing Good or Evil in reſpect of God? I anſwer there is, *viz.* the acts of his own Will; they pleaſe him, and whilſt that Will continues, every thing which croſſes it, or tends that way, is Evil or diſpleaſing to him. Thus it is his Will that we ſhould have Freedom of choice in many things; and he has ſet certain limits to our Choice to prevent our hurting ourſelves or others by chooſing amiſs. Therefore it would be contrary to our Nature to take away the uſe of Free-will from us; and ſince it is his will to give us ſuch a Nature, 'tis likewiſe his will to continue the uſe of our Freedom: It would likewiſe be contrary to the Will of God for us to uſe our Freedom to miſchieve ourſelves or others, and therefore we conceive that every one who thus miſuſes his Freedom incurs the diſpleaſure of God.

But then 'tis plain that in all acts which we conceive to be pleaſing or diſpleaſing to the Deity, we derive the Reaſon of their being ſo from the Conſideration of their agreeableneſs or oppoſition to his Will: and we derive the Knowledge of that will from nothing but the Manifeſtation God has made of it,

either

determine it) is ſomewhat External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Cauſe which determines the Election, it follows that the act of Election and every thing that depends upon it is neceſſary.

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only reaſon becauſe he has choſen to make them ſo, he himſelf will be at liberty, his whole Work will be free. The World will be made not of neceſſity, but choice; nor will it be impoſſible to be effected, tho' it be in itſelf unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it ſufficiently appears of how great Importance it is, that all the Goodneſs of the Creatures ſhould depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodneſs of them; for ſo we may conceive Fate to be taken away, and Liberty eſtabliſh'd.

But if things are good becauſe he has choſen to make them, his whole Work will be free.

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll ſay, from the Objects of his Choice, why ſhould he chooſe them? Is it not more probable that he ſhould do nothing at all, than buſy himſelf in things that are like to be of no benefit? I anſwer, That it is no more trouble to him to will things than not to will them; and hence it comes to paſs that when he wills them, they exiſt; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reaſon, as it ſuppoſes an indifference of things in reſpect of God, ſo it aſſerts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves that that will be agreeable to him which he ſhall chooſe. But we have a better yet at hand, *viz.* that God choſe to create external things that there might be ſomething for him to delight in without himſelf. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Ex-

External things are in themſelves abſolutely indifferent to God, but he has a complacency in his Choice.

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either by the Nature that he has been pleaſed to give the Creatures, or elſe by Revelation. So that after all, we have no meaſure of Good or Evil, but the Will of God.

Exerciſe of his Powers and Faculties. (52.) Now God is inveſted with infinite Power, which he can exerciſe

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(52.) This reaſon is very conſiſtent with what our Author had delivered in C. 1. § 3. par. 9, 10. where he aſſerted that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exerciſe his ſeveral Attributes, or (which is the ſame thing) to communicate his Perfections to ſome other Beings: which Exerciſe or Communication could proceed from no other Cauſe beſide his own free Choice; and therefore he muſt be abſolutely and phyſically indifferent to it, in the ſame reſpect as Man was ſhewn to be indifferent towards any Action * only with this diſparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect Agent, may eaſily be imagined to will abſurdities or contradictions, but God cannot be ſuppoſed to will or act either inconſiſtently with his Nature and Perfections, or with any former Volition (as our Author obſerves in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and conſequently cannot be ſaid to be indifferent to ſuch things (as ſome have miſunderſtood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is. *Leibnitz* urges farther † that it could not be in any ſenſe indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, ſince his *Goodneſs* was the Cauſe (according to our Author himſelf in the place above cited) which determined him to the Creation. But what do we mean by his *Goodneſs* here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exerciſe his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happineſs or Perfection? And is not this the very Determination or Election we are ſpeaking of? To ſay then that God is determined by his Goodneſs, is ſaying that he determines himſelf; that he does a thing becauſe he is inclined to do it; 'tis aſſigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Cauſe of his Action; which is no more than we contend for. Whereas they that would oppoſe us ſhould aſſign a *Cauſe* for that Will or Inclination itſelf, and ſhew a *natural* neceſſity for the operation of the Divine Attributes (for a *moral* one is nothing to the preſent Queſtion) a ſtrict phyſical connection between the Exiſtence of certain natural Perfections in the Deity and their Exercise on outward Objects. But if God had no other reaſon for the creation of any thing beſide his own Goodneſs, he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create that thing; and if he will'd, or was inclined to exert his Perfections thus freely, he muſt be as free and indifferent ſtill to the actual Exerciſe of them. Nor will it from hence follow (as *Leibnitz* objects) that there is ſuch an abſolute Indifference in the Deity as muſt make him regardleſs whether the World were

* *See* Note 45, and 49. and *Ode. Theol: Nat.* p. 246.

† *Remarques*, p. 473.

exerciſe innumerable Ways; not all at once indeed, (for all are not conſiſtent with each other) but ſuch

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well or ill made; Mankind happy or miſerable, &c. For if the Communication of Happineſs be the ſole end of his acting, whenever he does act he muſt propoſe that end, and the Exerciſe of his ſeveral Attributes will lead directly to it. Knowledge, Power and Freedom are *Perfections*, *i.e.* the Foundation of *Happineſs* to the Being poſſeſſed of them, and therefore when communicated to other Beings they muſt produce that Happineſs, which is founded in and naturally reſults from them: to ſuppoſe the contrary, is the ſame abſurdity as to ſuppoſe that Knowledge may produce Ignorance, Power Weakneſs, or Freedom Neceſſity.—The Communication of theſe Attributes then, or the Exerciſe of theſe Perfections united, will conſtitute a wiſe, good and holy Providence purſuing a good end by fit and proper Means. All which is included (as our Author ſays) in the very *firſt Act* of the Deity, or rather in his Will to act at all; and to ſuppoſe him to will or act in any reſpect contrary to this, is ſuppoſing him to will and act againſt his own Nature, and in contradiction to himſelf; or, which is the ſame, imagining an Effect to be quite different from, or contrary to its Cauſe. The *Moral* Perfections of the Deity are therefore immediate conſequences, or rather the genuine Exerciſe, of his natural ones. And thus, I think, it may be ſhewn how all the actions of the Deity muſt certainly be Good, Wiſe, &c. without recurring to any ſuch *Fitneſſes* or *Relations* of things as are by ſome unaccountably ſuppoſed to be *antecedent* and abſolutely *neceſſary* to the determination of the Will of God himſelf.

But don't we, when we ſpeak of God's chooſing fit and proper means, evidently ſuppoſe that ſome things are in themſelves good and eligible, and *vice verſa*, even before any determination of the Deity about them? Where is the room for Wiſdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and indifferent to him? I anſwer, firſt, If by things being in themſelves Evil, &c. be only meant, that ſome particular ways of acting may be conceived, which would, if the Deity could be ſuppoſed to will them, be neceſſarily and eſſentially oppoſite, and have a tendency directly contrary, to his preſent method of acting; we grant that ſome ſuch things may be imagined: but then it will be an abſurd and impoſſible ſuppoſition that God ſhould ever will them, as he has already willed the contrary; and therefore, in regard to him, they muſt ſtill be only imaginary. Nay, they would be ſo far from being independent of, or antecedent to the Will of God in any ſenſe, that the very Eſſence and Idea of them would proceed entirely from, and pre-ſuppoſe its Determination; ſince we can only

ſuch as are conſiſtent are for the moſt part indifferent, nor is there any reaſon why he ſhould prefer one

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conceive any Relations or Conſequences of things to be Good or Evil, ſo far as they are conſiſtent with, or contrary to the preſent Syſtem pre eſtabliſhed by the Will of God. I anſwer in the ſecond place, that the primary Intent of the Creator being, as was ſhewn above, to communicate his Perfections to various Creatures (to which communication he was nevertheleſs abſolutely free and indifferent, and therefore could be determined to it by no external Cauſe) while that Intent continues, the neceſſary conſequence of it is, that Creatures be ſo made and conſtituted as to attain that End, and endowed with ſuch Powers as will make them reſemble *Him* as much as poſſible in their ſeveral States and Orders. All this is only proſecuting the ſame Volition, or continuing to communicate *himſelf*; and what we mean by chooſing *fit and proper means* for this, is only, that he is not a blind and unintelligent Agent, but conſcious of his own Nature and Operations, and therefore able to act in a certain *determinate manner*. Now ſuch determinate Action muſt produce a regular Syſtem, the ſeveral Parts whereof will be related to and connected with each other, and by a mutual dependency rendered ſubſervient to the Good and Perfection of the whole. Though this whole Syſtem might at firſt perhaps be indifferent to the Agent in regard to ſeveral other Syſtems equally poſſible, and which might have been made equally perfect in its ſtead. * It is not then as *Leibnitz* argues † the natural and neceſſary goodneſs of ſome particular things *repreſented by the Divine Ideas* which determines God to prefer them to all others, if underſtood of his *firſt* act of producing them; but 'tis his own free arbitrary Choice, which among many equal poſſibilities, makes ſome things *actually* good, and determines them into Exiſtence. When theſe are once ſuppoſed to exiſt, every thing or action becomes *good* which tends to their Happineſs and Preſervation. Hence alſo in reſpect to *us* certain conſequences and relations ariſe, which, by the very frame of our Nature and Conſtitution, we are directed to approve, and obliged to purſue, if we expect to be happy. And thus all *moral Obligation* is ultimately referred to the *Will of God*, which ſeems to be the only ſure and adequate foundation of it, and from which I think it may be deduced with much more clearneſs and conſiſtency than from that *Hypothetical Neceſſity* of the Relations of

* *See Note Q.* † *Remarques*, p. 447.

one before another,* it must therefore be his own Choice which makes one more agreeable than another;

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of things, which evidently pre-supposes, as was observed before, and is itself only founded on the Will of God. ‡

Give me leave to add here, that their Argument seems to be of very little force against our Author, who urge, that if all Good and Evil depend upon the *Arbitrary Will* of God, then it would not be impossible for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two and two make five, *&c.* For allowing that God at first made all things what they are, and still continues to them the same Existence, (though perhaps no reason a *priori* can be assigned why he made them all, or in this rather than some other manner) Vice must be Vice, *&c.* that is, while things are as they are, the same Consequences and Relations will result from them; and to suppose the contrary, is to suppose that things may be different, or have different consequences, while they continue the same; or that they may be what they are and what they are not at the same time. Thus all the present *Relations* are evidently *subsequent* to the present Order of Nature, and must continue with it; and this consequential Necessity is all the *Fitness* that I know of.

To stile this *Eternal* and *Immutable* can therefore only mean thus much, *viz.* suppose things to be at any time what they now are, and at the same time the very same consequences wou'd flow from them which we now find. Suppose a Set of Beings constituted like ourselves, and framed with the like Capacities for Happiness, and the same relative Duties must be incumbent on them in order to attain that Happiness. If they be imperfect, dependent Creatures, and perpetually standing in need of each others assistance; if also they have such Passions, Instincts and Inclinations as tend to unite them to each other, and oblige them to act in concert: if they be thus framed, I say, they will of consequence be thus related, and subject to all the moral Obligations which *we* now are. But still this necessity is only hypothetical, and like the necessity of any certain Consequence resulting from certain Premisses; which Premisses being altered, a different, a quite contrary one will be equally necessary. Thus in the former Instance, if any rational Creatures be constituted social Beings, they will indeed be obliged to act as such; but let some be made independent of each other, and unsociable; endowed with, or so made as necessarily

* *Instances of this Indifference may be seen in our Author's Note* E, *and the 5th precedent Paragraph.*

‡ *See the Preliminary Dissertation,* and R. i. *or* Pufendorf *of the Law of Nature and Nations,* B. 1. C. 1. § 4. *Note* 7. *and* B. 2. C. 3. § 20.

other; not is it otherwiſe conceivable how a thing that is in itſelf indifferent to the Elector, ſhould prove more pleaſing than any thing elſe.

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neceſſarily to *acquire*, Paſſions, Inſtincts and Inclinations quite oppoſite to the former, and their Duties will be quite the reverſe. The great Virtue of *Selfiſhneſs* will then occupy the place of *Univerſal Benevolence*, and that Method of Life perhaps produce the greateſt Sum of Happineſs to each individual, and conſequently be the moſt eligible to every one, which has now the direct contrary Effect. If ſuch a ſuppoſition be conceivable, 'tis ſufficient to ſhew that theſe Relations are not *abſolutely neceſſary in themſelves*, but only conditionally and conſequentially to the preſent Order of the Creation. ‡

Upon a farther enquiry into the Doctrine of *abſtract Fitneſſes* and *eternal Reaſons* of things, I find a great many Perſons very much perplexed about them, who cannot apprehend but that they muſt neceſſarily determine the Deity in all Caſes, as well as abſolutely oblige Mankind, nay are the only ground of moral Obligation. I ſhall therefore endeavour to explain myſelf more fully on this Subject, which appears to me in the following Light.

From all Eternity God had in his Mind the Ideas of all things, which could poſſibly exiſt either ſeparately or all together. He ſaw that ſeveral Syſtems of Beings might be created, the reſult of which would be ſeveral Kinds and Degrees of Happineſs or Miſery to theſe Beings (though 'tis impoſſible to ſuppoſe any abſolutely higheſt degree, ſince that would be a Limitation of infinite Power.) As theſe various poſſible Syſtems were at once preſent to his view, he ſaw the ſeveral *Relations*, which the Beings in them would have to each other, or to themſelves in different Circumſtances, ſuppoſing them to be formed in any given manner; he knew alſo how to ſuit the Condition of theſe Beings to their Relations, ſo as to produce a certain ſum of Happineſs or Miſery from the Compoſition. If we enquire whether of theſe two kinds of Creatures he ſhall chooſe, we can find no natural neceſſity to determine him, ſince he is abſolutely independent and completely happy in himſelf without any Creation at all, nor can his Happineſs be increaſed or impaired by the Happineſs or Miſery of his Creatures. We muſt therefore have recourſe to his own free Pleaſure, directed by his other Attributes, for the only cauſe, ground, or reaſon of his Works. If he be a benevolent Being, and

‡ See *Pufendorf*, B. 1. C. 2. § 6. and the Note 2. p. 20. or B. 2. C. 3. § 4, 5. and the Notes *Q. R.* See alſo Dr. *Felton*'s Preface to his L. *Moyer*'s Lecture, p. 18. and p. 34. — 51, &c.

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reaſon of the Election, *i. e.* why he chooſes this rather than And determines himſelf to Action.

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and have perfect Knowledge and Power, he will frame the World in ſuch a manner and ſuit every Circumſtance to each Condition ſo as to produce univerſal Good, if malevolent, the contrary.

But from a view of the preſent Syſtem we find that Happineſs, Beauty, Order, are prepollent; and that no good has been omitted, which cou'd have been beſtow'd conſiſtent with the Happineſs of the whole. Hence we gather that he muſt be abſolutely good, or that he will act upon ſuch Reaſons, and produce Beings which have ſuch Relations to each other, that the reſult of all ſhall be Happineſs in the main. Theſe Reaſons and Relations we call *good*, which have this beneficial tendency to the whole Syſtem, and what we mean by his being *determin'd* by them, is that his Goodneſs always inclines him to promote the Happineſs of his Creatures, and his Knowledge repreſents to him the moſt proper means of effecting it. *Why* he is good, or inclined to act in this manner, we know not, any more than why he is intelligent; nor do we think a reaſon *a priori* can be given, or ought to be expected for either of theſe Attributes.

But thus much ſeems evident, that unleſs he was previouſly ſo inclin'd, a proſpect of theſe Reaſons and Relations could never determine him; ſince, as was obſerv'd above, he is abſolutely independent, and incapable of being affected by them: all the Goodneſs which reſults from them can be no good or benefit to him, and conſequently he cannot be obliged to purſue them by any other neceſſity than a *Moral* or *Hypothetical* one, *i. e.* one that is founded on the previous ſuppoſition of what we call his *Goodneſs*. It is their being agreeable to this Divine Attribute, or rather the ways in which it is exerted; their being the moſt proper means to the beſt end, or productive of the greateſt univerſal Happineſs, which denominates them *fit, right, &c.* and what we muſt either mean by theſe words, or we can, I think, have no diſtinct Ideas to them.

Thus much concerning theſe Relations with regard to the Deity, But tho' we may not comprehend the Nature of a ſelf-exiſtent Being, or the manner of his acting, nor ſee in what ſenſe he is determin'd, obliged, or under a neceſſity to act agreeably to all ſuch *Relations* as a Syſtem of things will have to one another's Happineſs (nor indeed is it of any uſe, nor can it have any meaning, farther than knowing that he is permanently *good*) yet with reſpect to their conſtituting a *Law of Nature*, and our deducing *moral Obligation* from them, I think the Caſe is very clear. As we are made ſenſible Beings, or capable of Happineſs and Miſery, nothing can be a Law to

than that; for upon ſuppoſition that there is a reaſon the indifference would be deſtroy'd, and the Election

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[o] ur Nature but what produces the one and prevents the other: [a]nd as we are endow'd with freedom of Will, we can never be under any other ſort of *Obligation*. To find out the tendency of things to this great End, is the Province of *Reaſon*; and all that we can mean by terming one thing more *reaſonable* than another is its ſuperior tendency to *Happineſs* on the whole, which is, and ought to be, the ultimate end of all truly rational dependent Beings.

Can *Man*, for Inſtance, have any reaſon to purſue that which does not at all relate to him? and does any thing relate to him or concern him, which has no Relation to his Happineſs? As therefore we have our Happineſs to ſeek in a great Meaſure from without, and have no innate Inſtinct or implanted Appetite, to direct us in the ſearch; no truly natural Paſſion or Affection in which it conſiſts, (as may be eaſily gather'd from Mr. *Locke*'s excellent Hiſtory of the human Mind) it will be the part of pure Reaſon to diſcover the means of obtaining it, and theſe means will be the doing ſuch Actions, and acquiring ſuch Habits of mind as are ſuitable to our dependent State, *i. e.* ſuch as tend to oblige all thoſe other rational Beings on whom we are dependent; ſuch as engage the good Will and Affections of all thoſe who have it in their power to promote or impede our Happineſs; and more eſpecially that Being on whom we depend abſolutely, and who is able to make us happy or miſerable to all Eternity. And as the only means of engaging the good will of all our fellow Creatures with whom we are or may be concern'd, is the manifeſting a Diſpoſition to promote their Happineſs; which is at the ſame time complying with the Will of our Creator, who intends nothing but the common good of us all; and requires that we ſhou'd co-operate with him by our joint endeavour to promote it; ſo 'tis evident that all ſuch Actions and Diſpoſitions of Mind as have this tendency and direction, are *Duties* to us, the Diſcharge of which will either be attended with Happineſs by natural Conſequence in this Life, or by the poſitive Reward of God in another.— From this ſenſe of the Reaſon or Relation of things (which, as was obſerv'd before, is all that can give them any Relation to us, or afford any Reaſon for our obſerving them) we may eaſily deduce a compleat Scheme of Duty, which muſt be *always* obligatory, and will appear ſo to all Beings of the like Nature with ourſelves. This, if we pleaſe, may be term'd abſolutely *fit*, *right* and *reaſonable*; provided that we keep the true Reaſon and End of all in view, *viz.* our own *Happineſs*; and do it in *Obedience* to the *Deity*, who alone can ſecure this main

Election would not be free. If we ſuppoſe that there is ſuch a thing as better and worſe in the Objects themſelves,

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main End to us, and who can only be engaged to this by our performing every thing on his Account. If on the other hand we follow Virtue for its own ſake, its native Beauty or intrinſic Goodneſs, we loſe the true Idea of it, we miſtake the means for the End; and tho' we may indeed *qualifie* ourſelves for an extraordinary Reward from God for ſuch a ſtate of Mind, yet we do really nothing to *entitle* ourſelves to it: if we attain the good Effects of every Virtue in this Life, we *have our Reward*; if we do not, what claim have we to any amends from God, whom we have never thought of in it, and conſequently whoſe *Servants* we cannot be ſaid to be? The only Principle which can in Reaſon recommend us to his Favour, muſt be the *doing all things to his Glory*, in Obedience to his Will, or in order to pleaſe him. Obedience to God is the *Principle*, the good of Mankind the *Matter*, our own Happineſs the *End*, of all that is properly term'd Moral *Virtue*.

Since the Concluſion of this I have met with a Pamphlet entitled *Calumny no Conviction*, *&c.* which contains ſome Arguments againſt our Author's Doctrine, and alſo does me the honour to take notice of what I had advanced in favour of it. Tho' I cannot but think moſt of this celebrated Writer's Remarks already obviated in the Additional Part of the foregoing Note, and thoſe of our Author; yet I will incur the Cenſure of being tedious rather than wholly omit them. He begins with an Exception againſt the Fourth Paragraph; the Deſign of which was to ſhew that God was perfectly *free* in creating the World, and cou'd not be determin'd by any thing external. Firſt, Becauſe he could receive no benefit from any thing without him. 2dly, Becauſe he could have no Reaſon to prefer one thing to another in every reſpect equal, as the Author explains himſelf in the following Paragraph.

He concludes that when things are made, they muſt be made in conformity to the Divine Nature; but as there are ſeveral poſſible ways of making them, in which there will be the ſame conformity, nothing cou'd render one way more agreeable to the Deity than another, but his free Choice; this agreeableneſs therefore of any one before another is not *antecedent*, but *conſequent* to ſuch free Choice. In ſupport of this Notion I aſſerted that notwithſtanding this twofold Indifference, *viz.* both to acting in general or not acting, and to any particular manner of acting among equals, yet ſtill it might be ſhewn that whenever he does act, all his Works will be *wiſe*, *good*, *&c.* The Reaſon given for it was *to this purpoſe*, *viz.* that the ſole End of his acting being to communicate his Happineſs,

themſelves, who would affirm that the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God will not neceſſarily determine him to

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and every one of his Perfections being naturally productive of Happineſs, it follows that he is both willing and able to produce it, and conſequently muſt produce it whenever he produces any thing. Now the voluntary communication or production of Happineſs ſeems to comprehend all moral *Goodneſs &c.* but this voluntary Communication is nothing more than the exerciſe of his natural Perfections as above; it follows that the Exerciſe of his natural Perfections muſt conſtitute the *Moral ones*, or that theſe Moral Qualities in God which we ſtile Good, Wiſe, Juſt, *&c.* are only conſequences of the Exertion of his ſeveral natural Perfections of Knowledge, Power, Freedom, in purſuance of the abovementioned End.

This brief ſtate of the Queſtion may be in a good meaſure ſufficient to direct the Reader in forming a Judgment of what this Writer has objected. Firſt, He ſays, *the Archbiſhop ought to have concluded that the Congruity of things to the Rectitude or Perfection of the Divine Nature was the Ground (and not the mere Will of God) of their being good or Perfect in their kind*, viz. *by this reſemblance of them to it.* * Anſwer, 'Tis allow'd that where one way of acting is more congruous to the Divine Nature than another, that congruity is a ſufficient Reaſon for its being preferr'd by the Deity, but that Reaſon will never hold where many ways are equally congruous, which is the Caſe the Archbiſhop argues upon; in which Caſe there is no room for any thing but mere Will to determine, and in which Caſe alone the Will of God is conſider'd ſeparately from his other Attributes. Wherever the nature of the thing allows ſuperior Wiſdom and Goodneſs, there the Archbiſhop ſuppoſes the Divine Will to be always accompanied with them, as he has told us twice in his third Paragraph. I ſhould be glad to know the preciſe meaning of the Words *Rectitude* and *Perfection*, which this Author makes the Ground of the Divine Acts; if they ſignify no more than *Goodneſs*, as I think they hardly can, if they are to be ranked among his moral Qualities; they coincide with our Notion of mere Will; ſince we can never ſhow why he is good, or aſſign a Cauſe for that particular Determination of his Will, which we ſtile Goodneſs, as was obſerved in the beginning of this Note. If they include only his natural Perfections, and imply that *all ſufficiency* which reſults from the Union of them, I fear there will be no more connection between this and *moral* Perfection, than between

that

* P. 73.

to chooſe the better? For who can honeſtly poſtpone the better and prefer the worſe? As then in indifferent

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that and free Choice: * *i. e.* no Reaſon can be given why an all-ſufficient Being ſhould communicate his Happineſs rather than not, (except we knew more fully wherein that Happineſs conſiſts,) or immediate connection ſhewn between the Exiſtence of perfect Knowledge and Power in God, and their being exerted in the Production of any thing without him. But when ſuch a Being is determined to make any thing, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he will make it like himſelf rather than the contrary; that one perfectly happy will communicate his Happineſs rather than produce Miſery, as was ſaid above.

This is all the account that I can give of the Moral Perfections of the Deity, or why he ſhould propoſe that end in all his Works, which we attribute to him when we ſtile him *Good*. But this goes no farther than probability: and I ſhould be obliged to this Author for a ſtrict Proof of the moral Attributes of God from any property in the Divine Nature, which is itſelf previouſly demonſtrable. To return, 'Tis not therefore the *bare* exerciſe of his *Knowledge* and *Power* which by *neceſſity* (*i. e.* a *Phyſical* one) conſtitutes his Moral Qualities; but the voluntary Exerciſe of them (or the diſpoſition to exerciſe them) in purſuance of this *End*, which muſt neceſſarily (meaning a *Moral* Neceſſity, or ſuppoſing this End) include all moral Perfection, though there be ſeveral ways that equally lead to it. In this ſenſe only, and with this reſtriction, I would be underſtood whenever I aſſert that perfect Knowledge and Power can produce nothing but what is wiſe and juſt; though it may not have been always mentioned.

This I apprehend to be far from ſubverting the ground of Morality, or making it ever equally agreeable to the Deity to have acted for no End at all, or for a bad one: † Since it ſuppoſes that he was always determined to purſue the very beſt End, and by the beſt means, (wherever there was room for *better* and *worſe*) though *why* he was ſo determined I cannot pretend to ſhew; and in what ſenſe this was *better* and *fitter for him* ‡ who could receive no addition of Happineſs from it; I muſt confeſs I do not underſtand. I think the Archbiſhop was not ſo weak as to be deceived by that *erroneous Inference* which this Author charges him with, p. 77. viz. *that God's Will could not be determined by the greater good in Objects, becauſe theſe Objects were not actually produced* — but rather argued from the equality and indifference in Objects, which muſt appear to the Divine Mind before his determining to create them (as he ſhews in his Note Q.) that his Will could not be deter-

* Pag. 75. † P. 76. ‡ P. 74, 75, 76.

ferent Matters there can be no reaſon why one is choſen before another, ſo there is no need of any: for ſince

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determined by them to produce one Syſtem rather than another: which is the beſt proof of his perfect Liberty in producing them, to eſtabliſh which was the Deſign of the Archbiſhop in this place. I readily own that God who ſees all Poſſibilities muſt have a previous Repreſentation of things in his Mind, which things therefore are hypothetically antecedent to the determination of his Will. To aſſert thus much is only ſaying that he knew what he was about when he made the World, which none I hope will doubt: But this Repreſentation will never come up to what is affirmed of theſe *Relations* abſolutely, and at all times, determining him to one particular; except there always were one abſolutely beſt, which I think deſerves to be a little conſidered. That he ſhould produce Happineſs in general rather than Miſery, ſeems to me very agreeable to his Nature, who is perfectly Happy; but what particular ſort or degree of it he ſhall chooſe, is perhaps not very eaſily determined, except by ſuch as will, with *Leibnitz*, deny any perfect equality or indifference in nature, and imagine they can always find a *beſt*, to whom I would recommend our Author's Note abovementioned.

By this time 'tis hoped, I have explained my ſelf ſufficiently, I ſhall diſpatch the reſt of the *Appendix* in as few Words as poſſible.

From what has been ſaid it appears that I don't maintain that the Moral Attributes of God proceed from the *mere* exerciſe of his natural ones, without any *end* or aim; much leſs that theſe were exerted *neceſſarily*; as this Author ſeems to underſtand me, p. 78. but only that the *voluntary* Communication of the Divine Happineſs by the free exerciſe of every ſuch Perfection as is productive of it, will conſtitute all thoſe which we call moral Attributes: a voluntary, deſigned Production of Happineſs or Miſery being all that to me ſeems requiſite to make any action *Moral* in God or Man. And that an abſolutely powerful, intelligent, free and happy Being, intending to communicate ſome degree of theſe Perfections, needs no other *Objective Rule* than what is contained in theſe Perfections themſelves; that ſo long as he is pleaſed to exerciſe them in purſuance of this general intent, he can never do amiſs or go wrong in the exerciſe of them, though there be ten thouſand equal ways of exerciſing them, and conſequently no objective Rule to direct which he ſhall actually chooſe: Becauſe perfect Knowledge, Power and Happineſs *can never produce any thing in the main repugnant to Knowledge, Power* and *Happineſs*, i. e. to *themſelves*.

To

ſince the Divine Will is ſelf-active, and muſt neceſſarily be determined to one of the indifferent things, it is

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To this *purpoſe* ‖ was the foregoing Obſervation made, which I find to be much the ſame with that of Dr. *Clarke. Demonſtr. Prop.* 12. *Par.* 1. how confuſedly ſoever it might be expreſſed. I meant therefore *Power and Knowledge exerciſed voluntarily in congruity to the Rectitude of the Divine Nature*, p. 79. in one ſenſe of theſe Words, *i. e.* in conformity to his general intent of communicating *Happineſs* (and if that be all the meaning of *Rectitude*, I readily admit it) but not in ſo large a ſenſe as to make the preſent method of communicating it, the *only right, fit*, and reaſonable one, and immutably preferable to all other Methods conceivable; ſince many others may be ſuppoſed, any of which would have led to the ſame End, and as ſuch been equally agreeable to the Deity if he had choſen it. This Author ſeems afraid of our placing the *Obligation* to Virtue on the *mere Will of God*; as if his Will were ſeparated from his other Attributes, which would indeed of itſelf be no ground of Obligation at all, ſince upon ſuch a blind Principle we could never be ſecure of Happineſs from any Being how faithfully ſoever we obeyed him, or how much ſoever we reſembled him in Perfection. This Notion therefore of *mere* arbitrary Will we muſt exclude from both our Schemes of Morality in every caſe but that of *indifference* ſo often mentioned above.

I grant *the natural Conſequence of Virtue is Happineſs* p. 81. (at leaſt would be ſo, if univerſally practiſed) and as ſuch it carries a partial Obligation in itſelf, or is ſo far its own Reward; but what will become of the Obligation (according to my ſenſe of that Word) when this Conſequence does not follow? As this Author very reaſonably grants it *cannot* in the preſent ſtate, p. 82. To deduce one from the proſpect of Reward in a future ſtate (tho' I think the certainty of it equal on either of the two Schemes) is having recourſe to the *Will* of God to ſupply defects and compleat the Obligation, inſtead of founding it on theſe *Relations as ſuch*, as *abſolutely fit* and *right*, and to be followed for *their own ſakes* without regard to any farther End. 'Tis owning that the Obligation ſuppoſed to ariſe from them is not in itſelf adequate and indiſpenſible, and ſeems to be quite giving up that *full obligatory Power* of theirs *antecedent to any Reward or Puniſhment annexed either by natural conſequence or poſitive Appointment to the Obſervance or neglect of them* § which the Authors of that Language have ſo eagerly contended for, and to oppoſe the ill Conſequences of which

‖ P. 79.

§ Evidences of *Nat. and Rev. Rel.* pag. 218. 5th Ed.

is its own reaſon of Action, and determines itſelf freely. Nay ſo great is the Power of God, that whatever he ſhall chooſe out of infinite Poſſibilities, that will be the beſt; 'tis all one therefore which he prefers.

The difficulty of conceiving how a power can determine itſelf to action ought not to hinder our aſſent to the truth of the propoſition.

X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are ſtill unſatisfy'd how a Power can *determine itſelf*, i. e. you are ignorant of the *Modus*; but a thing muſt not be denyed becauſe we do not know the manner how it is done: we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it better underſtood how the Members of the Body can be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction of the Will. Yet no body denies theſe things, becauſe he knows not the manner in which they are performed. If therefore it be manifeſt that the divine Will does determine itſelf, we ſhall not trouble ourſelves much in enquiring how it can be done.

'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by itſelf: we are prejudiced by being accuſtomed to material, *i. e.* paſſive Agents.

XI. But to confeſs the truth, 'tis no leſs difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another, than by itſelf; but as we are accuſtomed to material Agents,* all which are paſſive in their Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all ſolicitous about the manner of it: whereas if we conſider the thing thoroughly, we ſhall find ourſelves as far from apprehending how Motion is communicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itſelf: but there ſeems to be nothing wonderful in the one, becauſe is is obſerved to happen at all times, and in every Action; whereas the other is looked upon as incredible,

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which is the only Deſign of all that has been advanced on this Head. If any Miſtakes appear in it (as probably there may) I ſhall be obliged to this judicious Author for pointing them out, and promiſe freely to give up them or any others in the Book as ſoon as I can be made ſenſible of them.

* *See* Note 43.

dible, ſince it is ſeldom performed, *viz.* by the Will alone. And tho' both Reaſon and Experience prove that it is done, yet we ſuſpect ourſelves to be impoſed upon, becauſe we know not the manner of it. The ground of the miſtake is this, that ſince the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted with, the reſt being all paſſive, we are not eaſily induced to believe it to be really ſuch, but form our Judgment of it from a Compariſon with other Agents, which ſince they don't move but as they are moved, we require a Mover alſo in the Will of God: which is very abſurd; ſince it is evident that if there were no *active* Power in Nature, there could not be a *paſſive* one; and if nothing could move without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action at all.† For we cannot conceive how it ſhould begin. Now it is much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, than how an Agent can move itſelf. Since then here are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be denied becauſe the manner of it is above human Underſtanding.

What is ſaid about indifference, with reſpect to the Will of God, takes place in his primary Elections.

XII. It is to be obſerved, that what we have ſaid concerning this Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in thoſe Elections which we apprehend to be the *Primary*, but not always in the ſubſequent ones. For ſuppoſing God to will any thing, while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the ſame or any thing neceſſarily connected with it, for that would be to contradict himſelf. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better, we muſt remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable things equal in Nature and Perfections. For inſtance, we may conceive numberleſs Men equal to one another in all reſpects; and alſo numberleſs Species

† *See Dr* Clarke's *Demonſtrat. of the D. Attributes.* pag. 82, 87, &c. *or* S. Fancourt's *Eſſay concerning Liberty*, &c. p. 28, 29. *or* Note 43.

Species of rational Beings equally perfect: nothing but the Will of God could determine which of theſe he ſhould create firſt. But when it was determin'd to create Man ſuch as he now is, *i. e.* with the Faculties, Appetites, and integral Parts which he conſiſts of at preſent, it is impoſſible that God ſhould will or chooſe any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election continues.

God may have all things at once in his view which are connected with the thing choſen, and either will or refuſe them by one ſimple Act.

XIII. For when we conceive any thing propoſed to the Knowledge of God as fit to be done, he muſt alſo neceſſarily have under his Eye, as it were at the ſame Glance, all thoſe things that are neceſſarily connected with it, or conſequent thereupon to all Eternity; and muſt will or reject them all by one ſimple Act. If therefore he determin'd to create Man, he muſt alſo be ſuppoſed to will that he ſhould conſiſt of a Soul and Body, that he ſhould be furniſh'd with Reaſon and Senſes, and that his Body ſhould be ſubject to the general Laws of Matter: for all theſe things are evidently included in the Choice to create Man.

As he is of infinite Goodneſs, he alſo wills the good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as is poſſible.

XIV. Nay, this primary Act of Volition muſt be ſuppoſed to contain not only thoſe things which have a neceſſary connection with what is choſen, but ſuch things alſo as tend to promote its benefit and happineſs, as far as they can be made conſiſtent with the benefit of the whole. For ſince God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his Creatures ſhould exiſt commodiouſly as much as that they ſhould exiſt at all. He therefore will'd ſuch things as are agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preſerve the Conſtitutions of his Creatures in the ſame Election whereby he determin'd to create them.

When the World therefore is once made, it is impoſſible that thoſe things ſhould pleaſe him which tend to the confuſion, &c. of his Work.

XV. We have ſaid before, that there is a double Goodneſs in things, the firſt and principal is that which renders them well-pleaſing to God, as they are conformable to his Will: the other is that whereby they agree with one another, where-

by they afford each other mutual Aſſiſtance, whereby they promote the Convenience, Preſervation and Perfection of the whole: but both theſe proceed from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once determin'd to pleaſe himſelf in the Creation and Preſervation of the World, he muſt be ſuppoſed at the ſame time to have willed all ſuch things as contribute to the Benefit and Perfection of his Work, otherwiſe he would have contradicted himſelf, and thereby been the cauſe of fruſtrating his own Election. For he is now ſuppoſed to have choſen that there ſhould be a World, that it ſhould continue as long as he himſelf had determin'd, that every Being ſhould attain the End aſſign'd to it, and all things act according to the Nature he had given them, and conſpire together to preſerve and perfect the whole. It is impoſſible therefore that he ſhould will the reverſe of all this, or that ſuch things ſhould pleaſe him as tend to the diſordering, maiming or deſtruction of his Work. For 'tis impoſſible to conceive that he ſhould chooſe the Exiſtence of things, and yet refuſe the Means neceſſary thereto.

XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act of conſtituting him of ſuch a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, that God alſo willed that he ſhould be pious, ſober, juſt and chaſte. (*R.*) Theſe and the like Laws of Nature then

When Man is made of ſuch a nature as requires him to be juſt, ſober, &c. God is not at Liberty not to will theſe things.

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(*R.*) Againſt this 'tis objected, Firſt, That it makes God require thoſe Virtues from Men, not becauſe they are morally good, but becauſe of the Advantages which they bring by preventing ſuch things as may trouble civil Society or hurt a Man's ſelf. To this I anſwer that the Author has ſhew'd in his Book that Moral Evil is founded on Natural, and that in the ſtate of Nature, before Revelation, Men had no way to know what free acts were good or pleaſing to God, but by obſerving what was advantageous to particular Men, or to Society. Obſerve all the Laws of Nature, and you will find them diſcover'd

then are immutable, *viz.* conformable to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very firſt Act of Election

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ver'd and proved from this ſole Principle: As is manifeſt from all the Books that treat of them. To pretend therefore that the natural Miſchiefs ariſing from Vice do not prove them to be morally Evil, is an uncommon way of thinking; ſince the very Argument whereby we prove them morally Evil is becauſe they are pernicious.

But 2dly, From hence, ſay ſome, it follows that the Turpitude of Vices is not to be eſtimated from their own Nature, but from the Evils which attend them: as if effects did not flow from their Cauſe, and thoſe things which lead us into ſuch Evils as *might* have been avoided by abſtaining from them were not properly Evil; or that we ought to judge of the nature of any thing otherwiſe than from the Properties and operations that neceſſarily attend it.

As to the *Turpitude* of things, we give that Appellation to ſuch as ſeem contrary to the Dignity and Honour of a rational Nature, which cannot be ſeen or heard without ſome nauſeous abhorrence and reluctance of the Senſes.

We attribute it to Vices by a kind of *Analogy*, ſince they proceed from ſuch Principles as are unworthy of human Nature, as leſſen the value and eſteem of him who has imbibed them, and make him as it were unclean and ſordid, and the averſion of all good and modeſt Perſons.

But ſuch Turpitude as this does not ariſe from the Nature of the Things themſelves, but from ſome ſordid Qualities that adhere to them and offend the Senſes. In like manner the Turpitude of Vices does not ariſe from the ſimple Nature of Actions, but from ſome adventitious Circumſtances, which bring Evil on them, and as they are undue and heterogeneous, they as it were defile thoſe Actions to which they adhere.

'Tis to be obſerv'd farther, that God can diſpenſe with ſome Actions which ſeem contrary to the Law of Nature, but not with others.

For Inſtance, he commands *Abraham* to kill his innocent Son, who prepares to obey, and if he had executed the Divine Command he had done nothing amiſs. And yet it ſeems contrary to the Law of Nature for a Father to kill his innocent Son. But as God is the Giver and Lord of Life, Reaſon tells us that he may take it away by whom he pleaſes.

But no Man in his Wits can believe that God may require any reaſonable Creature to hate him or diſobey his Commands, to be rebellious or perjur'd; or that any ſhould take theſe for Duties owing to God, tho' an Angel from Heaven ſhould declare them to be ſo. What is the Reaſon therefore why God com-

tion wherein he determin'd to create Man. Nor is God at Liberty not to will theſe during his purpoſe to

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commanded the firſt of theſe, and the Father of the Faithful was obedient; when we believe that neither God can command the latter, nor we be obliged to pay Obedience to any who ſhall pretend ſuch a Command?

I think no other account is to be given of this difference than that the ſlaying a Son is of ſuch a Nature as may be ſeparated from all thoſe Evil Conſequences that attend wilful Murder, whereas Hatred of God, &c. are ſuch as cannot; but naturally and neceſſarily lead thoſe who are guilty of them into Natural Evils, and are prejudicial both to the Authors themſelves and others: They undermine the Principles of all Goodneſs, and diſſolve the Union between God and human Society, which from the very Nature he has given Mankind is neceſſary to human Happineſs: nor need we mention other Natural Evils, which would flow as certainly from the Allowance or Commiſſion of the like Crimes by natural Conſequence.

But 3dly, 'tis urg'd that this is to confound natural and moral Evils, which all Divines have hitherto diſtinguiſh'd. Anſw. If the Objector had but obſerved the Diſtinction which the Author gives of Moral Evil, Chap. v. Introduct. he might have found a full anſwer to this Objection. There he might ſee that all Evil is inconveniency, but that ſome inconveniencies ariſe from the ſeries of natural Cauſes without our Conſent and ſometimes our Knowledge; theſe we call natural Evils; but others happen from the abuſe of Elections, when an undue Choice occaſions them, and in this caſe beſides the Natural Evil that ariſes from them, there is likewiſe an Obligation on the Perſon that makes the Choice to anſwer for the hurt he has done by it. Now theſe Choices that bring inconveniencies, are called moral Evils, and the difference between natural and moral Evil is not but that they both bring inconveniencies, and hurt ourſelves or others (for therein conſiſts the nature of their Evil) but that the ill Effects of the one proceed from the Choice, thoſe of the other from natural Cauſes, and hence the Author of that Choice is anſwerable for the one, but no body for the other. Moral Evil therefore is Natural Evil with Choice ſuperadded.

But 4thly, It is alledged that Moral Evil is predominant in the World, and yet the Work of God is not diſturb'd by it; Vice has quite overwhelm'd Mankind, and yet they ſtill ſubſiſt; which ſhews that God may very well command Men to be impious, debauch'd, unjuſt, &c. without deſtroying the World, and therefore the Author ought to hold that God is free as to his ſecond Elections as well as to the firſt.

If

to continue Man ſuch as he is: For by this means the ſame thing would pleaſe him, as being agreeable to

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If this Objection prove any thing it proves that before Revelation what we now call vices were not ſo, ſince at that time there was no way to diſtinguiſh vicious from virtuous Actions, but by obſerving which hurt, or help'd Mankind, one of which Nature taught him to cultivate, and to avoid the other. But if the Actions we call vicious (ſuch as murther, luſt, injuſtice, contempt of God and Irreligion) did no hurt, there was no reaſon Men ſhould be debarr'd from them or God be imagin'd to forbid them, before he declar'd his Will to that purpoſe. But 2dly, it is a plain caſe that theſe and all other wicked and irreligious Actions do miſchief to mankind, and have a deſtructive influence according to their number, and if all Men ſhould give themſelves up to them without reſtraint, Mankind could not ſubſiſt. If ſelf-murder were univerſal, there were an end of human race: If none wou'd take care of Children, one Age would put a period to the Species. If all were falſe, treacherous and cruel, Life would be ſhort and comfortleſs; if there were no amity, ſociety and juſtice, it would have the ſame Effect. If Luſt and unnatural Mixtures were practiſed as oft as Opportunity offer'd; if drunkenneſs, intemperance and exceſs were indulg'd to the utmoſt, moſt would ſtarve, and the reſt live a ſhort uneaſy Life. This plainly ſhews that theſe Vices are contrary to the Nature of Mankind, and therefore God who gave that Nature has clearly enough ſignified that they are contrary to his Will. It muſt be confeſs'd indeed that there is much vice and wickedneſs in the World, and it is proportionably miſerable; but yet take the Actions of the worſt of Men, and you will find ten innocent for one that is criminal or miſchievous. For the truth of this I appeal to common Experience. Let any reckon the Acts of any one Man from Morning to Night, and he will find the Proportion hold; and this is much more obſervable if we take the whole Life of a Man together; the proportion of innocent acts to the vicious will appear much greater; Childhood and old Age being much freer from miſchievous acts than the middle part of Life.

But laſtly, It is urg'd that if theſe things be contrary to the Will of God, he ought not only to have forbid them, but taken effectual Care that they ſhould not be practiſed.

I anſwer, God has taken effectual Care to preſerve Men from theſe in ſuch a Degree, that our Lives are ſecured as far as is expedient for the good of the whole. The Frame of our Natures is ſuch, and the Laws of God have ſo great Effect upon us, that as I have already ſhew'd, a thouſand acts of

Juſtice,

to his firſt Choice of Creating Man, which is ſuppoſed to ſtand yet, and diſpleaſe him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the very ſame things that are contained in the firſt; that is, he would at the ſame time will and not will the ſame thing, which cannot be attributed to God.

XVII. Yet he is nevertheleſs free, becauſe he cannot will that a Man be perjur'd, a Murtherer, *&c.* for he is no otherwiſe determin'd than by his own Choice; nor does a thing pleaſe or diſpleaſe him on any other account than becauſe it is agreeable or contrary to his Will. For While that Election of the Deity which conſtitutes me a Man, (*i. e.* an Animal that is obliged to be pious, juſt and ſober) remains, 'tis impoſſible that he ſhould will me to be perjur'd, or a Murtherer; nor can the latter Choice take place in God ſo long as the former ſtands, ſince it is repugnant to the former. When therefore we acknowledge that things are good, and aſſert that ſome Actions are grateful to God, and others odious; this is not becauſe we believe the Divine Elections to be determined by them, but becauſe we ſuppoſe them to be comprehended in the very firſt Act of his Will of creating things, and to be pleaſing or diſpleaſing to him ſo far as they are agreeable or oppoſite to that Election. Nor is the Liberty of God deſtroy'd becauſe he muſt neceſſarily will theſe things while he does will them: For every thing, while it is, neceſſarily is; but this Neceſſity is conſequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Divine Election therefore is not determined by the Goodneſs of things, but the Goodneſs and Fitneſs of them ariſes from that Election, and that is beſt for

This is no bar to the Divine Liberty.

NOTES.

Juſtice, Temperance, Truth, Charity and Piety are done for one of the contrary Vices. 'Tis the practiſe of theſe Virtues that ſupports the World, and tho' many Vices are permitted, yet, as ſhall be ſhewn in due time, there is none that could be prevented even by Omnipotence without greater Inconvenience.

for them which is moſt agreeable to that Choice of the Deity whereby he will'd them to be what they are. From hence, I think, it appears ſufficiently that God is ſuch an Agent as delights in things merely becauſe they are choſen.

A Being endow'd with this Power is more perfect than one that wants it: yet this does not imply infinite Perfection, therefore it is communicable.

XVIII. Yet it is to be remarked that this ſelf-determining Power is not of ſuch a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection; for it may be conſiſtent with an imperfect underſtanding, and other Appetites, as we have ſhewn before: 'Tis not therefore peculiar to God, or incommunicable, there is no reaſon therefore for us to doubt whether a Creature may partake of it: if God were pleaſed to communicate it, there ſeems to be no contradiction in the thing for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this gift beſtowed upon it, will manifeſtly be more noble than the reſt, and a more perfect reſemblance of the Deity: ſince therefore God has created the leſs perfect Beings, we may, without any abſurdity, believe that he has not omitted the more perfect. Let us ſee then whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine Works *.

* *For the* poſſibility *of ſuch a Power, and its being* communicated, *ſee Dr.* Clarke's *Demonſtr. of the Being and Attributes of God,* p. 82 *and* 85. 7th Edit. *For the* Perfection *of it, ſee* Note 81. and §. 2. *of this Chapter.*

SUBSECT. V.

That Man partakes of the Principle of pleaſing himſelf by Election.

Some reaſons are offer'd to ſhew this.

I. IT appears, I think, from what has been ſaid that there is ſuch a Principle in Nature, and that it is alſo communicable. We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferred it upon us: If we

we conſult our own Minds, we may poſſibly entertain a doubt whether we are always paſſive in our voluntary Acts: namely, whether the Goodneſs of Objects determines our Elections according to the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them: or to ſpeak more plainly, whether we always chooſe things becauſe they pleaſe us or ſeem convenient; or whether they ſometimes appear indifferent in themſelves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and acquire their Goodneſs from it, and are for this reaſon only agreeable becauſe they are choſen. We have ſeen that there is in Nature ſuch a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodneſs in things by willing them; but whether we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now that we do partake of it may I think be evinced from the following Reaſons. Firſt, If we be conſcious of an inherent Liberty. Secondly, If we experience in ourſelves thoſe Signs and Properties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, If the Cauſes which are ſuppoſed to determine the Will be evidently inſufficient, or ariſe from Election inſtead of producing it.

II. As to the firſt; We experience in ourſelves a Principle of this kind, (*i. e.* a free one,) to ſuch a degree of certainty, that if our Minds be conſulted we can hardly doubt of it; and from hence it is that all Men of all Nations, while they followed the Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have conſtantly aſſerted their Liberty, at leaſt in ſome particular Actions: Nor has any one, unleſs he were forced to it, and as it were circumvented by Philoſophical Subtilties, ever denied either that he was free, or that he could pleaſe himſelf in chooſing one or other out of many Objects preſented to him, though that which was preferred were no ways preferable to others in reſpect of any intrinſic worth. First, Experience.

The vulgar often judge better of matters of Fact than Philoſophers.

III. In this therefore, as in many other Caſes, the Vulgar ſeem to be much wiſer, and to reaſon more juſtly than Philoſophers. For the Vulgar generally follow the natural Senſe of the Mind; and tho' they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in ſuch things as are the immediate Objects of Senſe and Experience, they are often more acute than Philoſophers themſelves: who either puffed up with the Vanity of appearing wiſe above the Vulgar, or impoſed upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monſters of their own, and deny things that are the moſt manifeſt: while they are ſtriving to purſue Truth through Coverts impervious and inacceſſible to human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in broad Day. Hence ſome have denyed Motion, and others Reſt, others Space, others all Senſe in Brutes, others the being of a *God*, and others all manner of Truth: and on the ſame account, ſome have deny'd Liberty, *viz.* becauſe they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they themſelves had involv'd it by their Subtilties. The ignorant and unlearned do much better in ſlighting all ſuch Arguments, and judging of things ingenuouſly according to the dictate of their Senſes and Experience; and if their Judgments be taken, we have clearly gained the Cauſe: for all theſe declare that they are conſcious of this free Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have ſhewn, be well explained otherwiſe than we have done: The Senſe of our unprejudiced Mind agrees with theſe, nor is the common Teſtimony of Mankind to be eſteemed of little importance in a matter of Fact. (53).

IV.

NOTES.

(53.) The Subſtance of what *Leibnitz* objects againſt this Argument* amounts to thus much, *viz.* That it is no proof of the non-exiſtence of a thing becauſe the Vulgar don't perceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is perceived

* *Remarques*, p. 477.

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourſelves the Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, it

"Tis proved that we partake of this Power, becauſe we diſcover the Marks and Properties of it in ourſelves.

NOTES.

ceived by the Senſes; they believe the Air to be nothing when it is not moved: they know nothing of the ſubtle Fluid which cauſes Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter; much leſs of immaterial Subſtances: and therefore the ſeveral Cauſes of Action, the ſecret Springs, the Reaſons and Inclinations, may be all unknown to them, and yet we be abſolutely determined (as he believes we always are) either by the conſtitution of our own Bodies, or of thoſe about us, or by a thouſand little things which, upon due attention and reflection, we might be able to diſcover.—We reply, that though in many Caſes our not perceiving a thing be no Argument that it does not really exiſt, yet in ſome Caſes, in this particularly, it is. To feel no Pain, to be conſcious of no Idea, is to have none: and in like manner to perceive no motive or reaſon of Action, is the ſame as not to act upon any, or to perceive that we act without one. If any one (whether Philoſopher or Peaſant) be thinking upon a Subject, he muſt, at that inſtant, know the Subject that he is thinking on, or however, that he does think on ſomething: 'tis likewiſe ſelf evident, that every reaſonable Man, when he reſolves upon ſome View, or follows an Inclination, muſt be conſcious of that View, or at leaſt be ſenſible that his Reſolution was formed upon ſome View or other. In theſe Caſes therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not *to be* and not to be *perceived*, is the very ſame thing.

But beſide the abſurdity of being influenced by a Motive which we know nothing of; beſide the Impoſſibility of reconciling theſe imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, (for which ſee Note 45.) we reply, ſecondly, that our Author does not conclude againſt the Exiſtence of a thing becauſe the Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the contrary, argues, that there muſt be ſuch a thing as Liberty of Indifference, becauſe they do continually perceive and acknowledge it; becauſe they clearly perceive and experience it in themſelves, or at leaſt imagine that they do ſo; nay, becauſe they have as great Evidence of ſuch a ſelf determining Power, as they have of any thing, even of their own Exiſtence; and conſequently they muſt either be deceived in every thing, or not deceived in this.* The preſent Argument is therefore built on matter of Fact, and will be concluſive here, though our Ignorance be ever ſo great in other Caſes. Our aſſurance of a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the leſs for there being a great many other Truths which we do not perceive: and though our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it

* *See* Note 58.

it cannot be queſtioned but we have the Power itſelf: Now theſe are a Self-conſciouſneſs that we are the true Cauſe of our Actions; an Ability to act and pleaſe ourſelves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senſes and Reaſon. If it be evident from Experience that we can do theſe things, it will be but too certain that we have ſuch a Power as is able to pleaſe itſelf barely by Election.

In the firſt place, we impute our Actions to our ſelves, whereby we own ourſelve to be the true Cauſes of them. Hence it is that we diſtinguiſh Misfortunes from Crimes.

V. In the firſt place then, we have declared that a Being endowed with this Principle is the only true efficient Cauſe of its Actions, and that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men impute the Actions of their own Will to themſelves, and eſteem them truly and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad; which is a certain Sign that they do not perceive themſelves to be determined from elſewhere to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwiſe they would not look upon themſelves as the Cauſe, but the Determiner. It cannot be otherwiſe than from a conſciouſneſs and firm perſuaſion of this Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than ſuch things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this account only that a light Evil occaſioned by our own Choice grieves and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of another. If we expoſe ourſelves to Poverty, Diſgrace, or an untimely End;

NOTES.

it does not exiſt, yet our actual perception of it is a Demonſtration that it does. It is not, therefore, *becauſe we do not conſider the Cauſes that communicate Motion to the Soul, or are not able to delineate the preciſe manner of that Communication, that we aſſert the Soul to be ſelf-motive* (as the Author of the late *Diſſertation on Liberty and Neceſſity* argues. p. 15.) But we aſſert that it is ſelf-motive, becauſe we *feel* it to be ſo, and have as great Evidence of it as we could expect or conceive ourſelves to have, were it really ſo. And that Author unreaſonably begs the Queſtion, in ſuppoſing that there are ſuch Cauſes and Communicators in a Caſe where he has, where he can have, no Evidence at all of them, But this *Diſſertation* is fully confuted by *Mr. Jackſon*, to whoſe anſwer I refer the Reader.

End, by an Act of Choice, our Conſcience remonſtrates againſt it, Remembrance ſtings us, and we cannot forgive ourſelves, though we were ſecure both from human Puniſhment and the Wrath of God. But when the ſame Evils befal us by external Force or the Neceſſity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxiouſneſs, and vindictive Reproach of Conſcience, which ſcourges thoſe that become miſerable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Principle muſt neceſſarily blame himſelf if he bring any Inconvenience upon himſelf by his own Choice; ſo he that does blame himſelf, demonſtrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impoſſible but that he ſhould accuſe himſelf, who believes that he is the true cauſe of his own Miſery; ſo on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who does accuſe himſelf, thinks that he himſelf is the true cauſe of his Miſery: otherwiſe he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the Perſon that compelled him to commit ſuch things as he finds make him uneaſy, but would never condemn himſelf as the Cauſe and Author of them, unleſs he were conſcious that he could have hindered them. If the grief ariſing from a Crime be diſtinct from that which is occaſioned by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other account, than becauſe the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, *i. e.* one who determines himſelf to Action, but the Misfortune from a neceſſary one.

VI. 'Tis plain then from our *Conſcience* of Good and Evil Actions, that we have this active Principle in ſome reſpect within us. For we not only rejoice in ſuch things as are done well, and grieve at the contrary: but alſo impute them to ourſelves, and either blame or applaud ourſelves as the Authors and true Cauſes of them: which is the firſt and ſureſt Sign that our Minds are ſenſible of their Liberty, and

This is a moſt certain Sign that we are conſcious of our liberty.

and that they could have pleaſed themſelves in doing otherwiſe than they have done. (54.)

VII.

NOTES.

(54.) 'Tis pleaſant to obſerve how the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry* endeavours to anſwer this Argument, by confounding the two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accuſation; of a Misfortune and a Crime, as *Hobbs* had done before him. "Conſcience (ſays he) being a Man's own Opinion of his "Actions, with relation to ſome rule, he may at the time "of doing an Action contrary to that rule, know that he "*breaks* that Rule, and conſequently act with reluctance, though "not ſufficient to hinder the Action. But after the Action is "over, he may not only judge his Action to be contrary to "that rule, but by the abſence of the pleaſure of the Sin, and "by finding himſelf obnoxious to Shame, or by believing "himſelf liable to Puniſhment, he may really accuſe himſelf; "that is, he may condemn himſelf for having done it, be "ſorry he has done it, and wiſh it undone, becauſe of the "conſequences that attend it.' ‡ Where, not to inſiſt upon the perpetual abuſe of the Words, *do*, *act*, &c. which upon this Hypotheſis muſt have a Signification directly oppoſite to that which they now commonly bear; what can we mean by a Man's accuſing or condemning himſelf, when he is ſenſible that he has done nothing which he could have altered or avoided; or rather done nothing at all, but only *ſuffered* all the while from ſome other? He may indeed perceive and judge himſelf to be miſerable, and be ſorry that he is ſo, and wiſh himſelf otherwiſe; but what is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorſe, and Self-conviction? Is this all that we underſtand by a *Guilty Conſcience?* Can he blame, reproach, or be angry with himſelf for being only what another made him, and what he knows he could not poſſibly help?

At this is matter of Fact and Experience, we appeal to the common Senſe of Mankind, whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorſe, *&c.* be not entirely different, and evidently diſtinguiſhable from theſe. The ſame holds with regard to our blame or accuſation of another, as has been ſhewn at large by Biſhop *Bramhall*, to whoſe *Caſtigations* of *T. Hobbs* I muſt refer this Author. "I aſked (ſays the Biſhop †) why do we blame free "Agents ſince no Man blameth Fire for burning Cities, "nor accuſeth Poiſon for deſtroying Men. Firſt, he return-"eth an Anſwer, *We blame them becauſe they do not pleaſe us.* "Why? May a Man blame every thing that doth not pleaſe "his Humour? Then I do not wonder that *T. Hobbs* is ſo "apt to blame others without Cauſe. So the Scholar may "blame

‡ *Philoſophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty*, p. 105, 106.

† Pag. 764.

VII. The ſecond Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able to oppoſe the natural Appetites, Senſes and Reaſon, and can pleaſe itſelf in the Oppoſition. If we experience this Ability in ourſelves, we may be certain that we partake of ſuch a Power.

The ſecond token of this Power, that it can go againſt the Appetites, &c.

VIII. With reſpect to the natural Appetites, we have ſaid before,* that this Principle, when it happens to be joined with natural Appetites in the ſame Perſon, often runs counter to them, and pleaſes itſelf in reſtraining them; if we find that

'Tis ſhewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites.

NOTES.

" blame his Maſter for correcting him deſervedly for his Good. " So he who hath a vitious Stomach may blame healthful " Food. So a Lethargical Perſon may blame his beſt Friend " for endeavouring to ſave his Life. And now, having ſhot " his bolt, he begins to examine the Caſe, *Whether blaming* " *be any thing more than ſaying the thing blamed is ill or imper-* " *fect.* Yes, moral blame is much more, 'tis an Imputation " of a Fault. If a Man be born blind, or with one Eye, we " do not blame him for it: but if a Man has loſt his Sight by " his Intemperance, we blame him juſtly. He enquireth, " *May we not ſay a lame Horſe is lame?* Yes, but you cannot " blame the Horſe for it, if he was lamed by another, with- " out his own Fault. *May not a Man ſay one is a Fool or a* " *Knave* (ſaith he) *if he be ſo, though he could not help it?* If he " made himſelf a Sot, we may blame him; though, if he be a " ſtark Sot, we loſe our Labour. But if he were born a natu- " ral Idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame " him for it. Where did he learn that *a Man may be a Knave* " *and cannot help it?* or, that Knavery is impoſed inevitably " upon a Man without his own fault? If a Man put fire to his " Neighbour's Houſe, it is the fault of the Man, not of the " Fire. He hath confeſſed formerly, that a *Man ought not* " *to be puniſhed but for Crimes*, the reaſon is the very ſame, " that he ſhould not be blamed for doing that which he could " not poſſibly leave undone; no more than a Servant whom " his Maſter had chained to a Pillar, ought to be blamed for not " waiting at his Elbow. No Chain is ſtronger than the Chain " of *Fatal Deſtiny* is ſuppoſed to be."

See the ſame Author's Definitions of Liberty, Neceſſity, &c. with his Defence of them, p. 756, &c. and his reply to all *T. Hobbs*'s Evaſions (ſince tranſcribed by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, p. 91, &c.) in his *Vindication*, p. 679, &c.

* Subſect. 3. par. 11, 12.

we can do this, 'tis a Sign that we have it. But who has not experienced this in himſelf? who has not ſometimes voluntarily ſuffered ſuch things as are hard, incommodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight in ſuch Sufferance, as a Good ſuperior to the Gratification of the Appetites? (55.) Nay the Pain itſelf ariſing from the Violence offered to theſe natural Appetites, if we do but chooſe to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would otherwiſe be very irkſome. From whence it is moſt apparent that this Pleaſure depends upon the Choice; for while that continues it continues too; when that is changed, 'tis gone. Now ſuch Elections as theſe are made every Day, and none can be ſo much a Stranger to himſelf, as not to be conſcious of them. (56.)

That we can do it alſo in our Senſes, and in a manner change the nature of things by an obſtinate Election.

IX. It is to be obſerved farther, that we do not only embrace with pleaſure ſuch things as the Appetites refuſe, and reject ſuch things as they deſire, but alter, as it were, Nature itſelf by an obſtinate Election,

NOTES.

(55.) To this *Leibnitz* anſwers, "That it is only oppoſing "or ballancing one Appetite with another. We ſometimes "bear Inconveniencies, and we do it with pleaſure, but this "only by reaſon of ſome hope, or ſome ſatisfaction which "is joined to the Evil, and which ſurpaſſes it." We reply, if by hope be meant an expectation of ſome future Good, 'tis plain that we can oppoſe and reſiſt any natural Appetite without any ſuch Expectation, as may be experienced when we pleaſe, in Hunger, Thirſt, &c. The proſpect of the bare pleaſure of willing to do ſo cannot be the Good hoped for, ſince that is a ſure attendant on every ſuch Volition; all the ſatisfaction then which appears to be joined with the Evil, and to counterballance it in any ſuch Caſes, can only be the pleaſure ariſing from the actual Exertion of the ſelf-moving Power, which is the thing our Author contends for. See the latter part of Note 45.

(56.) 'Tis a common and juſt Obſervation, that Men as well as Children bear any Labour or Fatigue which they undertake voluntarily, with half the Uneaſineſs and Grief which the very ſame thing would give them, if they were forced to undergo it; which cannot, I think, be accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle.

Election, and make these Appetites pursue what they naturally avoid, and fly what by Nature they desire. And this takes place not only in Appetites, but also in the Objects of the Senses. Some things are naturally unpleasant to them, some bitter, nauseous, deformed; yet these are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change of the natural Propensity, at length become Delights *. On the contrary, what was sweet, beautiful, *&c.* being rejected by the Will, becomes at length disagreeable. We could not possibly do this, if we had not a Power of pleasing ourselves by other Means than the agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senses. For whence comes it that such things as are sweet, comely, excellent, commodious; nay, all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senses should become irksome and offensive? On the contrary, whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay Death itself should be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unless from this Principle which pleases itself in its Election? If it be granted that we have such a Principle, these things may easily be accounted for; since natural Good may, by the Power of it, be changed into Evil, and Evil into Good: for it has a Good in itself superior to these, by means of which it can overcome and alter the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Explanation will be shewn below †.

That we can conquer not only our Appetites and Senses, but also our Reason by the force of Election.

X. These things are generally supposed to be done by the Power and Prescription of *Reason*; and 'tis thought, that the Will under its guidance embraces things disagreeable to the natural Appetites and Senses: I confess this sometimes is, and always ought to be done according to reason; for we have hinted above, that some regard should be had to these in Elections; but very often the Case is

* *See Mr.* Locke's *Chapter of Power*, §. 69. *Tho' all this may be effected by the sole Power of Election, and without the Reasons which he there assigns for it.*

† *See the following Section.*

is far otherwiſe. We have ſhewn before, that a Power which is capable of pleaſing itſelf in Election, cannot be determined by reaſon; for the Underſtanding depends upon it, rather than *it* upon the Underſtanding. 'Tis therefore the *third* Mark and Property of this Power, that it can run counter, not only to *Appetites* and *Senſes*, but alſo to *Reaſon*. If we can do this, we muſt own to our Sorrow, that we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, conquer not only the Appetites and Senſes, but the Underſtanding too, (*S.*) daily Experience teaches; and we have reaſon to lament that it can be prov'd by ſo many inſtances that we pleaſe ourſelves in Elections contrary to the natural

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(*S.*) 'Tis objected that the Will doth not indeed always follow the Judgement of the underſtanding, becauſe there are other Motives that come from inſenſible Perceptions and ſecret Inclinations which determine it: but that it always follows the moſt advantageous repreſentation of Good and Evil, which reſults from Reaſons, Paſſions and Inclinations whether diſtinct or confuſed: and yet it is alledged that this is not contrary to Liberty or Contingency. For there are two kinds of Neceſſity, one founded on a Contradiction, *i. e.* the Propoſition affirming a thing to be includes ſuch a Neceſſity that it ſhould be, as to make it a Contradiction to ſay it might not be, the Cauſes that produce it being neceſſary. The other kind is when there are ſufficient Cauſes to produce the Effect, and ſuch as will infallibly produce it, but there is no Contradiction in ſaying they may not produce it. Tho' therefore he that underſtands perfectly all the Cauſes and Motives that concur to an Event, muſt know the Reaſons how it comes to paſs; and that thoſe Reaſons were ſo ſufficient that they prevail'd certainly and infallibly; and the Man that had ſuch a repreſentation of the prevailing Good or Evil of what he was to chooſe, was carried certainly and infallibly to the Reſolution he took; yet this is not neceſſarily, becauſe it doth not imply a Contradiction that he ſhould have determin'd himſelf otherwiſe.

Licet enim nunquam quicquam eveniat quin ejus ratio reddi poſſit, neque ulla unquam detur indifferentia æquilibrij, cum potius ſemper ſint quædam præparationes in cauſa agente concurrentibuſq; quas aliqui prædeterminationes vocant: dicendum tamen eſt has determinationes eſſe tantum inclinantes, non neceſſitantes; Ita ut ſemper aliqua indifferentia ſive contingentia ſit ſalva; nec tantus unquam in nobis appetitus eſt ut ex eo actus neceſſario ſequatur.

Nam

tural propenſity of our Senſes and Appetites, and at the ſame time againſt the dictate of Reaſon.

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Nam quamdiu homo mentis compos eſt, etiamſi vehementiſſime ab ira, ſiti, vel ſimili cauſa ſtimulatur, ſemper tamen aliqua ratio ſiſtendi impetum reperiri poteſt, & aliquando vel ſola ſufficit Cogitatio exercendæ libertatis & in affectus Dominij.

In anſwer to this, which ſeems the ſtrength of what is abjected againſt the Author's Notion of Liberty, I deſire theſe few things may be conſider'd:

Firſt, that it is not eaſy to comprehend this neceſſity of Contradiction, which is inconſiſtent with Liberty, or to diſtinguiſh it from that Neceſſity which is only founded on Conveniency, and yet never fails to ſucceed, becauſe there is always a ſufficient Reaſon or Cauſe to produce the effect. I wiſh there had been an Example given of the one and t'other that we might have been able to paſs a better Judgment of them. For to me it ſeems that at this rate all the actions of Beaſts are as free as thoſe of Men. If a beaſt be never ſo hungry, and turn'd out into never ſo tempting a Paſture, yet there is no Contradiction in ſaying that he may abſtain from eating. Nor do I ſee how his Appetites being determin'd any more oblige him to eat, than a Man's, when all Circumſtances, Motives, Prediſpoſitions and Qualifications incline him to it.

2dly, At this rate the effects of all natural Cauſes would be free. For it is no contradiction to ſay the Sun will not riſe to morrow, but his riſing is no more free on that account. And in truth I do not find that any Propoſitions but thoſe that concern metaphyſical and abſtract Verities, are in this Senſe neceſſary. All the effects of natural Cauſes have only a *poſitive* or hypothetical neceſſity, that depends on the Will of God. Yet if we conſider only the Sun, and the part he has in raiſing himſelf, he cannot be ſaid in any tolerable ſenſe to be free in riſing. And ſo if we conſider all things given which are neceſſary to an Action, either a Man can in theſe Circumſtances forbear his Action, or he cannot; if he can he is indifferent, for *poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis poteſt agere vel non agere*, which is the very definition of an indifferent, free Agent: If he can't ſuſpend the act, then is the neceſſity as great on him in theſe Circumſtances as on the Sun to riſe.

If it be ſaid the caſe is different, becauſe a Man has Underſtanding which is always ready to ſuggeſt to him new Conſiderations to ſtop his Actions. I anſwer, whence come theſe new Conſiderations that alter the Man's Circumſtances? If from the Will, then it determines itſelf after all, and is not determin'd by any diſpoſition, motive or reaſon from without: But if theſe Conſiderations that change the Will are independent of it, and ariſe from any external diſpoſition, reaſon or inclination, he is no more free that is determin'd to his Choice by theſe, than

'Tis appears from Inſtances.

XI. We have ſeen an Atheiſt ſupported by the Obſtinancy of a perverſe Mind, enduring Torments, Con-

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than the Sun is free to move when natural Cauſes determine him to that Motion.

Every one may not ſee all the Chains and Movements that lead him to his Choice, but if the will be *paſſive* in its Determination, they are as certain and infallible as if he were drawn with Chains of Adamant. And whereas it is ſaid that the mere thought of exerciſing our Freedom is ſometimes ſufficient to ſtay the importunity of all our Paſſions and Inclinations: I anſwer, If the Will can croſs all external Cauſes which incline it to a determination, purely on this account, that it will exerciſe its Liberty, then it is a clear caſe, the exerciſe of its Liberty is a greater good to it than all other Conſiderations, which is the very thing I plead for.

But 3dly, I aſk how comes this Conſideration of exerciſing its Liberty in its way? The Underſtanding, you ſay, offers it. But is it without Cauſe that it offers it, or cou'd it not have offer'd it? If the Cauſe be in the Underſtanding, that is neceſſary, and could no more forbear offering it than the Sun could forbear riſing. But ſuppoſe this Conſideration offer'd, no matter how, can the Will ſtill reject it? If it can, we are as far from a determination as ever. For that rejecting muſt be either from the Will itſelf, or ſome other Cauſe, concerning which the ſame Queſtions recur; and ſo on till we come at the firſt Cauſe, God. In all which Chain every link is neceſſarily connected with the next before it, and ſo according to the Repreſentation in Poets, the fatal Chain is tied to the Chair of *Jupiter*. He, and he alone is accountable for all the Good and Ill of all Sorts in the World. Nor doth it in the leaſt help Liberty or Contingence that there is no contradiction in the Propoſitions that relate to the being or not being of Things; for as long as there is a Chain of natural or moral Cauſes that certainly and infallibly produce the effect, in which the Will is abſolutely paſſive, there is no more room for Liberty in intelligent Cauſes than in natural.

I know very well Men do many things willingly, as Beaſts eat their Food, and that ſome call this Liberty and Contingence; but they might as well call it an Elephant or a Horſe. For if this were the Queſtion, whether Men did things voluntarily and with a full inclination, no body could queſtion but they did: but it is plain when we aſk whether a Man be free or no, our meaning is whether he has a full power to do or not do any thing notwithſtanding all previous Conditions and Circumſtances, in which providence has placed him. Not that a Man is always abſolutely indifferent: for he may have Reaſons and Inclinations that may byaſs him greatly one way;

Confinement, and Death itſelf, rather than abjure his beloved Impiety: We have ſeen a great many Perſons

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yet notwithſtanding that byaſs, he has ſtill a power to act againſt them all, and pleaſe himſelf in ſo doing.

'Tis plain to me that they who are againſt this true Freedom muſt be poſſeſſed with an opinion that all things in Nature are paſſive and acted on by others; which was expreſsly Mr. *Hobbs*'s Doctrine: and tho' they endeavour to diſtinguiſh themſelves from his Diſciples, 'tis in vain: their ſentiments come to the ſame thing as to neceſſity, and the ſame cauſes, reaſons and arguments are produced by both; the concluſion alſo is the ſame, only the one calls that an abſolute neceſſity, which the other calls neceſſity of convenience; that is of a thing's being, becauſe there is ſufficient reaſon to produce it. For the very reaſon by which he proves his neceſſity, is this of a *ſufficient Cauſe*. If the cauſe, ſays he, be ſufficient, and all Prediſpoſitions, Conditions and Qualifications requiſite be preſent, the effect will certainly follow; which is true. If then the conſent of the Will be cauſed by ſomething without itſelf, thoſe conditions being preſent, it will neceſſarily follow. If it be not ſo cauſed, if it has a power in itſelf to act and make a thing good or bad, agreeable or diſagreeable by its choice, 'tis plain that nothing external can determine it. This proves Liberty, *a priori*. For if there be ſuch a power 'tis evident that *poſitis omnibus extra ſe ad agendum requiſitis, poteſt agere, aut non agere*. All that is pretended to determine it is the antecedent conſiderations of Good or Evil; but where the chief good expected ariſes from the determination itſelf, and is conſequent to it, there 'tis impoſſible it ſhould be determined by ſuch Conſiderations.

And this ſeems to me the true reaſon, why ſome are ſo angry at this new Notion, as they call it, of things pleaſing us becauſe we chooſe them, ſince it utterly deſtroys their Notion of a paſſive Will determined only by antecedent views of Good and Evil, and demonſtratively eſtabliſhes Freedom; therefore they treat it as a Chimera, a Fairy and Romance.

But 2dly, 'Tis urged that this is a power to chooſe without any Motive, without any final or impulſive Cauſe, which is a great imperfection. Anſwer, I deny that this is to chooſe without any motive or final Cauſe. 'Tis chooſing indeed without any motive or cauſe which is foreign to the Will; ſo that it does not depend in its Operations on any external Objects, but has the Cauſe, motive and end of its actions in itſelf; and ſure 'tis not the worſe for being thus independent; it has a Cauſe and End, even to pleaſe itſelf, and ſurely to have it in its own power to do ſo is far from an Imperfection.

Suppoſe

Perſons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul, leſt they ſhould be diſappointed in a

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Suppoſe two Men, one has ſufficient to feed and cloath himſelf in his Poſſeſſion, the other is forced to go abroad and beg for both, and let any one Judge which of them is in the moſt perfect or happy Condition.

3dly, Tis ſaid it does not appear how pure indifference can contribute to Happineſs; on the contrary the more a Faculty is indifferent the more muſt the Perſon poſſeſſed of it be inſenſible of the Good he enjoys. But ſure thoſe that raiſe ſuch Objections have either never read or little minded the Book. If the Author had taught that the Faculty continued indifferent *after* the Choice, there had been ground for ſuch an Objection; but on the contrary he holds that after the Election is made, the Will is as much attached to the thing choſen whilſt the Election continues, as the natural Appetites are to their Objects; and it enjoys it with as much, nay greater pleaſure, and to ſuch a degree that ſometime it prefers the Enjoyment of it to Life. But the Happineſs lies in this, that it is not obliged to chooſe, and when it has choſen, if it can't enjoy the Object of its choice, it may reject it again.

4thly, 'Tis urg'd that ſuch a Faculty as this would render Science uſeleſs, reduce all actions to mere Chance, and leave us no Meaſures or Rules for them.

I can't but wonder what ſhould induce any to bring ſuch Arguments. The Caſe is this: Man is placed by God in a World where he is concerned with, and has relation to many Objects; he has many Appetites which he may gratify by the right Enjoyment of theſe Objects; he may meet with many diſagreeable things in the courſe of Affairs, and may employ himſelf in many things that in the end will prove impoſſible to compaſs, that may hurt his fellow Creatures, or incroach on things forbid him by his Creator: To comprehend theſe he has an underſtanding given him, as well as a power to chooſe or refrain from any of them; but becauſe his Underſtanding is not infinite, and therefore he may often miſtake, and it may ſo happen that the bars and limits aſſign'd by God and Nature may hinder him from enjoying what his natural Appetites require, and his Judgement ſees wou'd be moſt agreeable to him; therefore God has given him a power of Choice, whereby he may make thoſe things agreeable that would be otherwiſe, were he only to gratify his natural Appetites. So that this Power is ſuperior to them all, and in a great meaſure commands them and their Actions; inſomuch that he finds a pleaſure and Satisfaction often in curbing and reſtraining them. Nay this Faculty is of ſuch force that it always carries its Satisfaction with it; and tho' it cannot abſolutely change the

nature

a fooliſh Choice. We have beheld not a few diſregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind; Dangers, Diſtreſſes, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell; in ſhort, deſpiſing all that is Good, or could appear to be ſo, when ſet in competition with ſuch things as, excluſive of the Goodneſs which they receive from Election, are mere Trifles and worth nothing at all; ſuch as have no manner of Good or pretence of Good in them. There have been Perſons who knowingly, without any kind of hope, any kind of belief, have deſtroyed themſelves and their Relations, and yet were in their right Mind and conſiſtent with themſelves, if a right Mind may be judged of by ſober Words and a ſerious tenor of Action. Did theſe Men follow Reaſon, or any other Good beſide the fruition of their Choice? We have ſhewn already that this Power may produce theſe and greater Abſurdities; for ſince it is ſuppoſed to be of ſuch a Nature as can pleaſe itſelf

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nature of the Appetites, or make us not feel the natural Evils that ſurround us, ſuch as pain, torment, diſappointment; yet by its exerciſe it raiſes us ſo much Satisfaction as to make theſe tolerable, if not pleaſing to us.

Now muſt not every one ſee that ſuch a Faculty as this acts on the greateſt reaſon and for the beſt end, even to make all the Actions of a Man's Life, as far as poſſible, pleaſing to him? And doth it not appear that ſuch a Will needs plain and certain Meaſures and the greateſt prudence and judgment to act by: otherwiſe it may fall into impoſſible, abſurd or wicked Choices? It has been ſhewn in the Book what limits are aſſign'd our Wills by God and Nature, and how neceſſary it is we ſhould keep within them. In ſhort the Argument is as if one ſhould alledge, a Prince is abſolute Governour of his Kingdom, and muſt not be controled by his Subjects, therefore he needs no Counſellors, becauſe he is not obliged to be determined by them. But ſure the more abſolute he is, the more need he has to preſcribe good Rules to himſelf, and adviſe with the beſt Counſellors he can find, becauſe he has it in his power to rule well, and none is to blame but himſelf if he do not. Whereas if he were to be determined by his Counſellors, he wou'd be under no ſuch concern, ſince they, not he, wou'd in all reaſon be anſwerable for his Miſtakes.

itſelf in its Act, where ever it can exert that Act, it can alſo pleaſe itſelf, even in oppoſition to the natural Appetites, the Senſes and Reaſon. If then ſuch a Principle be granted to be in us, it will not ſeem ſtrange that we ſhould be able to do things that are repugnant to theſe; if this be not allow'd, it cannot be made appear how ſo many Abſurdities, ſo many things diſagreeable to Reaſon, to Senſe; ſo many things contrary to the dictate of the Mind, ſhould every Day be committed by Mankind.

That the Underſtanding admits not only evil things for good, but Falſities for Truths *viz* being under ſubjection to the Will.

XII. Nay, which may ſeem more ſtrange, the Will appears to have ſo great a Power over the Underſtanding that the latter is ſo far ſubdued by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forced to admit Falſities for Truths. Neither will this appear impoſſible to one who recollects that the Senſes are as much natural Faculties, and have by Nature as quick a Reliſh of their proper Objects, and can as well diſtinguiſh thoſe that are agreeable from them that are diſagreeable, as the Underſtanding. If therefore we ſometimes pleaſe ourſelves in chooſing what is repugnant to the Senſes, 'tis alſo poſſible for us to take pleaſure in embracing what is diſſonant to Reaſon. The Senſes are forced to admit and tolerate ſuch things as are diſguſtful to them, which things they take for agreeable by uſe, having as complete Enjoyment of them as of thoſe that are adapted to them by Nature *. The ſame may happen ſometimes to the Underſtanding, *viz.* to be compelled by the Will to admit Falſities for Truths, to believe them thro' cuſtom, and at laſt make uſe of them ſeriouſly as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, *that we eaſily believe what we eagerly deſire*; and ſome take a pleaſure in ſubduing not only Senſe, but Reaſon too. I confeſs, he that does this, acts fooliſhly and is much to blame; but

* *Nay generally more ſo: 'Tis a common Obſervation, that ſuch things as were at firſt the moſt diſagreeable of all to the Palate, become by uſe the moſt delightful:* viz. *Wines, Tobacco, Olives, &c.*

but from this very thing, that we act fooliſhly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can, but actually do pleaſe ourſelves in Elections which are made contrary to Reaſon; and that the Judgment of our Underſtanding depends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determined by it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of a Power of pleaſing itſelf by Election agree to us, and therefore we certainly partake of it.

'Tis proved that we have this Power from a conſideration of thoſe reaſons which are ſuppoſed to determine the Will.

XIII. The ſame will appear, thirdly, from conſidering the Reaſons which move us to the choice of theſe *Abſurdities*, according to the Opinion of thoſe Men who think that the Will is *paſſive* in Elections. For if, while they are labouring to aſſign Reaſons for theſe and the like Determinations, they produce nothing for Reaſons but the very Elections themſelves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that they are in a Miſtake, and offer Effects for Cauſes; which will appear more fully from an Enumeration of thoſe Reaſons which are ſuppoſed to move the Will in ſuch Caſes.

Thoſe are enumerated.

XIV. The Principle of theſe Reaſons are *Errors of the Underſtanding*, *Obſtinacy of the Mind*, *the force of Paſſions*, and *Madneſs*; on theſe are charged all the unreaſonable, abſurd, and impious Actions of Men; theſe are eſteemed the Cauſes of all ſuch Elections as cannot be allowed to proceed from the intrinſic Goodneſs of the Objects which are choſe: but this is all groundleſs.

Firſt, Errors of the Underſtanding: theſe are ſhewn to depend upon depravd Election rather than to cauſe it.

XV. For in the firſt place, as to *Errors of the Underſtanding*, 'tis certain that we ſometimes chooſe hurtful Objects by miſtake, which we often lament, but never impute to ourſelves, except we be conſcious that the Error was voluntary, *i. e.* in ſome reſpect owed its Origin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for that depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by miſtake that we chooſe Abſurdities, but by chooſing Abſurdities

we miſtake the Truth. But to confeſs the Truth, we are hurried on in an abſurd Election, tho' we ſee and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any Error, 'tis only this that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election, than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident that there ariſes ſo much Pleaſure from Election as is able to impoſe upon the Underſtanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural Good; nay to Life itſelf. But whether this be done erroneouſly or wiſely, 'tis the ſtrongeſt Argument that we have ſuch an Elective Self-pleaſing Principle as this within us.

Secondly, Obſtinacy, which is ſhewn to be nothing elſe but perſevering in a deprav'd Election.

XVI. Secondly, as for *Obſtinacy*, by which they ſuppoſe that we are moved to chooſe abſurd things; 'tis plain that this is nothing elſe but the perſeverance of a bad Election: neither can Obſtinacy and Perverſeneſs be explained otherwiſe than by Elections. If it be granted that theſe things pleaſe us becauſe they are choſen, we ſee clearly enough what Obſtinacy is, *viz.* an unneceſſary adherence to an Election, and a Self-complacency in it, contrary to the dictate of Reaſon, and with the loſs of natural Good. (57.) But if the Will be determined from without, there will be no ſuch thing as Obſtinacy. By

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(57.) *Leibnitz* (in his Remarks frequently cited above) argues* "That Obſtinacy is not barely the continuance of a "bad Election, but a diſpoſition to perſevere in it, proceeding from ſome Good that a Man forms to himſelf, or from "ſome Evil which one ſuppoſes to attend the change. The "firſt Election, ſays he, was made perhaps thro' *mere Levity*, "but the reſolution of adhering to it comes from ſome ſtronger Reaſons or Impreſſions". But if this be all that is meant by Obſtinacy, how come the World to fix ſo bad a Notion to that Word? If it be a diſpoſition always proceeding from a proſpect of Good, or dread of Evil, and founded on ſecond thoughts and ſtronger Reaſons, how can it ever be deemed a Crime? Again, if the *firſt* Election can be made without any external

By an obſtinate Perſon we only mean one that has continued a long time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judgment. Now he that does this is miſerable indeed, but cannot be called in the leaſt degree obſtinate, according to the common Notion of Mankind.

XVII. Thirdly, ſince neither Errors nor Obſtinacy are ſufficient to explain the Nature of theſe Elections, they fly to the *Power of the Paſſions*; *viz.* the Deſire of Fame or Glory; Anger, Hatred, *&c.* Theſe are the Cauſes, ſay they, why we chooſe abſurdly, and by them the Choice is determined. But Fame or Glory have no manner of Good in them, eſpecially to thoſe who believe that they ſhall not exiſt after Death: why then are theſe Men content to purchaſe Glory with Life? Certainly from no other Cauſe beſide Election; 'tis by Election that we have form'd theſe Idols to ourſelves, and

Thirdly, The violence of Paſſions, *viz.* Deſire of Fame and Glory, *&c.* all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election.

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external Motive, (which he ſeems to allow by aſſigning *Levity* as the ſole Cauſe of it) why may not the perſeverance in it be ſo too? may not the ſame Cauſe be ſuppos'd to produce the ſubſequent Elections, as well as the firſt? In ſhort, *Leibnitz*, after all his ſeeming oppoſition to our Author on the head of Liberty, moſt evidently grants the Queſtion both here, and p. 480. where he affirms, that in effect we are able to change the Natures of things, and make theſe transformations abovementioned. "But this (ſays he) is not as among the *Fairies*, "by a ſimple Act of that Magic Power; but becauſe a Man "darkens or ſuppreſſes in his Mind, the repreſentations of "the good or ill Qualities naturally joined to certain Objects, "and becauſe we only regard thoſe which are agreeable to "our Taſte, or Prepoſſeſſions; or even becauſe we join by "force of thought, certain Qualities, which are only found "united by accident, or by our cuſtomary way of conſidering "them". Now what is it to darken or ſuppreſs the repreſentations of good or ill Qualities,—to regard ſome only and neglect others,—and to join Qualities to Objects by the force of thought,—but to exert this very Power in debate? Which often chooſes the fruition, or even the conſideration of ſome one out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and by that ſimple Act makes it agreeable to our Taſte, and joins ſuch Qualities to it as could neither proceed from Chance nor Cuſtom, nor any Aſſociation of Ideas whatſoever. See the Concluſion of this Subject in the following Note.

and from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talked of after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name to diſtant Regions; theſe things pleaſe us on no other account but becauſe we will them. Obſcurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as pleaſing to the Man that chooſes them, and have been ſo. Thoſe Perſons then who imagine that theſe determine Elections, take Effects for Cauſes. For theſe, which are nothing in themſelves, ſhew us that they acquire ſo much Goodneſs from Election as makes them over-ballance all kind of natural Good.

The ſame is ſhewn of Hatred, Love, &c.

XVIII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of Anger, Hatred, Love and Deſpair, by which many are believed to be driven upon Abſurdities. But in reality all that is abſurd and pernicious in theſe Paſſions proceeds from Election. Nature has given us Paſſions which are generally innocent, while ſolicited only by their proper Objects, and natural Opportunity, as we ſee in Brutes; but they are compelled to change the natural Objects by the Power of Election: thus Anger and Hatred are excited by the Will, and applyed not to ſuch things as are naturally hurtful, nor Love and Deſire to ſuch as are naturally deſirable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have no natural Congruity, ſuch as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this kind alſo are moſt of the Inſtruments of Luxury, which are commonly ſaid to pleaſe, purely by the ſtrength of *Fancy*, that is in reality, by Election. Hence it is that Men purſue with ſo great eagerneſs and emotion ſuch things as are in themſelves trifling, pernicious, and abſurd. Nay they barter away Life itſelf for Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, caſt off that in diſpair. 'Tis the Election itſelf which ſubſtitutes theſe things as fit to be proſecuted by theſe Paſſions inſtead of their natural Objects, and while they are hurried on, not according to the exigence of Nature, but the command of the Will, they confound

found every thing, tranſgreſs the bounds of reaſon and utility, and diſregarding theſe rage without limits or reſtraint.

XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature but the Will, and ſetting aſide Election are mere nothing. For whatever is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account given why any one ſhould undergo Labours, Dangers, Griefs and Difficulties; why he ſhould loſe his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he reſolved within himſelf, but that he *choſe* to ſatisfy them. 'Tis evident that the moſt unexperienced Perſon is ſufficiently convinced of this. But theſe, when once embraced by Election, become more agreeable than thoſe things which Nature has made neceſſary. Thoſe abſurd Elections then are not made by the force of theſe Paſſions, but the abſurd and irregular force of theſe flows from Elections. Of Envy and Revenge.

XX. They who perceive that theſe Cauſes are inſufficient, have recourſe to *Madneſs* and *Phrenzy*, in order to account for abſurd Elections: but this is playing upon Words, and taking Madneſs in a different Senſe from that wherein it is commonly underſtood. He is looked upon as mad that is ſo far diſordered in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one Idea from another, nor make Obſervations upon what he ſees: but theſe Men who do ſo many abſurd things enjoy the abovementioned Powers, and have their Underſtanding and Senſes ſtrong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which drives them into Abſurdities? The power and prevalence of the ſuperior Faculty, *viz.* the *Will*, which has a Good peculiar to itſelf, which it produces by Election. This it purſues regardleſs of all that Reaſon, the Body, Circumſtances, Appetites and natural Faculties require. For while it can provide for and pleaſe itſelf, it is not at all ſolicitous about any thing which may prejudice theſe, but has a certain Complacency Fourthly, *Madneſs*: 'tis prov'd on the contrary, that theſe Men are in their Senſes who chooſe abſurdly.

in its own Exerciſe, and endeavours to augment its Happineſs by the purſuit of ſuch things as are repugnant to them. The more Difficulties and Abſurdities it encounters, the more it applauds itſelf in a conſciouſneſs of its own Abilities; which ſeems to be the very thing that we call *Vanity* and Pride. Hereupon it compels the Senſes, Reaſon, and natural Appetites, to be ſubſervient to its Elections: nor can he be call'd a Madman who acts againſt Reaſon, thro' the force of a ſuperior Faculty, any more than he that falls from a Precipice by the violence of a greater impulſe. For it is not every one who acts againſt reaſon, that muſt immediately be looked upon as Mad, but only he that acts abſurdly from ſome injury done to the underſtanding Faculty itſelf, or an Impediment to the Uſe of Reaſon: he that could have followed the dictate of Reaſon and yet knowingly violated it, muſt not be reckoned mad, but wicked, unleſs we will impoſe upon ourſelves by changing the cuſtomary Names of things.

All theſe things cannot be explained otherwiſe than by admitting a Principle of this kind.

XXI. If it be granted that we have this ſuperior Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all theſe things may come to paſs. For he that is endowed with it, will be able to pleaſe himſelf in the Proſecution of his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to the prejudice of Senſes, Appetites and Reaſon; which we often ſee done to our Amazement; but unleſs we have this Faculty imparted to us, it does not ſeem poſſible for us to create Good to ourſelves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to every natural Good.

As much good ariſes from this Principle, ſo it is attended with this Evil, *viz.* a Power of ſinning.

XXII. Theſe things, I confeſs, ought not to be done; but if nothing could be done which ought not, there would be no ſuch thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good ariſes from this Principle, ſo there is this Evil alſo, that by it Crimes and Follies are committed: And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it ought not.

XXIII.

XXIII. From theſe and other Arguments which might be brought, I think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, and that our Will is only determined by itſelf. They are miſtaken therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Paſſions, or Underſtanding, determine Elections. What probably gave occaſion to the Miſtake was, that other things pleaſe or diſpleaſe us, beſide what we chooſe, *viz.* ſuch as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senſes. Now it being obſerved that we have regard to theſe in Elections, and do not chooſe any thing repugnant to them, but upon neceſſity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of the Underſtanding ought to be made uſe of in chooſing, and being accuſtomed to this kind of Choice, we become at laſt perſuaded that it is abſolutely neceſſary, and that our Wills are always determined by ſome Judgment of the Underſtanding: at leaſt, that it is a Condition requiſite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing choſen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, *viz.* that the Mind judges things to be good becauſe we have willed them, becauſe we have formed an Appetite in ourſelves by ſome antecedent Election, and thoſe things which we embrace by this *factitious Appetite*, as we may call it, give us equal Pleaſure with that which we deſire by the Neceſſity of Nature.

This miſtake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding, aroſe from hence, *viz.* that it is imprudent in us to act without conſulting the Underſtanding.

XXIV. Nay, we chooſe Objects which are contrary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reaſon, and deſtitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this only Reaſon, that we may aſſert our Liberty of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power of pleaſing himſelf in Election. Nor can he be ſaid to be determined by the Judgment of the Underſtanding; for this reaſon is made by the Mind itſelf, and may ſerve equally for every Election, ſince it is drawn from the Indifference of

We can act in order to ſhew our Liberty, which is proved to be the ſame as acting without any reaſon at all.

the

the Will itſelf: and he who does any thing upon a reaſon which is made by himſelf, and is indifferent to either Side, muſt be eſteemed to act in the ſame manner as if he had done it without any reaſon at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make uſe of the Appetites and Senſes only as Spies and Informers; of Reaſon as a Counſellor; but that the Will is Maſter of itſelf, and creates pleaſure for itſelf in Objects by Election. (58.)

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(58.) Upon the whole it appears that the true deſcription of Free-will muſt include thus much. A Power of chooſing or not chooſing, or of chooſing either Side in any given Caſe; naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulſion, influence or neceſſity; phyſically determined by either bodily Senſations, Appetites, *&c.* or mental Perceptions, Reaſon, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the purſuit of ſome before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them; or laſtly, of preferring the very conſideration of ſome unknown Objects to all the reſt; of deliberating upon, or attending to ſome particular Ideas, and reſolving to overlook others, though equally preſented to the Mind, and ſuppoſed to be of equal Importance.

All this is contained in the very Notion of a *Self-moving Power*; (though none perhaps have given ſo full and diſtinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in ſtrictneſs moves itſelf, is properly and phyſically independent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do ſo; what is determined in certain circumſtances by or according to particular Senſations, Motives, *&c.* and cannot poſſibly be determined either without or againſt them, is ſo far, and in ſuch circumſtances, only moved, acted upon, and purely paſſive. If then there be any ſuch thing, properly ſpeaking, as an active Principle, it muſt be endowed with ſuch an abſolute Indifference as our Author ſuppoſes: and when we ſpeak of the *ſtrongeſt Motives*, we don't mean ſuch as have the greateſt phyſical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (ſince we ſuppoſe none of them to have any at all) but only ſuch as the Mind moſt commonly determines itſelf upon in fact; and to argue from ſuch determinations that theſe Motives muſt have ſuch an Influence both abſolutely and comparatively, *i. e.* whether taken by themſelves, or in oppoſition to each other, is manifeſtly to beg the Queſtion, and ſtill to ſuppoſe that it cannot move or direct itſelf, notwithſtanding our moſt evident perception and experience of the contrary. And that

SECT. II.

Where it is ſhewn that Happineſs conſiſts in Elections.

I. FROM what has been ſaid above, it appears that a Being endowed with a Power of chooſing is more excellent and perfect than one that is without it; For that which neither acts nor

The more free any Being is, the leſs he is expoſed to Motions from without, and meets with leſs inconvenience.

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we have ſuch experience, a little reflection on ourſelves will convince us. "I think (ſays Mr. *Collíber*,) I may appeal "to any conſidering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary "Caſes ſenſible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon any "particular Object, even antecedently to any deliberation, "and then, whether after deliberation about particular Objects "he cannot reſume his deliberation, and ſometimes vary his "Judgment; and whether, after the cleareſt Judgment, and "moſt deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be "not ſtill conſcious of a power of ſuſpending his practice, of "reſuming the conſideration of the Objects whenever he plea-"ſes, or of immediately chooſing or practiſing the contrary, "without being determined by impreſſions from without, or "impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof "of our own Exiſtence than *Conſciouſneſs*: and I conceive we "need not expect greater Evidence of any thing than we have "of our Exiſtence."*

If then our Mind has ſuch a power of ſelecting ſome particular Ideas out of many perceived by the Underſtanding, and attending to them alone without any previous apprehenſion of their nature and tendency, without any ſpecial Reaſon, Motive or Inducement whatſoever to ſuch particular Choice; if the Mind, I ſay, does in ſome Caſes exert ſuch a power as this, then it is in theſe Caſes abſolutely free. It cannot here be directed by the Judgment, ſince it is ſuppoſed to act independently of it: nay it may be properly ſaid ſometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obſtruct and ſubvert the Judgment itſelf, for as much as it confines that to ſome particular Objects only, and of conſequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of theſe and withdraws others from it, which were

* *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 42, 43. See alſo an *Eſſay on Conſciouſneſs*, p. 205, &c.

nor is acted upon, is the fartheſt from Perfection, ſince it is of no more uſe in Nature than if it were nothing

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were abſolutely neceſſary to a compleat View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the ſpring of all Errors, at leaſt all criminal ones, hence vitious, abſurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the ſame Power alſo duly apply'd proceeds the happy conſciouſneſs of Deſert, and in it is entirely founded all the Reaſon of Reward. It's uſefulneſs then, and neceſſity, appear both for the eſtabliſhment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happineſs; and alſo, that we might always have wherein to pleaſe ourſelves, which (as our Author has ſhewn in the latter end of Subſect. 4.) otherwiſe we very often could not. Hence it appears I think ſufficiently, that this Power is one of our greateſt Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come ſhort of Infinity) it be liable to the greateſt abuſe, and ſo capable of being turned into the worſt of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquired with our Author, whether all the Happineſs ariſing from it counterballances the Miſery, and conſequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this ſee § 2. and 5.

We ſhall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle againſt the three principal Oppoſers of Liberty abovementioned. In the firſt place then, we don't aſſert that by this Power the Mind can chooſe Evil *as Evil*, or refuſe Good *as Good*, i. e. that the former, as ſuch, is or can be a *Motive* for Choice, or the latter for refuſal: But we ſay that it can chooſe the one and refuſe the other *without any particular Motive at all*; (i. e. any drawn from the particular nature of the Object choſen,) nay, in oppoſition to the ſtrongeſt Motive (*viz.* that Motive which preſents the greateſt Happineſs, and which it uſually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its free, active or ſelf-moving Power. ‡

You'll ſay it does this to prove it's own Power, and the pleaſure attending ſuch proof is the ſtrongeſt Motive in theſe Caſes. I anſwer, that granting this to be ſo (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was obſerved from the *Eſſay on Conſciouſneſs* in Note 45.) yet this, as our Author obſerves, muſt be a Motive of its own creating, which, with reſpect to Volition, is the ſame as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring to prove, *viz.* that the Soul has a Power of determining to think or act, and of pleaſing itſelf in ſuch determination, without any other Motive or Reaſon

‡ *See* Jackſon's *Vindication of human Liberty*, p. 49, &c. or *the beginning of* E. Strutt's *Defence of Dr.* Clarke's *Notion*, &c.

nothing at all; that which is purely paſſive in its Operations is one degree more perfect, but that which

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ſon but what is produced by itſelf, and follows that very determination, without any external Cauſe whatſoever: in which Power all its Liberty conſiſts, and the greateſt Part of its Happineſs, as will appear in the next Section.

Nor ſecondly, will ſuch a Power as this only make us liable to miſtake the true Good which is in things (as the Author of the *Philoſoph. Enquiry* and *Leibnitz* argue) but on the contrary, it often *makes* true Good or Happineſs in thoſe things which of themſelves had none at all; and improves thoſe things which have, and alleviates thoſe which have the contrary Qualities; and of conſequence is not an *Imperfection*, but a very valuable and neceſſary Perfection. Our Author does not ſuppoſe us left to an abſolute, blind indifference in all Objects (as *Leibnitz* often urges) without any Guide or Direction in the Choice of them; which would indeed be an imperfection; but affirms that the Mind of *Man* is ſenſibly and neceſſarily affected by ſome, and informed by his Underſtanding of the Nature and Effects of others, and ſo is ſufficiently directed to the Choice of theſe which are in themſelves good and agreeable to his Conſtitution, and *vice verſa*; yet ſtill with the reſerve of a full Power of following or not following that Guide, of neglecting or refuſing that Direction: Which *Power* therefore, even in theſe Caſes, remains ſtill unaffected. In other Objects, he ſhews that the *Man* is totally indifferent, which yet, by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no leſs conſtituent Parts of his Happineſs.

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be formed to the common Queſtion, *What Benefit* is there in a Power of chooſing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exactly alike? We anſwer, the Benefit of enjoying *any one* of them; which Enjoyment a Man could not poſſibly have without ſuch a Liberty, but muſt neceſſarily hang in perpetual Suſpenſe, without any Choice at all: this *Leibnitz* owns to be an unavoidable conſequence of his Opinion * and to avoid this Abſurdity, is driven to a greater, *viz.* to deny that there are any ſuch indifferent and equal things in Nature † the contrary to which has been abundantly evinced already with reſpect to both God and Man.

Laſtly, to the Argument againſt the *Poſſibility* of ſuch a Liberty, ſo frequently repeated by the two Authors above mentioned, *viz.* that Actions done without any Motive, would be *Effects* without a *Cauſe*; We reply, in ſhort, that it is a plain *Petitio*

* *Eſſais de Theodicee*, p. 161, &c.

† *See his 4th Letter to Dr.* Clarke.

which has the Principle of its Actions within itſelf, ſince it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is alſo more *of itſelf*, i. e. it ſeems to be made for its own ſake, and chiefly to reſpect its future Benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. Nor does it ſeem poſſible for a greater Perfection to be communicated than the fruition of ſuch a Principle. The more free any one is, and the leſs liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is: God has therefore multiplied this kind of Creatures as far as the Syſtem and Order of his Work allowed, and decreed that ſuch as are paſſive in their Operations ſhould be ſubſervient to theſe.

Happineſs ariſes from the proper uſe of the Faculties, *&c.* If therefore a Power of chooſing be the moſt noble of all, the greateſt Happineſs will conſiſt in the Exerciſe of it, *i. e.* in Elections.

II. Since therefore Happineſs, according to the common Notion of it, is granted to ariſe from a due uſe of thoſe Faculties and Powers which every one enjoys; and ſince this Power of determining ourſelves to Actions, and pleaſing ourſelves in them, is the moſt perfect of all, whereby we are the moſt conſcious of our Exiſtence and our Approach towards God; our chief Happineſs will conſiſt in the proper uſe of it, nor can any thing be abſolutely agreeable to us but what is choſen. (*T.*) It is to be confeſſed that many external Objects,

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Petitio Principii, in ſuppoſing Motives to be the real *phyſical efficient* Cauſes (and theſe are the only Cauſes which can concern the preſent Queſtion) of Volition or Action, which we deny; and yet are far from ſuppoſing theſe Acts to be abſolutely without a Cauſe; nay we aſſign them another, and affirm that their only true and proper Cauſe is this ſelf-moving Power, and the only Cauſe of this is the Creator who communicated it.

On this Subject may be ſeen Dr. *Clarke*'s *Demonſtrat.* p. 136, *&c.* 2d Edit. or his *Remarks*, &c. p. 28, *&c.* or *Chubb*'s *farther Reflections on Natural Liberty. Collection of Tracts*, p. 388, *&c.*

(*T.*) Againſt this it is objected, 1ſt, That the Author here deſcribes Free-will to be a Power of chooſing this or that without any dependence either on the other Faculties or Attributes of the free Agent, or on the Qualities of external Objects.

Anſwer.

jects, many that are offered by the Senſes, pleaſe us; but if we look into the thing more narrowly, this

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Anſwer. The Author never ſaid or imagined that Liberty was a power to chooſe *in all Caſes* without any dependence on the other Faculties, or the Qualities of Objects, but the direct contrary; *viz.* that all other Faculties of the Agent were to be conſidered, his Appetites conſulted, and the fitneſs of Objects obſerved. He expreſly teaches that if a free Agent chooſe any thing contrary to the natural Appetites without any Cauſe, he gives himſelf unneceſſary trouble, if any thing above his power to compaſs, or impoſſible in the Nature of things, he makes himſelf ſo far unhappy. That which the Author maintains is only this, that Goodneſs is the Agreement of a thing to ſome Appetite, and that agreement may either ariſe from the natural fitneſs of the Object to the Appetite, or the Appetite's accommodating itſelf to the Object; that God has given us a power in many Caſes, and indeed in the moſt common Affairs of Life, to accommodate our will to things; that this is done by our chooſing them, and whatſoever we ſo chooſe, if we can enjoy it, as long as the Choice continues, will pleaſe us; and laſtly, that this power is of mighty advantage to us; for we can't expect that things ſhould always anſwer our natural Appetites, and therefore ſince it is unreaſonable all the World ſhould be made to accommodate us, 'tis a great Benefit that God has given us a power to accommodate ourſelves to the things as we find them; if we make a right uſe of this power we may be always happy, for we may always chooſe ſuch things as we can enjoy, and reject thoſe that can't be had, and if we do ſo we may be always pleaſed.

Thus things may become Good or Evil to us by our Choice, and our Happineſs or Miſery will depend upon it. Now he that would in earneſt confute this Notion has but one of theſe two things to do, either firſt, to ſhew that there is no ſuch Power or Faculty poſſible, or 2dly, That there is no advantage in it.

I will put the rambling Objections that I have met with in as good a method as I can, though they are generally ſo little to the purpoſe, that it is harder to bring them in than anſwer them.

2dly, Therefore it is urged that we know by experience that to make a Man pleaſe himſelf in his Choice, it is not neceſſary that he ſhould believe that he is not inſenſibly and imperceptibly directed to it by ſome external Cauſe; and the inference from this, if intended againſt the Author, muſt be, that therefore a Man's chooſing a thing doth not make it pleaſing to him: but nothing like this follows; all that can be juſtly inferred

this will appear to ariſe from hence only, that theſe are as Motives which induce us to exert an Act

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ferred is that whether a choice be free or neceſſitated it is ſufficient to make the thing choſen agreeable.

It were in vain to produce all the Inſtances impertinently brought to prove that a neceſſitated choice may pleaſe us. Yet to ſhew how ſtrangely ſome Authors can wander from the point, I will examine one or two of them. Firſt, it is ſaid, if a Man ſhould upon mature Deliberation reſolve on a thing, and whilſt about to execute it, on a ſudden a ſtrong impetuous thought comes into his Mind to do ſomething elſe, and he follows that and ſucceeds, he would conceive an extraordinary Joy; for he muſt imagine that God, a good Angel, or his good Fortune had prompted him to do it, and therefore it is not his Choice that pleaſes him.

I anſwer, Firſt, it is plain ſuch a Man alters his Choice, and makes a new one, and that new one pleaſes him; if his former Choice continued, he cou'd not have made the new one, nor would the doing the thing he is about otherwiſe ſatisfy him.

But 2dly, We muſt diſtinguiſh between the Choice and the means of obtaining it. When once the Choice is made, the moſt eaſy and effectual ways of obtaining the thing choſen pleaſe us beſt. A Man is to fight a Battle, his choice is to conquer; he thinks of means to execute it. Several ways occur and he pitches upon one, which pleaſes and is choſen, not for itſelf, but as ſubſervient to his deſire of Victory. An Angel appears and directs him to another: none can doubt but this will cauſe extraordinary joy in him, becauſe it brings him to obtain his Choice by the moſt certain and infallible means. Now this is ſo far from proving that Choice is not the thing that gives goodneſs to Objects, that it directly proves the contrary. For here the only thing that makes him reject what his reaſon propoſed to him as the beſt means to obtain his Choice, is becauſe he has diſcovered a better. On the other Hand, if a General out of treachery ſhould deſign to loſe a Battle, and it happened in the hurry that he ſhou'd be forced to do ſomething that gained it, he would not pleaſe himſelf in the Action. Here's a Victory that is good to one, and ill to another, and the difference lies plainly in the one's chooſing and the other's rejecting it.

But 2dly, 'tis objected, that a *Janſeniſt* or *Calviniſt* who gives an Alms, and is perſuaded that God inſpires him to do ſo, is better pleaſed with himſelf than a *Stoick*, who attributes to himſelf all the Glory of a charitable Action. Well, what then? Therefore things do not pleaſe us becauſe we chooſe them,

Act of Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to the natural Appetites: for tho'

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them. No ſuch Matter. A true Chriſtian, call him *Janſeniſt*, or what you will, chooſes to prefer the Glory of God to his own, and therefore he is better pleaſed to think the Glory of what he does belongs to God, than to himſelf, as this is more agreeable to his Choice.

In ſhort, all the Inſtances I have ſeen are of the ſame Nature, and if there were a thouſand of them they all receive the ſame anſwer, they are nothing to the purpoſe, and prove no more than that Men are beſt pleaſed with the moſt effectual means to obtain their Elections.

But 3dly, It is alledged that if the Happineſs of Man conſiſts in his Choice, God ought to have left him fairly to that Choice, ſo that neither the other Faculties of his Soul nor Qualities of Objects ſhould have any power over him to reſtrain the uſe of his Freedom.

If I underſtand this right, the meaning of it is that God ſhould not have given Man any particular Appetites determin'd to their Objects, or made any thing impoſſible for him to attain that he pleaſed to chooſe. This I confeſs had been a freedom with a witneſs, for it had put it in the power of every Man to turn the World as he pleaſed. But if one Man had this power no other could have had it. For things can be but one way at once, and if one Man had put them into a certain method, all the reſt muſt either have been content with that or have been miſerable; but God has put them in the way that is beſt, and ſince they muſt not be changed, he has given every Man a Power to conform himſelf to them, and pleaſe himſelf in the Choice: And to ſecure the preſervation of Men the better, he has given them natural Appetites to ſuch things as are neceſſary for their ſupport, and thereby guarded their Choice from hurting them as much as the nature of things, and the circumſtances in which they are placed will permit; which is ſo far from being an injury, that it is a great inſtance of Divine Goodneſs by ſetting bounds to our Choice where it might hurt us, and leaving us in all other matters to pleaſe ourſelves by a free Election. Thus he has obliged us to take care of our lives by a ſtrong Appetite to continue our Being. He has ſecured our feeding our Bodies by the Appetite of Hunger, ſo that we are uneaſy under it; and yet that uneaſineſs is not ſo great, but our choice, tho' with ſome difficulty, will make it pleaſing to us: and ſo in all other Appetites by which we are prompted to ſupply our natural neceſſities. And thus they always miſtake the Matter that preſume to teach God what he ſhould do.

tho' the Will cannot be determined to Election by any thing but itſelf, yet it may be *perſuaded to determine*

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But 4thly, It is urged, that we deſire Happineſs neceſſarily, and cannot chooſe Evil as Evil, and therefore our Choice does not make things agreeable, that is, good. But I ſee no manner of conſequence in the Argument, it rather proves the contrary. For we muſt take notice that Good and Evil are reſpective things, and have relation to ſome Appetite. Now we have ſeveral Appetites determin'd to their Objects, and the things agreeable and diſagreeable to them are good or bad antecedently to choice. But there are other things, that have no agreeableneſs or inconveniency to any Appetite before Election, and then are good or bad as they agree with that Choice. Now 'tis plain that there is nothing good or bad in reſpect of our natural Appetites, but we can chooſe it, even Death itſelf: and therefore it is not meant of them, or of this ſort of Evil, when we ſay we can't chooſe Evil. But it is abſolutely impoſſible that we ſhou'd chooſe what is contrary to choice, and ſo Evil in that ſenſe; for then we ſhou'd chooſe it and not chooſe it at the ſame time. This give us the reaſon why we cannot chooſe Evil *as ſuch*; becauſe it is made good by our Choice. And if a Man's choice of things, and enjoying them, be that which makes him happy, it is impoſſible he ſhou'd not chooſe Happineſs, becauſe whilſt he chooſes and enjoys a thing, he can not at the ſame time chooſe to reject and want it, that is, be unhappy.

But 5thly, 'Tis further objected that thoſe who believe that they are only free from conſtraint, thoſe that think their Will is determin'd by the Underſtanding, and thoſe who are of opinion that they poſſeſs indifference of Will, are all equally content with themſelves, ſo they chooſe conveniently; that is, ſo they enjoy their choice, or attain ſome great good whether they foreſaw it or no.

I anſwer, this may be true, but nothing to the purpoſe; ſince it is manifeſt all of them make a Choice, and provided they obtain what they have choſen, they are ſo far ſatisfied; which only proves that whether we believe our Choice to be neceſſitated or voluntary, it is of ſo great force as to make the thing choſen agreeable, *i. e.* Good, as long as the Choice laſts.

The true point in Queſtion here is which of theſe Hypotheſes will beſt ſecure the Happineſs of Men. As to the Firſt of theſe Opinions, that ſuppoſes us free only from conſtraint, and that our Choice is neceſſarily determined to the good or ill we conceive in Objects, the Author has proved that on this ſuppoſition Happineſs is impoſſible, in his 5th Chap. Sect. 1. Sub-

ſect.

termine itſelf, in order to avoid what is abſurd and diſguſtful to the Natural Appetites.

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ſect. 1. par. 18. As to the 2d, which ſuppoſes the Will to be determined by the laſt act of the Underſtanding, this is ſhewn to be equivalent to neceſſity, becauſe the Underſtanding is neceſſary and obliged to judge as things appear to it. And as to the 3d, that places an indifference in the Will, the Author has ſhewn, Chap. 5. Sect. 1. Subſect. 2. par. 8. that mere indifference of Choice is of no uſe, but rather an impediment to Happineſs, except the Will have at the ſame time a power to make the thing choſen agreeable. If ſuch a Power be in the Will, the Author ſhews, Subſect. 3. of the ſame Sect. Par. 22. that the Agent poſſeſs'd of it may be happy tho' he have a very imperfect Underſtanding and commit many Miſtakes.

It ought likewiſe to be conſider'd that if we really have this Power, it is not material whether we know or believe that we have it or no, for whatever our opinion of it be, it will do its own Work. If a Man believe himſelf free, as generally Men do, when he really is neceſſitated by a force he doth not perceive, he is never the freer on that account. And if he believe himſelf neceſſitated contrary to what he feels in his own Mind, as ſome are perſuaded to do by the ſophiſtical Arguments of vain Philoſophers, he is never the leſs free for that. And hence it is that whatever opinion Men have concerning the Freedom or neceſſity of choice, they are equally pleaſed or diſpleaſed with it, when once it is made; becauſe the pleaſure doth not ariſe from their opinion concerning the Faculty, but from the uſe of it.

But laſtly, 'tis ſaid that good Angels and Saints in Heaven have no ſuch Liberty as this; that the good Angels are perfectly determined to love God, and the Souls of Men as ſoon as they enter Heaven, ceaſe to be indifferent to Good and Evil, and can't make any other than a good Choice.

If this is intended againſt the Author's Poſition, the Inference muſt be either that the Angels and Saints do not chooſe to be in Heaven, or that Heaven doth not pleaſe becauſe they chooſe to be there, neither of which Conſequences do at all follow. But then is it not ſtrange that a Liberty of indifference which remains no longer than our miſerable ſojourning on Earth, and is at an end as ſoon as a Man begins to be perfectly happy, ſhould be neceſſary to our Happineſs, and the Fountain of it here? To which I anſwer, that the whole Argument is founded on a great Miſtake.

The Author believes that the Angels and bleſſed in Heaven are happy only by this means, that they freely chooſe every act that they perform, and are always able to execute what they

Election is the cauſe why things pleaſe us.

III. For 'tis certain that we make uſe of the Aſſiſtance of the Underſtanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to diſtinguiſh Good from Evil; but we uſe it as a Judge and a Counſellor, not as a Sovereign and a Dictator: and to ſpeak the truth, in order to avoid fooliſh and hurtful things, rather than to acquire what is good and agreeable. For whatever we chooſe will (as was ſhewn before) be *ipſo facto* good, and agreeable, except it lead us into ſomething contrary to the Appetites, or otherwiſe abſurd. The Underſtanding therefore points out and admoniſhes us (as we ſaid before) to avoid theſe external Evils, or to embrace the Good: but till we have exerted an Act of Election about them, neither is the one abſolutely pleaſing, nor the other diſpleaſing. We have proved before that this is the Caſe, and it will be evident from

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chooſe. I own that they never chooſe amiſs, nor ever will: but the reaſon of that is not want of Power, but becauſe either 1ſt, their Circumſtances are ſuch that they have no opportunity to make ſuch Choices: Or 2dly, becauſe they are ſo well pleaſed with the choice they have made that they will never alter it; or 3dly, becauſe their Experience has ſhewed them what miſery an ill choice has brought on them or others. Time was when ſome angels made an ill choice, and were thrown into Hell for it: can we wonder if thoſe that remain are grown wiſer, and have learnt by the miſery of their Fellows to chooſe better? The ſame may be ſaid of the Saints. They may remember the Miſeries they ſuffered here on Earth, and that may teach them how to avoid the like: But to argue that becauſe they will not chooſe amiſs, therefore they cannot, is a falſe Concluſion. The truth is, herein conſiſts their Virtue, their Goodneſs and Merit, that having the power to chooſe amiſs, they will not; and being poſſeſſed of a Faculty which they may either uſe well or abuſe, they employ it to the beſt. Thus we may underſtand how the Saints and Angels are confirmed in Goodneſs, not mechanically, or by a phyſical reſtraint on their Wills, but by the firmneſs of their reſolution and ſteadineſs of choice. If the caſe were otherwiſe, their Virtue were no Virtue, nor any way praiſe-worthy; they would be good Creatures, as the Sun is good, but no more thanks to them than to him.

Let

from Experience to any one that conſiders it. If then nothing pleaſe us but what is in ſome reſpect choſen, 'tis manifeſt that our Happineſs muſt be ſought for in Election.

IV. We have ſhewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is merely paſſive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for as it is liable to external Motions, it muſt neceſſarily meet with hurtful as well as uſeful Objects; nor is it poſſible that all things ſhould be agreeable. It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from all kind of Grief ſhould have the Principle of his own Happineſs within him, and be able to delight himſelf, in what manner ſoever external things be diſpoſed; *i. e.* that he have the Government of his own Actions, and may pleaſe himſelf by willing either this or ſomething elſe: Such an Agent as this is, will be ſatisfied with any Object that occurs; ſince Objects are not choſen by him becauſe they pleaſe him, but on the contrary, pleaſe him becauſe they

He therefore that has a free power of chooſing, can always pleaſe himſelf.

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Let us conſider farther, that tho' the Angels and Bleſſed in Heaven ſhould have loſt their Freedom ſo far as not to be able to choo.e Evil, yet this doth not take away their Choice in other actions. We muſt not think that theſe bleſſed Creatures are altogether idle, and have no buſineſs or exerciſe of their Faculties; they ſurely employ themſelves in what is good, and as there may be great variety of actions in which they may employ themſelves with pleaſure, there is ſtill choice enough left them, and the reaſon why one ſort of exerciſe pleaſes them more than another ariſes from their Choice. For having no neceſſities to ſupply by labour as we have here, no particular exerciſe is neceſſary to them, and therefore nothing can be ſuppoſed to make one exerciſe more pleaſing than another, but their Choice. And in truth we count ourſelves the moſt happy here when we have no particular buſineſs to oblige us to labour, but are left to employ our time as we pleaſe.

But laſtly, we don't know how it is with the Saints and Angels in Heaven; we know they are happy, but how or by what means we are entirely ignorant, and muſt be, till we get there, and therefore no argument ought or can be drawn from the ſtate of their Happineſs to ours.

they are choſen. Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himſelf happy, *viz.* by chooſing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice to things.

We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and ſo can attain Happineſs.

V. And this ſeems to be the only way that Creatures can be made completely happy: for ſince things themſelves are neceſſarily fixed by certain Laws, and cannot be changed, it remains that the Elections be altered, in order to make them conformable to things, *i. e.* to the Will of God: for thus free Agents will have a Power in themſelves of attaining Happineſs. Hence it is that we are ſo frequently admoniſhed in Holy Scripture to be *conformed to God**; on this Point our Salvation and Happineſs turn: And with good reaſon; for what is Happineſs, if not to be in every thing as we will, or chooſe? But he who chooſes to conform himſelf in all things to the Divine Will, muſt certainly be always what he would be, and will never be diſappointed in his Choice: however external things fall out, a Perſon thus diſpoſed may enjoy Happineſs, nor does any one ſeem to have been capable of it on other terms.

Care of the Body and the natural Appetites diſturb Elections in this preſent ſtate, and hinder our Happineſs from being perfect.

VI. But perfect Happineſs, may ſome ſay, is not to be expected; for thoſe Beings which are united to terreſtrial Matter muſt neceſſarily be affected with the Motions of it, as was ſhewn before, and cannot bear the diſſolution of the Body, or the impairing of its Organs (which are yet unavoidable) without ſome Pain and uneaſy Senſation. I confeſs, abſolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for in the preſent State: But yet the more our Elections are conformable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections were perfectly free, we ſhould alſo be at Liberty to enjoy perfect Happineſs; but ſince the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appetites diſturb our Elections, and ſometimes byaſs them to one Side, we cannot pleaſe ourſelves in Elections abſolutely, and without a Mixture of Uneaſineſs.

For

* *Rom.* 12. 2. *Coloſſ.* 3. 1, 2, *&c.*

For though they afford Delight, and even greater than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner of Uneaſineſs, nor extinguiſh the Senſe of Pain. While therefore we are in this State, we muſt acquieſce in a mixed and imperfect Happineſs, ſuch as the preſent State of things affords; and it is plain that this, ſuch as it is, ariſes only from Elections. For tho' we cannot by mere Election always extinguiſh the Pain and Uneaſineſs which ariſes from our being forced to bear ſuch things as are diſguſtful to the natural Appetites, yet we can chooſe to bear theſe things, and pleaſe ourſelves in that Choice: the Conſciouſneſs of our Powers in bearing theſe ſurpaſſing the Uneaſineſs of Pain, nay perhaps augmenting the Pleaſure ſo far as that the Exceſs of it ſhall overcome the Pain ariſing from the fruſtrated Appetites by ſo many Degrees as could have been obtained, if there had been no contrariety between them and the Election. For inſtance, if one feel two Degrees of Pain from a Diſtemper, and receive ſix Degrees of Pleaſure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum; ſubſtracting two Degrees of Pain from theſe ſix of Pleaſure, he has four of ſolid Pleaſure remaining: He will be as happy therefore as one that has four Degrees pure and free from all Pain. If this be granted to be poſſible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as if nature had given us none, nor will there be any cauſe to complain of them. (*U.*)

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(*U.*) The true advantage of ſuch a Faculty appears in many inſtances, as is obſerved in the Book. Firſt, when by the courſe of Nature and the Order of the World we are obliged to undergo many things contrary to our natural Appetites, many things painful and diſagreeable. 2dly, when by the weakneſs of our Underſtanding we are obliged to make choices the conſequence of which we cannot foreſee, as it muſt often happen to a finite Underſtanding. 3dly, when the general good of the World requires us to ſacrifice our particular Intereſt or Appetite. Laſtly, where there is little or no diffe-

We have reaſon to admire the Divine Wiſdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to pleaſe itſelf in its own Nature, howſoever external things be diſpoſed.

VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire the Divine Goodneſs and Wiſdom, which (ſince Objects

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rence in matter of choice, as it happens in moſt things of Life. In all theſe and many other Caſes the right uſe of this Faculty gives us eaſe and Satisfaction, and without it we muſt be in continual torment.

If it be ſaid that Reaſon tells us we ought to be content and ſubmit in ſuch caſes, and therefore if the Will be determined by the laſt act of the Underſtanding, there will need no ſuch Faculty as the Author pleads for, that can make a thing good by chooſing. I reply, on the contrary this very caſe ſhews the neceſſity of ſuch a Faculty. For ſuppoſe I am ſick and feel great pain; my Underſtanding tells me this is unavoidable, that it is the Will of God and the courſe of nature, and therefore I ought to bear it with patience. If I have a power of chooſing thus to bear it, and by that choice of making it pleaſing to me, it is to very good purpoſe that my Underſtanding makes this repreſentation, for by means thereof I obtain a degree of Happineſs in the midſt of all the natural Evils that oppreſs me. But if I have no ſuch power to chooſe, or if I chooſe and that choice does not make the thing I ſuffer better, it is in vain that my Underſtanding makes ſuch a repreſentation; it only tells me that I am miſerable, but yields me no help. Counſellors are of great uſe to a Perſon that has a Power to execute what they adviſe; otherwiſe their advices are in vain, and only ſerve to augment the Perſon's Miſery by ſhewing his impotence to help himſelf. 'Tis thus between the Underſtanding and the Will; if we ſuppoſe no power in the Will by chooſing to make Objects agreeable or diſagreeable, it is in vain for the Underſtanding to adviſe us to chooſe them. To what purpoſe ſhould we chooſe them, when our Choice can make no alteration in them as to their Good or Evil Qualities?

But here it will be ſaid that antecedent to the Choice there is a goodneſs in bearing ſickneſs patiently, and the Underſtanding by repreſenting that Goodneſs to the Will determines it to chooſe it, and from that ſenſe of Good ariſes the pleaſure and eaſe we find in Patience. But this I think is a plain miſtake: for we often find one Man of better ſenſe than another uneaſy under pain, whilſt the weaker makes it eaſy to himſelf.

If you diſcourſe theſe two, you'll find that the Man of better Underſtanding has a much clearer repreſentation of all Motives that may induce patience than the other; knows exactly all the benefits of Contentment, and how much it is his intereſt to comply with his circumſtances; and yet he does it not. How then comes this difference? Whence can it ariſe

but

Objects are generally fixed and confined under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that ſhould have

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but from this, that the one chooſes to comply and the other does not? If it be merely the reaſons and motives being more advantageouſly repreſented to one Man than the other, that makes the one patient and the other impatient under pain; either that repreſentation ariſes from ſome free act of the Will, or from ſome natural or accidental diſpoſition, inclination, or circumſtance of the Agent. If from a free act of the Will; then it recurs to what was pleaded for at the firſt, *viz.* that we are pleaſed becauſe we chooſe. But if the repreſentation that determines our Choice ariſe from any natural or accidental diſpoſition, *&c.* theſe being all external to the Will, and out of its power, 'tis plain the determination can't be free. He is a happy Man to whom ſuch a diſpoſition, *&c.* happens, but he can't be looked on as more virtuous or commendable than he that chooſes ill becauſe he wants them. He may be commended, as Gold or Jewels are, becauſe he has ſome things that agree to our deſires, but not as an Agent that merits thanks or praiſe for Virtue.

And here I muſt obſerve that the generality of Men imagine that every thing antecedently to choice is either Good or Evil, and we ſo far concerned in it, that except we could poiſe the whole World exactly, and ballance all future conſequences with reſpect to our convenience or inconvenience, we could never perform any act but what muſt either contribute to our Happineſs or hinder it. But this is a moſt falſe Suppoſition, and contrary to reaſon as well as experience. For it happens in a thouſand Inſtances that the things we chooſe are of ſo little moment as to be perfectly indifferent to us, and that only pleaſes beſt which we chooſe. A Man is walking in a bowling-green, the exerciſe of his Limbs is all that he deſigns, and which way ſoever he walks he is equally pleaſed. But if any hinder him after he has choſe his way, or force him to a different one, it will provoke his Anger, and perhaps put him on a Quarrel that may coſt him his Life.

There's no neceſſity therefore that to make an equilibrium for the Will, the World ſhould be ſo divided that all impreſſions from one part, and the other, ſhould be actually equal: for as a Man may turn the beam of a ballance with his hand, though as many weights lie in the other Scale as it can hold; ſo the Will may determine itſelf, though all the conſiderations the World affords lay in oppoſition to the thing we chooſe: but it often happens that the World affords none at all either way, and then the Will turns the ballance as it pleaſes. And in truth, if our Happineſs were concerned in every circumſtance

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have wherewith to ſatisfy it within itſelf; and might render any State agreeable, barely by willing it. Now

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of Life; it were unreaſonable to oblige us to chooſe before we knew them all, which is impoſſible, and ſo God would have made a right Choice to depend on an impoſſible Condition. Whereas if we have a power by the pleaſure of our Choice to ballance the inconveniencies that happen from outward things, it ſufficiently juſtifies the Divine Goodneſs, tho' he has put us in ſuch Circumſtances that it is impoſſible always to regulate our Choice as we would have done, had we foreſeen all the Conſequences that attend it.

But here 'tis urged, that though a Man doth not always perceive the reaſon which determines him to chooſe one of the two things that ſeem perfectly equal, yet there is always ſome ſecret impreſſion that does determine him. But this is to ſuppoſe the very thing in Queſtion; juſt as if a Man ſhould go about to ſolve an Objection, to which he could find no other anſwer, by telling the Objector that it could not be true, becauſe if it were, the poſition againſt which he produced it muſt be falſe.

In ſhort, we prove the Freedom and Indifference of the Will by producing many Inſtances where there is no motive to determine it one way more than the other; Nay, when viſible Motives are againſt it. To which the Enemies of Free-will reply, 'tis true, they can't produce or find any reaſon; but there is one, though imperceptible to the Man that chooſes, as well as the reſt of the World. Which as it is ſaid, without reaſon needs none to confute it.

But they ought to remember that to chooſe any thing for a reaſon not known or obſerved; is to chooſe without reaſon; a reaſon unknown is no reaſon at all, except they'll ſay that the will is determined as mechanically as matter is by impulſe.

But we carry the Matter yet much farther, and ſhew that where there are many and ſtrong Motives, great conveniency and agreeableneſs to our natural Appetites on one ſide, and nothing but the exerciſe of our Liberty on the other, we often prefer that to all theſe Motives, and are well pleaſed with ourſelves, when we have done ſo.

The Men that might live an eaſy and quiet Life engage in buſineſs, toil and labour, and every one is ſo well pleaſed with his Choice, that it is hard to ſay amongſt ſo many ſtates and ſuch variety of Conditions, which are moſt happy: and though they ſometimes complain when preſſed with inconveniencies, yet as *Horace* obſerves, hardly one would change if an Option were given him. If the things themſelves pleaſe abſtractedly from Choice, moſt Men being of one Make, and having the

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Now Free-Will has this Effect by accommodating itſelf to Objects, when the Objects themſelves cannot be changed. For the Man will be no leſs happy who chooſes what he knows will come to paſs, than he who brings that to paſs which he chooſes; the

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ſame Paſſions, Wants and Appetites, thoſe only that had all things ſuitable to thoſe Appetites could be pleaſed, and all the World would be confined to one way of living.

But as Happineſs ariſes from the Choice, it ſo happens that in the great variety of Circumſtances wherein Men are placed, they generally are pretty equally happy, becauſe they enjoy their Choice. A Mariner's is a life that ſeems intolerable to me, and deſtitute of all thoſe things that are agreeable to my natural Appetites; ſuppoſe then I am forced to that kind of Life, muſt I needs be miſerable? No, I will and can make it my choice; not from any Motive which my Underſtanding affords me, for it repreſents it as diſagreeable in every reſpect: But I will chooſe and reſolve to follow it, that it may pleaſe me, and by the force of that Choice it will at length become agreeable.

If it be ſaid that the neceſſity which is on me to lead that ſort of Life determines my Choice; I anſwer, that quite contr[illegible], nothing is more oppoſite to choice than force, and we find nothing is apter to make us reject and be diſpleaſed with a thing than to ſee it forced on us. My being forced therefore on Ship-board would rather raiſe an averſion than pleaſure in me; but as ſoon as by the power of my Free-will I reſolve to live that Life, and be pleaſed with it, I find the pleaſure begin and grow upon me. If there be any Wiſdom in the World, undoubtedly this is the Maſter-piece, to make all things eaſy to us by chooſing the ſtate and condition of Life in which neceſſity has placed us.

But my Underſtanding repreſenting the evil and hardſhip of a thing with the neceſſity of bearing it, will no way contribute to my eaſe, except at the ſame time it aſſure me that I can take away or diminiſh the natural Evil that accompanies it, if I chooſe to endure it with Contentment. Without this the Conſideration of the neceſſity that is upon me would rather encreaſe the difficulty and uneaſineſs I feel, than allay it; as knowing the danger of a diſtemper encreaſes a Man's fear of Death, if at the ſame time no remedy be offered.

In ſhort, the Exerciſe of this Faculty of making things agreeable by Choice is all the remedy Nature affords us under unavoidable ſufferings; if we have it not, we have none; and if we have, it takes off the complaint we make againſt God for putting us in ſuch Circumſtances where we neceſſarily muſt undergo ſuch Evils.

the one may always be done, the other is often impoſſible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happineſs. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happineſs who has it in his Power to pleaſe himſelf. This ſeems to have been the Opinion of the ancient *Stoics*, who had the ſame thoughts of Liberty with thoſe laid down above, but did not explain them diſtinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter.

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happineſs in the Uſe and Election of ſuch things as are in our own Power; which yet would be impoſſible, if we were not able to pleaſe ourſelves in Election. (59.)

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(59.) Our Author's mentioning the *Stoics* here, might probably give *Leibnitz* his reaſon to ſuſpect him of maintaining all the abſurd Conſequences which that Sect are ſaid to have drawn from the above mentioned Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly miſrepreſented) urged it ſo far as to aſſert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleaſed: that all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power and of our making; and conſequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleaſure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to *Leibnitz*'s Objections of confounding all the diſtinctions of things,— of contradicting the natural Appetites,— making Reaſon and Underſtanding uſeleſs,— and ſubverting all the other Faculties of the Mind. Theſe and the like Reflections, I ſay, are juſtly made upon the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, as they have generally expreſs'd themſelves; and overthrow a total, *abſolute Indifference* of the *Mind* to will in all Caſes; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, inſiſts upon a neceſſary, fixed, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the preſent Syſtem; and has allowed their full force to both Reaſon and the natural Appetites, all over the laſt Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book.

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an application of this Section. See § 5. Subſect. 2. and the Notes to § 5. Subſect. 3.

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SECT. III.

Concerning undue *Elections.*

I. FROM hence it is ſufficiently evident what kind of Elections are to be called *undue* ones: For it appears that God has given us this Faculty of chooſing, that we may pleaſe ourſelves in the uſe of it, and be happy in the fruition of thoſe Objects which we chooſe. For it is a Happineſs to obtain the things choſen, and Miſery to be fruſtrated and fall ſhort of them. Whenſoever therefore we knowingly make ſuch a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things choſen, it is plain that we chooſe fooliſhly and unduely: for we bring upon ourſelves unneceſſary Miſery, ſince we could have choſen otherwiſe with equal Pleaſure. Whoever then chooſes knowingly what he cannot obtain, or what may produce unneceſſary trouble to himſelf or others, muſt be eſteemed to chooſe unduely. And this may be done, firſt, If any one chooſe *Impoſſibilities.* It may ſeem ſtrange that any Perſon ſhould chooſe a thing which is impoſſible, knowing it to be ſo; but 'tis very probable that this has happened ſometimes, as was ſaid before.*

To fall ſhort of what we chooſe is Miſery; we chooſe amiſs therefore when we chooſe what cannot be enjoy'd: This is done 1ſt. when ſuch things are choſen as are *impoſſible.*

II. Secondly, If he chooſe ſuch things as are *inconſiſtent* with each other: he that does this contradicts himſelf, and evidently cuts off all hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we muſt take all its neceſſary conſequences together with it. But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitterneſs: we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuſe the reſt: but this is in vain, ſince the agreeable Parts cannot be ſeparated from the diſagreeable ones: we muſt therefore

Secondly, When thoſe things are choſen which are *inconſiſtent* with each other.

* Sect. 1. Subſect. 5. par. 10, 11, 12.

fore either chooſe or reject the whole. He that does otherwiſe cannot poſſibly ſatisfy himſelf, ſince he muſt bear with what he would not: He is therefore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election.

Thirdly, If the things choſen be not in the power of the Elector.

III. Thirdly, he muſt be eſteemed to chooſe unduely, who aims at ſuch things as he knows are not *in his Power*. For it is a hazard whether he enjoys thoſe things that are not in his Power; and it is fooliſh to commit our Happineſs to Chance; while therefore it is in our Power to chooſe only ſuch things as we are certain of obtaining, we riſk our Happineſs, or throw it away when we purſue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happineſs to ourſelves as is in our Power, and ought to uſe our utmoſt Endeavours to attain it; but we loſe this by undue Election when we deſire thoſe things which we know to be out of our Power.

Fourthly, If any chooſe thatwhich is pre-occupied by the lawful Choice of others.

IV. Fourthly, That alſo is an undue Election, which obliges us to ſeize thoſe things that are lawfully *occupy'd* by the Elections of other Men. To be diſappointed of an Election is Miſery, as we ſaid before; to enjoy it, Happineſs. Every one therefore that is endowed with a Power of chooſing, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing choſen, ſo far as is neceſſary to the Exerciſe of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he muſt be eſteemed an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himſelf what is common, or aſſume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock than fall to his Share. Thoſe things then which are preoccupied by the Choice of other Men belong to the Chooſers, and cannot juſtly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them would have what is not his due: *i. e.* endeavours by undue Election to rob others of their Right. This is to be referred in an eſpecial Manner to ſuch things as are pre-occupied by the Choice of the Deity; for theſe are to be eſteemed by all as ſacred and prohibited: nor can any one meet with

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Succeſs that oppoſes himſelf to God, and chooſes what God diſapproves. For what God wills muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, but God wills the Happineſs of all Men as far as it is poſſible; therefore he that offends unneceſſarily againſt the Happineſs of any one, is ſuppoſed to offend againſt God, and to chooſe what is not his due.

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to deſire thoſe things which are *hurtful* to ourſelves or others. By hurtful things I underſtand thoſe that lead to natural Evils, *viz.* ſuch as are prejudicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been ſaid, that things pleaſe becauſe they are choſen, but Reaſon perſuades us to abſtain from ſuch Elections as may prove pernicious to our own Minds, or thoſe of others; or ſuch as defraud the Appetites unneceſſarily: for we owe a Gratification to theſe Appetites, when it can be procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election oppoſed to theſe *gratis*, and without any reaſon, muſt be judged an undue one, becauſe it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites. *(W.)*

Fifthly, When thoſe things which tend to Natural Evils, are choſen without Neceſſity.

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(W.) It has been objected, that 'tis a Contradiction for God to create ſuch a Faculty as is above deſcribed, and yet that it ſhould chooſe amiſs: for what can be amiſs to a Faculty that can make every thing good by chooſing? But the anſwer is plain, the Faculty is not ſo indifferent but it has Limitations, and he that has limits certainly does amiſs by tranſgreſſing them. Tho' there is a natural Power in the Will to chooſe a thing in oppoſition to all its natural Appetites and the dictates of the Underſtanding, and hereby to give itſelf ſome degree of pleaſure for the time, and we ſee that it ſometimes doth ſo; yet the Evils that proceed from ſuch an exorbitant exerciſe of this noble Faculty plainly ſhew that it ought not have done ſo; and the Author never ſaid, or imagined any one would think he meant that Wiſdom and Prudence were uſeleſs to ſuch an Agent, or that he ought not to regulate the exerciſe of this Faculty ſo as to prevent its chooſing impoſſible, abſurd or inconſiſtent things, or the claſhing of his Choice with his natural Appetites and their Satisfaction. A King muſt have a Power to puniſh his wicked Subjects with Death, and to reward

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ward thoſe that deſerve it with Honours and Riches; if he had not this Power, he could not govern. But ſhall he therefore kill the innocent and ſquander away his Favours on the undeſerving? So Man has Free-will by which he may chooſe Objects, and gratify himſelf in the Choice; doth it therefore follow that he may chooſe things impoſſible, things beyond his power, or contrary to his natural Appetites? Yet if he had not this natural Power to chooſe, he could no more be happy, than a Prince could govern that had not the Power of Rewards and Puniſhments.

SECT. IV.

How it is poſſible for us to fall into undue Elections.

This is done five ways.

I. 'TIS difficult to comprehend, as was ſaid before, how one can fall ſhort of Happineſs who has it in his Power to pleaſe himſelf; yet if he chooſe in the foregoing Manner, or the like, he muſt neceſſarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be fruſtrated, *i. e.* he muſt be unhappy. But how is it poſſible, you'll ſay, that any one ſhould make ſuch a Choice? † I anſwer, This may proceed firſt, from *Error* or *Ignorance*. Secondly, from *Inadvertency* or *Negligence*. Thirdly, from *Levity*. Fourthly, from a contracted *Habit*. Fifthly, from other *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature. Not that the Will can be determined by theſe, or any thing elſe which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and occaſion of determining itſelf, which it would not have had otherwiſe.

Firſt, By Error or culpable Ignorance.

II. Firſt, As to the firſt of theſe, we have proved before that we are liable to Errors and Ignorance; and that this is to be reckoned among natural Evils. When therefore we are forced to chooſe among

† See *Locke*'s Chapter of Power §. 5, 7. &c.

among things not ſufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charged upon us, nor is it credible that God will ſuffer them to prove fatal to us. But when we are under no manner of Neceſſity, an Election often preſents itſelf to us in Matters ſufficiently underſtood, and then we hurry on without a ſtrict and careful Enquiry, and chooſe Impoſſibilities, *&c.* and therefore are not entirely free from Fault, ſince we ought to deliberate and examine things before Election.

III. Secondly, Theſe undue Elections therefore may happen thro' Inadvertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil which is in Objects; but being negligent and ſupine, we are frequently impoſed upon, and ſuffer for our Negligence, by falling into the forementioned Inconveniencies. Secondly, By *Negligence.*

IV. As to the Third, Since the Pleaſure of a free Agent conſiſts in Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himſelf as large a Scope as he can in the Exerciſe of it. Neither will it be any thing ſurpriſing, if in this full Exerciſe of Elections, he ſometimes tranſgreſs the Bounds preſcribed him by God and Nature: and light upon ſome things which are attended with no very proſperous Iſſue, (*viz.* Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities) ſince he will attempt every thing. For he pleaſes himſelf in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event; but this is no Excuſe; for every one is obliged to take care of himſelf, leſt he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity become unduely troubleſome to himſelf or others. Thirdly, By giving too great Indulgence to the Exerciſe of Election.

V. Fourthly, We ſee that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this ſeems to proceed from hence, that as we delight in an Election often repeated, we are eaſily induced to hope that the ſame Pleaſure will always follow the ſame Act, whereupon we grow ſupine and negligent, and diſregard the Alterations of things; and he that does this may eaſily fall Fourthly, By *Obſtinacy*, or a *Habit.*

into ſuch Elections as will not be attended with Succeſs. Beſide, 'tis difficult for us to change thoſe Elections, the Delight of which is fixed and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by frequent Experience: Yet we are not excuſable for ruſhing upon abſurd and impoſſible things, in order to avoid the Uneaſineſs attending the Change of Election. And if we ſearch into the Caſe more narrowly, we ſhall find that moſt undue Elections ariſe from this unſeaſonable Perſeverance, all which deſervedly come under the Character of culpable Obſtinacy.

Fifthly, By the importunity of the natural *Appetites.*

VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted, that we conſiſt of a Soul and Body, that theſe are mutually affected by each other, and that from hence various Appetites ariſe in us, ſuch as the Preſervation of the Body, Deſire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an impediment to theſe, we reckon hurtful. If therefore we be not upon our Guard, we are hurried on by the Importunity of them to Abſurdities, or when we give looſe to our Elections, we graſp at ſuch things as offer an unneceſſary Violence to them: hence ariſe an immenſe train of Uneaſineſſes to ourſelves and others; hence comes Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to which we owe at leaſt a moderate Indulgence: hereupon we raſhly and unlawfully ſeize thoſe things that are pre-occupied by the Elections or Appetites of other Men: nay, are not ſo cautious as to refrain from what is determined by the Will of God himſelf: from theſe and the like Occaſions it happens that we abuſe our Liberty, and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourſelves or others. For as we are endowed with Liberty in theſe and the like Caſes, we may either uſe it according to the dictate of Reaſon, or abuſe it: this Power ſeems to be included in the very Notion of created Liberty.

Why every thing ought not to be choſen, and why Elections are not eaſily changed.

VII. It appears from hence how cautiouſly Elections ought to be made; for tho' nothing pleaſes us but

but what is choſen, yet we do not only take delight in *chooſing*, but much more in *enjoying* the things choſen, otherwiſe it would be the ſame thing whatever we choſe: we muſt take care then that our Elections be made of ſuch things as we may always enjoy. For if they be of periſhable Objects, or ſuch as are not in the leaſt anſwerable to the end of the Elector, he that chooſes them muſt neceſſarily grieve at the Diſappointment. He may avoid this, will ſome ſay, by changing his Election, when the thing choſen periſhes or fails; but it is to be obſerved that Elections are not changed without a Senſe of Grief and Remorſe. For we never think of altering them till we are convinced that we have choſen amiſs. When therefore we are diſappointed of the Enjoyment of what we have choſen, we deſpair, become miſerable, penitent, and conſcious of an Evil Choice, and then at laſt begin to alter our Choice; which cannot be done without an anxious and uneaſy Senſe of Diſappointment, and the more and longer we have been intent upon any Election, ſo much the greater Pain it will coſt us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering Elections; hence many had rather perſiſt in abſurd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things pleaſe us becauſe we will them; but to reject what we have once willed is contradicting ourſelves, and cannot be done without a very diſagreeable ſtruggle and convulſion of the Mind: as any one may learn from Experience. (60.)

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(60.) Any one that attentively conſiders the Workings of his own Mind, will ſoon be ſatisfied of the Truth of all that our Author here advances; he will obſerve what difficulty and reluctance he feels in receding from what he has once firmly reſolved upon, tho' perhaps he can perceive no manner of Good in it except what ariſes purely from that Reſolution. To make a Viſit at a certain Time; to walk to any particular place; to recreate ourſelves with this or that kind of Diverſion; may be Actions in themſelves perfectly indifferent and trivial:

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but when once propoſed, even upon mere whim and caprice, and reſolved on with as little reaſon, they become often as much the Objects of our Hope and Deſire, the thoughts of proſecuting them give us as great pleaſure and ſatisfaction, and we are as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much diſappointed when we fall ſhort of the fancied enjoyment of them, as we ſhould be in Matters of the laſt Importance. Every Man that has taken the leaſt notice of what paſſes within himſelf, is able to give numberleſs Inſtances of the truth of the foregoing Obſervation: which may ſerve to convince us how great the force and power of *Volition* is, and what excellent uſe it may be of in Life. How it ſupplies us with courage and conſtancy in the moſt arduous Undertakings, and enables us to ſurmount the greateſt Difficulties: how it qualifies and alleviates our Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happineſs; and makes us run contentedly the Round of low and otherwiſe tedious purſuits, and bear with pleaſure the otherwiſe inſupportable load of human Woes. This ſhews the great uſefulneſs and neceſſity of ſuch a Principle, and will lead us to conſider with our Author, in what a cautious manner it ought to be exerted, leſt it fall upon wrong and improper Objects, and thereby, inſtead of leſſening, increaſe our Miſery, and become itſelf the greateſt part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, though frequently attended with theſe conſequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the moſt beneficent Donor, muſt appear from a general computation of its Good and Evil Effects, with regard to the whole Syſtem, which will be the Subject of the following Sections.

SECT. V.

How Evil Elections are conſiſtent with the Power and Goodneſs of God.

SUBSECT. I.

Propoſes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to the Solution of it.

The Evils of Free-Agents are not neceſſary, and therefore ſeem to be permitted by God voluntarily.

I. WE have ſhewn that moral Evils ariſe from undue Election; that Elections are free; and that it is not at all neceſſary for any one knowingly and willingly to purſue the worſe. Moral Evils

Evils cannot therefore be excuſed by neceſſity, as the natural ones, and thoſe of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature implies Imperfection in the very terms of its being created (ſince what is abſolutely perfect is very God,) either therefore nothing at all muſt be created, or ſomething imperfect. We have ſhewn that by the ſame Neceſſity Natural Evils are annexed to things naturally imperfect, and that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and Goodneſs required, permitted no manner of Evil in Nature, the abſence whereof would not have introduced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the preſence or abſence of it, God made that which was attended with the leaſt. There are no Evils then which could poſſibly be avoided, and therefore they muſt be looked upon as neceſſary, ſince the Imperfection of a Creature did not admit of pure and abſolute Good. But this Neceſſity does not appear in free Agents: For the Evils incident to them ſeem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but *free Choice*, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, ſince neither the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Univerſe require the permiſſion of them: that is, the World would be as well without as with them.

II. 'Tis to be obſerved, that God permitted the former kind of Evils becauſe they were inſeparable from things; either therefore the things muſt not have been created, or their inherent Evils tolerated. But Evil Elections have no neceſſary connection with the free Acts of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he ſhould chooſe amiſs: nor does any benefit accrue to him from theſe Elections which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hunger, Thirſt, Fear, and the reſt of the Paſſions: for without theſe Affections, as was ſhewn, the Animal would ſoon periſh; but no Evil would befal us (nay what Good would not?) if we always attended to Reaſon, and never choſe amiſs.

Moral Evils have no neceſſary connection with a free Nature, nor are of any advantage to it.

Since therefore Man might bring the greateſt pleaſure to himſelf, and exerciſe his faculties by chooſing always well, how comes it to paſs that God ſuffers him to hurt himſelf and others unneceſſarily by Evil Elections? If it be ſaid that a Power of chooſing either Side is contained in the very Notion of Liberty; this muſt be allowed, but yet there ſeems to be room enough for the Exerciſe of Liberty, though the Will were confined to the choice of what is lawful and convenient; what need is there then of ſuch a Power as may extend to the choice of Evil?

Here lies the ſtreſs of the Difficulty, *viz.* why did God permit thoſe Evils which are neither neceſſary nor uſeful?

III. This ſeems to be the hardeſt point, the main ſtreſs of the Difficulty, *viz.* Whence come Moral Evils; *i. e.* thoſe that are not neceſſary? If they be ſaid to be neceſſary, how are they free? If they be not neceſſary, why does God permit them? The latter ſeems repugnant to the Goodneſs of God, the former to the Nature of a free Agent.

IV. It muſt be confeſſed, that we are leſs prepared for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Syſtems of the Intellectual World are leſs known to us than thoſe of the purely Material one: Material Objects ſurround us, and occupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the only things that immediately affect our Senſes. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce many and various Senſations in us. But of intellectual Beings, of their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we have but very few, and thoſe very obſcure Notions, *viz.* ſuch as ariſe only from the reflection of our Underſtanding upon itſelf, or are collected by the uſe of Reaſon deducing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perceived by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions ariſing from it, with thoſe that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from this alone.

We don't know ſo much of the Nature of thinking Beings as of material ones, and therefore are leſs prepared for an Anſwer to this Difficulty.

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'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reaſonings about theſe and their Operations; and do not ſo clearly perceive the neceſſity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motions of Matter; nor ſo eaſily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from reſtraining the exerciſe of Liberty, as we ſee the conſequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the whole Maſs of Matter would prove entirely uſeleſs, and that there would be no room for ſo many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subſiſtence from it; which is juſtly eſteemed a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natural Evils ariſing from Matter and Motion: and we ſhould find the ſame thing in the prevention of the uſe of Free-Will, if we underſtood the Syſtem of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can ſhew that more Evils neceſſarily ariſe from withdrawing or reſtraining the uſe of Free-Will, than from permitting the abuſe of it, it muſt be evident that God is obliged to ſuffer either theſe or greater Evils. And ſince the leaſt of theſe neceſſary Evils is choſen, even infinite Goodneſs could not poſſibly do better.

The abuſe of Free-Will may be conceived to have been prevented three ways which are conſider'd in the following Subſections.

V. Let us try then whether the abuſe of Free-Will could be prohibited with leſs detriment to the whole Syſtem, than what ariſes from the permiſſion of it. There are three Ways whereby God may be conceived able to have prevented bad Elections; firſt, If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence interpoſe, and occaſionally reſtrain the Will, which is naturally free, from any wrong Election. Thirdly, If he ſhould change the preſent ſtate of things, and tranſlate Man into another, where the occaſions of Error and incitements to Evil being cut off, he ſhould meet with nothing that could tempt him to chooſe amiſs.

SUBSECT. II.

Why God has created Free Agents.

God might have prevented moral Evils, if he had refuſed to create any free Being.

I. AS to the firſt, 'Tis certain that God was not compelled by any neceſſity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endowed any Being with Free Choice: for ſo there would have been nothing that could ſin. But ſuch a monſtrous Defect and *Hiatus* would have been left in Nature by this means, *viz.* by taking away all Free Agents, as would have put the World into a worſe Condition than that which it is in at preſent, with all the Moral Evils that diſtreſs it, though they were multiply'd to a much greater number.

But without theſe the World would have been a mere Machine and every thing paſſive.

II. For in the firſt place, if we ſet aſide Free Agents, *i. e.* thoſe which have the Principle of Action within themſelves, there is properly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely paſſive: there is indeed ſome kind of Action in Matter, *viz* Motion; but we know that it is paſſive even with regard to that; 'tis therefore the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itſelf; which does not move itſelf, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere *Machine*, capable of being turned any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itſelf. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itſelf exert one ſingle Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and ſtupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone: it would continue ſluggiſh and incapable of Action, unleſs actuated by external force. Second Cauſes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the firſt. We need not ſay, how much a World thus conſtituted would

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be inferior to the preſent, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

III. Man, you'll ſay, neceſſarily aſſents to this Propoſition, twice two make four; but though his Mind is neceſſarily driven to this Aſſent, and conſequently is not *free*, yet he is *active*: for it can ſcarce be ſaid that a Man is paſſive in giving his Aſſent.* The ſame may be affirmed of God, who tho' we ſuppoſe him to be abſolutely free in his primary Elections, yet when theſe are once fixed, he muſt neceſſarily execute what he had decreed: nevertheleſs he is properly Self-active in all Caſes, conſequently there may be ſomething active in Nature, though there were nothing free. Objection from thoſe who declare that the Underſtanding is active, tho' neceſſary, as alſo God himſelf.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what may be the efficient Cauſe of intellectual Aſſent; if the Object, then the Mind is merely paſſive in the Act of Underſtanding: nor is Aſſent imputable to it any more than Deſcent to a Stone; but if the Object be eſteemed only a Condition upon which the Underſtanding acts, we ſhall want a Cauſe to determine the Underſtanding; which cannot be ſuppoſed to determine itſelf, any more than the Fire determines itſelf to burn combuſtible Matter. For no body judges the combuſtible Matter to be active when it is ſet on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itſelf without being kindled by ſomething elſe. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechaniſm, where nothing moves itſelf, but every thing is moved by an external Cauſe, and that by another, and ſo on till we come at the firſt, namely God; who will be the only Self-active Being, and muſt be eſteemed the real Cauſe of all things; neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be aſcribed to others. Anſwer to the former part of the Objection.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being muſt be denominated Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Election: But God is no other- Anſwer to the latter.

* See Note 42.

otherwiſe obliged to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he ſuffers nothing by neceſſity, nor from any other beſide himſelf, and is determined to act by his own Liberty.

God has a complacency in his Works, and if nothing were free, that would be wanting in them which is moſt agreeable to the Deity.

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to exerciſe the Powers he is poſſeſſed of for the Good of the Univerſe; the Divine Goodneſs therefore delights and applauds itſelf in its Works, and the more any thing reſembles God, and the more 'tis Self-ſufficient, it is to be eſteemed ſo much the more agreeable to its Author. But any one may underſtand how much a Work which moves itſelf, pleaſes itſelf, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unleſs by the force of ſome external Impulſe: any Perſon, I ſay, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child careſſing his Father, and a Machine turned about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and ſuch of his Works as are endowed with Freedom; there's room for Covenant and mutual Love. For there is ſome ſort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in ſome meaſure return the benefits of the Creator, at leaſt make an acknowledgment for them; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceived to be agreeable to God, this muſt certainly be ſo*. One ſuch Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion: if there had been no free Creatures, God muſt have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almoſt the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he ſhould have made ſuch Beings, as it is to the World that they ſhould

* *See* Paradiſe Loſt, B. 3. l. 100, &c.

ſhould be made: for if nothing of this kind had been created, the very beſt thing among the Creatures, and that which is moſt agreeable to the Deity, would have been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abuſe of Liberty in ſome than to have omitted ſo much Good. For the Defect and Abſence of ſuch Agents is to be eſteemed a greater Evil than all the Crimes conſequent upon the abuſe of Liberty.

VII. Thirdly, From what has been ſaid, we learn that ſome Evils which neceſſarily adhere to things, *viz.* Natural ones, and thoſe of Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodneſs from creating the Good with which they were connected, ſince the exceſs of Good compenſated for the fewer and leſs Evils which were unavoidable: Thus God choſe ſuch Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger, Thirſt, and other Paſſions, rather than none at all. If then thoſe Evils which were *neceſſary* and foreſeen did not hinder God from creating the Good that was annext to them, how much leſs ſhould the *poſſible* Evils ariſing from the abuſe of Free-Will hinder his Goodneſs from creating Free-Agents? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good than ſimple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the train of Natural Evils; how much more gratefully ſhould we embrace the Gift of Liberty, attended only with ſome Danger of Evils, but not with the Evils themſelves, as in the former Caſes. (61.)

Neceſſary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much leſs thoſe which are only poſſible.

VIII.

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(61.) In relation to *us*, indeed, a Gift which is attended only with the poſſibility of ſome inconveniencies, appears to be of more dignity and value than one that brings ſome degree of unavoidable Miſery along with it, and as ſuch it ought to be received with proportionable gratitude by us. But with reſpect to a Being who foreſees all the Abuſes of Free-Will, all the contingent Evils conſequent thereupon are as certain as the natural and neceſſary ones, and therefore ought to be equally provided againſt. This Argument therefore about the *Contin-*

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Natural Evils are greater than Moral ones, and Free-Will a greater Good than the Natural Appetites.

VIII. Fourthly, It must be obſerved that Elections are therefore eſteemed Evil, becauſe they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an Election contain nothing abſurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. Hatred of God, Rebellion againſt his Commands, Murther, Theft, Lying, are Sins, becauſe they deprive us of natural Good, and lead to Evil. Elections therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils which ſometimes attend them; Natural Evils then are greater than Moral *: For that which makes any thing bad muſt neceſſarily be worſe itſelf: But Free-Will is better than a natural Appetite, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be denied to the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than the natural Appetites and Propenſities: both of them indeed ſometimes lead us into the ſame Evils, but with this Difference, that the one, *viz.* the natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by neceſſity, but the other, *viz.* Free-Will, not of neceſſity, but only if we pleaſe. Theſe might have been avoided ſince they are contingent, but thoſe could not, ſince they force themſelves upon us againſt our Wills: If therefore it was not unworthy of God to create an Appetite which was attended with neceſſary Evils; how much more agreeable was it to his Goodneſs to have endowed us with Free-Will, by which theſe Evils may be avoided, or at leaſt alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than what theſe Evils which flow from it can overballance, and therefore worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become capable of Hap-

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gency of Moral Evil, ſo far as it relates to the Deity, need not be inſiſted on, ſince our Author allows the Divine Preſcience, and conſiſtently with that, offers reaſons ſufficient for the Vindication of the other Attributes of God in the preſent Caſe.

* *See* Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. *and* R. i.

Happineſs, tho' joined with the Danger of falling into Evils by abuſe?

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worſe without Free-Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminiſhes inſtead of increaſing the Sum of Evils, and is beſtowed upon us for that end. But how much more miſerable the State of Man would be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear to any one who conſiders what Sort of Creatures we ſhould be without Election. For if Man were not free, he would be driven by the violence of Matter and Motion, and ſooner or later be quite overwhelmed with thoſe natural Evils which neceſſarily ariſe from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But it is better to ſtruggle with ſome of theſe with Liberty, than all of them with neceſſity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes *. If by being deprived of Election we ſhould be freed from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but ſeeing that whether we be free or bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies) we muſt neceſſarily endure thoſe Evils which are conſequent upon the affections of Bodies; (nay thoſe very Evils which we were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain to deſire the abſence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and uſing it aright, we may avoid the moſt bitter part even of theſe neceſſary Evils.

The State of Man would be worſe if Free-Will were taken away.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is moſt manifeſt that the greateſt Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the aſſiſtance of this we riſe above Fate, and when attacked from without by adverſe Fortune, we find our Happineſs within ourſelves. Other Animals have nothing to oppoſe to a Diſtemper, Death or Pain; nothing to Delight themſelves in, except Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species,

Free Agents only are capable of perfect Happineſs, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty.

* *Only in ſome Degree. See the Obſervation from* Bayle *in* Note 24.

cies. But a free Agent, in the midſt of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirſt, nay Death itſelf, has wherewithal to pleaſe itſelf, and to blunt the Edge of all theſe Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we are obliged to undergo very many and great Hardſhips; how much more full of Complaints ſhould we be if we were entirely ſubjected to them, and hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Happineſs in our own Power, than to be obliged to ſeek it elſewhere, nay rather to deſpair of it? Which Happineſs is only to be found in a Free Choice, as was ſhewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, ſufficiently why God created Free Agents notwithſtanding the abuſe which they are liable to. For he choſe a Creature which would ſometimes do amiſs, rather than that every thing ſhould be dragged by Fate and a Chain of Neceſſity, into inevitable Evils.

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(62.) Our Author having ſhewn in Sect. 2. that the greateſt part of our Happineſs conſiſts in this Principle of Election, here points out ſome of the many Inconveniencies that would attend the Loſs of it. Firſt, If there was no ſuch thing as a free Agent, all would be mere Mechaniſm and neceſſary Effects of the firſt Cauſe, *i. e.* the beſt and nobleſt part of Nature would be cut off, that which of all others is moſt worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Creatures capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reaſonable Obedience and Duty to God; no poſſibility for him to diſplay his Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Mercy in the Government of them, nor any means of bringing them to the ſublimeſt Degree of Intellectual Happineſs, *viz.* that which ariſes from *Morality*. Secondly, Thoſe paſſive Beings themſelves would be in a much worſe Condition than they now are. They would be deprived of all the Happineſs which they now enjoy from the choice of indifferent Objects; they would be neceſſarily expoſed to all the natural Evils ariſing from the general Laws of Matter and Motion, *viz.* Diſtempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Seaſons, Hunger and Thirſt, *&c.* which Liberty enables them frequently to guard againſt and avoid, and frequently to bear with pleaſure, and even to convert to their ſuperior Good: nay, they muſt inevitably undergo the greateſt part of thoſe

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XI. But you will ſay, that you deſire the Pleaſure and Advantages ariſing from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; *i. e.* you would have a Liberty reſtrained by Nature within certain bounds, ſo as never to extend to Evil. But it may be juſtly doubted whether this was poſſible in the preſent ſtate of things: For Free-Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itſelf to Action, and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they ſhould give occaſion for the Exerciſe of Elections; 'tis therefore active in its own Nature. Now whatſoever is limited by another admits of bounds, and is therefore paſſive with reſpect to the Limiter; it

The benefits of Free-Will could not be had without a Power of Sinning.

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very Evils which at preſent, by this Power, they have at moſt only a *poſſibility* of incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the other moſt exalted Powers of the mind would be entirely uſeleſs, and often aggravations of our Miſery. "A Faculty of "Underſtanding (ſays Dr. *Jenkin* *) without a Will to de- "termine it, if left to itſelf, muſt always think of the ſame "Object, or proceed in a continued ſeries and connection of "thoughts without any Aim or End; which would be a per- "petual Labour in vain, and tedious Thoughtfulneſs to no "purpoſe: but if it ſhould be ſometimes determined by ſome- "thing external to new Objects, yet what uſe of Reaſon could "there be in Contemplations, which were merely obtruded "and forced upon the Mind?" And to foreſee a train of Evils, without any power of acting againſt and oppoſing them, muſt be only anticipating Miſery, and adding the future to the preſent, and a ſenſe of our Inability of ever helping ourſelves to both. Theſe Conſiderations are ſufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to any conſcious Syſtem.

For a fuller Explication of them ſee Mr. *Jackſon's Defence of human Liberty*, p. 79, *&c.* and *Scott's Chriſtian Life*. Part 2. C. 4. Sect. 3. p. 318, *&c.* 8*vo.* or *Sherlock* on *Providence*, C. 7. p. 240. 2d Edit. or *D'Oyly's Firſt Diſſertation*, C. 10. or *Jenkin*, in the Chapter above cited.

The next Enquiry muſt be, what Conſequences would attend either the Limitation of this free Power to ſome *Particular Objects*, or the Infringement and Suſpenſion of it on particular *Occaſions*.

* *Reaſonableneſs of the Chriſtian Religion*, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit.

it ſeems equally abſurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itſelf and of tis own Nature paſſive, to determine itſelf to Action, and is perhaps no leſs impoſſible. (63.)

The will could not be determined to Good by Objects, ſince the Goodneſs of them generally proceeds from Election.

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally reſtrained to chooſe Good only, it muſt have this reſtraint either from the *Object* or the *Underſtanding*: But neither could be done. If ſome things were in themſelves always Good, and others Evil, it might be poſſible indeed that the Will ſhould no more admit of Evil than the Sight does of Savours: But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not abſolute things, but merely relative: for there is almoſt no Action which proceeds from Choice, but what

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(63.) If Matter were made *active*, it would be no longer *Matter*: in like manner if a ſelf-moving or active Being were rendered paſſive, it would be no longer what it now is, nor have the ſame properties which it now has. Hence appears the abſurdity of ſuppoſing a Liberty, properly ſo called, to be determined to ſome particular way of acting, 'tis the ſame as the Liberty of a Stone to ſome particular Ways of moving, *i. e.* no Liberty at all. The very Eſſence of Liberty includes an abſolute Phyſical Indifference to either Side in any given Caſe. Such a Liberty as this has been ſhewn to belong to Man in reſpect of *Willing*. He can will or chooſe any thing in Nature, he can alſo either chooſe or refuſe any thing, and therefore to determine his Will to ſome Objects, or incline it to one Side in any given Circumſtances, would be ſo far to deſtroy it. The Queſtion then is not, whether a man might be neceſſarily inclined to ſome particular thing or act, and yet continue to have Free-Will; for that, I think, is a contradiction. But whether he ſhould have his power of willing deſtroyed on ſome particular Occaſions, or whether he ſhould be ſometimes altered and made what at preſent he is not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, or beneficial to the World, will be more fully examined in the following Subſection: our Author proceeds to enquire how this determination could poſſibly be effected in the preſent State of things, and if upon Enquiry into all the imaginable Methods of effecting it, they appear to be either inſufficient for the End propoſed, or attended with worſe Conſequences than the preſent Eſtabliſhment, this muſt be an invincible Argument againſt them.

what may be good or Evil upon a change of Circumſtances*. Even Natural Evils themſelves are ſometimes good and eligible. Free-Will then muſt needs be indifferent to all external Objects, and thoſe things which are now agreeable, become ſhortly diſagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumſtances and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be determined to Good by Objects. Nay, to confeſs the Truth, we generally do not chooſe Objects becauſe they are Good, but they become Good becauſe we chooſe them. The Goodneſs of them therefore is for the moſt part determined by the Election, and not that by the Goodneſs. For we have ſhewn before*, that this is the Nature of an Elective Faculty, and ſuch it ought to be, otherwiſe we could not have the leaſt poſſibility of attaining Happineſs in ſo great variety and uncertainty of outward things †.

XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determined perpetually to Good by the *Underſtanding*, than by Objects. For the Underſtanding acts neceſſarily, and repreſents nothing as Good but what proceeds from Objects; if therefore the Will were determined by it, it would neither be free, nor always able to pleaſe itſelf. For the Underſtanding often repreſents all external things as ſad and unproſperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, ſuch as Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us to bear them in proſpect of a farther End. But to endure a thing in view of a farther End, is to undergo preſent Miſery in hopes of future Happineſs; *i. e.* to weigh a preſent Evil againſt a future Good, and of two Evils to chooſe the leſs; which Reaſon indeed ‡

The Intellect often finds nothing good in things, except that they help towards the attainment of an Election, the Will therefore could not be determined to Good by the Underſtanding.

* *See* Turner's *Diſcourſe of the Laws of Nature, and the reaſon of their Obligation*, Sect. 23, 24. or *Puffendorf* of the *Laws of Nature*, B. 1. C. 2. Sect. 6.

† Sect. 1. Subſect. 3. ‡ *See* par. 16 *and* 17 *of this Sect.*

deed perſuades us to do, ſince it is neceſſary that it ſhould be done: but this helps nothing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodneſs, which has impoſed this Neceſſity upon us: nor can he be happy by the Judgment of his own Underſtanding, who muſt undergo theſe things. But if it be granted that things pleaſe us, not becauſe the Underſtanding judges them to be eligible, but becauſe we reſolve to exerciſe our Free-will in performing them, even theſe will become agreeable by Election, and the Underſtanding will perceive them to be made ſo, and not make them to be ſo. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the Underſtanding to govern the Will, but to diſcover means for the attainment of that which is choſen, and to give warning when it chooſes ſuch things as are abſurd or impoſſible: For the Underſtanding, as we ſaid before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our Choice, except this lead us into Abſurdities. In order therefore to avoid Abſurdities, we make uſe of the Underſtanding as a Monitor, not a Maſter.

And from hence, I think it appears how inconvenient it would be for the Choice to depend in all caſes upon the Underſtanding. For ſince the Judgment of the Underſtanding depends upon the Objects themſelves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites; if the Choice were to be determined by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we muſt neceſſarily want a great many things which the Underſtanding judges to be good, and could never hope for ſolid Happineſs, (64.) ſince Objects

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(64.) That is, if every thing which the Underſtanding repreſented as good in itſelf, made a *neceſſary Part* of my Happineſs, I ſhould be always unhappy, ſince I could never attain to all the Good I ſaw. Whereas by this Power of willing, I cut off ſeveral of theſe apparent Goods, and only make ſuch be conſtituent parts of my Happineſs as I chooſe, and if I choſe only ſuch as I could obtain, I might be always Happy. This Propoſition, *viz. that all Good does not make an Eſſential*

Objects are fixed, as we ſaid before *, and can never anſwer to our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the attainment of continual Happineſs, it was neceſſary that we ſhould be able to pleaſe ourſelves in ſome reſpect, independently of the Underſtanding, and by Election to conſtitute thoſe things good and agreeable to us, which the Underſtanding, if there had been no ſuch Election, would have pronounced offenſive, diſagreeable and painful: From hence it appears how fit it is that this Power ſhould be freed from the Government of the Underſtanding; but if it is freed, it could not be determined by it.

XIV. Fourthly, It is to be obſerved that the Divine Power is Infinite, and that there are innumerable things poſſible to it which are repugnant to one another, and deſtructive of each other, and cannot by any means be conſiſtent. If therefore God ſhould act according to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attributes, he would effect nothing at all, or elſe immediately deſtroy what he had effected. His infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs therefore gave bounds and reſtraint to his Power, which would otherwiſe confound every thing; and theſe muſt of neceſſity be equally infinite with his Power, otherwiſe infinite Evils muſt certainly ariſe from infinite Power. But a Creature, as his Elective Power neceſſarily extends farther than his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, is made naturally

The Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God being equal to his Power, hinder him from chooſing amiſs.

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Part of our Happineſs, becauſe we do not will it, is aſſerted by Mr. *Locke* [*b*] and well urged as a Reaſon why the greater Good does not abſolutely determine the Mind: and the ſame, I think, might as juſtly be affirmed of *Pain*, viz. That the removal of all Pain does not make a neceſſary part of our preſent Happineſs, ſince we do not always abſolutely *will* or *deſire* to remove it; but on the contrary chooſe to bear it, and by that Choice, often produce a Pleaſure, which does more than counterballance it. See C. 5. Sect. 2. *and* Note 45.

* Sect. 1. Subſect. 3. par. 2. [*b*] Chapter of *Power*. §. 43.

turally liable to fall ſometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians ſometimes ſuppoſe a Line to be infinite, in which they may take a Point wherever they pleaſe. Now ſince our Election may be made as we pleaſe, the Wiſdom and Goodneſs whereby it is to be governed, ought to be infinite; for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitched upon beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodneſs and Wiſdom be finite, the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amiſs. But ſince all created Wiſdom and Goodneſs muſt neceſſarily be finite, it follows that there wants a ſufficient reſtraint upon Elections, and that every *free* Creature is neceſſarily *defectible*. As then all created Beings are neceſſarily imperfect in general, ſo every one has its own peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, *viz.* the Power of Sinning, is proper and peculiar to ſuch as enjoy Free-Will: nor can they be conceived ſeparate from each other, any more than Contrariety from Motion. (65.)

But Man may chooſe amiſs ſince his Goodneſs and Wiſdom neither are nor can be adequate to his Power.

XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty of pleaſing itſelf by Election cannot be determined to Good by *Objects*, in the ſame manner as the Sight is to Light, or Taſte to Savours, (ſince Goodneſs is not always an abſolute Quality in things, like Light and

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(65.) As Motion without Contrariety would be of no uſe, ſo Liberty without a Power of doing amiſs, if ſuch a thing were poſſible, would be of no value: it would not have the good Effects and Ends for which Liberty was given: particularly it would not be attended with the happy conſciouſneſs of *Deſert*, or the Idea of receiving a Benefit by way of reward, conferred upon us for having done what was right and good, and what we might as eaſily have not done. From which Idea, as including *Self-Approbation*, &c. we frequently feel a far more exquiſite Pleaſure, than from the intrinſic Value of the Benefit itſelf: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would prove even an Uneaſineſs to a generous Mind. This Notion will be farther explained and vindicated in the following Subſection; for the Truth of it we muſt appeal to the conſtant Experience of the ingenuous part of Mankind.

and the Objects of Senſe) nor by the *Underſtanding*, ſince many things muſt be choſen in which the Underſtanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they are capable of being choſen, and when choſen pleaſe, becauſe they exerciſe the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet in a finite number there are infinite reſpects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There is need then of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs to direct the Choice, leſt it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endowed with Wiſdom is finite, it is impoſſible but that it ſhou'd have a natural Power of ſometimes chooſing wrong.

'Tis better to be ſometimes deceived with Pleaſure, than to be always ſolicitous.

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the Choice of thoſe things only which the Underſtanding declares to be good, or was reſtrained from chooſing till the Goodneſs of the Objects were apparent, we muſt of neceſſity heſitate in many things and be anxious and ſolicitous in all. For ſince things are connected together by a long chain of Conſequences, it is impoſſible for us to form a right Judgment of the abſolute Goodneſs of them, without a foreknowledge of theſe Conſequences, we muſt therefore have been obliged to uſe all poſſible Diſquiſition before every Election, and ſuſpend the Choice where any Suſpicion of Error or Ground of Doubt ſhould appear: but ſuch a Diſquiſition and continual Solicitude would be a greater Bar to Happineſs than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itſelf by chooſing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expoſed by a bad Choice, may be compenſated by the Pleaſure which ariſes from the Senſe of Liberty. But if we were obliged to all poſſible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Obligation, than from ſome Errors in Elections; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all poſſible Examination, a finite Underſtanding may be deceived. Evil Elec-

tions are to be avoided on account of the Uneaſineſs conſequent upon them, if therefore ſuch a Diſquiſition as is neceſſary to diſcover the Good, and a Suſpenſion of the Elective Faculty till that Good be diſcovered, would bring greater Uneaſineſs than ſome wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amiſs, than if he were obliged to wait for the determination of the Underſtanding in every Caſe. For it is better that ſome Perſons ſhould ſometimes do amiſs, and ſuffer Uneaſineſs from the Conſcience of having done ſo, than that all Men ſhould in every Caſe be always afraid, uncertain, and ſolicitous, nay generally ceaſe from all manner of Action.

'Tis better to be in danger of Sinning, than to ceaſe from Election.

XVII. Such is the nature of our Will that it can pleaſe itſelf in Election, and by its own Power make the things choſen agreeable, though in themſelves diſagreeable to the Appetites. And though this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be deprived of ſo uſeful a Faculty, or to be reſtrained from Election till an imperfect Underſtanding, ſuch as that of Man neceſſarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoſſibility. It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happineſs from the Will itſelf; for if it depended on the Underſtanding it would come with difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could ſeldom enjoy it pure and unmixed. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to pleaſe ourſelves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Conſequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to ceaſe from Election, and be reſtrained from the Exerciſe of our Faculties till a whole train of theſe were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (66.)

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(66.) All that *Bayle* objects to this [*c*,] is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to him,

SUBSECT. III.

Why God does not interpoſe his Omnipotence, and occaſionally reſtrain the Will from depraved Elections.

I. 'TIS evident from what has been ſaid, that it was agreeable to the Divine Goodneſs to have created Free Agents, for without theſe the Syſtem of Nature would have been imperfect: nor could

More and greater Evils would ariſe from thence, than from the abuſe of Free-Will.

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him, are no leſs happy in themſelves, nor perform a leſs acceptable Service to the Deity, for the want of it; and why therefore might not we? — To what was obſerved about the Inconcluſiveneſs of all ſuch Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note *H* we ſhall here add, firſt, That it is more than we are obliged to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are abſolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impreſſions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Underſtandings, fewer and leſs Temptations, *&c.* without being leſs free [*d*]; nay they muſt be in one ſenſe more free, the more they are ſo qualified. [*e.*] This way of reaſoning therefore proceeds upon a falſe, or at leaſt uncertain Hypotheſis.

Secondly, Though it ſhould be granted that theſe glorious Beings, ſuppoſing them all neceſſary, might have as ample Knowledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and conſequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themſelves, as if they were all free; though they might have no occaſion to ſee or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and made ſenſible of the infinite Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs of the Deity, ſhewn in the Government and Suppreſſion of the former, and in the Production and Improvement of the latter; Tho', I ſay, theſe exalted Beings could be ſuppoſed to have a thorough Intuition of all the Attributes of God without any ſuch manifeſtation of them in his Works; (againſt which Notion ſee *D'Oyly*'s *Firſt Diſſertation*, C. 8. *and Concluſion*, p. 123.) yet it does not

[*c.*] *See his Anſwer to the Queries of a Provincial, and Crit. Dict. Article* Marchionites, *Remark* F. *&c.*

[*d.*] *See ABp.* Dawes's *5th Serm.* p. 73, 74, *and the latter end of Note* T.

[*e.*] *See the beginning of Note* 72.

could their Actions have been determined to Good by any natural Propenſity or Limitation, in the ſame manner as the Senſes are limited by Objects: But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he ſhould ſuſpend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could ſo eaſily hinder the abuſe of Liberty, why does he ſuffer it? Why does he not reſtrain Elections when they tend to Vice and Abſurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be ſatisfactorily anſwered otherwiſe than by ſhewing that more and greater Evils would befal the Univerſe from ſuch an Interpoſition, than from the abuſe of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be conſidered,

It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free-Will, as the Motion of the Sun.

II. In the firſt place, That this cannot be effected without *Violence done to Nature.* 'Tis allowed that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking Beings cannot otherwiſe be happy: God himſelf in creating them has determined, as it were by a Law, that they ſhould be free. For by giving them a Nature endowed with Choice, he allowed them to make uſe of it. They cannot therefore be hindered without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can diſpenſe with the Laws

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ſeem poſſible for ſuch imperfect Creatures as *we* are, to attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms than the preſent. We could not ſure have had ſo lively an Idea of the *Mercy* of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been ſo thoroughly conſcious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had ſo grateful a ſenſe of our conſtant Support, our frequent Deliverances; nor conſequently have arrived to ſo great a degree either of Virtue or Happineſs in this Life or the next, by any other Method; as will be further ſhewn in Notes 79 and 82. Either then theſe Happy Beings are ſtill perfectly free, which Freedom conſtitutes the greateſt part of their Happineſs; and let any Man try to prove the contrary; or at leaſt they once were ſo, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only altered by being tranſlated into another State, and put out of farther Trial; and conſequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examined in Subſect. 5.

Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the Syſtem of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other Security of our Happineſs, and of the Duration of the World, than the Divine Conſtancy and Immutability: the Univerſal Laws of Nature are the Aſſurances of this Conſtancy, and upon them does the Security and Happineſs of the whole Work depend. It is not therefore to be expected that God ſhould lightly diſpenſe with theſe Laws, much leſs alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. Since then it is provided by an Univerſal Law, that Free Agents ſhould procure to themſelves Happineſs by the uſe of Election, and it is impoſſible but that theſe, being left to themſelves, ſhould ſometimes fall into depraved Elections; would it not be an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if God ſhould interpoſe and hinder the uſe of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had eſtabliſhed? We don't expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Courſe of the Sun, ſhould be altered on our account, becauſe theſe ſeem to be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreaſonable, that for our private Advantage the Order and Harmony of things ſhould be changed, to the detriment of ſo many Beings. But to alter the Will, to ſtop Election, is no leſs a Violation of the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Courſe of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of its Nature are to be eſteemed more ſacred, and not to be changed without a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if God ſhould interfere and hinder the Actions of Free-Will; and perhaps it would prove no leſs pernicious to the Intellectual Syſtem, than the Sun's ſtanding

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ing ſtill would be to the Natural. His Goodneſs therefore does not ſuffer him to interpoſe, except when he foreſees that the Evils ariſing from our depraved Elections are greater than thoſe which would enſue upon an Interruption of the Courſe of Nature, which he only can know who knows all things. (67.)

III.

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(67.) By this laſt Conceſſion our Author evidently allows that God may ſometimes have ſufficient reaſon to interpoſe in matters relating to our Elections; (though perhaps he never acts upon the Will by *Phyſical Impulſe*, or irreſiſtibly, which will be conſidered in the next Subſection.) His Deſign therefore is only to ſhew that this ought not to be done frequently, or as often as Men chooſe amiſs. Now this may be illuſtrated in the ſame manner as we treated of the Laws of Motion. That there are general Mechanic Laws in the Natural World, the Eſtabliſhment and Preſervation whereof tends more to the Happineſs of the Creation, and is every way more worthy of the Deity, than to act always by *particular Wills*, was ſhewn in Note 25. If theſe Laws were frequently altered and unfixed, they would ceaſe to be Laws, and all Action, and Contrivance which depends upon the Stability, and computes the future Effects of them, muſt ceaſe, or at leaſt prove inſignificant. In like manner *Liberty* has been proved to be an Univerſal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the great Uſe and Excellence of it evinced, and therefore we have equal reaſon to ſuppoſe that it could not be, at leaſt not frequently, ſuſpended, without as great Inconvenience as would attend the Violation of theſe Laws of Mechaniſm. If this were done in the Rational World, all Studies, Enterpriſes, Arguments, all kind of Reaſoning and Policy would be in vain and uſeleſs; all rewardable Action, and its concomitant Happineſs (of which in Note 65 and more below) muſt entirely ceaſe. Nay, perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free-Will, would be altogether as abſurd and inconvenient, as to endow a Machine with Reflection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World muſt render any Argument of this kind very uncertain. However, thus much we are ſure of, that ſo great Violence done to the Will, would be directly contrary to the general Method of God's treating reaſonable Creatures, and quite oppoſite to the end of all thoſe Manifeſtations he has made of his Nature and Will; the very Reverſe of all thoſe Arguments, Exhortations, Promiſes and Threats, which are the Subject of Revealed Religion: a Man that believes any thing of theſe (upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) can never imagine

III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Violence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and Puniſhments: To divert them from unreaſonable or abſurd things, and draw them to better by the perſuaſion of Reaſon. But it is doubtful whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election to be determined by Impulſe, or as it were by immediate Contact. For it ſeems equally abſurd to attempt a change of Election by any other means than thoſe above mentioned, as to deſire to ſtop the Motion of Matter by Intreaty, or offering Rewards. May we not with the ſame reaſon expect that Matter ſhould be moved by Rewards and Puniſhments, as the Will influenced by *Phyſical Impulſe*, as they call it? For it is by theſe Means that they would have God to ſtop or alter the Choice. So prepoſterous an Interpoſal would confound every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal ſuch an Experiment would be, and how it would affect the Minds of the Obſervers, or what Suſpicions concerning God and their own Security, it might ſuggeſt to the whole Syſtem of thinking Beings, God only knows. We ſee that human Laws cannot be diſpenſed with, without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made upon an imperfect Foreſight, and can provide for few Caſes, ſeem naturally to require ſome Interpoſal: how much greater Evils may we apprehend from a Diſpenſation with the Divine, the natural Laws; on the Obſervance of which the Good of the whole depends? This ſeems to be the reaſon why God makes uſe of ſo much Labour and Pains,

God by interpoſing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents.

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imagine that they are all made uſe of to no purpoſe, as they muſt be in a great meaſure, if the Will could be over-ruled occaſionally without any conſiderable Inconvenience. This is what our Author endeavours to prove in the following Paragraph.

ſo great an Apparatus of Means, (68.) ſo many Precepts, Perſuaſions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind; which nevertheleſs he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleaſed to apply force; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not foreſeen more Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence done to Elections.

He would take away that which is the moſt agreeable to us in Elections, *viz.* a Conſciouſneſs that we might have not choſen.

IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greateſt Pleaſure in Elections, is a Conſciouſneſs that we could have not choſen; without this 'tis no Choice at all: but ſuch is the Nature of us rational Beings that nothing pleaſes us but what we chooſe. In order therefore to make any thing agreeable to us, 'tis neceſſary for us to be *conſcious* that we chooſe it voluntarily, and could have refuſed it: But if God determine our Election extrinſically, the moſt agreeable Part of all is taken away. (*X.*) For we muſt

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(68.) The Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh* Nation affords good Inſtances of this. What an apparatus of outward Means was continually made uſe of in the Government of that ſtiff-necked People? What frequent Murmurings, Rebellions and Apoſtacies were permitted, and then puniſhed? What numerous Miracles, both of the remunerative and vindictive kind were applied, in order to bring them to ſome tolerable ſenſe of their dependence on God, and a ſuitable practice of the Duties reſulting from it? All which would have been unneceſſary at leaſt, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds could have done the buſineſs; if their Underſtandings could as well have been illuminated and their Wills reformed at once; and if their Practice produced by this means, and as it were extorted from them, would have been equally agreeable to the Deity. And in this, as well as many other reſpects they ſeem to have been Types and Repreſentatives of all Mankind.

(*X.*) 'Tis objected, that this explication of Free-Will makes *Adam* more unreaſonable in the ſtate of Innocence than his Poſterity in the ſtate of Corruption. For according to this it would have grieved him to think that his chooſing right was due to God's aſſiſtance, and that he would not have believed himſelf happy, if when he was ready to break God's Command, he had perceived that God by his Grace had interpoſed and enabled him to reſiſt the Temptation. Whereas in truth,

muſt either be conſcious that God determines our Will or not; if we be conſcious, how can that be agreeable

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ſuch a diſcovery would have made him, as it muſt make us, more happy, tying him by a new Obligation to acknowledge the Sovereign Goodneſs of God, and on that account to love and adhere to him the more cloſely. But it is alledged that the Author is abſolutely of another Opinion.

I anſwer, the Objector may aſſure himſelf, the Author has no ſuch Opinion, nor is there any thing like it in the Book or that can be deduced from it. What the Author ſays is, that God has made Man an intelligent Creature, capable of pleaſing himſelf by Choice; that the proper way to move his Will is by Rewards and Puniſhments as the proper way to move Bodies is by phyſical Impulſe; that in the ordinary Courſe of things it is as improper, and perhaps as impracticable to move the Will by any other force than that of rational Motives, as to attempt to move a Body by Rewards and Puniſhments: That there is this difference between them, that a body neceſſarily moves when impelled, but the Will is not neceſſitated by the moral Motives propoſed to it. That there are two ſorts of Goods which may be propoſed to a Man, one that ariſes from the conveniency of things to our natural Appetites, and is antecedent to Choice, and another that is founded in the Choice itſelf, and conſequent to it; and that the firſt is ſubordinate to the ſecond.

When therefore theſe two interfere, the firſt gives place to the latter: and hence we ſee many Men prefer their Choice even to Life, which is the greateſt natural Good, tho' 'tis true, this is done with difficulty and reluctance. But when there is no ſuch interfering between the Choice and Appetites, there the Man is entirely free, and can make the thing choſen good without mixture, which happens in a thouſand Inſtances of Life, and therefore there is much more Good than Evil in it.

As to *Adam*, he was placed in this State of Freedom becauſe his Natuure required it; and the Author believes God might have prevented his chooſing amiſs, if he would have altered his Nature, Motives and Circumſtances; that is, made a new World for him, and left this without intelligent Inhabitants. I do not deny but God may ſtop Man from executing his Choice, when he is ready to make an ill one; for no body ought to preſume to limit the Divine Power. But I ſay, when a free Agent is ready to make an ill choice, and wou'd do it if not prevented by an Almighty Power, he is already guilty in the ſight of God, ſuch a readineſs is an obliquity in his Will and a moral Evil, and therefore God is not obliged to prevent the Execution of it; for that were to prevent the

Puniſh-

agreeable which is obtruded on us by force? If we be not, we are deceived in the Operations of our own

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Puniſhment, though the guilt be contracted: and it is eaſy to ſee what the Conſequence of ſuch a procedure may be in a World that is to be governed by Rewards and Puniſhments; and what effect it might have on thoſe innumerable Myriads of intelligent Beings that are under the Government of God, and that are all now virtuous by their Choice, and thereby juſtly diſtinguiſhed in their Rewards and Circumſtances, and poſſeſſed of that moſt valuable perfection and only moral Good, an active conformity to the Will of God. Whereas if the Will of Man were neceſſitated and held by an irreſiſtible force from chooſing amiſs, the whole intellectual Creation would be let looſe, and under no kind of moral Obligation to concern themſelves about their Choices; and ſo there could only be a paſſive Conformity to God's Will, and no room for Virtue or Holineſs, which are the moſt valuable Goods in the World; and hence to avoid ſome Moral Evil there wou'd be no room left for any moral Good.

Againſt this it is urged that the *Elect* are thus prevented by God's Grace, and yet no body denies them to have moral Good. The Holy Scriptures teach us that it is the *Spirit of God* that Works in us to will and to do, and that it is his *Grace* that efficaciouſly determines the Wills of thoſe that are predeſtinated.

To this I anſwer, that Man by his ill choice and abuſe of his Faculty of Free-Will had diſabled it from chooſing Spiritual Good. When a Man loſes a Limb or an Eye, or is wounded in any mortal Part, he can't have that Limb reſtored or be recovered but by a Miracle; and the ſame will hold as to the Spiritual Functions, when they are loſt or diſabled, only he that gave them can reſtore them. Now this the Holy Scriptures and the Catholic Church have taught us to be the caſe of the Will of Man in his corrupted State as to ſpiritual Objects; and therefore the effectual interpoſition of God's Power to reſtore Man is the Chriſtian Doctrine. But though the reſtoring the Faculty to its former ſtate be the immediate Work of God's Spirit, yet the acts performed by that reſtored Faculty are Man's, and he is free in the exerting of them, and this I take to be likewiſe the ſenſe of the Catholic Church. 'Tis true, thoſe who are thus elected and influenced by God will certainly uſe their Free-Will right ſo far as the Goſpel requires in order to their Salvation: but it is not becauſe they have not the Power to do otherwiſe, but becauſe they make their Choice otherwiſe; nor doth it follow becauſe they can chooſe amiſs, that they will do ſo. *A poſſe ad eſſe non valet Conſequentia.*

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own Minds; neither can we know whether the Elections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws,

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If it be aſked, why God did not afford this help to all Mankind. I anſwer that the Elect are deſigned for a ſtation in *Heaven* void for them by the fall of the Angels, or ſome other way, and that a certain number may be ſo provided and no more; and when the number of the Elect is full, then will follow the Conſummation of all Things. But it is reaſonable to permit God to chooſe the Perſons to whom he will vouchſafe this ſupernatural Favour, and to take care that the pardoning and recovering of Sinners may not have an ill effect on the reſt of his Creatures: and this he has done partly by letting ſeveral of them ſuffer for an Example, and partly by appointing ſuch a Satisfaction for them in the death of our Saviour, as is capable to deter both Men and Angels from failing in their Duty, more than the Puniſhment of the Malefactors could have done. For nothing could more fully demonſtrate the determinate decree of God not to diſpenſe with Obedience to his Laws, on the Obſervation of which the Good of the whole depends, than that he would not pardon a few on a leſs Conſideration than the interpoſition and death of his Son.

But ſecondly, God may be conceived to have permitted *Adam* to fall not only for the reaſons above, but likewiſe becauſe it was better for him upon the whole than if he had been kept from the act of Guilt by an inviſible force. He had no reaſon to preſume this, but the Power of God is ſo great that he brought Good out of Evil, and made *Adam*'s State after his Fall more advantageous to him than Innocence had been. This is plain from Holy Scripture that prefers our State under the ſecond *Adam* to what it was under the firſt. And as it was better for *Adam* himſelf, ſo it is not certain but it was beſt for his Poſterity. For ſome of them it undoubtedly was, I mean thoſe that are found in Chriſt: and as to the reſt, it doth not appear but all things conſidered it was as good for them too. We have a notion that if *Adam* had not fallen all his Poſterity would have continued innocent, and been free from all natural Inconveniencies: but the Author ſhews that neither the Holy Scriptures, nor the Catholic Church has determined either of them; nor is it ſaid how every one that was to be born would have uſed his Free-Will if he had been tried, nor that even thoſe who uſed it right would have been ſubject to no natural Evil, And therefore 'tis a very uncertain Argument that is drawn from theſe ſuppoſitions, and ought not to be oppoſed to the Goodneſs of God.

But laſtly, however this Matter ſtand, it is to be ſuppoſed that it was beſt for the whole that things ſhould be as they are,

and

Laws, together with the Efficacy of Rewards and Puniſhments, would be quite deſtroyed. For who would

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and that the hindring Man from falling by an irreſiſtible force would have been more miſchievous in general than his Sin. We know that God, as the Author obſerves, is to govern an innumerable multitude of Creatures to all Eternity, and he only can comprehend what influence an action may have on that Syſtem in infinite Ages. It has been ſhewn that there is a Community and Connection amongſt them all, and each is or may be affected with what his fellow Creature doth or ſuffers; and it is impoſſible for any but God to be a judge of this. We ſee that in the greateſt Number imaginable, if we change but one unit after a few Multiplications and Diviſions the whole product is entirely altered. The ſame might happen in the World in an infinite ſeries of Mutations, if any one action were changed: it muſt be of great conſequence to the whole if God ſhould interpoſe and alter any the minuteſt thing, and perhaps change the whole original Scheme. If therefore that Scheme was at firſt contrived to the beſt Advantage of thoſe Creatures of which is conſiſted, to alter any thing in it wou'd certainly make it worſe; if it had not been beſt for the whole that Man ſhould be permitted to fall, God would not have done it; and if it was beſt he ought not to alter it. Free Creatures were neceſſary to the perfection of the World, that is, ſuch Creatures as being eſſentially ſhort of perfection were capable of chooſing amiſs. And to make them thus free and abſolutely hinder the uſe of that Freedom appeared a greater Evil than the fall of a few: for that would have defeated the very end of their being made Free Agents, which was that they might make themſelves happy by chooſing right. Thus good Men here are happy, the bleſſed in Heaven, and all the Holy Angels, ſo far as we know of them.

But it is farther urged, could not God have determined their Wills to good, and neither let them nor any other Creature know it, and then the ill effects which could be apprehended from the Example might have been avoided? The meaning of this Expedient, ſo far as I can underſtand it, is that God ſhould have deceived and cheated all rational Creatures at once; and tho' he had given them Faculties to diſcern truth from falſehood, yet he ſhould have obliged them all to believe a Lye. Sure he delights in Treachery and Falſehood that can ſuggeſt ſuch an Expedient.

But ſuppoſe God ſhould deceive Men and Angels and make them believe that they chooſe when really they do not, but their Wills are ſecretly determined; yet this would not obtain the end, or ſupply the uſe of Free Choice, or yield the pleaſure

which

would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was certain that God would hinder him from doing any thing which might occaſion the Loſs of Rewards, or make him incur the Puniſhments? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greateſt Pleaſure, nay our very Reward, conſiſts in being conſcious that we have uſed our Choice aright, and done thoſe things which we might not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greateſt Grief and Affliction to have omitted ſuch things as would have tended to our Happineſs, and were in our Power: one of theſe could not be had without the other, and if none were ſuffered to grieve for a bad Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that ſome few ſhould grieve for their own folly, than that all ſhould be deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Priviledge then of doing well, and pleaſing ourſelves in what is well done, could not be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God ſhould take away the one, the other would vaniſh of itſelf.

But you would have the Pleaſure which ariſes from Election without the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do you obſerve that the greateſt Pleaſure in this Caſe is, that you could have done otherwiſe: and this ariſes from the very Nature of Pleaſure, which ſeems to be nothing elſe but *a Senſe of the Exerciſe of thoſe Faculties and Powers which we enjoy.* The more therefore any Action is *ours*, the more it pleaſes us; and ſince a free Action (which we could either exert

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which is the reſult of it. For it is not, as obſerved before, the belief of our being free that gives us the pleaſure, but the true and right uſe of the Faculty: Tho' a Man believed never ſo firmly that he ſees or knows a thing, yet if his Faculty of Sight or Knowledge were not really exerciſed, he would neither have the uſe nor the pleaſure of them. And at the ſame rate if a Man have not the exerciſe of his Choice, he will neither have the uſe nor pleaſure ariſing from it.

or omit) is the moſt of all ours, it muſt neceſſarily pleaſe us moſt: But if the Will were confined to one Side, or detained from the other, the Action would ceaſe to be ours, and the Pleaſure would periſh together with the Senſe of Liberty. A Mind conſcious of Virtue is the Pleaſure and Reward of good Actions, but unleſs it were poſſible for it to become conſcious of Vice, 'tis plain it could not be conſcious of Virtue. (69.)

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(69) In oppoſition to what our Author has here advanced, *Bayle* [*d.*] brings a great many Arguments drawn from the Tenets of *Calviniſts*, *Spinoziſts*, *&c.* who believe that all their Actions are neceſſarily determined, and yet are no leſs pleaſed with them. Nay ſome, ſays he, rejoice in this very thing, that they are under the abſolute Direction of the Deity. *Dij me tuentur*— [*e.*] and to be *naturally* determined to the beſt was always looked upon as a peculiar Happineſs, and they that came neareſt it were eſteemed the beſt Men, as the known Compliments to *Cato* and *Fabricius* declare. Some are as well pleaſed with what they have by Lot or Inheritance, as what they get by their own Labour: witneſs the Pride of antient Families, *&c. Gaudeant bene nati*, is a common Proverb; and among the Things, *quæ vitam faciunt beatiorem*, *Martial* reckons *Res non parta Labore ſed relicta*. And again: If, ſay he, we did take delight in chooſing things, yet it would be enough for us if God concealed his determination from us, and we only believed that we were free to chooſe and act.

We need not, I think, ſpend much time in anſwering ſuch Arguments as theſe. For the *Calviniſts*, *&c.* notwithſtanding all their abſurd Tenets, have evidently this Conſciouſneſs of Choice within them, which is the ſecret ſource of the Pleaſure that attends their Actions, and cannot be extinguiſhed by any of their Principles, but overcomes them all, and conſtantly puts theſe Men upon ſuch endeavours as are vain and uſeleſs upon the Suppoſition, and inconſiſtent with the Belief of Fate and abſolute Predeſtination: which ſhews us that theſe Notions are neither acted upon in Life, nor purſued to their utmoſt Conſequences; that they reſt in pure Speculation, and are generally laid aſide in Practice; in ſhort, that they are abſolutely inconſiſtent with human Nature, as well as human Reaſon.

Secondly,

[*d.*] *Anſwer to the Queries of a Provincial.* p. 665. Fol.

[*e.*] *Horace*, B. 1. Ode 17.

You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleaſure than undergo the Danger; that is, you had

Secondly, Some Perſons may rejoice in being under the particular Care, Protection and Government of the Deity; but then their Joy proceeds not ſo much from a bare Contemplation of what the Deity does for them, as from conſidering *on what account* he does it, *viz.* becauſe they are agreeable to him, and proper Objects of his Favour, and that on account of ſomething which they *themſelves* have done. If *Horace* meant otherwiſe by his *Dij me tuentur*, he had ſmall reaſon for what he adds in the next Line, *Diis Pietas mea & Muſa cordi eſt.* But in truth this and moſt other of *Bayle*'s Teſtimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic Flouriſhes, rather than Philoſophic Truths, and conſequently not worth a ſerious examination. To draw any thing like an Argument from another's Words, we ſhould at leaſt be ſure of his determinate Meaning, of the preciſe number of his Ideas, as well as the juſtneſs of their Connection together, which we muſt never expect from ſuch kind of random Quotations. It may not therefore be improper to obſerve here once for all, that *Bayle*'s uſual Method of reaſoning from Authorities muſt be very weak and unphiloſophical; and calculated rather to blind Men's Eyes, than to inform their Underſtandings.

Thirdly, We are pleaſed indeed with what we call *Good Fortune*, when a great Sum of Money comes to us by Lot, or a Large Eſtate, or a Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the more delighted, the greater the Change is in our Circumſtances; and the leſs Expectation we had of it [*f.*] But is this Pleaſure comparable to that Intellectual or Moral Pleaſure, that ſublime Satisfaction and complacency, which we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money by ſome laudable Act, or egregious Undertaking, that may properly be called *our own?* Is it equal to that ſolid Comfort, and Self approbation which every ingenuous Mind is ſenſible of from his doing what *deſerves* an Eſtate or Title, and receiving theſe as the proper Recompence and due Tribute of ſuch Deeds? The Man that can value himſelf more upon his Deſcent from an antient Family, than upon being by theſe means the Founder of a new one, is a diſgrace to his Deſcent, and unworthy of the Arms he bears. — But to return.

There is undoubtedly an agreeable and exalted Conſciouſneſs attending all the Bleſſings which we ourſelves are inſtrumental in procuring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction which they could afford us, if we knew ourſelves to be uncon-

[*f.*] *See* Note 19.

had rather be a Brute than a Man: neither could you by this means avoid theſe natural Evils which you

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concerned in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter, (as is illuſtrated at large by Dr. *Scott* in the firſt Vol. of his *Chriſtian Life*, and by Dr. *Jenkin*, in his *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly *merit* any thing at the hand of God, yet the Conſciouſneſs of having performed ſuch Actions as are in themſelves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Bleſſings from him in return for ſuch Actions, muſt very much increaſe our Happineſs in the Enjoyment of theſe Bleſſings, both in this World and the next, (as is ſhewn in the ſame places.) Nor laſtly, could we receive this Pleaſure which now reſults from our Choice and Action, if we were determined in every thing by the Deity, ſuppoſing that Determination concealed from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to chooſe and act. For, as our Author obſerves, this would be to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Cauſe. All our Ideas of Merit ariſe from, and are entirely founded in *Free Choice:* this (as far as we can apprehend) is the neceſſary Medium to ſuch Moral Happineſs; and we can no more conceive how one ſhould come without the other, than how we ſhould ſee without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleaſure, tho' another did the Action, would be the ſame as for one Man to be conſcious of his doing what ſome other really did, or for him to ſee by ſome other's Eyes. Such Suppoſitions as theſe would breed endleſs Confuſion. For we muſt either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourſelves, or pride ourſelves in that which we know belongs to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourſelves, or pleaſe ourſelves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and ſo we in reality may never deſerve either praiſe or blame. The natural conſequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Deſert, or ſtrive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuine Product of all ſuch Suppoſitions as queſtion the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us ſuſpect that we may be impoſed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The ſame Arguments with thoſe of *Bayle*, as well as the like method of reaſoning, are made uſe of by the Author of the *Philoſophical Enquiry*, p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks, "It "may not be improper to obſerve, that ſome of the Pleaſures

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you dread ſo much as fooliſhly to wiſh yourſelf a Brute, leſt you ſhould fall into them. But ſuppoſing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The Syſtem of the Univerſe required free Agents: without theſe the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodneſs choſe the Benefit of the Univerſe rather than that of yourſelf; eſpecially when this is better for you too, tho' you ſhould be ſo ungrateful as not to confeſs it.

V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by his abſolute Power, ſo nothing can be conceived to be more diſagreeable to himſelf. We have ſaid that God made the World in order to have ſomething wherein to exerciſe his Attributes externally: But ſince he has ſeveral Attributes, he cannot exerciſe them all in every thing alike. His Power therefore exerts itſelf chiefly in one thing, and his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in another. He exerciſed his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion; his Goodneſs and Wiſdom in the Order and Agreement of things: But the Divine *Wiſdom* ſeems to have ſet apart the Government of *Free Agents* as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exerciſeth itſelf, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it were finite it would not be equal to ſo great a Taſk.

Free Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine *Power*, the Government of theſe therefore is the proper Exerciſe of the Divine *Wiſdom*, wherein God delights.

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" Man receives from Objects are ſo far from being the Effect " of Choice, that they are not the Effect of the leaſt Premedi- " tation, or any Act of his own, as in finding a Treaſure on " the Road, or in receiving a Legacy from a Perſon unknown " to him." But has a Man the ſame Pleaſure in theſe Caſes as if he had done ſomething to *deſerve* a Treaſure of the Public? or had the Legacy conferred on him as a Reward for his good Deeds to the deceaſed Perſon, his late loved Beneficiar, or intimate Friend? If this Author can find a difference in theſe two Caſes, this Obſervation of his muſt be improper: if he cannot, I am ſure he has a different Senſe of things from the reſt of Mankind, and of conſequence is not to be argued with.

It does not ſeem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and abſolutely direct ſuch Beings as are merely paſſive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Reſiſtance. For thoſe things obey eaſily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wiſdom to govern them; for infinite Power, with a moderate uſe of Wiſdom, would have been ſufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wiſdom of God ſhould diſplay itſelf, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themſelves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Perſon how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exerciſe of Wiſdom it requires to direct a Multitude of theſe to a certain End, and make them conſpire to the common Good, than to order Brute Beaſts, and ſuch as have no Power of themſelves, in what manner you pleaſe. To them that conſider the vaſt Multitude of Free Agents, which is almoſt infinite, and their Independence (ſince every one is, at leaſt in many Caſes, abſolute Maſter of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God ſeems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wiſdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End propoſed, ſo many Free Spirits, ſo many Agents that were in a manner ſet at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for Wiſdom, wherein (ſetting aſide, and in a manner ſuſpending the Exerciſe of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to paſs that ſo many jarring Wills depending on themſelves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no ſuch thing, ſhall yet conſpire together to promote the Good of the Univerſe. 'Tis impoſſible that

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this Exerciſe of Wiſdom ſhould not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be eſteemed agreeable to him. But if he were obliged to interfere with his Power, t'would ſeem to argue a Defect of Wiſdom; for what occaſion is there for him to interpoſe and ſtop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wiſdom could provide ſufficiently for the Good of the whole without altering his Plan? *

VI. From hence it ſeems ſufficiently evident why God would not interpoſe his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, ſince that could neither be advantageous to ourſelves nor to the whole Syſtem, nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that abſolute Goodneſs permits Evil Elections, ſince for the moſt part they could not be prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's no doubt but God will take care that the very beſt ſhall be done. (70.)

It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor uſeful to us, that God ſhould always hinder bad Elections.

SUB-

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(70.) What has been urged in the foregoing Subſection about the Divine Interpoſition in human Elections muſt be underſtood in a limited Senſe, *viz.* as relating only to an *immediate* Influence, or an abſolute Determination of the Will, *i. e.* to ſuch an intermedling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subſection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interpoſition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular ſort which would ſubvert their natural Powers, or be deſtructive of their Freedom! Though God has eſtabliſhed general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left theſe entirely to themſelves, but influences, directs, and governs them in ſuch a manner as is moſt conducive to the great End for which he deſigned them; which End could not be attained without ſuch a particular Influence, as will be ſhewn below. In determining the *manner* of this Government we muſt beware of the two Extremes of ſuppoſing either firſt, that the Deity always influences ſecond Cauſes or acts (as *Malebranch* terms it) by *particular Wills*, in the Natural or Moral World; which would diſſolve all Laws of Nature, deſtroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every

* See Dr. *Jenkin*'s 2d Vol. C. 12. p. 240, &c. 5th Edit.

SUBSECT. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

Devout Men hope for a change in the courſe of Nature, through their Prayers.

I. SOME may apprehend that God is not ſo averſe from interpoſing immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here aſſerted; and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of ſo great con-

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thing to Fate: or ſecondly, that he never interpoſes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of Mechaniſm or of Liberty take their natural Courſe, and operate as it were independently of himſelf; which would entirely deſtroy a *particular Providence*, and render the *general* one in a great meaſure uſeleſs. The bad Conſequences which would attend the former of theſe Schemes have been touched upon above: The latter (which is particularly eſpouſed by *Leibnitz* in his Syſtem of *Pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, and by Mr. *Whiſton* in his *New Theory of the Earth*) will be obviated in the following Subſection. I ſhall here only add the Opinion of Mr. *Colliber* on the preſent Subject; "[*s.*] 'Twas highly ſuitable "to the Divine Wiſdom in the Government of the World, "both to pre-ordain ſome of the principal Events with "relation to the entire human Community, or to the more "conſiderable parts of it, and to reſerve to himſelf a Right "of interpoſing and influencing particular Agents, as in other "Caſes, ſo more eſpecially in order to the accompliſhment of "theſe Events. That he has actually done ſo is abundantly "clear from Scripture Prophecies, and Hiſtories. And that "in ſo doing he has acted in a manner moſt worthy his Wiſ"dom, is no leſs manifeſt. For hereby it appears that the "Divine Government is equally oppoſed to Chance and De"ſtiny. Had the Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left "every Man to the Conduct of his own Inclinations, and na"tural Effects in general to the Influence of their Cauſes, "without ever interpoſing to direct them to the attainment "of his great Deſign; this would have been almoſt in effect "to diveſt himſelf of the Government of Rational Agents, "and to ſubject their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard of "the utmoſt Diſorder and Confuſion. Or had he on the con"trary abſolutely or fatally determined every Event, tho' this "would have been far enough from diveſting himſelf of the "Government of the World, yet it would have been a Go-

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[*s.*] *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 115.

conſequence with him, but that he may be eaſily and frequently, induced to diſpenſe with them, contrary to what we have here advanced. Nay, this ſeems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Supplicant that addreſſes himſelf to God, believes that this is effected by the Deity through his Prayers: if he perceived it to be otherwiſe, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to the Deity. For if all came to paſs according to the natural Order of things, and the Series of Cauſes, who could hope to be delivered from a Diſtemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, by virtue of Prayer? Theſe things are either effected by the immediate Interpoſition of the Divine Power, or are requeſted of God in vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Cauſes, which may not be altered, thoſe Cauſes would produce their Effects as well upon the omiſſion as the offering of theſe Supplications. But if God ſometimes vouchſafes to ſuſpend or change the Order and Laws of Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the ſame be done to prevent the abuſe of Free-Will and Natural Evils? Either this Interpoſition muſt be ad-

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" vernment unworthy of the Deity, a Government entirely " excluſive of all proper Sin and Puniſhment, Virtue and Re- " wards: wherein himſelf would in effect have been the only " Agent, and all the Creatures ſtupid and paſſive. Whereas, " by pre-ordaining the moſt material Events, and ſuffering " the Creatures freely to exert their Faculties in all conveni- " ent Caſes, he appears moſt wiſely to have choſen the middle " way, and thereby to have equally avoided the Miſchiefs of " both Extremes." See alſo p. 116.

All the Difference between this ingenious Writer and our Author is, that in the Government of the World he ſuppoſes the general Law of Liberty to be ſometimes ſuſpended, as well as the Laws of Motion. Whereas our Author, though he aſſerts the ſame of the latter, yet he denies it of the former; at leaſt does not grant that ſuch an Abridgment of Liberty is neceſſary to the aforeſaid Government: How on this Principle he accounts for that which we generally mean by a *Particular Providence*, anſwering the Prayers, and thereupon often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs of Mankind, will be ſhewn in its proper place.

admitted in order to oppoſe theſe Evils, or it muſt be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deſerves an Anſwer. We attempt to ſolve it in the following manner.

God does not hear all Prayers.

II. 'Tis to be obſerved then, in the firſt place, that all *Prayers* are not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things ſhall be done which are requeſted of him, but only ſuch as he has declared to be agreeable to his Will, and has in ſome reſpect promiſed to perform. Thoſe things then which are unneceſſary, trifling, inconſiſtent, hurtful, or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by the Petitioners, though they be requeſted never ſo frequently.

God is obliged to the Creatures, by his Goodneſs and by *Covenant*.

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Creature, firſt from his Goodneſs, whereby he is obliged ſo to order all external things, that Exiſtence ſhall be better than Non-exiſtence to all who duly perform their Duty. Secondly, By ſome Covenant or Agreement whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to beſtow ſome Favours upon Men, notwithſtanding they were Sinners: Which Covenant, tho' it may not be eſteemed a natural one, yet it cannot be judged to be againſt Nature, or to offer Violence to it.

What may be requeſted of the Deity relates either to the Mind, the Body, or external things.

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requeſted of God either belong to the Mind, *viz.* that the Mind be ſound and vigorous, and able to govern the Affections, *&c.* or to the Body, that Life and Strength be prolonged, *&c.* or to external things, that the Weather be ſerene and ſeaſonable for the Fruits of the Earth, *&c.* Now theſe differ from each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the ſame Conditions.

God does not give Aſſiſtance to our Minds at random, but under as certain Laws as thoſe of the Natural World.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, ſince the Elective Power is the chief Part of Man, and is ſelf-motive, 'tis ſcarce conceivable how it ſhould be determined from without itſelf. For that which determines itſelf is entirely different from that which ſtands in need

need of another to move it, and theſe appear to be no more applicable to the ſame thing, than a Square and Circular Figure are to the ſame Surface, at leaſt their Natures muſt be changed to make them compatible. But yet this Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abuſe and a perverſe manner of acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that God only can reſtore it, for is ſuppoſed to be ſubject to him alone.

This Aſſiſtance muſt be afforded to Mankind in ſuch a manner that no blemiſh be thereby caſt upon the Divine Conſtancy, nor any Prejudice done to his Wiſdom in eſtabliſhing the Laws and Order of Nature. Now that all kind of Interpoſition does not prejudice theſe, appears from hence, *viz.* that it is moſt worthy of the Divine Majeſty to have reſerved to himſelf a Power over Nature, eſpecially while the Beings over whom this Power is reſerved enjoy their Liberty; it ſeems not only proper that God ſhould be at Liberty to act in this manner with them, but alſo neceſſary, provided this be not done at random, but under ſome known and certain Condition. And here the Divine Wiſdom has exerted itſelf in a wonderful manner, and deviſed a Way to reconcile the Conſtancy of God, and the Sanctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Aſſiſtance which is occaſionally afforded to Mankind upon their Requeſt. Man might preſume upon ſome Method of effecting this before Revelation, but 'tis to this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifeſtation of it. From hence we learn that God will give his *Holy Spirit*, under ſome certain Laws and Conditions, to thoſe that are fitly diſpoſed: which would be as certain and conſtant a Principle of Spiritual Actions to them that are endowed with it, as Nature itſelf is of the Natural. Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace aſſiſts our depraved Will, and in ſome reſpect reſtores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judged to violate the Order

der of Nature, any more than when its Influence ſuſtains natural Cauſes. If it be aſked what thoſe Laws are, under which the Influence of this Spirit is promiſed; I anſwer, all ſuch things as are neceſſary to Salvation are promiſed to them who make a right uſe of their preſent Abilities, —that pray to God thro' *Chriſt* for an increaſe of them, —and that celebrate the *Sacraments* as the Law of God requires. Upon theſe Conditions this Spirit deſcends into the Minds of Men, and by its holy Inſpiration forms them to Piety.

The Aid of the *Holy Spirit* is not miraculous.

VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by Chriſt, was a moſt miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it, ſince they are now produced according to fixed Laws and a ſettled Order, as regularly and conſtantly as the Works of Nature, cannot be reckoned a *Miracle* any more than theſe are: For I call a Miracle a ſenſible Operation of God, which is performed in a Way contrary to Nature; and as it happens beyond all certain and fixed Order, it proves God to be the immediate Cauſe and Author: But the Interpoſition of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Interpoſition of this kind; for it is done, as we ſaid, according to a certain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I confeſs that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free Agents, (71.) but it is no leſs regular than the

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(71.) He does not mean that this is an Exception from the Law of their *Liberty*, as appears from what immediately follows; but from their being left entirely to themſelves, or to the caſual Impreſſions of thoſe External Objects and Agents which ſurround them; from their acting ſolely upon Principles of their own Formation or Diſcovery, and following the Guidance of their natural Underſtanding, without any internal Aſſiſtance: which ſeems to be the general Law of this their preſent State of Probation. The *Holy Ghoſt* then, according to our Author, does not ſubvert and ſuperſede, but rather ſtrengthen, preſerve and perfect our natural Freedom; it repairs the breaches

the Law itſelf, nor any more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God may interpoſe

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breaches made therein by the Violence of Temptations, by the Force of Evil Habits; it counterballances the Influence of Evil Spirits, and reſtores the Mind to its native *Equilibrium*, or Indifference. How theſe Effects may be ſuppoſed to be produced in us, and of what kind the Influence of the Holy Ghoſt, of Good and Evil Angels is, will be conſidered by and by. We ſhall firſt give the Opinion of an Author or two concerning what the Holy Spirit's Operations *are not*, or that they cannot be in any reſpect deſtructive of our natural Powers.

" In the firſt place, The manner of the Spirit's Operation " is not inconſiſtent with the Nature of Mankind; (which ſays " Dr. *Stebbing*) is a Truth ſo fully and ſo liberally granted by " all Parties, that nothing needs to be ſaid to prove it. Now " Man we know is an *intelligent* and *rational* Being, able to " diſcern between Good and Evil; he has alſo ſuch a *Freedom* " or *Liberty* of *Will* as makes him accountable to God for his " Behaviour in this Life. By conſequence the Spirit muſt not " be ſuppoſed to operate in ſuch a manner as not to make the " leaſt uſe of the Underſtanding, nor muſt it be ſo far incon- " ſiſtent with Freedom and Liberty, as that a Man's Actions " may not properly be called his own. [*t*]" Again, " ſuch " is the manner of the Spirit's Operations, that they do not " make our own Care and Diligence after Virtue and Godli- " neſs unneceſſary, but that on the other hand the Operations " of the Spirit will do us no Good, if our own Endeavours " be wanting. Thirdly, He does not produce his Effects in " us all at once, but in ſuch Order, and by thoſe Degrees " that ſuit with our Capacities and Qualifications. [*u*] Laſtly, " His Motions are not diſcernable by us from the natural Ope- " rations of our Minds. We feel them no otherwiſe than we " do our Thoughts and Meditations, we cannot diſtinguiſh " them, by the manner of their affecting us, from our natural " Reaſonings, and the Operations of Truth upon our Souls; " ſo that if God had only deſigned to give the Holy Spirit to " us, without making any mention of it in his Word, we " could never have known, unleſs it had been communicated " to us by ſome private Revelation, that our Souls are moved " by a Divine Power when we love God and keep his Com- " mandments. [*w*]"

This is a Confirmation of what our Author has declared above, particularly that the Holy Spirit's Operations cannot be called

[*t*] *Treatiſe Concerning the Operations of the Spirit*, C. 7. pag. 123. 8*vo*. [*u*] *Ibid.* p. 124.

[*w*] *Ibid.* p. 125, 126.

terpoſe in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the Order of Nature, nor injure his Conſtancy.

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called *miraculous*. A larger Proof and Illuſtration of the foregoing Propoſitions may be ſeen in the ſame Chapter. The Conſequence reſulting from them, *viz.* that the Spirit does not operate *irreſiſtibly*, is clearly proved and defended againſt *Turretin* in Chap. 8, 9, *&c.*

See alſo *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Part 2. Chap. 4. par. 5. p. 237. "God (ſays that Author) in the ordinary courſe of his Go-"vernment doth as well leave *free* Agents to the natural *Free-*"*dom* with which he firſt created them, as *neceſſary* ones to theſe "Neceſſities which he firſt *impreſſed* upon their Natures. For "his *Providence* is *ſuccedaneous* to his *Creation*, and did at firſt "*begin* where that *ended*, and doth ſtill *proceed* as it *began*, *or-*"*dering* and *governing* all things according to the ſeveral "*Frames* and *Models* in which he firſt *caſt* and *created* them: "Nor can he order and govern them *otherwiſe* without *unra-*"*veling* his own *Creation* and making things to be otherwiſe "than he firſt made them. For how can he ordinarily *neceſ-*"*ſitate* thoſe Agents whom he firſt made *free* without *changing* "their Natures from *free* to *neceſſary*, and making them a *dif-*"*ferent* kind of Being than he *made* them? So that tho' in the "courſe of his Government God doth powerfully *importune* "and *perſuade* us, yet he lays no *Neceſſity* on our *Wills*; but "leaves us free to *chooſe* or *refuſe*; and as the *Temptations* of "*Sin* incline us *one* way, ſo the *Grace of God* inclines us *an-*"*other*, but both leave us to our *Liberty* to go which way we "pleaſe."

See alſo Bp. *Burnet* on the 10th Article of the Church of *England*, and ABp. *Tillotſon*'s 169th Serm. p. 455. Vol. 3. or 147th Serm. p 310. 3d. Edit. Fol. or Dr. *Rymer*'s General Repreſentation of Revealed Religion, C. 9. p. 210, 211.

If the foregoing Obſervations be true, it follows that the ordinary Operation of the Spirit cannot be any *Phyſical Influence*, or immediate Determination of the Will; it muſt therefore be only a *Moral* Influence, or mediate, rational Determination. The Manner of effecting this may be by injecting Ideas, Repreſenting Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and aſſiſting the Underſtanding in its apprehenſion of them. This I think is all that Mr. *Wollaſton* could mean by the Words *Suggeſtion*, *Impulſe*, or *ſilent Communication of ſome Spiritual Being*: [x] and ſeems to be the only intelligible Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil Spirits: in which ſenſe I believe that we are very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in order to promote the Good of the whole, and compleat the Deſigns of a particular Providence. The Author laſt mentioned has given us

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[x] *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 106.

ſtancy. Not that God actually determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God rather than to the Will of the Creature;

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a fine Deſcription of the manner in which this Government of Free Beings may be exerciſed and applied to the Ends abovementioned. "It is not impoſſible (ſays he) [y] but many things "ſuitable to ſeveral Caſes may be brought to paſs by means of "ſecret and ſometimes ſudden Influences on our Minds, or "the Minds of other Men whoſe Acts may affect us. For "inſtance; if the Caſe ſhould require that *N.* ſhould be de"livered from threatning Ruin, or from ſome Misfortune "which would certainly befall him, if he ſhould go ſuch a "way at ſuch a Time as he intended; upon this occaſion ſome "new Reaſons may be preſented to his Mind why he ſhould "not go at all, or not then, or not by that Road; or he may "forget to go: or if he is to be delivered from ſome danger"ous Enemy, either ſome new turn given to his Thoughts "may divert him from going where the Enemy will be, or "the Enemy may after the ſame manner be diverted from "coming where he ſhall be, or his (the Enemy's) Reſentment "may be qualified, or ſome proper Method may be ſug"geſted, or Degree of Reſolution and Vigour may be excited. "After the ſame manner, not only Deliverances from Dangers "and Troubles, but Advantages and Succeſſes may be con"ferred. Or on the other Side, Men may, by way of Pu"niſhment for Crimes committed, incur Miſchiefs and Cala"mities. I ſay, theſe things and ſuch like may be. For ſince "the Motions and Actions of Men, which depend upon their "Wills, do alſo depend upon their Judgments, as theſe again "do on the preſent Appearances or Non-appearances of things "in their Minds; if a new proſpect of things can be any way "produced, the Light by which they are ſeen altered, new "Forces and Directions impreſſed upon the Spirits, Paſſions "exalted or abated, the Power of judging enlivened or debi"litated, or the Attention taken off, without any Suſpenſion "or Alteration of the ſtanding Laws of Nature; then with"out that, new Volitions, Deſigns, Meaſures, or a ceſſation "of thinking alſo may be produced, and thus many things "prevented that would otherwiſe be, and many brought about "that would not." See alſo *Sherlock* on *Providence*, pag. 51. 2d Edit. Again, [z] "That there may be poſſibly ſuch Inſpi"rations of new Thoughts and Counſels may perhaps ap"pear farther from this, that we ſo frequently find Thoughts "ariſing in our Heads, into which we are led by no Diſcourſe, "nothing

[y] Page 105. [z] Page 107.

ture; but that in ſome manner he reſtores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly diſpoſed, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty.

Prayers naturally tend to perfect the Mind.

VII. Fifthly, It may be demonſtrated that the *Prayers* themſelves have ſome natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will: For Prayers are certain Endeavours towards the Exerciſe of Liberty, and contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones; and ſuch is the Nature of all Powers, that they acquire Strength by trial and exerciſe, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more perfect one, till they have attained to a Habit and Facility of Acting. The conſtant Exerciſe of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural Efficacy, to reſtore

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"nothing we read, no clue of Reaſoning, but they ſurpriſe "and come upon us from we know not what Quarter. If "they proceed from the Mobility of Spirits ſtragling out of "Order, and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or were of the "Nature of *Dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, "and extravagant as they are?" Is it not much more reaſonable to imagine that they come by the Order and Direction of an all ſeeing and all-gracious God who continually watches over us, and diſpoſes every thing in and about us, for the Good of ourſelves or others? Not to ſpeak of the agreeableneſs of this Notion to the Opinions and Belief of the beſt and wiſeſt Men in all Ages. The Conſequence Mr. *Wollaſton* draws from the whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of our Author. "If "this be the Caſe, as it ſeems to be, that Men's Minds are "ſuſceptive of ſuch Inſinuations and Impreſſions as frequently "by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an Inclina-"tion towards this or that, how many things may be brought "to paſs by theſe means, without fixing and refixing the "Laws of Nature, any more than they are unfixed when one "Man alters the Opinion of another, by throwing a Book pro-"per for that purpoſe in his way?"

To the ſame purpoſe ſee *Scott*'s Chriſtian Life, Part 2. Vol. 2. § 1. p. 81, 82. Or *Whitby*, Append. to 2 Cor. 6.

I hope the Reader will excuſe me for inſiſting ſo long on this Point, ſince falſe Notions concerning it have produced the moſt pernicious Conſequences to Religion in general, as well as the principal Objections againſt our Author's Syſtem.

ſtore the proper uſe of Free Will, and regain its native Vigour.

VIII. Sixthly, The ſame may be ſaid concerning the Government of the Paſſions and Affections, which conſtitutes ſo great a Part of human Felicity: we have ſhewn that the Elective Power is ſuperior to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great Meaſure falls from that Power which nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the Mind have not quite ſhaken off the Yoke, they ſtill obey, tho' with ſome difficulty, but uſe and exerciſe are neceſſary to implant an Habit of Obedience in them. Since therefore Prayers contain in themſelves an exerciſe of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to ſtrengthen the Elective Acts, and by the ſame means accuſtom the Affections to obey: for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes Reſiſtance. (72.) And to ſubdue the Affections.

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(72.) *Prayer* puts us upon making good Reſolutions, and endeavouring to ſubdue our vicious Inclinations: it animates our Zeal, and enflames our Affections; it exerciſes and improves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity; and therefore is in itſelf a Means of ſtrengthening our Faculties, and removing all Impediments to a due Exertion of them. It alſo makes us ſenſible of our ſtrict Dependence on the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the great Benefit of his Supplies, and of conſequence it naturally fits us for them, and inclines us to make a right uſe of them when we do receive them. "It is not only a Means, (ſays Dr. *Barrow* [*a*]) by Impetration acquiring for us, but it is an effectual Inſtrument working in us all true Good. It is the Channel by which God conveyeth Spiritual Light into our Minds, and Spiritual Vigour into our Hearts. It is both the Seed, and the Food of Spiritual Life by which all holy Diſpoſitions of Soul, and all honeſt Reſolutions of Practice are bred and nouriſhed, are augmented and ſtrengthened in us. It exciteth, it quickeneth, it maintaineth all pious Affections. The love of God can no otherwiſe than by it be kindled, fomented or kept in Life, (without it we certainly ſhall have an Eſtrangement and Averſation from him) it alone can maintain a conſtant

 "reverence

[*a*] Firſt Vol. 1ſt Edit. p. 493.

The Actions of Free Beings will produce a contingency in material things, yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature.

IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, *viz.* our own Bodies and the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble than the Material, and consequently that this latter was made for the ſake of the former, and is ſubſervient to its uſe: But ſince the Actions of Beings endowed with Underſtanding and Will are free, and on that account contingent, they neceſſarily produce a Contingency alſo in material Subſtances which depend upon them. For we can excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Caſe produced merely according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of the Will.

Nor would they have happened at the time or in the manner they do, if the Will had not by its own Li-

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" reverence and awe of God, keeping him in our Thoughts, " and making us to live as in his Preſence. It chiefly enli- " veneth and exerciſeth our Faith in God; it is that which " ſweetneth and endeareth to ourſelves the Practice of Piety; " which only can enable us with delight and alacrity, to obey " God's Commandments: It alone can raiſe our Minds from " the Cares and Concernments of this World to a ſenſe and de- " ſire of Heavenly things.

" God's End (ſays Mr. *Chubb*) in requiring this Duty of " Prayer, is wholly and ſolely the Good and Benefit of his " Creatures, *viz.* that it may be a means to work in the Pe- " titioner a ſuitable frame and temper of Mind, and to diſpoſe " him to a ſuitable Practice and Converſation, and ſo render " him a ſuitable and proper Object of God's ſpecial Care and " Love."

" And as this is God's End in appointing this Duty, ſo for " this End he requires the frequent Returns of it, that the Mind " of the Petitioner may be habitually ſeaſoned with a ſenſe of " himſelf. [*b.*] See alſo Bp. *Patrick's* Diſcourſe concerning " Prayer, Ch. 8. and 9.

Theſe Effects and Uſes of Prayer, moſt of which are diſcoverable by natural Reaſon, prove ſufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a *natural Duty*. Concerning the *Efficacy* of it, and the manner whereby Providence may be ſuppoſed to anſwer our particular Requeſts, ſee the following Notes to this Subſection.

[*b.*] *Chubb's Tracts*, p. 180, *&c.*

Liberty excited them. Neither do we ſuppoſe that any Violence or Diſorder happens hereby to the Laws of Nature; for Nature itſelf has provided that the leſs ſhould give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of the Will, being the more excellent of the two. We muſt believe the ſame concerning Agents of a ſuperior Nature; and the more noble Order they are of, the greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are can convey Water in Canals, drain ſuch Parts of the Earth as are naturally covered with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other Changes both in the Earth, the Water and the Air. Who then can affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almoſt the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws? All who acknowledge the Exiſtence of ſuch Beings, are agreed that theſe things are poſſible; now it muſt be allowed that whatever is performed by theſe Beings, is done according to the Laws of Nature, and that no manner of Violence is hereby offered to the Order of it, any more than by the Actions of our own Will.

There is a Syſtem of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act as much upon each other.

X. Eighthly, And as all material Beings are connected together, and by mutual Influence act upon each other; *viz.* the Superior upon the Inferior, the Sun upon the Æther and the Moon, and that upon the Air, Water, and Earth; and perhaps *vice verſa*; ſo 'tis in like manner probable that there is a certain Order and Syſtem of intellectual Beings conſtituted, who are no leſs ſubordinate to one another, and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the Laws eſtabliſhed by Nature.

God makes uſe of the Miniſtry of Angels in the Government of Mankind, nor is this any Violence to Nature.

XI. Ninthly, There ſeems to be no reaſon why God ſhould not make uſe of the Miniſtry of thoſe Beings in the Government of this World * whenever

* *See the Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 108, 109.

ever it may be expedient. This we ſee is done in ſome meaſure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes uſe of Men to govern other Animals, and ſome Men are ſet as Guardians over others. And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges perform their Office, not as they themſelves pleaſe, but according to the Appointment of their Maſters, or the Laws; ſo in like manner we are to believe that Agents more excellent than us (which we ſtile miniſtring Angels) diſcharge their Office according to the Laws preſcribed by God. Suppoſe therefore this, about aſſiſting ſuch as regularly apply to God, to be one of theſe Laws; let them be commanded to relieve thoſe who make their humble Addreſſes to him, and let the manner of invoking him be preſcribed by Nature, or ſome poſitive Law: Can it be doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the Aſſiſtance of theſe Supplicants, and as diligently diſcharge the Duty of relieving them from diſtreſs, as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs the Commands of his Maſter? And ſo long as theſe things are done according to the general Order, and under ſuch Conditions as are agreeable to Nature and Reaſon, they can be no more deem'd repugnant to the Order of Nature, or to the Laws appointed for the Government of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconſiſtent with the Laws of univerſal Nature: for it does not ſeem any more repugnant to theſe that Angels ſhould uſe their Powers for the Relief of ſuch as pray to God, than that Men ſhould help each other according to their Abilities. If it be granted that theſe things are ſo, it will be very apparent how our *Prayers* may have their Effect, and the deſired Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without doing Violence to Nature, or diſturbing the Order eſtabliſhed by God. Nay it may be provided by a

Law, that our Wiſhes be thus fulfilled: and we need not declare how much this Power over external things granted to free Agents, may tend to raiſe our Affections and incline the Wills themſelves. 'Tis very well known how great an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spirits have over theſe. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature capable of being moved by free Agents, at leaſt when we deſire it, 'tis not impoſſible but that by the Means of theſe Bodies, they may have Acceſs to the Soul; and though they cannot act upon the *Will* immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert its own Acts. (73.)

God is not obliged to take away the abuſe of Free-Will, ſince he has eſtabliſh'd a Method of aſſiſting his Worſhippers.

XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occaſion nor room to explain how agreeable this is to Reaſon and the Holy Scriptures. Let it ſuffice to obſerve how large a Field is hereby opened for Prayer, and how effectual it may be for obtaining the Aſſiſtance not only of God himſelf immediately, but alſo of his Miniſters.

It muſt be confeſſed that God ſometimes relieves the Diſtreſſed, and when applied to, interpoſes in Matters relating to the Will: but theſe things are effected according to the Univerſal Law of Nature. And though this be ſuperior to that which is implanted in the particular Nature of ſome Beings; yet it is no leſs natural with regard to the Syſtem of Univerſal Nature; neither are we to believe that this is often done, but only in Caſes where a particular

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(73.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclined to any thing by a Proſpect of the Pleaſure or Pain which may attend the Proſecution or Omiſſion of it; or, as we commonly ſay, by another's *working upon* his Paſſions, his Hopes, or his Fears: For that ſuperior Beings act upon us in no other ſenſe, that their Influence conſiſts only in occaſioning pleaſant or diſagreeable Ideas in us, in repreſenting Arguments, Motives, *&c.* to us, may perhaps be gathered from Note 71. And, I think, it muſt be allowed that this is very conſiſtent with that Phyſical Indifference, or abſolute Freedom of the Will above deſcribed.

cular Nature cannot be left to itſelf without Detriment to the whole. Nor is God, becauſe he ſometimes vouchſafes to interpoſe and help the Supplicant, alſo obliged entirely to remove the abuſe of Free-Will; that is, in reality, to deſtroy the Nature itſelf. By a Law of Nature, the Exerciſe of that Faculty belongs to ſuch Agents as are endowed with it, and though that Law admits of an Exception, yet it cannot be quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than what may happen from the abuſe of it. Nor is God obliged, becauſe Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve ſuch as don't pray to him at all.

The *Efficacy of Prayers* cannot be accounted for if all things be left to neceſſary cauſes.

XIII. Eleventhly, This ſeems to eſtabliſh the *Efficacy of Prayers* much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fixed by God in a fatal Concatenation, and that ſuch things as are requeſted of God, and ſeem to be obtained, are not in any reſpect owing to the Prayers; but that God has by his Foreknowledge joined the Actions of the Will with corporeal Motions, in ſuch a manner that they ſhould happen together, but without any other relation to each other than what ariſes from his Preordination; as appears in the Agreement between the Index of a Watch and the Sun.

For inſtance: God has pre-ordained a Storm from neceſſary Cauſes, and that ſome notorious Offenders ſhall be ſailing in it: when they are in danger they ſhall repent and pray to God, and at length the Wind ſhall ceaſe.

Thus a Calm enſues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but without any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force of prediſpoſed Cauſes, which do not require any Interpoſition of the Divine Power. (74.)

The

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(74.) The forementionʼd Hypotheſis of a pre-determinʼd and neceſſary Connection between Corporeal Motions and the Operations of the Will, is advanced by *Leibnitz* in what is commonly

The Aſſertors of this Opinion are obliged from the common ſenſe of Mankind to allow that God is

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monly called his Syſtem of the *Pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, which occurs in ſeveral of his Works, an account of which may be ſeen in *Fabricius*. [*b*] An Explanation of it by *G. Hanſcius* may be found in the *Preſent State of the Republic of Letters*, Vol. 4. for *Octob.* 1729. There are ſome Objections againſt it in *Bayle*'s Dict. Article *Rozarius*. Rem. L. — But as the whole of it is built upon a Suppoſition that the Mind has not a Liberty of *Indifference*, and of conſequence no proper Liberty at all, we need not ſpend any time in confuting it, having, I hope, ſufficiently eſtabliſhed the contrary Principle above, and thereby removed the Foundation of it.

Mr. *Whiſton* in particular has eſpouſed the Opinion which our Author alludes to, and enlarged upon it in the following Manner, [*c*] "Our Imperfection is ſuch, that we can only "act *pro re nata*, can never know beforehand the behaviour or "actions of Men, neither can we foreſee what Circumſtances "and Conjunctures will happen at any certain time hereafter. "And ſo we cannot provide for future Events, nor pre-"diſpoſe things in ſuch a manner that every one ſhall be dealt "with, or every thing done, no otherwiſe than if we were "alive and preſent, we ſhould think proper and reaſonable, "and ſhould actually do. But in the Divine Operation it is "quite otherwiſe. God's Preſcience enables him to act after a "more ſublime manner, and by a conſtant Courſe of Nature "and Chain of mechanical Cauſes to do every thing ſo as it "ſhall not be diſtinguiſhable from a particular Interpoſition "of his Power, nor be otherwiſe than on ſuch a particular "Interpoſition would have been brought to paſs. He who "has created all things, and given them their ſeveral Powers "and Faculties, foreſees the Effects of them all; at once "looks through the entire Chain of Cauſes, Actions and Events, "and ſees at what Periods, and in what manner 'twill be "neceſſary and expedient to bring about any Changes, be-"ſtow any Mercies, or inflict any Puniſhments on the "World. Which being unqueſtionably true, 'tis evident he "can as well provide and prediſpoſe natural Cauſes for thoſe "Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he can as eaſily put the "Machine into ſuch Motions as ſhall, without a Neceſſity of "his mending or correcting it, correſpond to all theſe fore-"ſeen Events or Actions, as make way for ſuch Alterations af-"terwards by giving a random Force to the whole: and when "theſe two ways are equally poſſible, I need not ſay which is

[*b*] *Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. p. 387, &c.
[*c*] *New Theory*, B. 4. C. 4, Solution 87.

is to be invoked and that ſuch as duly offer up their Prayers have their Requeſts granted; but as they are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for *Contingency*, or a *particular Providence*, they have invented this Scheme that there might be, or at leaſt might ſeem to be, ſome room for Prayers. But all this is to no purpoſe: For ſince God has made Agents free, and allowed them the uſe of Liberty, he muſt alſo have reſerved to himſelf a Liberty of treating them according to what their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Providence, and immediate Interpoſition;

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" moſt agreeable to the Divine Perfections, and moſt worthy " of God." *And again:* [*d*] " We pray to God for fruitful Sea- " ſons, for Health, for Peace, for the Succeſs of our Endea- " vours, for a Bleſſing on our Food and Phyſick, and depre- " cate the contrary Miſeries from us. Yet at the ſame time " we ſee the Seaſons depend on the ſettled Courſe of the Sun, " or other natural and neceſſary Cauſes: we find our Health " or Sickneſs to be the proper Effects of our Diet and Re- " gimen: we obſerve Peace and War ſubject to the Intrigues " of Princes, and the plain Reſults of viſible Conjunctures in " human Affairs: we know that worldly Prudence and Cun- " ning has a main ſtroke in the Succeſs of Mens Labours: we " feel the advantageous Effects of ſome Food and Phyſic, and " have reaſon to believe that the ſame does very much reſult " from the Goodneſs of the Drugs, the fitneſs of the Pro- " portion, and the Skill of the Phyſician, and can frequently " give a plain and mechanical Reaſon of the different Opera- " tion of all theſe things; neither do we hope for the Exer- " ciſe of a *miraculous* Power in theſe or the like Caſes. In " ſhort, Second Cauſes, ſays he, will work according to " their Natures, let Mens Supplications be never ſo importu- " nate: and to expect a Miracle in anſwer to every Petition, " is more than the moſt religious dare pretend to." See alſo Mr. *Wollaſton*'s Illuſtration of this Hypotheſis, p. 104. or Dr. *Fiddes*'s Body of Divinity, 1ſt vol. p. 154.

We ſhall propoſe an Anſwer to it in the following Note. Let it ſuffice at preſent to obſerve, that this particular Interpoſition of Divine Power which our Author contends for, is very improperly ſtiled *miraculous*, as may be ſeen from Note 71, and the 6th Paragraph of this Subſection.

[*d*] Ibid. *Corollary*, p. 362. 1ſt Edit.

terpoſition; without theſe no Efficacy will be left to Prayer, no Worſhip to God, no Honour to Religion; For if the Production of thoſe things which we requeſt depend upon antecedent, natural, and neceſſary Cauſes, our Deſires will be anſwered no leſs upon the Omiſſion, than the offering up of Prayers. Vows and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be ſaid that the Supplicants could not omit them, ſince they were pre-ordained. I anſwer: He that could omit them could not poſſibly offer them: his Omiſſion therefore is not culpable: And he that is employed in Prayer to God undertakes a ſuperfluous Office: for theſe Petitions in reality contribute nothing to the Effect, and no reaſon can be given why that ſhould be required which is of no Benefit. (75.)

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(75.) Tho' this Anſwer is very ſolid, and may by ſome perhaps be thought ſufficient; yet, as the Point before us is of the greateſt Importance; ſince wrong Notions concerning it cauſe Perplexities which diſturb the Minds of moſt Men, as Mr. *Whiſton* obſerves, [*e*] and ſince the Scheme of Providence ſo elaborately diſplayed by that Author will not, I fear, help to clear them, as he promiſes, but rather occaſion worſe; — on theſe accounts it will not be improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from ſuch Authors as endeavour to prove that the forementioned Scheme of Providence is both impoſſible in itſelf, and attended with Conſequences deſtructive of the very Notion of Prayer, and moſt other Duties of Religion. "The "Abettors of the mechanical Hypotheſis, [*f*] ſays Dr. *Jenkin*, "argue that he is the beſt Artiſt who can contrive an Engine "that ſhall need the leaſt meddling with after it is made. But "it ought to be conſidered what the Nature of the Engine is, "and what the ends and uſes of it are; and if the Nature of "it be ſuch that it cannot anſwer the Ends for which it was "framed, without ſometimes an aſſiſting hand, it would be no "point of Wiſdom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his "Contrivance, to loſe the moſt uſeful Ends deſigned by it. "And if, among other uſes, this curious Engine were deſigned "to reward the good, puniſh bad Men; to remove the Puniſhment upon Amendment, and to renew it upon a re-"lapſe:

[*e*] *New Theory*, p. 362.

[*f*] *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d Vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.

An Intimation that this is not repugnant to the Divine *Preſcience.*

XIV. 'Tis ſcarce poſſible for one who reads this not to think of that famous Difficulty, *viz.* how the

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" lapſe: ſince brute Matter is incapable of varying its Motion, " and ſuiting itſelf to the ſeveral States and Changes of free " Agents, he muſt aſſiſt it, unleſs he will loſe the chief End " for which it is to ſerve. It is no defect in the Skill and Wiſ- " dom of the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have not " Free-Will as Men have; but it would be a great defect in " his Wiſdom not to make them the Inſtruments of Rewards " and Puniſhments, becauſe it is impoſſible for them of them- " ſelves to apply and ſuit themſelves to the ſeveral States and " Conditions of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and Mo- " tion is ſuch, that they cannot ſerve all the Deſigns of their " Creator, without his Interpoſition, and therefore he con- " ſtantly doth interpoſe according to a certain Tenor which he " hath preſcribed to himſelf."

He proceeds to a particular Examination of the *Pre-eſtabliſhed Order* in p. 221. which he oppoſes with much the ſame Arguments as theſe that follow from Dr. *Fiddes*. [*g*] " As to " the Opinion of thoſe who ſay, God upon the Foreſight of " the Prayers of Men to him, diſpoſeth the Order of things in " ſuch a manner, that what they pray for ſhall happen, or " what they deprecate be averted; this is altogether incon- " ceivable; or rather, in the Nature of things, ſuppoſing Men " free Agents, impoſſible. For though God does foreſee which " way Man will act, yet nothing upon the Mechanical Hypo- " theſis can follow from his Action, but according to the Laws " of Mechaniſm. In caſe any one, for inſtance, ſhould pray " to be delivered from the danger of ſome infectious or peſti- " lentious Diſtemper, the Vapour whereby 'tis propagated, " will, notwithſtanding, purſue its natural Courſe, and pro- " duce its Effect wherever it falls upon a proper Subject: it " can make no manner of Diſtinction between him that *ſa- " crificeth* and him that *ſacrificeth not*. God may indeed, by " ſome ſecret Impulſe on the Mind of Man, which yet he is " at Liberty to follow, be the occaſion of diverting him from " the Scope of its Motion; or perhaps, on ſome extraordinary " Exigence, by an inviſible Power, retard, accelerate, or ob- " ſtruct its Courſe; but ſtill, if all things operate mechanically, " whether Man pray or no, it will unavoidably have its pro- " per Effect. There is another Caſe wherein the Motives to " Prayer, if all things come to paſs by the fixed Laws of Me- " chaniſm, appear ſtill more evidently groundleſs. A Man " in the Heat of Battle, prays that God would preſerve him " from the Inſtruments of Death, which fly every where a- " bout

[*g*] *Theol. Spec.* B. 3. Part 2. C. 4. p. 292.

the Contingency of things can be conſiſtent with the Divine *Preſcience*: Neither is it proper to med-

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" bout him; yet a Ball from a Canon or a Muſquet will ne-
" ceſſarily purſue the line of its direction; it depends how-
" ever on the choice of Man, whether he will give it ſuch a
" particular Direction as by the natural tendency of it will
" take away the Life of the Perſon who deprecates the Danger
" wherewith he finds himſelf ſurrounded. In this Caſe it is
" impoſſible, upon any foreſight of his Prayers, that the order
" of Cauſes, which are in themſelves of arbitrary and uncer-
" tain Determination, ſhall be diſpoſed after ſuch a man-
" ner as certainly to produce the deſired Effect of them."
Concerning the Impoſſibility of adapting a fixed and immutable Law to the State and Condition of Free or mutable Agents, ſee B. 2. Part 1. p. 154.

Laſtly: " It is of great uſe to us (ſays Dr. *Sherlock*) [*b*] to
" underſtand this which teaches us what we may expect from
" God, and what we muſt attribute to him in the Govern-
" ment of Nature. We muſt not expect in ordinary Caſes
" that God ſhould reverſe the Laws of Nature for us; that if
" we leap into the Fire it ſhall not burn us; or into the Wa-
" ter it ſhall not drown us: and by the ſame reaſon, the Pro-
" vidence of God is not concerned to preſerve us when we
" deſtroy ourſelves by Intemperance and Luſt: for God does
" not Work Miracles to deliver Men from the evil Effects of
" their own Wickedneſs: But all the kind Influences of Hea-
" ven which ſupply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with
" Food and Gladneſs, are owing to that good Providence
" which commands Nature to yield her Increaſe; and thoſe
" Diſorders of Nature which afflict the World with Famines,
" Peſtilence and Earthquakes, are the Effects of God's Anger
" and Diſpleaſure, and are ordered by him for the Puniſhment
" of a wicked World. We muſt all believe this, or confeſs
" that we mock God, when we bleſs him for a healthful Air
" and fruitful Seaſons, or deprecate his Anger when we ſee
" viſible Tokens of his Vengeance in the Diſorders of Nature.
" For did not God immediately interpoſe in the Government
" of Nature, there would be no reaſon to beg his Favour
" or deprecate his Anger upon theſe accounts." — And to the ſame purpoſe he urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that God takes a particular Care of all his Creatures in the Government of all Events that can happen to them (which Belief appears to be impoſſible upon the *Mechanical Hypotheſis*) there is no reaſon nor pretence for moſt of the particular Duties of Religious Worſhip, as is fully proved in the ſame place. See

alſo

[*b*] *On Providence*, p. 83. 1ſt Edit.

dle with it in this Place: For it would require a whole Book. Let it ſuffice to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon conſidering the *Manner* by which we apprehend the things of God. (76.) He

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alſo C. 9. Concerning the true *Notion*, as well as the *Reaſonableneſs* and *Neceſſity* of Prayer, ſee p. 381. *ib.*

(76.) He means the Scheme of *Analogy*, concerning which ſee his Note C. We have given our Notion of the Word *Preſcience* in Note 10. R. e. ſee alſo Mr. *Jackſon* on *Human Liberty*, pag. 62. But though we cannot perhaps determine the preciſe manner of God's knowing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain that he does and muſt always know them: ſince otherwiſe he would know many things now which he did not know once, and conſequently his *Omniſcience* or Infinite Knowledge would receive addition from Events, (which as we have made appear in *R. l.*) is contrary to the true Notion of Infinity. This general Argument drawn from God's infinite or *perfect* Knowledge, ſeems to me the only one which can come near to a Proof that he muſt always have a compleat and equal Knowledge of ſuch actions as are in themſelves abſolutely contingent, as all thoſe evidently are which depend upon the Free-Will of the Creature. Theſe actions (as we formerly obſerved) may properly be called *Future* with reſpect to us or other Men, and the Knowledge of them in the ſame reſpect be ſtiled *Fore-Knowledge*. But with regard to the Deity, whoſe Exiſtence and Attributes can have no relation to time, *i. e.* to which nothing can be at a diſtance; I think, the Expreſſion is abſurd; and we muſt neceſſarily either admit the fore-mentioned abſurdity of ſuppoſing his Knowledge limited, or elſe allow that all things are at all times equally in his view; and conſequently that Knowledge, as in him, hath nothing to do with *fore* or *after*.

If we admit this Notion of things being always preſent to God, though ſucceſſive to us, which ſeems to be the only way of conceiving how Contingencies can poſſibly be Objects of any Knowledge; If this, I ſay, be allowed, then all things, actions, *&c.* which can properly be ſaid to exiſt will be equally proper *Objects* of God's Knowledge, ſince he is hereby ſuppoſed not to know them *in fieri*, or in *their Cauſe*; but *in eſſe*, or in their *actual Exiſtence*. Which at the ſame time gives us the *Medium* of their being knowable, *viz.* Their real Exiſtence; and makes it as eaſy for us to imagine how God ſhould always know them, as how we ſhould ever know a thing when it is immediately preſented to us.

'Tis ſubmitted to the Reader, whether this Old Notion of the Schoolmen be not ſtill the beſt we are able to frame upon the preſent Subject.

He that underſtands that manner rightly will never ſtick at this Difficulty.

The Reader may obſerve, that in this and other Places, I interſperſe ſome things which belong to *Revealed Religion*, contrary to what I intended at firſt; which happened becauſe ſome Objections ſeemed to ariſe from revealed Religion, in oppoſition to the Principles and Arguments here laid down. Since therefore I had determined to produce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of Faith, and the Principles of the Chriſtian Religion, I found it neceſſary to call in the Scripture to my Aſſiſtance, that the Anſwer might come from the ſame Quarter with the Objections.

One that knows nothing of Revealed Religion cannot bring theſe Objections; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them. For if he be ſenſible that the Objections are of any force, he muſt of neceſſity alſo admit the Solutions, ſince both of them depend upon the ſame Authority. (77.)

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(77.) This general Argument lies againſt all thoſe who bring Objections from the Scripture Account of the *Creation, Fall, &c. viz.* either they believe the Truth and Divine Authority of thoſe Books, or they do not; if they do, then they muſt believe them alſo when they declare that all the Works of God are holy and juſt and good; and conſequently that the forementioned Difficulties are no real Arguments againſt the Divine Attributes: if they do not; then the whole falls to the Ground. For to admit one part of an account and reject the other, when both depend upon the ſame Authority, is evidently unreaſonable.

Objections therefore drawn from the Scripture account of theſe Matters can but be mere Arguments *ad hominem* at beſt: and are of no force either to make or juſtify an Unbeliever.

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SUBSECT. V.

Why God does not tranſlate Man to ſome other Place, where nothing would occur that could tempt him to chooſe amiſs.

This is the ſame as if it were aſk'd why God did not give the Earth to be inhabited by the Brutes only.

I. 'TIS plain, that in the preſent State of things it is impoſſible for Man to live without natural Evils, or the danger of erring. 'Tis a common Queſtion, why does not God change this State, and tranſlate Man to ſome other, where all Occaſions of Error and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might chooſe only Good; *i. e.* in reality, Why he has placed Man upon the Earth? Why did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There are ſome perhaps who expect ſuch things as theſe from the Divine Goodneſs, but without any Senſe or Reaſon; ſince it manifeſtly appears to be better that we ſhould contend with the preſent Evils, than that the Earth ſhould be void of all rational Inhabitants. (78.)

Some

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(78.) To aſk why Man was placed in ſuch a World as this, is to aſk why he was created at all? Since if he was to be made what he is, *i. e.* conſiſting of a Soul and a Body, this World was a proper place for him. To the Queſtion, Why ſhould he be made of ſuch a Nature as denominates him *Man*; or placed in this lower Claſs of Beings? a ſufficient Anſwer is given in Note 24, where, I think, it is rendered probable, that the ſame Goodneſs which excited the Deity to create Beings of the higheſt Order, would induce him both to create as many of that Order as could commodiouſly exiſt together, or be conſiſtent with the Good of the whole; and likewiſe to produce a Series of as many inferior Orders, and as many particular Beings in each of thoſe Orders as could be conceived to exiſt between himſelf and nothing: or ſo long as Exiſtence in the very loweſt Order might be a Benefit, either to the Beings of that Order, or to thoſe of ſome other. The Conſequence of which is, that we muſt either have been placed in the Claſs we are in at preſent, or no where, ſince by the Suppoſition

Some make it a Queſtion, why ſo great a Part of the Earth is given away to the Brutes; but theſe Men would have it all left to them; and Mankind itſelf extinct.

II. We have often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided, nay that they are prohibited by God, becauſe they are prejudicial to human Nature; but how much worſe would it be to take that Nature entirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine Goodneſs, deſire the greateſt Evil of all as a Remedy for Evils. The ſame Perſons alſo, that with ſuch Earneſtneſs deſire a Change of their Condition are afraid of Death, forgetting that this Change of their Condition is what they dread the moſt of all in Death.

This is totally extirpating Mankind.

III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God will tranſlate good Men into a better State, but it is neceſſary that they ſhould be

God in due time will tranſlate good Men to a better ſtate: but the preſent is as neceſſary as Seed-time is to Harveſt.

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poſition every other Claſs is full. And there will appear ſufficient reaſon for our being created in this Order, and placed where we are, rather than not created at all, provided that Exiſtence be a Bleſſing to us, or that we receive in general more Happineſs than Miſery in this preſent State: which point will be conſidered in the next *Subſection*.

That theſe ſeveral Claſſes may be ſuppoſed to advance gradually towards perfection, and of conſequence that we in time may be removed into ſome better State, ſee Note 19 and Y.

Theſe Conſiderations will ſupply us with an Anſwer to *Bayle*'s Objection againſt what our Author advances in this Paragraph. "This (ſays he) is juſt like as if a King ſhould 'confine ſeveral of his Subjects in his Dungeons, till they 'were 60 Years old, becauſe theſe Dungeons would otherwiſe be empty.' But to make any *likeneſs* at all in theſe two Caſes, it muſt be made appear in the firſt place, that we really meet with more Evil of all kinds than Good in this World; and conſequently, that it were better for *us* to be out of it than in it: contrary to what our Author has proved in Ch. 2. par. 7. Ch. 4. § 8. par. 7. and in the following Subſection: and ſecondly, it muſt be ſhewn alſo, that we might have been placed in ſome better World, without any Inconvenience to the *reſt of the Univerſe*, contrary to what may be concluded from the former Part of this Note, and that other to which it refers.

be prepared here, as Plants in a Nurſery, before they be removed into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit. (79.) God has therefore decreed this Life

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(79.) *Bayle* objects, that our Author's compariſon here is not a juſt one, ſince God cannot be ty'd to the uſe of common means, and a ſlow Progreſs of ſecond Cauſes. He is not obliged to nurſe us up as a Gardener does his Plants, but might as well have produced us adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made us happy at once.—But perhaps it may appear a little doubtful to a Perſon who attentively conſiders Note 19. whether this could be done even in *natural* Pleaſure. However, I think, 'tis abſolutely inconceivable how it ſhould be effected in *Moral* Happineſs. If we conſider the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not be poſſible for us to imagine how this could be implanted in him at firſt, or infuſed into him afterwards, or he be in any wiſe made morally perfect or *good* on a ſudden. The Idea of Virtue conſiſts in a repetition of free Acts, and therefore it cannot be received *paſſively*: and though the Diſpoſition might be thus communicated, yet to compleat its Nature and make it actually productive of true Moral Happineſs, there muſt neceſſarily be required due time for Exerciſe, Experience and confirmed Habits, as may be gathered from the *Preliminary Diſſertation*; and will farther appear from Notes 81 and 82.

From the Nature of Man alſo, or a Being in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer that he could not have ſo great an Idea of the moral Perfections of the Deity, nor ſo clear an apprehenſion of the contrary Qualities, nor conſequently, a ſuitable affection for the one, and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not ſome experience of both. [*i*.]

We know not the real Value of a good thing, we cannot be duly ſenſible of its Excellence, except we have been in ſome meaſure acquainted with its Oppoſite, or at leaſt have perceived the want of it on ſome occaſion. "Does any one (ſays *Leibnitz*) [*k*.] ſufficiently reliſh the Happineſs of good Health who "has never been ſick? Is it not moſt times neceſſary that a "little Evil ſhould render a good more ſenſible, and conſequently greater?" See alſo Not. 19. The ſame holds ſtronger ſtill in Moral Good: which is a confirmation of the *Alternative* that *Lactantius* ſpeaks of; [*l*] and which is well deſcribed by *A. Gellius*. [*m*] It does not therefore ſeem poſſible for

[*i*] *See* Note 66.

[*k*] *Memoirs of Literature*, v. 3. Art. 25. pag. 118.

[*l*] *De Ira Dei*, § 13. ſect. ſub. fin. *and* 15.

[*m*] B. 6. Ch. 1.

Life to be as it were the Paſſage to a better. Thus this Earth is repleniſhed with Inhabitants, who being

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for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue if we had never ſeen Vice. Without this Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently deſire it, without ſuch a deſire, and a ſedulous proſecution of that deſire, we could not attain to the proper exerciſe of it, and without this attainment we could not have any conſciouſneſs of deſert, any comfortable ſelf approbation, or true Moral Happineſs.

It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our own, that a Series of theſe Acts is requiſite to conſtitute an habit of Virtue, and of conſequence that this cannot be *inſpired* into any Being, or however not produced in one of our weak frame *on a ſudden:* and in the laſt place, that this preſent State is neceſſary (as our Author ſays) to train us up, and fit us for a better. That this Life is properly a State of *Tryal* and *Probation,* and the Virtues of it abſolutely neceſſary to the Happineſs of the next, ſee *Rymer*'s *General Repreſentation of Revealed Religion,* Part 2. Ch. 3. pag. 385, *&c.* and *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life,* Vol. 2. Ch. 4. § 3. p. 321, 335, *&c. 8vo.* and *Sherlock* on *Death,* C. 1. § 3. p. 77, *&c.* 4th Edit. or *Rel. of Nat. Delin.* p. 213, 214.

To the ſame purpoſe is that excellent Paper in the *Spectator:* No. 447. — "The laſt uſe I ſhall make of this remarkable "Property in human Nature, of being delighted with thoſe "Actions to which it is accuſtomed, is to ſhew how abſolutely neceſſary it is for us to gain habits of Virtue in this Life, "if we would enjoy the pleaſures of the next. The State of "Bliſs we call Heaven will not be capable of affecting thoſe "Minds which are not thus qualified for it; we muſt in this "World gain a Reliſh of Truth and Virtue, if we would be "able to taſte that Knowledge and Perfection which are to "make us happy in the next. The ſeeds of thoſe Spiritual "Joys and Raptures which are to riſe up and flouriſh in the "Soul to all Eternity muſt be planted in her during this her "preſent State of Probation. In ſhort, Heaven is not to be "looked upon only as the Reward, but as the natural Effect "of a Religious Life." See alſo *Tillotſon*'s Serm. 1ſt Vol. Fol. p. 51, 82, 85, *&c.* and the 78th Serm. 2d Vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the Nature both of thoſe Virtues which will conſtitute the greateſt part of Heaven, and of thoſe *Inſtrumental Duties* by which we are to acquire, improve, and perfect theſe Heavenly Virtues, or make our own Heaven, ſee *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life,* Vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is alſo well defended by Dr. *Rymer* in the Chap. above-mentioned. See alſo Dr. *Laughton*'s Serm. on *Rom.* 6. 23.

ing educated under Diſcipline for a while, till they have finiſhed their Courſe, ſhall depart into another State ſuited to their Deſerts. They who find fault with this in God, ſeem to me to do the ſame as if one who knows nothing of Harveſt or the nature of Agriculture ſhould laugh at the Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the preſent State of things is as neceſſary, not only to the Earth leſt it ſhould be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the moſt part depend upon the Labours of Men, but alſo to Men themſelves: and as requiſite in the Divine Adminiſtration, in order to ſome better Life, as Seed-time is to Harveſt. (*Y.*)

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(*Y.*) But it is aſked, ſince Man is capable of a better State, why did not God place him in it immediately? Can it be agreeable to an infinitely good Being to delay ſo great a Benefit, and make his Creatures wait for it with a long train of Sufferings, when he might have placed them in that happy Condition at firſt? Wou'd we count him a kind beneficent Man that ſerved his Friends thus, and made them buy his Favours with a long attendance and a ſevere exerciſe of Patience? Is it not a Rule that he that gives frankly gives twice, and that benefits loſe their grace when diſpenſed with a ſlow hand?

To this I reply, that we ſhould not be ſurprized if we were able to give no reaſon for God's conduct in this particular. For ſince it's impoſſible that we ſhould have a perfect view of the contrivance and whole fabric of the Univerſe, 'tis likewiſe impoſſible that we ſhould be able to diſcover the reaſon of every thing in it. But if in thoſe parts that we are acquainted with, we diſcern apparent footſteps of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, we ought to conclude that the ſame go through all the reſt, tho' we can't trace them.

But 2dly, Tho' this anſwer be true and ſufficient, it happens that we have no occaſion for it at preſent. For we believe that we are able to give a very good account why God did not place Mankind in the ſame certainty and Degree of Happineſs that we expect in Heaven. In order to this let us conſider,

1ſt. That the World ſo far as known to us is one intire Machine, in which all the parts have a mutual reſpect, and dependance on one another, and contribute to the ſupport and preſervation of the whole. This is a proof of the Unity and Wiſdom of the Maker.

2dly.

SUBSECT. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of Happy Perſons, and the General Corruption of Mankind.

I. BUT it may ſeem ſtrange, that of ſo great a Multitude of Men, ſo few ſhould attain to Happineſs. For whether that be ſuppoſed to ariſe from the fruition of ſuch things as are agreeable

Some Objections propoſed concerning the Rarity of Happy Perſons.

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2dly. That in ſuch a vaſt Machine it was impoſſible all the parts ſhould be of the ſame ſort or have the ſame Offices, and of conſequence there muſt be in the ſeveral parts of the Syſtem different Bodies of different Conſtitutions and Qualities.

3dly. That every one of theſe were capable of ſubſiſting and ſupporting animals, but then it was impoſſible that all thoſe animals ſhould be of the ſame kind, or have the ſame qualifications or conveniencies.

4thly. The Caſe being thus, all that could be expected from the framer of the whole was that he ſhould fill each of theſe parts of the Univerſe with proper Animals, which might enjoy themſelves and live as conveniently as the circumſtances of the place allowed: and where the circumſtances of the ſtation would not afford conveniencies greater than the inconveniencies that attended it, that place ſhould be left void, ſince that was better than to fill it with miſerable Creatures. By miſerable I underſtand, as the Author does, creatures whoſe Being, taken in the whole duration of it, has more evil than good.

5thly. If we conceive ſome of theſe Creatures of ſuch a nature that they may either forfeit the place in which they are, or grow unfit for it by the imperfections that attend their bodies or circumſtances, a caſe which we ſee often happen to Men in this life; then it will be agreeable to the wiſdom and goodneſs of the common Author to contrive the Matter ſo that thoſe in a worſe ſtation ſhould grow up to a capacity of fitting and filling thoſe Habitations which the others deſerted or became incapable of poſſeſſing any longer. We ſee ſuch tranſmutations and tranſlations happen among the Animals.

Thus Inſects being generated and prepared in Water, at a proper time deſert their Womb of Water on Earth, get Wings and mount into the Air, which then affords them a more convenient habitation.

able to the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifeſt, that not even one of a hundred thouſand

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6thly, The ſame may be ſaid of Men. They were created at firſt on the Earth, becauſe there was no other Place for them, all others had their proper Inhabitants, and were full, and therefore Man muſt either be here or no where. Now this Earth is part of the Univerſe, and of ſuch a Nature that it was impoſſible the Animals in it ſhould be freed from all Inconveniencies, that is, exempted from all natural Evils: But our Good and Wiſe God ſo contrived it by his peculiar Care and Favour that Man, the only Intelligent Being in it, ſhould be exempted from the greateſt of theſe Evils, that is abſolute Extinction by Death, and be capable of Tranſlation to a better Place when it ſhould become void, and accordingly the fall of the Angels made room for Men. This is ſo eaſy a Thought that I find many are of Opinion that Man was created with deſign to fill the place from whence the Angels fell, and that theſe Angels are not ſent to Hell till there be Men enough to fill their place in Heaven.

7thly, If we conceive that the Creatures thus advanced have more pleaſure in their Advancement than thoſe that deſert or change their Station loſe by their Fall, it ſeems agreeable to the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God to permit ſuch an Exchange; for by that means his Favours are more equally diſtributed to his Creatures, and there is more Good in the whole World than would be if this were not permitted, If all Creatures were equal, and in Stations equally capable of Happineſs there were no room for ſuch an Exchange. But ſince ſuch an Equality is impoſſible, the next Good to it is to let each intelligent Creature have its turn in the beſt Station or at leaſt a poſſibility afforded him of having it.

8thly, This ſeems to be the Intent of what the Scripture declares concerning a certain Number of *Elect*, which muſt be compleated before the End and Conſummation of the World. A better Reaſon cou'd ſcarce be given why a certain Number was to be filled up before the laſt Day, than that this Earth was deſigned to prepare as many Inhabitants to be tranſlated into Heaven as were wanting; nor how any ſhould be wanting but by the fall or departure of ſome of the Inhabitants placed there by God at firſt. But it was reaſonable that this ſhould be propoſed to Mortals by way of Reward, and that as many as God vouchſafed this Favour to ſhould be at Liberty by a trial of their Virtues to ſhew themſelves worthy to ſucceed the fallen Angels. This ſeems to offer a Reaſon why God permitted Men the Uſe of Free-Will, *viz.* to ſhew himſelf juſt and equitable to his Creatures, ſo that thoſe of a lower Claſs cannot complain of God ſince he has put it in their Power

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thouſand is truly happy. In vain then do we enquire about the Means which lead to Happineſs; the Power

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er to better their Condition, if they will uſe their Faculties aright: nor thoſe in a higher State be too proud of the Divine Favour and deſpiſe their inferiors, ſince if they abuſe that Favour they ſhall be obliged to quit it to ſuch of theſe inferiors as ſhall better deſerve that Station. Nor could there poſſibly be a more equal Diſtribution of things, ſuppoſing it was neceſſary that there ſhould be an inequality among Beings, and different Degrees of Happineſs among rational Agents.

Methinks if theſe things be duly conſidered they give a very good account why God did not at firſt create Man in as good a Station as he is capable of filling. Why he made a trial of him, and allowed him the Uſe of Free-Will. Why he trained him up in Labour and a painful Exerciſe of Virtue in order to make him a fit inhabitant of Heaven. He did not confine Man to the Earth as a Priſon. But as a prudent Gardener prepares his Plants in a Nurſery to be removed into the Field or Garden, as ſoon as the Trees which grow there have been converted to their proper uſe: In like manner does the moſt Wiſe framer of the World prepare Men here for a removal into Heaven as ſoon as a place ſhall be ready to receive them. Or like an indulgent Father who educates his Children at School, and does not admit them to the Management of his domeſtic Affairs, or public Buſineſs, till room be made for them by the removal of ſuch as occupy their Poſts. Hence appears the Reaſon why Men are born weak, ignorant and unfit for Buſineſs, *viz.* to keep a Proportion between their preſent State, and the Offices they are deſigned for.

'Twould be to no purpoſe for them to be born in a Condition fit for public, domeſtic or manly Functions, when at the ſame time there was no room for them to exert themſelves, theſe being all taken up by others. 'Tis reaſonable therefore that they ſhould wait for their own turn, which will come ſoon enough when the preſent Poſſeſſors are gone off the Stage. Nor in the mean time are they in a ſtate of Miſery, and as it were ſhut up in a Dungeon, but in a Condition ſufficiently happy and eligible, and a better than which could not be given without ejecting thoſe which enjoy it at preſent.

Farther, If we conceive certain Creatures that by their Conſtitution are naturally ſubject to diſſolution, as 'tis demonſtrable that all things conſiſting of Matter are; and that the raiſing up new ones in the Place of ſuch as decay, yields a greater Pleaſure to thoſe that thus grow up, than ſuch as are already come to maturity could enjoy in the continuance of their being, then will it be agreeable to the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of

Power of Election is beſtowed on Man to no purpoſe, ſince it ſo rarely attains the end for which it was imparted.

That the power of Election is not regarded.

II. Secondly, The far greater Part of Mankind neglecting this Power of pleaſing themſelves in Elections or rather, to confeſs the truth, not in the leaſt obſerving that they have it, or that Happineſs is to be expected from the uſe of it; give them-

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God to permit thoſe that are thus grown up to decay according to the tendency of their Nature, and to ſubſtitute others in their room; rather than prevent their Diſſolution by a miracle. Which ſufficiently juſtifies the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God in permitting that Succeſſion of Generations which we ſee in the World. God does not therefore deny or delay his Favours thro' any want of kindneſs and beneficence, but becauſe they cou'd not be beſtowed ſooner without detriment to others. He could indeed have not created Men before the beſt place they were capable of was ready for them. But in the interim he had deprived them of the Benefit which they now enjoy, and there would have been no room for Merit or Demerit, for Divine Juſtice or Mercy. Is it not more reaſonable, more worthy of God, to reward them with the Kingdom of Heaven for their Obedience, and the Proof of their Virtues exhibited in an inferior State, than out of mere good Pleaſure to beſtow ſo great a Favour on them, who had done nothing at all, had given no Specimen of their Diſpoſition? The 1ſt, you'll ſay argues greater Munificence.

But it is the part of prudence to moderate Liberality, and ſince all could not partake of it equally (as in this Caſe 'tis plain they could not) to prefer the moſt deſerving. But it is urged, why did God create more than could be provided for in the very beſt way? I anſwer, becauſe he was not ſo ſparing of his Favours as to deny Exiſtence to any thing to which it would be a Benefit, and which might enjoy more Good than Evil in it. 'Tis plain that different Orders make for the good of the whole. The ſuperior ones have Faculties to exerciſe upon thoſe in a lower ſtate, by the exerciſe whereof they may increaſe their own Happineſs and aſſiſt others. As for the inferiors, can any thing contribute more to their Security and Satisfaction than to find themſelves committed to the care of ſuch powerful and beneficent Guardians, and enjoying their Help and Protection? Thus the whole Work of God is admirably connected together, and all the parts ſubſervient to each other, and demonſtrate both the Wiſdom and the Goodneſs of their Author.

themſelves up entirely to the Government of their natural Appetites and Senſes, and are plainly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of the *Animal Nature* as much as Brutes. If therefore we have this Power in us, it ſeems to be given us in vain, *i. e*, to ſuch as neither uſe it, nor are conſcious that they have it.

That there is an univerſal Corruption.

III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immerſed in Vice and Wickedneſs; and 'tis not one or two, but every one, that deviates from the right uſe of Election. How can theſe things be reconciled with the Care and Providence of an infinite good and powerful God?

Theſe are beſt anſwered by revealed Religion.

IV. I confeſs, that this Corruption of Manners, and almoſt univerſal Deviation from the way to Happineſs, is better ſolved from Revealed than Natural Religion, and that the neceſſity of a *Revelation* is from hence rightly proved. For ſince the true Cauſe which gave riſe to this is a matter of Fact, *viz.* the Fall of the firſt Man, it cannot be diſcovered merely by the Strength of Reaſon; but we ſtand in need of *Hiſtorical* Tradition to tranſmit this, as well as other matters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none ſuch, and we were ignorant of the Fall of the Firſt Man, yet we ſhould have been furniſhed with a proper, tho' not ſo clear an Anſwer, ſince the Miſery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not ſo great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of God.

Many attain to a moderate Happineſs

V. For as to the firſt Objection taken from the fewneſs of them that attain to Happineſs, we may reply that Happineſs is two-fold, *perfect* and *abſolute*, or *moderate* and *partial*. I call that perfect which anſwers in every reſpect to our Wiſhes, and that moderate which, tho' it does not equal our Deſires, yet is not quite deſtitute of agreeable Enjoyments with which Life being accompanied, and ſweetened as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils

and the Alleviation of its Cares, becomes a Bleſſing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man in this preſent State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature, tho' never ſo innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and muſt neceſſarily be ſuch (while we inhabit this Earth in its preſent State) as will by no means admit of this abſolutely perfect Happineſs. For Pains, Griefs, and the reſt of thoſe which we call natural Evils, cannot, as things now ſtand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural Favour of the Deity. The Earth then muſt either be left deſtitute of Inhabitants, or we muſt take up with a moderate ſhare of Happineſs; this alſo is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and embraced by Man. Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which happens to few Men; for all may enjoy it, and moſt actually do; eſpecially if they will make a prudent uſe of their Elections. For if there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from depraved Elections, and by a right uſe of theſe, any thing which creates uneaſineſs, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or removed. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miſeries of Life, yet we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that it is not a burden to us, and that not ſo few attain this moderate Happineſs, as the Objection would inſinuate. (*Z.*)

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(*Z.*) 'Tis objected that the Proof brought here to ſhew that there is more Good than Evil in the World can't be ſolid, becauſe it is founded on one of the greateſt and moſt evident Infirmities of our Nature. For both Divines and Philoſophers have condemned this fond deſire of Life as the greateſt Imperfection attending Mortality, and have judged no Evil to be greater than the fear of Death:

I confeſs indeed that an immoderate Deſire of Life, as alſo the dread of Death, becomes ſinful when to preſerve one or avoid the other, we are hurried into the Violation of the Laws

of

VI. As to the ſecond thing objected, *viz.* that moſt of us are either ignorant or regardleſs of this Power of pleaſing ourſelves by Election; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifeſt, that the uſe of this Power is neither diſregarded, nor ſo rare as might appear at firſt Sight. I own there are few who

Men make uſe of this Elective Power though they do not obſerve it.

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of God, but in itſelf 'tis neither Evil nor an Imperfection; nay, 'tis good and part of the Duty we owe to God the Giver of Life, and to ourſelves. To be mortal is indeed an imperfection, but to fear Death and endeavour to avoid it by all lawful Means is no new Infirmity of Nature, but a neceſſary means of preſerving the good Gift of God ſo long as he thinks proper to indulge it. 'Tis alſo to be obſerved that this fear of periſhing is founded in the ſenſe or opinion of the Pleaſure and Satisfaction which we have in Life, and theſe muſt bear a proportion to each other. Increaſe the Opinion of the Goodneſs of Life and the fear of diſſolution increaſes likewiſe: For that a Man ſhould have a great ſenſe of the Pleaſure and Satisfaction he has in a thing, and not to be afraid of loſing it when he apprehends it in danger, is abſurd and impoſſible. The fear of Death then is not an imperfection but a preſervative of Life, and a neceſſary Conſequence of that great Love and Value which we have for it.

But 2dly, 'Tis urged that it cannot be the ſenſe of the good we find in Life that makes us deſirous of it, and afraid of Death, ſince Chriſtians that are perſuaded of another Life, and firmly believe it to be infinitely preferable to the preſent, are yet equally deſirous of living and afraid to die with thoſe that have no ſuch Hope. But they were worſe than Pagans if the reaſon of that Fear was becauſe they thought there was more good in this World than in Heaven: and therefore it is no good Argument to prove that there is more Good than Evil in the World becauſe every Creature is fond of its Being, and deſires to preſerve it.

To all which I anſwer, that from hence it is manifeſt that the ſenſe of all animate Creatures and the Opinion of Mankind both bad and good is with the Author, and I ſhall always ſooner ſuſpect the ſubtilty of a Philoſopher diſputing againſt common Senſe and Experience than the truth of thoſe.

But 2dly, Whereas it is pretended that the beſt Chriſtians are afraid to die, which proves that 'tis not the Opinion of Goodneſs in the preſent Life makes Men fond of it:

I anſwer, That the Nature of things is and ought to be ſuch that they operate more or leſs according to their diſtance. Thus the Sun at the diſtance of ſo many Miles ſeems only a

Foot

who take notice of this in themſelves, or obſerve that the Pleaſure which they feel in acting ariſes chiefly from the Exerciſe of it. But nevertheleſs they do exerciſe it, and taſte the Pleaſure ariſing there-

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Foot broad; and every thing in like manner leſſens both its apparent magnitude and efficacy. Now ſince the Pleaſures of Heaven are at a great diſtance from us and can only be apprehended by Faith and Hope, 'tis no wonder that they are overballanced by the Pleaſures of this Life, which are preſent and immediately affect our Senſes.

If any aſk why God made us ſo that things at a diſtance are leſs affecting. I anſwer, if Cauſes did operate equally at all diſtances it would confound the Order of the World, and bring infinite Inconveniencies on the Creatures. If the Sun were as hot at the preſent diſtance as it would be if we touched it, neither Plants, Animals, nor the Earth itſelf could ſubſiſt a moment, but all muſt vaniſh into Smoak. In the ſame manner if things paſt or to come did equally affect our Minds and diſturb the Paſſions, Appetites, *&c.* we could not paſs one Day with Eaſe and Satisfaction. God therefore has well and wiſely provided that we ſhould not loſe the preſent good either through dread of futurity or memory of what is paſt, but that the benefits of this mortal Life, tho' ſmall in compariſon, ſhould often affect us more than much greater ones to come. The good of the whole Syſtem required that we ſhould ſtay our appointed time in this World, was it not therefore graciouſly ordained that this World ſhould appear very good and deſirable to us?

But 2dly, though good Chriſtians believe that Heaven is much better than this preſent State, yet the beſt are conſcious to themſelves that they are Sinners, and have often offended a juſt God, and conſequently have ſome doubt and terror on them when they are ſummoned to appear before his Tribunal.

Farther, we are ſo framed as not to attempt great, difficult and unexperienced Matters without ſome Emotion and unuſual Aſtoniſhment of Mind: which was neceſſary to prevent us from undertaking ſuch things raſhly and careleſly as might greatly prejudice ourſelves or others e'er we could foreſee the Conſequences. Now the Paſſage from this Life to another is entirely new, untryed, unknown: 'Tis no wonder therefore that the very ſtrangeneſs of the thing and greatneſs of the Change gives Men a ſhock and makes them rather chooſe to ſtay where they are, eſpecially ſince they find themſelves well pleaſed with their preſent Life. Neither is this without a Providence. For if the Paſſage to another World could be entered on without any ſuch Paſſion or Emotion, and every thing that

therefrom. And it is the ſame in the Exerciſe of this Power as in ſome Organs of Senſe, though we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what nature, yet we uſe them, and by the uſe of them per-

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that attended it were as clear and evident to us as the Circumſtances of this preſent Life, all delay would be an inſupportable Torment to good Men, nor could they wait their due time without the greateſt pain, impatience and uneaſineſs. How much better has the good Author of Nature diſpoſed things by providing that Mortals ſhould be content and happy in this preſent Life, and at the ſame time enabled to bear the neceſſary Evils of it by the proſpect of a better? Thus is the Earth furniſhed with Inhabitants which are ſo well pleaſed with their Lot as to be very unwilling to quit it, and yet are not without hopes of ſomething greater. This ſeems to have been long ſince obſerved by the Poet.

Victuroſque Dii celant, ut vivere durent,
Felix eſſe mori.

But 3dly, 'Tis alledged that many deſire Death in great Afflictions, but are hindered from attempting to diſpatch themſelves either firſt, for want of Courage, or 2dly, for fear of Infamy, or 3dly, for fear of Damnation. I anſwer, we ſee Men live and very fond of Life that are reſtrained by none of theſe. Men of approved Courage, who profeſs to believe nothing after this Life, and who may eaſily find ways of putting an end to it without ſuſpicion of Suicide, and yet they live on and willingly bear all the Inconveniencies of old Age and Diſeaſes. Nay, no body is more deſirous of Life than ſuch Men, as was obſerved in the Book C. 4. S. 8. Par. 7.

Farther, as to Courage, we generally look on it as cowardice for a Man to kill himſelf, and that contributes to make ſuch an attempt infamous. But 2dly, Courage is the Power of attempting hard, painful, and diſagreeable things: therefore Mens wanting Courage to kill themſelves is a plain Argument that Life is an exceeding great Good, and that a Man can hardly be brought to ſuch a degree of firmneſs and callouſneſs of Mind as to deprive himſelf of it.

As to Infamy, that, as we ſaid before, may eaſily be avoided. A Doſe of Opium will do the Buſineſs, and leave no room for Diſcovery. But ſuppoſing Diſgrace to be a ſure attendant on Self-murder, theſe Men are often notoriouſly profligate and know themſelves to be infamous for all ſorts of Vice, and yet diſregard, nay glory in it. Can we believe ſuch Perſons would be reſtrained from diſpatching themſelves for fear of hurting their Memories after Death, which they think they ſhall

perceive external things. Thus we pleaſe ourſelves in chooſing, though we are not aware that things pleaſe us becauſe they are choſen. Now that this is ſo will be evident if we examine thoſe things which afford Pleaſure to both young and old, wiſe as well as fooliſh. For if the greater part of them have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with the Neceſſities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleaſed us no otherwiſe than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of Children, and the ſerious Affairs of Men; the Temerity of Fools, and the Counſels of the Wiſe; and it will be evident almoſt in all of them that they are neither determined by Reaſon nor Nature, but pleaſe by Election only.* This, among other things, may appear from the Diverſions of *Cards* and *Dice*. Nothing is more agreeable to all, or pleaſes more; but upon no other account, if we examine it thoroughly, than becauſe we *will* be thus employed.

Nay

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ſhall feel nothing of, when they deſpiſe much greater ignominy while they ſtill live and are ſenſible of it?

As to the Fear of Damnation, this can never move Atheiſts, and yet none, as we obſerved, are more deſirous of Life; they profeſs to love it above all things, and call thoſe fools and Madmen that part with it on any Account.

'Tis alſo remarkable that a kind of Religious Melancholy drives moſt Men to Self-murder, which proves that the fear of Damnation is no ſuch hindrance to it.

But laſtly, 'tis urged that the Vulgar are incompetent Judges of the Benefits and Inconvenience of Life, and therefore we ought to appeal to the Sentence of the wiſe Men who have duly conſidered them; and if theſe had leave given to live their Lives over again, they would not accept it; as *Mothe de Vayer* affirms of himſelf. But I anſwer, that in this Caſe there's no believing *Mothe de Vayer*, or any Man on his Word; the Experiment was never made nor had he ever the offer; and therefore he neither knew what he would have done in ſuch Circumſtances, nor have we any Security that he ſpake his true Sentiments. Perhaps he was an old Man and knew he muſt

ſoon

* *See more of this in* Sect. 1. Sub. 5. par. 11, 12, &c.

Nay that *dire Luſt of Rule* which bewitches mortal Minds, and tranſports them beyond themſelves, which cannot be ſatisfy'd unleſs the whole World be ſubdued, and even not then; this neither receives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate Appetite.

But the force of Election is never more apparent than in ſome Men's inſatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofitable Riches, for no uſe, no end, but to ſatisfy their Choice. Behold the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curſe to his Relations, a Jeſt to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature; depriving himſelf of Food, Sleep, Reſt, and other Neceſſaries, and yet applauding himſelf ſtill. Why do theſe things pleaſe which are ſo unnatural, ſo abſurd, ſo prepoſterous? Can they be explained otherwiſe than from this Principle that we are pleaſed with what we *chooſe?* This is ſtill felt and purſued, tho' he that does this be not conſcious that he is doing it, nor does he obſerve what it is which pleaſes him. It is not therefore the Direction of the Senſes, or the Impulſe of Animal

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ſoon die, and then it was wiſely done to uſe all the means he could to put himſelf out of love with Life, as that makes Death more eaſy.

But 2dly, I obſerved before that Cauſes loſe their Efficacy at a diſtance, now the Pleaſures of Life are paſt long ago with old Men, and the Inconveniencies of Age upon them, no wonder then that thoſe diſtant Pleaſures do not influence them ſo much as to make them deſirous of living their whole Lives over again for the ſake of them: which is alſo a great Providence to perſons that are neceſſarily Mortal, and ſeems the only way of reconciling them to Death.

But 3dly, The propoſing to a Man to Live his Life again is not a motive equivalent to what is paſt. A Man's being ignorant of futurity eaſes him from the anxiety that the Knowledge of the unfortunate Parts would raiſe in him, and leaves him at liberty to hope the beſt; which is a great part of the Happineſs of Life. But when we offer him to live the ſame Life over again, we cut off all his Hopes, deſtroy the agreeable *Novelty* of the good Parts, and give him only a proſpect of the uneaſy

Animal Nature only, which tranſports us into Vices and unlawful Acts; theſe are commonly done againſt the Remonſtrance of thoſe Appetites which are implanted by Nature, againſt the Remonſtrance of Senſe and Inſtinct, no leſs than Reaſon, and the leaſt Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the *Impetus of Animal Nature*, and that this Power of pleaſing ourſelves by Election does not lie idle; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate uſe of it which tranſports us into Wickedneſs.

Elections produce the ſame effect in the Moral World as Motion does in the Natural.

VII. As to the third Objection, *viz.* that the *Corruption* of Mankind is almoſt *univerſal*, it is to be obſerved in the firſt place, that Elections produce the ſame effect in the Moral, as motion does in the Natural World: neither is it any more to be expected that in our preſent State all Elections ſhould be conſiſtent and uniform, than that all Motions ſhould be ſo. Now as contrariety of Motion is a ne-

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uneaſy Paſſages that he muſt meet with in it: all which muſt make his Life a thing quite different from what it was when he firſt lived it. But if we would propoſe to a Man of ſixty Years to lengthen his Life for ſixty more with the ſame ſtrength and vigour he had at twenty, and let him take his Chance, I doubt if one in a million would refuſe the offer.

Laſtly; let us ſuppoſe that a Man has lived happily many Years, and at length falling into ſome great Misfortune or grievous Pain diſpatches himſelf. This does not prove that he thinks the Life God hath given no benefit, or worſe than Death; but only that the ſmall and miſerable part which remains to him is not worth the living. A Man has a Veſſel of good Wine which he drinks with Pleaſure to the Dregs, then throws them out. Will any one conclude from thence that the Man thinks a Veſſel of Wine no valuable preſent? And yet this is exactly the Caſe of ſuch Self-murderers.

From the whole I think it manifeſt that Life, ſuch as it is, is a valuable Good, and conſequently fit to be beſtowed on us by a good God. As it has more Good than Evil in it, 'tis plain we are obliged to him that gave it; and it is a very wicked and ungrateful thing for any one to pretend the Contrary.

neceſſary Cauſe of Natural Corruption, ſo the interfering of Elections is of Vice or Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, *viz.* by deſtroying Motion and free Choice; but while theſe are permitted, neither of the Evils could be prevented in the preſent State of things.

VIII. Secondly, We may obſerve that things are connected together, and have a mutual dependence on each other; on this account, as Machines which require the moſt Workmanſhip may be ſtopped or diſordered by the defect of a ſingle Nail or Wheel: ſo the Error or Offence of one Man puts the rational Syſtem or Society of Mankind out of order. Any Perſon, by almoſt one ſingle free Act, may deſtroy a Houſe or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. Any King or Governor can, by an eaſy and free Act, overwhelm whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Father may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are ſure of inheriting his Diſeaſes and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be otherwiſe while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth are ſuch as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liberty and the Connection of things muſt be deſtroyed, or theſe Evils tolerated.

Things are connected together, and a Defect in one affects many others.

IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad Elections, but ſuch as may be reconciled with the Good of the whole Syſtem, and has digeſted and ordered every thing in ſuch a manner, that theſe very Faults and Vices ſhall tend to the Good of the whole. For as in Muſic, Diſcords, if heard ſeparately, grate and offend the Ear with harſhneſs, but when mixed in conſort with other Notes, make the more ſweet and agreeable Harmony; in like manner bad Elections, if conſidered alone, are looked upon as odious and deteſtable, but compared with the whole Syſtem, they promote and increaſe the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are tempered they become

Vice and Wickedneſs, tho' deformed in themſelves, do not impair the Beauty of the whole.

come medicinal to each other by that very Contrariety, and thoſe which would poiſon ſeparate, when mixed become a Remedy.

For Inſtance, One by a depraved Choice raiſes an immenſe Sum of Money, and a vaſt Eſtate, and either the ſame Perſon or his Heir, by his Vanity and Profuſeneſs, compenſates for what he had acquired by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by ſquandering away his ill-gotten Wealth to the moſt idle Purpoſes, as if he had beſtowed all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Induſtry, whereas he would otherwiſe afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man offends in Luxury and Idleneſs: the Poor tranſgreſſes no leſs by too much Labour and Solicitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other End than to provide Inſtruments of Luxury for the Rich: but each of them pleaſes himſelf in his Choice, and 'tis almoſt the ſame thing with reſpect to the benefit of the Univerſe, as if one had converted to pious Uſes what he ſpent in Luxury, and the other had laboured moderately to provide only what was uſeful. The ſame almoſt may be ſaid of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals themſelves, or thoſe that deſerve to ſuffer; nay they are often beneficials to others; and ſo long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis fit to allow every one the uſe of his own Will, and let them ſuffer for their Sin. God could indeed cut off all Occaſion of Sin, by taking away free Elections: But it is plain that this would be far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Buſineſs to prevent bad Elections; and if we will not, we ſuffer for our Folly: But God will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no leſs than by our Wiſdom. (80.)

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(80.) We may add, and by our *Sin* no leſs than by our *Righteouſneſs*. Thus it may be ſaid in a good Senſe that *private Vices* (as well as private Misfortunes) often become *public Benefits*,

X. If this be true, it is a ſufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodneſs, notwithſtanding ſuch a plentiful Crop of Vices be permitted; nor need we inſiſt upon a longer enquiry how this may be applied to particular Caſes; for whether this Corruption was occaſioned by the *Fall of our firſt Parents* If this be applyed to particular Caſes, it accounts for the univerſal Corruption.

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fits, tho' the Authors be no leſs liable to Puniſhment. But it will be objected, that this makes Vice to be neceſſary for the Public Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all, nor conſequently puniſhable. For a tendency or oppoſition to the general Happineſs of our Syſtem, is the very Nature and Eſſence of Virtue or Vice: If then what is called my Wickedneſs tends to the Good of the World, how can I be puniſhed for it? And if my Actions promote the Glory of God, *why doth he yet find fault?* We anſwer, Vice naturally and in general tends to the Miſery of any Syſtem; ſo that if *all* were vicious, all would be wretched; and on the contrary, if every one were virtuous, all muſt be happy; to be vicious and to be productive of Pain or Miſery, would then be convertible terms. But in a mixed irregular State, where ſome purſue the Rules of Virtue and others do not, the Caſe is very much altered, there Pain or Evil, and ſuch Actions as produce it, may often be the moſt proper means to remedy ſome greater Evil, or procure ſome ſuperior Good; to reform a Vice, or improve a Virtue; in which Caſe, tho' that way of acting which in general tends to Miſery, happens to be productive of ſome real Happineſs which could not have been produced without it, yet this is not ſufficient to excuſe or juſtify it, nor is it ſo much the conſequence of its own Nature, and attributable to its immediate Author, as an effect of the ſuperintendency of ſome other Agent, who applies it, and makes it inſtrumental to ſome End of his own; who brings Good out of Evil, or from the Evil takes occaſions to do ſtill more Good than he could be conceived to have done without that Evil.

All this I think may be ſuppoſed of God, and yet the different Natures of Good and Evil continue fixed. Man, who cannot ſee all the Conſequences and Connection of things, muſt be obliged to ſome general Rules of acting, and whenever he deviates from theſe Rules he does amiſs; at leaſt when he intends to act againſt the very *End* of theſe Rules, *i. e.* the general Good, he evidently ſins, let the Conſequence of his Acts be what it will. Thus the Actions of a Man may be often morally Evil to himſelf, tho' they prove naturally Good to ſome others: they may proceed from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a Tranſgreſſor by acting againſt his Rule; and

rents as Truth itſelf declares, or by any other Cauſe whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Damage to the whole. (81.) We may

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though God may have an occaſion of *Glorifying* himſelf thereby, of diſplaying his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, *&c.* to a higher degree than they could otherwiſe have been exhibited; and therefore may reaſonably permit the Actions of this Man, and convert them, either to the Puniſhment and Correction of himſelf or other Sinners, or to the Bleſſing of ſome righteous Perſons; yet the immediate Author is nevertheleſs accountable both to God and Man for ſuch his Actions. Inſtances of this kind are innumerable, and may be ſeen in *Sherlock* on *Providence*. See particularly what is required from God's Goodneſs in a State of Diſcipline. p. 221, 224, 230, *&c.* 2d Edit. or in *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, p. 83. 4th Ed, *Lond.* 1670.

What has been ſaid here only relates to God's *permitting* Moral Evil, ſo far as it is a means of ſome prepollent Good.

Mr. *Colliber*, in his *Impartial Enquiry*, *&c.* carries the Matter farther, and ſuppoſes that God may for the general Good, *decree* ſome ſuch Acts as may be morally Evil; which I can ſee no reaſon or neceſſity for ſuppoſing. How he endeavours to make this out and reconcile it with the *Holineſs* and *Juſtice* of the Deity, may be ſeen in Part 1. Ch. 11. prop. 9. p. 94, *&c.*

(81) Perhaps ſuch a Scheme as this of the *Fall* appears to be, from the Repreſentation given of it and its effects in Scripture, was neceſſary to make us duly ſenſible of the Nature of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully with the Moral Perfections of the Deity (which could not have been ſo clearly exhibited to us if there had never been any room for the Exerciſe of them) and conſequently to bring us to an Imitation of theſe Perfections, and thereby to the greateſt and moſt refined Happineſs that our better part is capable of. Man (as we obſerved in Note 89.) is a very imperfect compound Being, who, by the conſtitution of his Nature ſeems incapable of being made truly wiſe and virtuous, or which is the ſame thing, *morally* happy on a ſudden, he muſt therefore receive Improvement gradually; and as he is to compleat his good Habits by a Series of virtuous Acts, ſo it ſeems proper for him to be trained up by various diſpenſations, and a Series of Events adapted to the ſeveral Faculties of his Body and Mind, the various conſtituent Parts of his Nature, and different Sources of his Happineſs: accordingly we find the Happineſs of Man in his firſt Eſtate was chiefly [illegible] which an Earthly Paradiſe was exquiſitely fitted; [illegible] his

may wonder indeed that almoſt all Mankind are polluted in Wickedneſs, and that God puts no ſtop to the Progreſs of thoſe Vices which deform his Work;

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this was probably requiſite to introduce the *rational* or *moral* kind into the World, and to make him direct his Thoughts to ſomething higher than mere ſenſitive Delights. This we are told was the Method of Divine Providence with the *Jewiſh* Nation in particular, who had a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exerciſe them for a while, and lead them on to the Expectation of better things; to ſpiritualize their Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the Heavenly Doctrines of the *Meſſiah*. And why might not the like Method be made uſe of in the Government of Mankind in general, or even all rational Beings? What if God, willing to make known the greater Riches of his Glory, ſuffered our firſt Parents to fall ſoon from that Condition wherein he created them at firſt, in order to raiſe them and their Poſterity to a much higher State of Glory and true Happineſs after? And who can prove that the former was not conducive to the latter? We believe that the Bliſs of Heaven will infinitely exceed the Pleaſures of a Terreſtrial Eden; why then ſhould we not ſuppoſe that the leſs might be in ſome manner uſeful and introductory to the greater? Why might not a ſhort Life in Paradiſe be as proper a State of Probation for the Virtues of this preſent World, as this World is for the Glories of another? There is a Paſſage concerning Paradiſe in *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life** which confirms this Notion: But it is the moſt fully explained by Mr. *D'Oyly* in his *firſt Diſſertation*, C. 3. 31, *&c.* I ſhall tranſcribe ſo much as may be neceſſary to ſhew his general Deſign. "If we conſider our Nature as "it came in *Innocence* out of the hand of its Creator, God "foreſaw how very ſoon it would fall from its primitive Purity, and therefore deſigned it farther for a *much happier* State, "raiſed and refined by a clearer and more extenſive *Manifeſtation* of himſelf: But had it ſtood, the Reward, (at leaſt as far "as we know) would have been the indefeaſable Poſſeſſion of "Paradiſe in this World, the enjoying of an immortal Life "here on Earth, chequered as it were with Spiritual and Senſitive, or Animal Pleaſures. And for their Conduct in that "State God ſeems to have left them (one or two Inſtances "excepted) under the Direction of the *Law of Nature*, the "*Spiritual* or Religious Part of which taught them to look up "to him as the Creator of the World, the Lord and Author "of their Being; and to fear and obey him as their Almighty "Sovereign. The *Civil* part of it furniſhed them with right dictating what was neceſſary to be done in order well being in this World. So that had they ſtood, "their

* Vol. 1. p. 26.

Work; but in reality this is no more to be wondered at, than that this inferior World is by Motion univerſally ſubjected to natural Corruption. For

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" their Happineſs would probably have been—what that of " Mankind was afterwards—a mixture of *rational* and *ſenſi-* " *tive* or bodily Enjoyments, And as to any Knowledge of " God, farther than that now mentioned; it may, I conceive, " be thought reaſonable to preſume that they had the ſame " awful ſenſe of his *Veracity* as of any other Attribute; and " yet how very eaſily were they wrought into a Belief by the " firſt Story they heard, and from they knew not whom, " that he had acted *colluſively* in barring them the Fruit of the " *Tree of Knowledge*, deſigning by it only to keep them down " under the Veil of Ignorance, and that there was no ſuch " imminent Danger of Death conſequent to their taſting it, " as they were at firſt made to believe? Whatever ſuch Know- " ledge therefore we ſuppoſe them to have had, it may be " doubted, its Impreſſions were not vivid and forcible enough " to influence their Wills to ſuitable Efforts in *loving* and *cle-* " *aving* ſteadily to him: ſince no one can love whom he does " not believe, and without Faith 'tis as impoſſible to *love* as to " *pleaſe God*: So that thoſe Impreſſions could not conſequent- " ly be very inſtrumental in making an Addition to their " Happineſs, as has been ſhew above. Nay as to *Adam* him- " ſelf in particular, it may perhaps ſeem reaſonable to think " he had not that profound Reverence and awful regard for the " Divine Majeſty which he might juſtly have been expected " to expreſs, (tho' not under the Circumſtances of a *Criminal*) " ſince after the Fact committed, he ſeems attempting to ſcreen " his Guilt, even by throwing the blame *obliquely* upon God " himſelf, where he anſwers, The *Woman* whom *Thou* gaveſt " to be with me, ſhe gave me of the Tree and I did eat [*b.*]".

The Author proceeds to enquire into the State of Religion in the Antediluvian World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to the *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation, and ſhews that Mankind could not from the Works of Creation and Providence alone (which yet were their only means of Knowledge) have ſo extenſive and perfect a Knowledge of God as was requiſite to advance their Happineſs properly ſo called, as rational Agents, to any conſiderable Degree; nor conſequently to be the foundation of a Worſhip worthy of him. From whence he concludes, " The " Faculties of our rational Nature muſt have lain dormant and " uſeleſs as to the greateſt Happineſs it was capable of attaining " by the *Exerciſe* of them; and as to the higheſt Honour and " moſt exalted Worſhip it was in itſelf qualified to pay to the " Divine Majeſty, unleſs he had pleaſed to make proviſion for " the

[*b.*] Diſſert. 1. p. 33.

For as Contrariety of Motions neceſſarily works a Change in ſolid and heterogeneous Bodies, and tranſpoſes them into another Form and Condition, whence neceſſarily proceed Diſſolution and Concretion, Corruption and Generation: In like manner free Choice neceſſarily adminiſters occaſion of Sin to Agents endowed with an imperfect Underſtanding, and obnoxious

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" the farther *Manifeſtation* of himſelf: which, in what manner he has in his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs determined " to effect, will appear by laying open the moſt *advantageous* " *Changes* which have been made as to theſe and other reſpects, " by the appearance of *Chriſt in the Fleſh.* For if it be ſhewn, " that by that amazing Tranſaction he has ſo diſplayed the infinite Excellencies and Perfections of his Nature, as to give " the utmoſt poſſible Scope to the whole rational Creation, to " exert their nobleſt Faculties, and ſtrain them up to the moſt " exalted aſtoniſhing Thoughts of, and ſeraphical *Devotion* to " him: if farther he has thereby applyed the moſt proper and " forcible means to rectify the *Moral Errors*, reform the Vices, " and overcome the *daring Wickedneſs* of Mankind; and laſtly, " if it be ſhewn that he has done all this in ſuch a manner " that it could not have been effected *to ſo great Advantage* any " other way, then will it be demonſtratively evident, that " whereas he foreſaw from all Eternity, that Man whom he " had decreed to create would abuſe his *natural Liberty*, and " ſo, being tempted, fall into Sin: There was infinite reaſon " on this account why he might have pleaſed alſo in his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, to have decreed to permit it, " thereby to open a way for the ſtupendous *Manifeſtation* of " himſelf, as above expreſſed. And particularly — that by " what followed from it, Mankind might become capable of " attaining far *greater Happineſs* than they would have been, " had our firſt Parents continued innocent." p. 43.

How this Author makes out the fore-mentioned Particulars may be ſeen in the remainder of his *Diſſertation.*

See alſo *Jenkin* on the ſame Subject [*c.*]

Now this is not, as *Bayle* objects [*d.*] " To compare the " Deity to a Father who ſhould ſuffer his Children to break " their Legs, on purpoſe to ſhew to all the City his great Art " in ſetting their broken Bones. Or to a King who ſhould " ſuffer Seditions and Factions to encreaſe thro' all his King- " dom, that he might purchaſe the Glory of quelling them." But rather like a King who permits ſome of his Subjects to put their ſeditious Deſigns in practice, and to promote a Revolt,

 in

[*c.*] *Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity*, 2d vol. C. 12.

[*d.*] *Crit. Dict.* p. 2488.

noxious to Paſſions and Affections. And as in the natural World the Corruption and Contagion of one thing extends itſelf to others, and acquires Strength by ſpreading; ſo alſo in the moral if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poiſon is diffuſed along with it, and ſeizes and infects all about it.

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in order to illuſtrate his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs more fully in reducing them to their Duty, and to convince them more clearly of the Expedience and abſolute Neceſſity of obeying him, and thereby to confirm them, or at leaſt all the reſt of his Subjects, in a well grounded Obedience to his Government, in which their Happineſs entirely conſiſts: Or like a Father that finding his Children obſtinately diſobedient, ſuffers them ſometimes to wander aſtray, and fall into ſome Dangers and Inconveniencies, and lets them ſmart under the Miſery which they bring upon themſelves, in order to make them more ſenſible of their need of his Aſſiſtance and Direction, and thereby more dependent on him for the future, and more ſubject to him, and therefore more ſure of Happineſs. This Compariſon is well explained by *Sherlock* on *Providence*, Chap. 7. p. 262.

Hence it will appear that we have reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Fall of Man from Earthly and Animal Delights, was deſigned to raiſe him to a Rational and Heavenly State of Happineſs, and to make way for ſuch a wonderful Diſplay of all the Divine Attributes in that Expedient, as could not have been exhibited at all, or not in ſo high a Degree without it; and conſequently that this Method was the very beſt even for *our own* Syſtem. But if this Suppoſition ſeem improbable, or inſufficient, yet why may not all the Miſery in this Syſtem of ours promote and encreaſe the Happineſs of ſome other [*e.*]? We have good reaſon to believe that there is ſome Connection between the different Syſtems of the Univerſe; but have ſmall ground to imagine ours the beſt, why then may it not be ſubſervient to a better? This indeed is only Conjecture; however, I think it would be no eaſy Matter to confute it; till which be done, we may very ſafely conclude with our Author, that the *Fall itſelf*, as well as all the Sin and Miſery conſequent upon it, cou'd not have been prevented without greater detriment to the whole: and one may ſay the ſame of *Eve* as the Poet did of the hand of *Mutius Scævola*: *Si non erraſſet, fecerat illa minus* [*f.*]

[*e.*] *See* Note 80.

[*f.*] *See* Leibnitz *Eſſais de Theodicee*, Part 3. §. 239. Concerning the *Manner* of the *Fall*. See the firſt 7 Chapters of *Revelation examined with Candour*, or the *Univerſal Hiſtory* C. 3.

But yet both *natural* and *moral Corruption* have their Bounds, neither does God permit them to ſpread farther than is conducive to the Good of the whole*. It may ſeem ſtrange to us that he ſuffers both of them to wander over this World of ours without Reſtraint; but what is our World to the whole Syſtem of the Univerſe? How ſmall a Part! how next to nothing! Let this whole Earth of ours be ſtained with Corruption of both kinds; ſuppoſe it clouded and benighted with Darkneſs and Vice, yet it will be but like a very ſmall Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is ſo far from leſſening, that it encreaſes the Comelineſs and Beauty of the whole. The Earth notwithſtanding its Obſcurity, has its Uſe and Place in Nature, which it could not commodiouſly fill if thoſe things which render it liable to Darkneſs and Corruption were removed. The ſame muſt be ſaid of Men, they have their proper Uſe and Station, and in order to fill it commodiouſly, they were to be created of ſuch a Nature and Diſpoſition as might eaſily be corrupted with Vice. Neither have we any more reaſon to conclude that all free Agents are involved in Evil Elections, becauſe this happens almoſt univerſally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are ſubject to the ſame Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which conſtitutes our World ſeem by itſelf rude and unadorned: and tho' ſome Parts appear to us, who have not a View of the whole Contexture, larger or leſs than the juſt Proportion requires, yet they may agree with others in the moſt perfect Symmetry. Nor need we preſume upon the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs in the *Moral*, any more than in the *Natural* World. The Crimes and Vices themſelves very few in compariſon of the free Agents,

* See Sherlock *on Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d. Edit. *and Chriſtian Life*, V. 2. C. 4. par. 3. p. 318, &c. Svt.

(*A A.*) and may contribute to the Good of the whole, no leſs than natural Corruption does to the Prefer-

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(*A A.*) Concerning the prevalency of Moral Evil in the World, the Objector is ſo confident as to declare that no-body can have the leaſt doubt of it, and he dares ſay the Author himſelf believed it. But the Author profeſſes himſelf to be of a quite different Opinion, He firmly believes and thinks he very well comprehends that there is much more moral Good in the World, nay in the Earth, than Evil. He is ſenſible there may be more bad Men, than Good, becauſe there are none but do amiſs ſometimes, and one ill act is ſufficient to denominate a Man bad. But yet there are ten good acts done by thoſe we call bad Men for one ill one. Even Perſons of the very worſt Character may have got it by two or three flagrant enormities, which yet bear no proportion to the whole Series of their Lives. The Author doth not know the Objector, nor with whom he converſes, but he muſt profeſs that among ſuch as he is acquainted with, he believes there are hundreds that would do him good for one that would do him hurt, and that he has received a thouſand good Offices for one ill one. He could never believe the Doctrine of *Hobbs* that all Men are Bears, Wolves and Tygers to one another; that they are born Enemies to all others and all others to them; that they are naturally falſe and perfidious; or that all the good they do is out of Fear not Virtue. He that deſcribes Mankind in this manner may give us cauſe to ſuſpect that he himſelf is ſuch, but if Mankind were taken one by one perhaps not one could be found in an hundred thouſand that could truly own the Character. Nay the very Authors of this Calumny, if their own Characters were called in Queſtion, would take all poſſible Pains to remove the Suſpicion from them, and declare that they were ſpeaking of the Vulgar, of the bulk of Mankind, and not of themſelves. Nor in reality do they behave in this manner toward their Friends and Acquaintance; if they did, few would own them. Obſerve ſome of thoſe that exclaim againſt all Mankind for treachery, diſhoneſty, deceit and cruelty, and you'll find them diligently cultivating Friendſhips and diſcharging the ſeveral Offices due to Friends, Relations and their Country, with Labour, Pain, loſs of Goods, and hazard of Life itſelf: even where there's no fear to drive them to it, nor inconvenience attending the neglect of it. This you'll ſay proceeds from Cuſtom and Education. Be it ſo: However the World then has not ſo far degenerated from Goodneſs but the greater Part of Mankind exerciſe Benevolence; nor is Virtue ſo far exiled as not to be ſupported and approved, praiſed and practiſed by common Conſent and public Suffrage, and

Preſervation of the Syſtem: Nay one Man's Fault is often corrected by the Vices of another, and the Defor-

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and Vice is ſtill diſgraceful. Indeed we can ſcarce meet with one, unleſs preſſed by neceſſity or provoked by injuries, who is ſo barbarous and hard hearted as not to be moved with Compaſſion and delighted with Beneficence to others; who is not inclined to ſhew Good-will and Kindneſs to his Friends, Neighbours, Children, Relations, and diligent in the Diſcharge of civil Duties to all; who does not profeſs ſome regard for Virtue, and think himſelf affronted when he is charged with Immorality. If any one take notice of his own or another's Actions for a Day together, he'll perhaps find one or two blameable, the reſt all innocent and inoffenſive. Nay, 'tis doubtful whether a *Nero* or *Caligula*, a *Commodus* or *Caracalla* [g.] (tho' Monſters of Mankind, and prone to every act of wickedneſs and Fury) have done more ill than innocent Actions thro' their whole Lives.

'Tis to be obſerved in the ſecond place, that one great Crime ſuch as Murther, Theft, or Rapine is oftener talked of, more univerſally reported, and much longer remembered than a thouſand good, peaceable, generous Deeds, which make no noiſe in the World, nor ever come to public notice, but are ſilently paſſed by and overlooked. Which very thing ſhews that the former are more rare than the latter, otherwiſe they would not be received with ſo much Surprize, Horror, and Aſtoniſhment.

3dly, 'Tis obſervable that many things are done very innocently, which Perſons unacquainted with the Views and Circumſtances of the Actors eſteem criminal. 'Tis certain we cannot judge of the goodneſs or badneſs of an Action from bare Appearances, but rather from the inward Motions and Intentions of the Mind, and the light in which the thing appeared to the Agent. *Nero* killed a Man that was innocent, but who knows whether he did it out of premeditated Malice? Perhaps ſome entruſted with the care of his Perſon, or a flattering Courtier, whom he is obliged to depend on, informs of this innocent Man as plotting a conſpiracy againſt the Emperor's Life, and urges diſpatch leſt he be firſt ſurprized: Perhaps the Informer is impoſed upon himſelf, and thinks it real: 'tis plain ſuch Circumſtances very much leſſen the Guilt; and it is probable if the Crimes of Princes were weighed impartially, and the whole Proceſs laid open, many things might be offered which would greatly alleviate them.

4thly, Many things are done through Ignorance of the Law, and becauſe thoſe who commit them do not know that they are vicious; nay they are often eſteemed Virtues. Thus St. *Paul* per-

[g.] *See* Cardan's *Encomium of* Nero.

Deformity ſtamped upon the Works of God by the Wickedneſs of ſome, is obliterated by the ſupervening

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perſecuted the Church, and himſelf owns that he did it out of ignorance, and therefore obtained Mercy. How many things of this kind are done daily by ſuch as profeſs different Religions? 'Tis true, theſe are Sins; but Sins of Ignorance, which eaſily obtain Forgiveneſs, and as they do not proceed from an evil Diſpoſition, and depraved Will, are ſcarce to be reckoned in the number of Moral Evils. Whoever falls foul on others out of a Love of Virtue, Hatred of Vice, or Zeal towards God, does wrong; but ignorance and an honeſt heart make very much for his excuſe. This Conſideration alone would take a great deal off from the number of wicked Perſons.

Neither does this excuſe hold only in matters of Religion; Party prejudices have alſo a ſhare in it, which induce Men to extirpate with Fire and Sword thoſe that they believe to be public Enemies and Traitors to their Country. There's no Error more pernicious to Mankind and which has produced more or greater Crimes than this; and yet it ariſes from an honeſt Mind. The Miſtake lies here, that they forget that their Country and Commonwealth ought only to be defended by juſt and lawful Means, and not at the expence of Humanity.

5thly, Prejudice and Surmiſe makes many wicked that really are not ſo. The moſt innocent Converſation between Man and Woman gives the Malicious a handle to ſuſpect and ſlander them. From any one ſingle Circumſtance that uſually attends a criminal Action the ſuſpected Perſon is found guilty of the Fact itſelf: From one bad Action a Man's whole Life is diſparaged, and judged to be of the ſame tenor: if one Member of a Society be caught in a fault, all the reſt are preſumed to be as bad. 'Tis ſcarce credible how many are looked upon as ſcandalouſly wicked thro' ſuch Suſpicions, who are very far from it. Confeſſors and Judges in Criminal Caſes know very well how ſmall a part of common Fame is true, how little it is ever to be truſted.

6thy, We muſt diſtinguiſh, and the Law itſelf ſometimes does, between ſuch things as proceed from Malice and premeditated Wickedneſs, and thoſe that ariſe from violence of Paſſion and diſorder of Mind. The guilt is very much extenuated when the Perſon offending is under Provocation, and as it were tranſported beyond himſelf by a ſudden Fit of Reſentment.

Theſe things are all known to our moſt equitable Judge, who will paſs a merciful, and not a rigorous Sentence on us: and for theſe Reaſons, we believe, he forbad us to judge any thing before the time. We only know the outſides of things, and 'tis poſſible that ſuch as ſeem to us the greateſt Crimes, would upon ſeeing the whole procedure, and making proper Allowances,

vening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of ſome, a Stop is put to the Wickedneſs of many;

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Allowances, appear to be the leaſt. Many Virtues as well as Vices lie in the Mind inviſible to human Eyes: 'tis ſpeaking at random therefore to pronounce upon the number of one or other, and he that would from thence infer the neceſſity of an Evil Principle ought to be eſteemed a raſh Judge, and an Uſurper of God's Tribunal.

Laſtly, it may be obſerved that the continuance and Increaſe of Mankind is a ſure proof that there is more Good than Evil in the World. For one or two acts may have a pernicious influence on many Perſons, nay all immoral Actions tend to the deſtruction of Mankind, at leaſt to the common detriment and diminution of them: Whereas a great many, even numberleſs good actions muſt neceſſarily concur to the preſervation of each individual. If therefore bad Actions exceeded the number of the good there would be an End of human kind. We have clear Evidence of this in thoſe Countries where Vices multiply, the Number of Men continually decreaſes and the Place grows deſolate; but upon the return of Virtue and Goodneſs 'tis again ſtocked with Inhabitants.

This is a ſign that Mankind could not ſubſiſt if ever Vice were prevalent, ſince many good acts are neceſſary to repair the loſs which attends one bad one. One ſingle Action may take away the Life of a Man, or of ſeveral; but how many acts of benevolence and humanity muſt neceſſarily contribute to the bringing up, educating and preſerving every one?

From what has been ſaid I hope it appears that there is more good than Evil among Men, and that a good God might make the World, notwithſtanding the Argument drawn from the contrary Suppoſition. But almoſt all of this is unneceſſary, ſince the whole Univerſe may have ten thouſand times more Good than Evil; though this Earth of ours had no one good thing in it. This World is too ſmall to bear any proportion to the whole Syſtem, and therefore we can form but a very unequal Judgment of it from hence. It may be it's Hoſpital or Priſon; and can any one judge of the Healthfulneſs of a Climate from viewing an Hoſpital where all are ſick? or of the Wiſdom of a Government, from a Place of confinement where there are only Madmen? or of the Virtue of a People, from a Priſon where there are none but Malefactors? Not that I believe the Earth is really ſuch a Place; but I ſay it may be ſuppoſed ſuch, and any ſuppoſition which ſhews how a thing may be, deſtroys the *Manichean* Argument drawn from the impoſſibility of accounting for it.

In the Interim I look upon this Earth as an Habitation abounding with Delights, in which a Man may live with

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many; and the Virtue and Happineſs of a great many is confirmed and increaſed by the miſery of a few; nay an opportunity of doing Good is offer'd to ſuch as are ſo diſpoſed, which never could have been if none had abuſed their Choice. (82.)

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Comfort, Joy and Happineſs; I own with the greateſt Gratitude to God that I myſelf have lived ſuch a Life, and am perſuaded that my Friends, Acquaintance, Servants, have all done the ſame; and I believe that there's no Evil in Life but what is very tolerable; eſpecially to thoſe who have hopes of a future Immortality.

For a Proof that the good of both kinds in the World is ſuperior to the evil, ſee Sherlock *on Providence* C. 7. Hutcheſon *on the Paſſions, p.* 177, *&c.* Leibnitz, *Eſſais de Theodicee, or Memoirs of Lit Vol.* 3. *or* Chubb's *Supplement to the Vindication of God's Moral Character. Tracts p.* 281, &c. *or* Lucas's *Enquiry after Happineſs, Vol.* 1. *Sect.* 2. *C.* 2.

(82.) Upon the whole, from that little which we know of the Scheme of Divine Providence in the Formation and Government of the *Moral* World, it ſeems very reaſonable for us to conclude concerning this, in the ſame manner as we did concerning the *Natural* World, *viz.* That no conſiderable part of it can be altered for the better; or that no Evil in it could either have been originally avoided, or may now be removed, without introducing greater.

Since the whole Controverſy depends upon the truth of this general Concluſion, 'tis proper that we ſhould be as fully ſatisfied as poſſible about the ground of it. But to attempt to demonſtrate it by an Induction of Particulars would be infinite, I ſhall therefore chooſe rather to illuſtrate it by a review of ſome of the Principles before laid down. In the firſt place then the Deity is ſuppoſed out of pure Benevolence to have created as many immaterial Beings of the nobleſt kinds as were agreeable to the Order and Convenience of his Syſtem; for his Benevolence, being unbounded, ſeems to require this as much as it does the Creation of any Beings at all: The ſame Benevolence alſo prompted him to produce more imperfect, mixed ones; becauſe even thoſe were better than none. He endowed theſe with an abſolutely free Principle of *Volition* and *Action*, becauſe ſuch Freedom was abſolutely requiſite to their Happineſs in every reſpect, eſpecially to that for which he chiefly deſigned them, *viz.* Goodneſs, Virtue, or a reſemblance of his own Moral Qualities; which is the ſupream and only Happineſs of a rational Being. He continues this Freedom to them, though many abuſe it to the Corruption of their Natures, and Introduction of the greateſt Miſery; becauſe this

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SUBSECT. VII.

Wherein the Principles before laid down are applied to the Solution of ſome Objections.

I. FROM the foregoing Principle it ſeems not impoſſible to anſwer ſuch Objections as are commonly brought againſt the Goodneſs and Providence of God. For in the firſt place, when it is objected, that Moral Evil is not a neceſſary concomitant

Moral Evils are not neceſſary in reſpect of Free-Will, but they are neceſſary with regard to God, ſo that he muſt either tolerate theſe or greater.

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abuſe proportionably improves the Nature, and increaſes the Felicity of *others*, and ſo Liberty ſtill tends to the Good and Perfection of the whole: and this it may be conceived to do in the following manner. The miſerable Effect of the abuſe of Freedom by ſome of this World, makes all others much more ſenſible of the Nature and Conſequences of Sin, and more careful to avoid it, and renders them conſcious of a double Pleaſure in uſing their Powers aright: it exerciſeth ſome Virtues in them which could have no place without it; preſerves, improves and exalteth others, and conſequently raiſes their whole Nature to a higher degree of Perfection than it could otherwiſe acquire. By parity of Reaſon we may believe in the next World alſo the Goodneſs as well as Happineſs, of the Bleſſed will be confirmed and advanced by reflections naturally ariſing from their View of the Miſery which ſome ſhall undergo: (which ſeems to be a good reaſon for the Creation of thoſe Beings who ſhall be finally miſerable, and for the continuation of them in their miſerable Exiſtence.)*

"To have eſcaped Hell, and to find ourſelves in the unchangeable Poſſeſſion of Salvation by the free Mercy and Goodneſs of God, and by the Death of his own Son, are Thoughts which muſt create a new Heaven as it were in Heaven itſelf; I mean they will enlarge our Souls to the utmoſt Capacity of our Natures, and fill and actuate them with ſuch Divine Ardors of Love, as if we had been kept neceſſarily from all Sin, ſeem impoſſible to have been raiſed in us.†

This then we may with Reverence preſume to have been the principal Deſign of God in permitting all Mankind to bring themſelves into ſuch a dangerous Eſtate, and ſome of them to ſuffer under it; and perhaps the ſame reaſon will hold

* *See the* Appendix, § 2. par. 9.

† *Jenkin*, 2d Vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, &c. 5th Edit.

comitant of human Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no Benefit ariſes from the permiſſion of it, as there does from Hunger, Thirſt, and the Paſſions: We muſt reply, that Liberty of Choice is a neceſſary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exerciſe of it

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hold for his permitting the *Fall of Angels:* For I think it plainly appeared from Note 13. that the Good or rather *Goodneſs*, of the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of all the Diſpenſations of God, and not his own *Glory*, any farther than it is the means to it. His Glory ſeems to be diſplayed no otherwiſe than as it is ſubſervient and neceſſary to this End; and neceſſary it is; ſince Goodneſs is of our own making, and muſt require Knowledge, Example, Trial, *&c.* (ſee Note 66) as Motives and Means to further us in the gradual Formation of a ſuitable Temper and proper Habits here, the Enlargement and Improvement of which will conſtitute our Heaven hereafter, as *Scott* and *Rymer* have ſhewn at large.

Virtue therefore or *Moral Good* cannot (as *Bayle* imagines) be *infuſed* into us miraculouſly; neither could God, *according to the Order of our Ideas*, have acquainted us with ſo much of his adorable Nature, his *Mercy*, *Long-ſuffering*, *Goodneſs* and *Truth* (as he himſelf deſcribes it) [*h*] nor conſequently have brought us to ſo great a reſemblance of it, by any other Method. The ſole Idea of a *Being infinitely perfect*, as *Bayle* objects [*i*] would not do the Buſineſs; nor if it were received and would have been attended to, could it be of ſufficient force to influence the Minds of Men, and regulate their Practice, as is evident from daily Experience. The preſent Scheme of Providence was therefore neceſſary, in order to produce in the generality of Men the greateſt degree of *Goodneſs* in this Life, which is the ground and foundation of their *Happineſs* in the next. Even there alſo may the Memory of their former Trials (as was hinted above) the Conſciouſneſs of their own happy Choice, when others did, and they had the ſame Power and the ſame Temptations to have done otherwiſe: the joyful Reflection on their paſt Dangers and preſent Safety, and the natural Conſequence of all this, Love and Gratitude, and Glory to God in the Higheſt, and mutual Congratulations of each other—Theſe and the like Contemplations will (as *Jenkin* ſays) create a new Heaven in Heaven itſelf.

And though in one reſpect a view of the Miſery which the damned undergo, might ſeem to detract from the Happineſs of the Bleſſed, through Pity and Commiſeration: yet under another,

[*h*] Exod. 34. 6, 7. [*i*] Crit. Dict. p. 2488.

it cannot be hindered, as we have ſeen, without greater Evils; In reſpect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not neceſſary, but in reſpect of God it is, *i. e.* he muſt either tolerate this Evil or a greater; from hence alſo proceeds no ſmall Advantage to univerſal Nature, as well as to Mankind.

II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Anſwer to *Cicero*'s Objection in his third Book, *De Natura Deorum*, where *Cotta* is introduced arguing in this manner: "If a Phyſician knows that his Patient, "who is ordered to drink Wine, will drink too "much and dye of it immediately, he is greatly "blameable for allowing him it. Thus is this "Providence of yours to be blamed, which has "given reaſon to ſuch as it knew would make a "perverſe and wicked Uſe of it." He proceeds alſo

Cicero's Objection taken from a Phyſician who gives his Patient Wine when he knows that he will die of it: Or a Father who leaves his Eſtate to a Prodigal Son.

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other, a nearer, and much more affecting Conſideration, *viz.* that all this is the Miſery which they themſelves were often expoſed to, and were in imminent Danger of incurring; in this View, why may not the ſenſe of their own Eſcape ſo far overcome the Senſe of another's Ruin, as quite to extinguiſh the Pain that uſually attends the Idea of it, and even render it productive of ſome real Happineſs? To this purpoſe apply that of *Lucretius*, B. 2.

Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
E terra alterius magnum ſpectare laborem;
Non quia vexari quenquam eſt jucunda voluptas:
Sed quibus ipſe malis carcas quia cernere ſuave eſt.

But however this be, moſt of the foregoing Reflections ſeem juſt and unexceptionable.

I ſhall conclude with another Paſſage from *Jenkin*, [*k*] which ſets them in the ſtrongeſt Light.

"It muſt advance the Happineſs both of Angels and Men "in Heaven, that upon Choice and Trial they have preferred "God before all things, and upon that find themſelves con- "firmed and eſtabliſhed in the perpetual and unalterable Love "and Enjoyment of him. This very Conſideration, that they "might once have fallen from his Love, inſpires them with "the higheſt Ardors of Love, when they rejoice in the infi- "nite

[*k*] Pag. 243.

alſo to confute thoſe Perſons who endeavour to excuſe Providence, by ſaying, "That it does not "follow that we are not very well provided for "by the Gods, becauſe a great many uſe their "Gifts perverſely; ſince many make a bad uſe of "their Paternal Eſtates, and yet theſe cannot be "ſaid to have no Benefit from their Fathers." To which he replies in theſe Words: "I wiſh the "Gods had not beſtowed that Cunning upon Men "which very few make a right uſe of: Inſomuch "that this Divine Gift of Reaſon and Deliberation "may ſeem to be imparted for a Snare, and not a "Benefit to Mankind." He adds, "We leave "Eſtates to our Children in hopes of leaving them "well, wherein we may be deceived; but how can "God be deceived?"

'Tis ſhewn that the Compariſon is ill put between Reaſon and Free-Will, and the giving of Wine; and that God, if he took away Liberty for fear we ſhould ſin, would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he ſhould be ſick.

III. To all which we reply, Firſt, That it is very unfair to compare the Reaſon which is granted to Man with Wine given to the Sick. For a ſick Perſon may enjoy Life, and even recover, without Wine; but Man cannot be what he is without Reaſon. The Compariſon therefore is very impro- "perly

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"nite Rewards of ſo eaſy and ſhort a Trial: and the Reflec- "tion upon the Dangers eſcaped heightens even the Joys of "Heaven to them, and makes an addition to every Degree of "Bliſs. The remembrance of their paſt Sins and Tempta- "tions, and the Senſe of their own Unworthineſs ariſing from "that Remembrance, will continually excite in the Bleſſed "freſh Acts of Love and Adoration of God, who has raiſed "them above all Sin and Temptation, and fixed them in an "everlaſting State of Bliſs and Glory. The Trial that the "Righteous underwent here, makes up ſome part of their "Happineſs in Heaven; and in what Degree ſoever their "Happineſs can be ſuppoſed to be, yet it is in ſome meaſure "increaſed, and as it were endeared to them, by reflecting on "their former State of Trial, in which they were ſubject to "Temptation and Sin."

See the ſame handled more diſtinctly in the firſt of *D' Oyley*'s four Diſſertations, Ch. 10. ABp. *Dawes*'s 5th Sermon on the *Eternity of Hell Torments*, Argument the 4th. p. 73, &c. or *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, Vol. 5. p. 100.

perly made between things that are *diſparate*. Neither is there a leſs difference between *ſinning* and *dying*. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a ſick Perſon take Wine which he knew would kill him: but yet any prudent Phyſician would allow his Patient to take ſome Meat, without which he knew that he certainly muſt die, tho' he underſtood that upon taking it the Fever would encreaſe a little. In like manner God has given Reaſon to Men, without which they would not be Men, tho' he foreſaw that ſome Evils would ariſe from it. Reaſon therefore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Diſtemper. If then God were to take away Reaſon leſt Men ſhould uſe it amiſs, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he ſhould be ſick.

IV. Secondly, Human Reaſon is improperly compared to a *Patrimony*, ſince it is the very *Being* and Life of Man: and who would rather put his Son to Death than ſuffer him to lead a ſort of an irregular Life?

Reaſon is no leſs improperly compared to an Eſtate.

V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born for ourſelves alone, but are ſubſervient to Nature as Parts of the Univerſe: 'tis reaſonable therefore that we ſhould bear ſuch things as tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to us. Now we have ſhewn before that the Abuſe of Reaſon cannot be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Univerſe, without Detriment to Mankind and to ourſelves. If therefore a Father could not refuſe a Son his Inheritance, without breaking the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and laſtly, without the Loſs of his Son's Life, he would not deſerve to be blamed for giving him it, tho' he underſtood that he would make a bad uſe of it: Eſpecially if he foreſaw that the Brothers of this Prodigal would take warning by his Error, and become frugal, and that the Eſtate which he ſpent would turn to their Benefit.

It tends to the good of the whole, and of ourſelves too, that we ſhould have the uſe of Free-Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes, or without Reaſon.

Benefit. The ſame muſt be ſaid of the Phyſician who gives his Patient a Glaſs at his Requeſt; which if he did not give, the Patient would immediately ſtab himſelf. Is he culpable if he compound for a leſs Evil, in order to avoid a greater? More eſpecially if many labour under the ſame Diſtemper, and would not be convinced of the danger of uſing Wine but by Experiment, would it not be better to let one or two make the Experiment, than that all ſhould periſh? God therefore knowingly permits us ſick Perſons to uſe Wine; for though we abuſe it, yet our Condition will be better than if he had not beſtowed it upon us. If any urge that it is better not to be at all, than to be miſerable, and conſequently that it is more proper to deprive us of Life, than to ſuffer us to abuſe it. I anſwer as before, That we muſt make a Diſtinction in Miſery; for where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to be, than to be involved in this kind of Miſery; but that which attends human Reaſon is not ſuch, by our own Judgment. For we had rather be what we are, than not to be at all, or be without Reaſon. Elſe why are we unwilling to change our Condition with the Brutes, or Madmen, if we do not think it better than theirs?

Cicero has neither brought appoſite Similies nor given good Advice to Providence.

VI. But to conclude, *Cotta* in *Cicero* has neither brought pertinent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God, as a Phyſician, does not give Wine to the Sick Perſon to kill him: but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying ſooner. Nor has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons that they may waſte it, but has beſtowed it upon ſuch as will waſte it, leſt they ſhould want Neceſſaries. Whereas if *Cotta* had been Counſellor to Providence, he would have adviſed Phyſicians to let their Patients die with Thirſt, leſt ſome of them ſhould drink too much; he would have perſuaded Parents either to kill their Children, or never beget them, leſt they ſhould make a bad

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uſe of their Eſtates when they came to Age. (83.) (*B. B.*)

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(83.) The ſame holds good againſt all *Bayle*'s Compariſons, *Crit. Dict. Art.* Paulicians. *Rem.* E. F. ΚΔΔ, *&c.* p. 2488. where he ſays, that to permit Men to ſin rather than to overrule their Wills, is like a Mother that lets her Daughters go to a Ball, where ſhe is ſure they will loſe their Honour, and then pleads in her own Juſtification, "that ſhe had no mind "to reſtrain the Liberty of her Daughters, nor to ſhew Diſ"truſt of them." *Again* [*l*] If a Son ſhould ſee his Father "ready to throw himſelf out of the Window, either in a fit "of Frenzy, or becauſe he is troubled in Mind, he would do "well to chain him, if he could not reſtrain him otherwiſe." *And to name no more.*

"To have regard to the Free-Will of a Man, and carefully "to abſtain from laying any reſtraint upon his Inclination, "when he is going to loſe his Innocence for ever, to be eter"nally *damn'd*; can you call that a lawful Obſervation of the "Laws of Liberty? You would be leſs unreaſonable if you "ſhould ſay to a Man who gets a Fall near you, and breaks his "Legs, *that which hindered us from preventing your Fall is, "that we were afraid to undo ſome Folds of your Gown; we "had ſo great a reſpect for its Symmetry, that we would not un"dertake to ſpoil it, and we thought it was much better to let "you run the hazard of breaking your Bones.*" &c. [*m.*]

In all which this Author evidently miſtakes the Caſe, by comparing the *Deſtruction of Free-Will* (for this is the only thing, as we have proved, that can prevent the abuſe of it) which *Will* has been ſhewn to be the very Life and Soul of Man; to ſuch mere trifles as confining his Body or diſcompoſing his Habit: whereas, from the foregoing account of the ineſtimable worth of Liberty to each Individual, and the many Advantages that ariſe in common, even from the abuſe of it, it plainly appears that to abridge, or which is the very ſame, to deprive a Man of Liberty for fear he ſhould abuſe it, would, in regard to him, be juſt as good as to knock him on the Head for fear he ſhould maim or diſfigure himſelf. And with reſpect to the Public, he would be far more unreaſonable who ſhould deſire the abſence of this Liberty, becauſe of its frequent abuſe, than he who ſhould wiſh that there were no ſuch thing as Fire, Wind, or Water, in the World, becauſe ſo many Men, Houſes and Ships are deſtroyed by them.— As the reſt of *Bayle*'s elaborate Similies are founded on the ſame miſrepreſentation, one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to invalidate them.

[*l*] *Crit. Dict.* p. 2497. [*m.*] Page 2497.

VII. From the ſame Principles we may ſolve that formidable Objection of *Epicurus* againſt Providence, which *Lactantius* enforces in his Book *De Ira Dei* *: and, as ſome think, does not ſufficiently anſwer. It ſtands thus: "Either God is willing to "remove Evils, and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor willing. If he be willing "and not able, he is impotent; which cannot be "ap-

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(*B. B.*) 'Tis urged that the Author acknowledges the Goodneſs, Wiſdom and Power of God to be infinite, and that it was out of pure Goodneſs that he made Man and gave him liberty of choice as a means of Happineſs, and therefore it ought not to be ſuch a Liberty as may be abuſed and become a means of Miſery, at leaſt God ſhould have ſet a guard on it that whenever it was about to yield to Evil he might have interpoſed and prevented it. Thus kind and wiſe Parents indulge their Children in the uſe of their Liberty, but ſo as to be always near them and prevent its doing them miſchief. A good and prudent Mother will ſuffer her Daughter to go abroad, but if ſhe underſtand that ſhe is like to be ſeduced, ſhe will leave her play or buſineſs, and run to reſcue her Child. The ſame is obſerved of a Huſband in regard to his Wife; and the Mother or Huſband that do not take this care are neither counted wiſe nor good. How then can God be infinitely wiſe, good and powerful that does not take care to prevent men's chooſing ill, eſpecially ſince their eternal Happineſs or Miſery depends on it?

Anſw. Theſe Compariſons are not appoſite to the purpoſe, particularly in the following reſpects.

1ſt. The care of a Daughter or Wife is the principal part of a Mother's or Huſband's charge, ſo that no other buſineſs can in the uſual method of Management be compared with it, and therefore the Mother or Huſband that fails in it, are wanting in that which ought to have been the chief part of their Care. Whereas Sinners, whether Angels or Men, are but a ſmall and inconſiderable part of thoſe that are under the direction of Providence, and conſequently there is no Parity between the Obligations.

2dly. The Mothers and Huſbands in the forementioned Inſtances may generally take care of their Children and Wives without prejudicing the reſt of the World or interfering with their other Duties; and where this happens, their Neglect is inexcuſable. But when the ſaving a Man's Country is concerned, or any publick Good at ſtake, the Huſband muſt leave his Wife, and the Mother her Daughter, tho' they were ſure that

* §. 12. p. 435. *Cambr.* Edit.

" applyed to the Deity: If he be able and not wil-
" ling, he is envious; which is equally inconſiſtent
" with the Nature of God. If he be neither willing
" nor able, he is both envious and impotent, and
" conſequently no God. If he be both willing and
" able, which is the only thing that anſwers to the
" Notion of a God; from whence come Evils? Or
" why does he not remove them?

VIII.

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that by their abſence their Children and Wife would be corrupted.

3dly, The Mother or Huſband may hinder the Corruption of their Child or Wife without maiming or deſtroying them; for if the caſe were that a Mother muſt either venture her Daughter and let her take her choice, or kill her; I ſuppoſe there's no Mother but in ſuch circumſtances would let her Daughter take her Courſe.

4thly, In the inſtance before us here is no good or advantage to the Perſon ſeduced, or to the Family by letting her follow her Choice; but in the other Caſe, 'tis often more advantageous to the Perſon that chooſes amiſs, and always to the World, than if he had not been ſuffered to uſe his Liberty. And if there were no more but the conſideration of God's being able to turn the Sins of Men to the beſt, whereas a Mother or Huſband had no ſuch Power, it were ſufficient to ſhew the Diſparity.

The Caſe therefore ought to be put thus, ſuppoſe a Mother had many Millions of Daughters that by their very Nature were capable of being corrupted, that ſhe had no other means to prevent their being of ſuch a Nature, but by not bringing them into the World; ſuppoſe likewiſe that ſhe muſt either ſuffer them to be in circumſtances which will expoſe them to Temptations or they muſt have no Being. Suppoſe laſtly, that ſhe had no poſſible Means to ſecure them but either by locking them up altogether from Society, or 2dly by putting out their Eyes and depriving them of their Senſes, or 3dly by deſtroying all Mankind, that there might be none to ſeduce them. *Quære*, were it more goodneſs in a Mother to ſuffer one or two of the Millions to be corrupted, or to uſe theſe Remedies to prevent it?

If it be ſaid that if ſhe knew who they were that would yield to Temptations, ſhe would confine them, and leave the reſt at Liberty. I anſwer, if the permitting thoſe few to ſmart under the Effects of their ill Choice were the very Means and Motive by which the reſt were induced to make a good one, and perhaps all would be ſeduced if not fixed in a right choice

VIII. We muſt take the third of thoſe four Branches of his knotty Argument; *viz.* That God neither will nor can remove Evils. (84.) Yet we deny the Conſequence. He is neither to be eſteemed Envious nor Impotent becauſe he does not work Contradictions: But it is a Contradiction that all Evils ſhould be removed, without removing the whole

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by the terror of ſuch Examples, it would ſtill be agreeable to Goodneſs to ſuffer them to make the choice and feel the Effects of it.

Methinks the Caſe thus ſtated doth much better repreſent the circumſtances of God's permitting Sin, than as the Objection puts it. For I have already ſhewed that God has created as many indefectible Beings (if any ſuch be poſſible, which is indeed very doubtful) as this or any Syſtem of the World will allow: that he has placed as many of the Beings that are capable of defection in Places and Circumſtances that will ſecure them from Temptation, as there was room for, in this or any other poſſible Model of the Creation. That after theſe more perfect Beings were created, and theſe more ſecure places filled, there was ſtill room for many Creatures of other ſorts, and that many ſuch were poſſible, but all with a Capacity of chooſing ill, and the inconveniency of Temptations; and that there was no other way to ſecure them all from inconveniences, but either by not making them at all, or not allowing them the uſe of their Faculties, or laſtly changing their Nature into another ſort than the Syſtem of Creatures would allow. In this caſe the Queſtions are, whether it was better and a greater Inſtance of Goodneſs in God to condeſcend to give theſe imperfect Creatures a Being, and to diſpenſe with their Imperfections; or to deny it to them? 2dly, Whether it was greater Goodneſs in him to give all his Creatures a free uſe of their Liberty, which is the greateſt pleaſure of a rational Creature, and without which they cannot have a full Enjoyment of themſelves, though he foreſaw one in many Millions would abuſe it; or to debar the whole from ſuch a Satisfaction? Eſpecially when the Misfortune of that one ſecured the reſt of thoſe many Millions.

(84.) *Leibnitz* would rather ſay, "that God could take them "away, but he was not willing to do it abſolutely; and for "a very good reaſon, becauſe he ſhould have taken away the "Good at the ſame time, and becauſe he ſhould have taken "away more Good than Evil [*o.*]"

The

[*o.*] *Remarques*, p. 478.

whole Univerſe; which would be the greateſt of all Evils. For ſome kind of Evils adhere (as we have often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be removed while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference muſt neceſſarily be equal; neither is God impotent becauſe he cannot make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like manner, when he has made a Creature, he muſt neceſſarily tolerate the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as eſſential to it as an Equality of the *Radii* is to the Circle. When therefore Matter, Motion and Free-Will are conſtituted, he muſt neceſſarily permit Corruption of things, and the abuſe of Liberty, or ſomething worſe. For theſe cannot be ſeparated (as was ſhewn) without a Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent becauſe he cannot remove theſe Evils from things while the things themſelves remain, than becauſe he cannot ſeparate an Equality of the *Radii* from a Circle. The Conſequence then is falſe which charges God with Impotence becauſe he can remove Evils.

IX. Neither is that Aſſertion leſs falſe which attributes it to Envy that he will not. For he that al-

God always chooſes the leaſt of Evils, and therefore is not envious.

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The Anſwer of Lactantius *is as follows.* " Deus poteſt quicquid velit, & imbecillitas vel invidia in Deo nulla eſt: poteſt igitur mala tollere, ſed non vult; nec ideo tamen invidus eſt: idcirco enim non tollit quia ſapientiam (ſicut edocui) ſimul tribuit, & plus eſt boni ac jucunditatis in ſapientia, quam in malis moleſtiæ: ſapientia enim facit ut etiam Deum cognoſcamus & per eam cognitionem, immortalitatem aſſequamur, quod eſt ſummum Bonum. Itaque niſi prius malum agnoverimus, nec poterimus agnoſcere Bonum: ſed hoc non vidit *Epicurus*, nec alius quiſquam; ſi tollantur mala tolli pariter Sapientiam, nec ulla in homine remanere virtutis veſtigia, cujus ratio in ſuſtinenda & ſuperanda malorum acerbitate conſiſtit. Itaque propter exiguum compendium ſublatorum malorum, maximo & vero & proprio nobis bono careremus.

always wills the beſt, and the leaſt of many Evils, is abſolutely Good, and the fartheſt from Envy: and we have ſhewn that this is the Caſe with reſpect to God. If a Perſon had his Choice either to aboliſh or not to aboliſh Evil, he would be malicious if he did not aboliſh it. But when the choice is between this and a greater Evil, he that chooſes the leſs is far from being malicious. The Divine Goodneſs therefore reduces God to this Difficulty, that he muſt chooſe to make either no Creature at all, or an imperfect one; either no ſuch thing as Matter and Motion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things; either no free Agent, or admit a Power of ſinning. He muſt neceſſarily have choſen one of theſe, and 'tis eaſy to ſay whether of them was more directly oppoſite to Envy.

God could neither be infinitely powerful if he were not able to create imperfect Beings, *i. e.* Creatures: or things that are contrary to each other; *i. e.* Evils: nor infinitely Good, if he had been contented in himſelf, and denied Exiſtence to every thing elſe.

X. To ſpeak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reverence, pronounce that God would neither have been infinitely powerful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call Evil. For there are ſome things poſſible which are not conſiſtent with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually deſtructive, *i. e.* are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any of theſe, how would he be infinitely powerful, ſince he could not do all that is poſſible? Nor would it be leſs injurious to his Goodneſs to be unwilling, for by this means his Power muſt lie idle and never effect any thing at all; ſince nothing can be ſimply Good and exempt from all manner of Evil, but God himſelf. If therefore the Divine Goodneſs had deny'd Exiſtence to created Beings on account of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been eſteemed Envious, ſince he had allowed none to exiſt beſide himſelf; and while he refuſed to admit any kind of Evil, he would have rejected all the Good. Thus vaniſhes this *Herculean* Argument which induced the *Epicureans* to diſcard the good Deity, and the *Manicheans* to ſubſtitute an Evil one.

XI.

XI. *Epicurus* then is both a Deceiver and deceived himſelf, when from the preſent Evils he concludes againſt the Omnipotence and Goodneſs of the Deity. Whereas on the contrary God would neither have been powerful nor good if he had not tolerated Evils. From a competition or (if we may be allowed the Expreſſion) a *Conflict of two Infinites*, i.e. Omnipotence and Goodneſs, Evils neceſſarily ariſe. Theſe Attributes amicably conſpire together, and yet reſtrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Oppoſition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Reſemblance. Here then, and no where elſe, may we find the primary and moſt certain Riſe and Origin of Evils; and here only muſt we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients,

Epicurus is deceived who endeavours to attribute impotence and Envy to the Deity, when he ought to have inferred the higheſt Power and Goodneſs.

Νεῖκος ἐλόμενον καὶ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν.

The Peſtilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

APPEN-

APPENDIX:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

SECT. I.

Why God made Laws when he knew that they would not be obſerved.

The Divine Laws are either natural or poſitive.

I. THE Divine Laws are either thoſe which God has implanted in the Nature of every Being, or thoſe which he has publiſhed to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain *Meſſengers* choſen and ſent for this Purpoſe. For ſince a *Law is the Will of a Superior ſufficiently promulged to an Inferior, and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Puniſhment:* 'tis plain that God may be conceived to have made this Declaration of his Will to his Creatures two ways: Firſt, by giving them ſuch a Nature as requires that ſome things be done, and others avoided, in order to it's Preſervation: thoſe things which are made known to us in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we ſay, by the Law of Nature: and that Law which thus diſcovers itſelf to our Underſtanding we look upon as the Will of God promulged to his Creatures: For we are very certain that God according to his Goodneſs, wills the Good and Preſervation of all things which he himſelf has made, as far as is poſſible: and conſequently hates any thing that is hurtful to the Creature.

Particular Laws ought to give place to more general ones, ſince all kind of Repugnancy could not be avoided.

II. Now it muſt be obſerved that theſe natural Laws are either *Univerſal* or *Particular*; and 'tis fit the particular ones ſhould give way to the more Univerſal,

verſal, and thoſe of leſs Moment to the more important. For inſtance, 'tis of the Nature of Body that it be capable of Motion, that it be ſtopped and broken in Pieces by meeting with others in Motion, and this is the *Univerſal Law* of Bodies. But it is of the Nature of an Animal to preſerve itſelf, and uſe its utmoſt Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not ſeparated or diſſolved, and this is the *particular Law* of Animals.

Now ſince theſe Laws are ſometimes inconſiſtent, it is reaſonable that the latter, as being a particular one and of leſs Conſequence, ſhould yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. If it be aſked, Why did God make Laws which in ſome reſpect interfere with one another? I anſwer, as before, That this could not be avoided without a greater Evil: Since therefore of two Evils the leſs is to be choſen, God will'd that particular Laws and thoſe of leſs conſequence, ſhould give place to the more Univerſal and thoſe of greater Importance; rather than remove that Inconſiſtency, there ariſing leſs Inconvenience to Nature from thence.

III. The ſame muſt be ſaid of thoſe Laws which relate to Morality. 'Tis the Univerſal Law of Free Agents, that they ſhall pleaſe themſelves by Election, but there are ſome things eligible which may be prejudicial to ſome particular Beings. Now it is better, as was ſaid before, that Particulars be injured, than that the Univerſal Law of Free Agents be violated. We muſt ſuppoſe then that God will'ed this as the leſs Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore to abuſe their Free Will, and 'tis neceſſary that God ſhould tolerate either this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all neceſſary that Man ſhould make an Evil Choice; therefore he alone is faulty; for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a neceſſity of chooſing the leaſt among many Evils.

The ſame muſt be ſaid of thoſe Laws which relate to the moral World.

IV.

Why God is said to be angry with Sinners, since his Will is always done.

IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Nature are always obſerved according to the Will and Intent of God. For he willed that the particular ſhould give place to the General ones, and that Man ſhould ſin rather than be driven from Sin by force. You'll ſay, why then is he angry at Sinners, ſince nothing is done againſt his Will? I anſwer: When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis *after the manner of Men*;* whereas it is ordered and effected by the very Nature and Conſtitution of things, that whoever does any thing in oppoſition to any Law of Nature, though it be a particular one, ſhall bring ſome Inconvenience upon himſelf. By which contrivance God has taken care that the very leaſt law ſhould not be violated raſhly and without Neceſſity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a particular Law, brings certain Miſery upon himſelf, God who wiſely coupled theſe together, is ſaid to be *angry*: Becauſe a Man in Anger would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Perſon that provoked him; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election is to be eſteemed a Puniſhment inflicted as it were by an angry God.

God may alter or add to the Laws of Nature, and give us aſſurance that he intends to do ſo; hence the origin of poſitive Laws and a Revelation.

V. As to the ſecond ſort of Divine Laws, *viz.* the *Poſitive*; 'tis certain that God, who is the Author of Nature and eſtabliſhed the Laws of it, can either alter them or add to them when he ſees it proper. Neither does he want Means, whenever he pleaſes, to aſſure Mankind that he will do it. When therefore we find any Alteration in the Laws of Nature, we may from hence conclude that God demands our Attention. And hereupon we eſteem the Promulgation of a new Law recommended to us by this Token to be an authentic Declaration of the Will of God. In this manner were the *Moſaic* and *Evangelic* Laws eſtabliſhed; *viz.* by *Miracles*.

VI.

* *See* Chap. 1. § 5. par. 10. *and* Note C.

VI. But it is uſually aſked, Why did God eſtabliſh and promulge thoſe Laws which he knew Men would not obſerve? It muſt be anſwered, That theſe Laws are Means of acquainting Free Agents with what is expedient for them, and of moving them to the choice of it. Neither does their Nature admit of any that are more efficacious: for it is ſuch as muſt be perſuaded and not compelled. Notwithſtanding therefore God knew that his Laws would not be obſerved by all, yet he propoſes them to all, for by this Means a great many learn their true Intereſt, thankfully embrace the Laws and obey them; and the reſt are no worſe for them, ſince they would be involved in the ſame Evils which they feel from the Sanction of the Laws, and perhaps greater, though theſe Laws had never been. (85.)

Laws are the means of informing Free-Agents of what is uſeful or prejudicial to them.

But

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(85.) 'Tis a very uſeful Obſervation which our Author makes in this place, and illuſtrates in the following Section, par. 3. *viz.* that the Divine Laws (eſpecially thoſe of the *Chriſtian* Diſpenſation) are chiefly *Declarations* of the natural and neceſſary Effects of Sin, or *Directions* and *Means* to avoid them; which neceſſary Effects are conceived to be the real *Sanction* of theſe Laws. Conſequently theſe Laws cannot properly bring us into a worſe State than we ſhould have been in without them. — They do not introduce a new Train of arbitrary and additional Evils, but on the contrary are deſigned in pure Goodneſs to leſſen the Number of the old ones, — to forewarn us of the natural Conſequences of our own Acts and Habits, and prevent thoſe Moral Evils to which we are expoſed by the very conſtitution of our Beings; — which the univerſal Law of Liberty makes it poſſible for us to incur, and impoſſible for God to hinder by any other means, as has been ſhewn above. Farther; this Notion, that moſt of the Miſery both in this World and the next is the *neceſſary Conſequence* of ſinful Actions according to the fixed Laws of Nature, rather than any poſitive Puniſhment immediately inflicted by the Deity, will, I am apt to think, have the greateſt Influence on moſt Men to deter them from ſuch Actions. I am ſure I find myſelf more deeply affected with this Reflection that Miſery will follow of Courſe upon ſome certain Practices, and that by indulging them I naturally and neceſſarily deſtroy myſelf, than

But granting that ſome who tranſgreſs the Laws meet with greater and more Inconveniencies than they would have done without them, 'tis better that ſome ſhould ſuffer Inconveniencies thro' their own fault, than that all ſhould be deprived of the Benefit of the Divine Laws; God therefore out of infinite Goodneſs, which is always inclined to the beſt, promulged thoſe Laws which he knew all Men would not obſerve.

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I ſhould be by a Proſpect of the very ſame Degree of Pain threatned as a Puniſhment for ſuch Practices. And the Reaſon of this is evident: I am apt ſtill to hope that the latter may poſſibly be remitted; but the former leaves no room for Hope. Again, A due attention to this Doctrine that all our moral Happineſs in this World muſt be of our own making, and that diſordered, Evil Affections, irregular and perverſe Habits, &c. will conſtitute a great part of our *Hell*, in the next, (which might be ſhewn in the ſame manner as was hinted concerning virtuous Habits, in Note 79, but is rendered unneceſſary by the Authors there mentioned.) This Doctrine, I ſay, if rightly underſtood and applied, would diſcover the weakneſs of all ſuch pretences to Salvation as are built upon the bare Belief of, or Confidence in what any other has done or can do for us; or even of what we do ourſelves purely by way of *Opus Operatum*, i. e. as ultimately relying on the bare Diſcharge of any Duty, and not uſing and applying it as a means to ſome farther End, *v. g.* on *Prayer*, as the mere Labour of the Lips; on the *Sacrament* as a Charm; on *Repentance* as a ſimple Act entitling us to Happineſs; in ſhort, on any thing which does not enter the Heart and improve the Temper. If Heaven be not ſo much the *Reward* of Religion, as the *natural Conſequence* of a religious Frame of Mind, and *vice verſa*; then how abſurd is it for us who are aſpiring after that State, to ſtop by the way, to reſt in any particular Acts of Religion as arbitrary Inſtitutions procuring, and as it were *purchaſing* it for us, inſtead of uſing them as, what they really are, fit Inſtruments to *work out* our own Salvation by *producing* this frame of Mind in us; as proper Helps and Aſſiſtances enabling us to *acquire* this Heavenly Temper? And on the other Side, how vain muſt be our Hopes of eſcaping Hell by any ſuch Methods as theſe, if we ſtill carry our Hell within us?

The Mind is it's own Place, and in itſelf
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.

See Par. 11. *of the following Sect.*

SECT. II.

Concerning Divine Rewards and Puniſhments.

I. IT was proper to ſay ſomething concerning theſe, ſince Puniſhment is a natural Evil, *viz.* Pain, Diſappointment of Appetite, or Damage annexed to a wrong Choice, by a Foreſight whereof we might be deterred from making a wrong Choice. In theſe conſiſts the Power and Efficacy of Laws, nor would they be of any force without them. Now Good or Evil, *i. e.* Rewards and Puniſhments, may be annexed, either by Nature, or by Laws of poſitive Inſtitution.

Puniſhment is a natural Evil connected with a depraved Choice.

II. As to *Nature*, all Evil is prejudicial to it, *i. e.* interrupts its Courſe: Evil therefore proceeds from ſome Violence done to Nature, and that which offers Violence muſt neceſſarily ſuffer it; for every natural Action has Re-action joined with it. According to the Laws of Mechaniſm then Evil done to another is for the moſt part repayed with Evil to the Doer, *i. e.* with Puniſhment. By which piece of Machinery or Contrivance God has manifeſted both his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. For by this Means he has taken effectual Care that none ſhould tranſgreſs the Laws of Nature without Puniſhment, or offer unneceſſary Violence to the Appetites of others; or if it were neceſſary to offer it, yet that it ſhould not be without ſome Inconvenience to him that does offer it. It is better that a Creature ſhould be able to provide for its own Safety with ſome Inconveniencies, than that it ſhould be at Liberty to offer needleſs Violence to others, and the Laws belonging to their particular Nature be broken to no manner of end: For by that means there would be more Evils in Nature than there are at preſent, and they would be multiplied unneceſſarily. Hence it appears how worthy of God to have formed the Nature of things

Evil is violence done to Nature; but every natural Action has reaction correſpondent to it: therefore he that does Violence muſt neceſſarily ſuffer Violence, that none may ſin without Puniſhment.

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in ſuch a manner, that from the very Conſtitution of them the Intemperate, Injurious, the Thief, Robber, Adulterer, Proud, Envious, *&c.* ſhould have ſomething to dread. If any one aſk why there are not ſuch Puniſhments as might effectually imprint a lively ſenſe upon our Minds, and thereby totally reſtrain us from a wrong Choice? I anſwer: A greater Evil muſt not be done on account of a leſs; but if the Puniſhments and Dread of of them were increaſed to ſuch a Degree as to be ſufficient to prevent all kind of Evil, they themſelves would be the greateſt of all Evils, and the dread of them would more deeply affect, and be a greater affliction to the Minds of Men, even of thoſe who would not do amiſs, than the Evils themſelves are, for the Preſervation of which theſe Puniſhments are propoſed by God. It was therefore fit that there ſhould be ſome meaſure in Puniſhments; *viz.* leſt by being always preſent to the Mind of Mortals they ſhould prove a greater Prejudice to to our Eaſe and Happineſs, than thoſe very Evils which are prohibited under the Penalty of them would be, were we forced to undergo them.

Poſitive Laws acquaint us with the Puniſhments which attend depraved Elections from the Nature of the thing, rather than inflict new ones.

III. As to the Puniſhments which God has affixed by way of *Sanction to poſitive Laws*, we muſt affirm that they are to be eſteemed as Admonitions and Notices of the Miſchiefs conſequent upon evil Elections, rather than that God himſelf will immediately inflict them. Natural Conſcience is for the moſt part ſufficiently able to inform us what is Good and what Evil: but it was impoſſible for Nature to acquaint us with all the Conſequences which attend our Actions in an Infinite Train and Continuance of things. Now, leſt we ſhould be involved in Evils unawares, and contrary to our Expectations, God has informed us by poſitive Laws what our Condition muſt be if we will indulge ourſelves in Evil Elections. And has promulged them by way of *Puniſhments* denounced,

rather than by ſimple *Prediction*, that they might enter more deeply into our Minds, and oblige us to take care of ourſelves.

That the decreeing and inflicting Puniſhments prevents greater Evils.

IV. But if there be any thing which is not reducible to this head, and ſeems to prove an *immediate Infliction* by the Deity, neither is that done without Reaſon. For it is fit that God ſhould remove that Being out of the World which cannot be made conſiſtent with the Good of the Univerſe: and reform that by Chaſtiſement which would otherwiſe, through its irregular Motion, prove offenſive to the Author, and all about it. Puniſhments then are annexed to Evil Elections in order to *prevent* them, and inflicted to *correct* and *amend* the Offenders, or to *deter* others from the like Offences. If therefore the Appointment and Infliction of Puniſhments prevent greater Evils than they are them ſelves; it follows that God has choſen the better Part in eſtabliſhing and exacting them.

'Tis aſk'd in the 1ſt place, how this can be reconciled with eternal Puniſhments, which don't ſeem capable either of reforming the puniſhed, or of being a warning to others?

V. It may be aſked, how this can agree with the Puniſhments of the Wicked, which the *Chriſtian Religion* declares to be *Eternal?* For in the firſt place, 'tis plain that they are not inflicted either to reform the Guilty (for there is no room for Reformation in Hell) or to deter others from the like Guilt: for Sin will be at an End, and the very poſſibility of ſinning taken away before they ſhall be inflicted. They can neither be of uſe to the Dead therefore, nor to the Living; for they are kept ſecret while they might be of any uſe. Conſequently there ſeems to be ſome other end of theſe Puniſhments, *viz.* to make Satisfaction to the Divine *Vengeance* for the Injury and Affront offered to his Majeſty.

'Tis aſk'd in the 2d. place how Puniſhments can be eternal, ſince it is agreeable to Goodneſs to have created all things in ſuch a manner that nothing might repent of it's being?

VI. Secondly, Theſe Eeternal Torments appear to be not very agreeeble to the Divine Œconomy in another reſpect. For it is to be obſerved that God has framed all things and diſpoſed them in ſuch a manner, that nothing may repent of its having

ing been made by him: for when it is come to this that it's Misery exceeds it's Pleasure, the Being perishes, and is withdrawn from both. Not to *exist* therefore, or not to perceive any means of Relief, is the very worst Condition, as was shewn before †. A violent Object not only destroys the Sensory but takes away the Sense itself; the Divine Goodness providing that no Creature should be worse by its Existence than if it had not existed. And as far as appears, thinking Beings ought to be dealt with after the same Manner, *viz.* When Pain, Sorrow, Fear, Anxiety, and the rest of the Passions and Affections increase to so great a Degree that the Mind receives more Evil than Good from the Sense of it's Existence, 'tis reasonable that the Excess of these should extinguish Thought itself, as the Excess of bodily Pains destroys the Sense: Otherwise these miserable Beings seem to receive no Benefit from God, since Providence has reduced them to a State worse than that *Non-existence* in which it found them. [*p.*] Neither does it seem a sufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodness, to say, that this befalls them through their own Fault, for it is hardly agreeable to Goodness to have placed any Being in that State which was obnoxious to such excessive Misery: For who would choose Existence attended with a danger that so very much over-ballances it? He is not a wise Man that exposes all his Estate to hazard, nor a good Man that obliges any one to do it.

'Tis asked 3*dly*, how Punishments can subsist without a natural cause?

VII. Thirdly, Whatever is perpetual must have a *natural* and *perpetual Cause*; for a perpetual Miracle is not to be expected. If therefore the Punishments of the Wicked be eternal, it seems necessary for these Punishments to arise from the Laws and Constitution of Nature. For it is scarce conceivable how a State of Violence should be perpetual. I have proposed these Objections at length, lest I should seem

† Ch. 4. §. 8. par. 5. [*p.*] *See* Matth. 26. 24. *and* Mark 14. 24.

ſeem to have declined them on account of their Difficulty. (86.)

VIII. As to the firſt Objection, I anſwer: It appears from the Light of Nature that there ſhall be *future Puniſhments*, but not that theſe ſhall be *Eternal*: we muſt not therefore enquire of Natural Reaſon why they are inflicted; for they belong to revealed Religion, by which they are denounced: that is, there may be a Reaſon for them, but ſuch as is beyond the mere natural Sagacity of Man to diſcover. Now we find many things of this kind in Nature; it does not therefore follow, becauſe the Goodneſs of God has revealed to us that the Puniſhment of the Wicked ſhall endure for ever, that he is alſo obliged to reveal why and how that comes to paſs. For perhaps it may be above the Power of our Mind to conceive it in the preſent ſtate of Things.

To the firſt it is anſwered that eternal Puniſhments are made known to us by Revelation, and that God is not therefore obliged to reveal how or why they are ſo: perhaps the Reaſon is above our Comprehenſion. It does not appear but that the Puniſhment of the Wicked may be of uſe to the Good.

IX. Secondly, Who will undertake to ſhew that the Eternal Puniſhment of the Wicked has no Tendency towards confirming good Men in the Choice of

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(86.) The chief of thoſe Authors who ſeem to oppoſe the ſtrict, abſolute Eternity of Hell Torments, are ABp. *Tillotſon*, *T. Burnet*, *de Statu Mort.* Ch. 10. p. 290, *&c. T. Swinden* in the *Appendix* to his Book on Hell. The Author of the Annotations on *Lux Orientalis*, p. 73, 74. *S. Colliber* in his *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 105. *&c.* and his *Eſſay on Revealed Religion*, p. 142, *&c. Bayle*, *Epiſcopius*, and the *Fratres Poloni*. See alſo *Fabricii Delectus Argumentorum &c.* C. 47. p. 720. and two Pieces in the *Phenix*, *Whiſton's Diſcourſe*. Or *White's* Reſtoration of all Things. Printed A. D. 1712, in the Preface to which many other Authors both Antient and modern, are cited to the ſame purpoſe.

Some of thoſe who have particularly inſiſted on the Defence of it are ABp. *Dawes*, *Jenkin*, *Fiddes*, *Lupton*, *Lake*, *Horbery*, *Sherlock on Providence*, Ch. 2. and on a *future State*, *Rymer*, Part 2. Chap. 7. *Nichol's Conference with a Theiſt*, Part 3. p. [illegible]ithy. *Appendix to 2d. Theſſ. Scott's Chriſtian Life*, [illegible] *&c.* 8*vo.* and Diſcourſe 22d. p. 435, & 2d. Vol. [illegible] Fol. *Patrick. Witneſſes of Chriſtianity*, Part 2. [illegible] *Exiſtence of God*, &c. Chap. 12. See the following [illegible] 90.

of their Duty? (87:) If God makes uſe of *Means* for that End, and doth not immediately exert his Omnipotence alone, ſcarce could any other more effectual Means be found out to make the Bleſſed approve themſelves in their Choice conformed to the Divine Will, and perſevere therein, than the continual Contemplation of thoſe miſerable Beings who have done otherwiſe. Election is matter of Freedom, and not to be excited or prevented by other means than a Repreſentation of *Good* or *Evil* to the Underſtanding. Since therefore God has undertaken to conduct and preſerve an almoſt infinite multitude of thinking Beings to all Eternity, thro' all the Changes and Succeſſions of things, in as great a degree of Happineſs as is poſſible, without Violence done to Elections; where is the Wonder if he leave a few to the Miſery which they brought upon themſelves, thereby to give the reſt a Warning how much they ought to ſtand upon their guard againſt the like? There is no neceſſity therefore to attribute eternal Puniſhment to the Divine *Vengeance*, (nor is there properly any ſuch thing in God, but it is aſcribed to him, as other human Paſſions are, in condeſcenſion to our Capacity.) For ſince theſe Puniſhments may be conceived to promote the good of the whole, they may ariſe from the *Goodneſs*, and not the *Vengeance* of the Deity.

X.

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(87.) See ABp. *Dawes*'s Serm. 5. p. 73, *&c.* or Note 82. Or it may be for the perpetual Benefit and Improvement of ſome other Syſtems; ſee the latter end of Note 81. Or perhaps for a ſtanding Monument and Warning to the Heathen World during their State of Probation, which for ought we know, may be extended beyond this Life, as well as that of Chriſtians themſelves.

See *Scott*'s *Chriſtian Life*, 8*vo*. 2d Vol. p. 551.

Something of this kind, I humbly apprehend, muſt be conceived as the Reaſon for Hell-Torments, in order to make them conſiſtent with perfect Goodneſs [*q.*] how long ſoever this may be neceſſary to continue, or whatever we ſuppoſe the Nature of theſe Torments to be; of which below.

[*q.*] *See* Note 13

X. As to the ſecond Objection, The Matter is yet in debate whether it were better to be miſerable than not to be at all, and there are Arguments on both Sides. (88.) 'Tis manifeſt that, what the Objection mentions, *viz.* thoſe Evils which over-ballance the Deſire and Happineſs of Life put an End to Life itſelf, and that ſuch Objects as are hurtful to the Senſe, at length deſtroy it. The ſame ſeems to hold good in thinking Subſtances, *viz.* thoſe things which affect the Mind to a higher Degree than it is able to bear, may in like manner put an end to it. For they may be ſuppoſed either to drive us to Madneſs, or ſo far to diſorder the thinking Faculty, as to make us think of nothing at all. Who can tell whether the Puniſhment of the Wicked may not lead them into a kind of Phrenſy and Madneſs? Thus they may indeed be very miſerable, and become a ſad Spectacle to others; they may be ſenſible of their Miſery alſo, and ſtrive againſt it with all their Power; but while they do not obſerve or believe that it is founded in perverſe Election, they may hug themſelves in the Cauſe the Effects whereof they abhor; being ſtill wiſe in their own Opinion, and as it were pleaſing themſelves in their Miſery.

To the ſecond 'tis replyed, that the matter is yet in debate whether it is preferable to be miſerable or not to be at all. The Miſery of the Damned may be like that of Madmen.

Thus the more they labour under it, the more they embrace the Cauſe of it, and thereby become their own hindrance from ever getting free; and will not ſuffer themſelves to be any thing but what they are. This we ſee done daily by mad and frantic

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(88.) A moſt elaborate Diſputation on this Subject may be ſeen in Bp. *Barlow*'s Remains, p. 470, *&c.* But our Author, in the laſt Subſect. of his Book, par. 5, *&c.* very reaſonably grants, *That Non-exiſtence becomes preferable to Exiſtence whenever the Sum of Miſery exceeds that of Happineſs, and Evil becomes predominant in the whole*; and therefore if he takes this Queſtion in the ſame Senſe, he had no great occaſion to ſtart it. Nay the Queſtion will be about an abſolute *Impoſſibility*, if any Miſery which over-ballances the Happineſs of Life do *ipſo facto* put an End to Life, as our Author maintains in this very Paragraph: Concerning which Notion ſee Note 37.

tic Perſons, and reckon it a part of their Unhappineſs. The Divine Goodneſs therefore is not to be charged with Cruelty for letting them continue in that Exiſtence, though it be very miſerable, when they themſelves will not have it removed: or for not altering their Condition, which they utterly refuſe to have altered. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be, than to be: but only in the Opinion of wiſe Men, to which they do not aſſent. For they indulge themſelves in their obſtinate Election, and though every way ſurrounded and oppreſſed with Woes, yet will they not alter what they have once embraced. We have frequent examples in this Life reſembling this kind of Obſtinacy.

The Damned chooſe their miſerable State, as Lovers, angry, ambitious envious Perſons indulge themſelves in thoſe things which increaſe their Miſery.

XI. We ſee perverſe People voluntarily undergoing Pains, Afflictions, Torments, and even Death itſelf, rather than repent of their Reſolution and change what they have once determined in their Mind. Nor is it uncommon for ſome to indulge and in a manner *pleaſe* themſelves in their very Miſeries. Thus the ſorrowful love all ſuch things as aggravate and foment their Grief: and in like manner the Envious, the Angry, the Ambitious, the Deſpairing: not that they are inſenſible of Uneaſineſs under theſe Paſſions, or do not believe themſelves to be miſerable; but becauſe they had rather have that Miſery ſo long as they enjoy their Choice, than want it and them too; or at leaſt they can perſiſt in it, becauſe they do not obſerve that this Miſery ariſes from thence. When therefore the Wicked obſtinately oppoſe themſelves to God, and refuſe to make their Elections conformable to his Will, they take delight perhaps in that very Oppoſition: to hate God, to diſobey his Commands, and ſtrive againſt him with all their Power, is pleaſing to them; and though they ſee themſelves overwhelmed with innumerable Evils, yet they had rather endure them all than repent. As Men that are deſperately in Love, ambitious, envious, chooſe

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to bear Torments, loſs of Eſtate, and hazard of Life, rather than lay aſide theſe fooliſh and bewitching Affections. We may eaſily conceive then how the Wicked in Hell may be in very great Miſery upon the increaſe of their Obſtinacy and Folly, and yet unwilling to be freed from them. All ſee and exclaim againſt the Folly, Miſery, and Madneſs of thoſe Men who ſpend their Eſtate in Vice, impair their Health, and bring on an untimely Death; and for no other end but becauſe they will do ſo: yet they perſiſt in this, and their Obſtinacy increaſes with their Evils. Theſe are ſome *Preludes* of the Miſery of the Damned, and from hence we may underſtand that theſe Perſons are extremely miſerable, and yet will not be ſet at Liberty (89.)

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(89.) From hence likewiſe we may underſtand what a natural, abſolute, and indiſpenſible Neceſſity there is for watching over all our *Habits*, *Affections*, *Appetites*, &c. for curbing our Paſſions, and correcting our Deſires by *Reaſon*; for taking a ſtrict and conſtant care that theſe be neither violent, irregular, nor fixed on improper Objects in this Life, if we hope to avoid Miſery in the Life to come. For if theſe accompany us into the other World; (and if we conſider what *Scott* and *Rymer* have ſaid upon the Subject, it will appear infinitely probable that they do) the ſame or greater Unhappineſs muſt unavoidably attend them there. If we ſhall have any Memory in the other World of what paſſed in this (which we muſt have, in order to give us either a good or evil *Conſcience*, and to make us capable either of Reward or Puniſhment in that reſpect) how probable is it that we ſhall then alſo feel the force of all thoſe *Habits* and *Aſſociations* which in this Life were ſo ſtrong as to raiſe Paſſions, Affections, *&c.* in us, and make us conſtantly proceed upon them for ſelf-evident Principles, and purſue them for ultimate *Ends* of Action? "And this being ſo, of "what unſpeakable conſequence are the Actions of Men, that "thus draw after them a Chain of Joys or Woes, as long as [illegible]? And how careful ought we to be to what courſe [illegible] determine ourſelves, conſidering that our *Eternal* [illegible]nds upon what we are now doing, that every moral [illegible]e perform is a Step to *Heaven* or *Hell-wards*, that [illegible] bad Choice we make, we are planting our *Tophet*, [illegible]*aradiſe*, and that in the Conſequence of our preſent

It may be objected, that theſe miſerable Beings may receive ſome kind of *Pleaſure* from their *Elections*. But we place Felicity not barely in the *Act* of *chooſing*, but much more in the *Enjoyment* of the Objects choſen. The more obſtinately therefore any one chooſes abſurd and impoſſible things, the more miſerable will he be when fruſtrated of his Choice; and we may imagine the damned to be always fruſtrated: nevertheleſs, after ſo much Warning and Experience, they do not intend to alter their Elections, but ſtill perſiſt in them, oppreſſed with the Senſe and Weight of their Miſery, and plunged in deep deſpair. For it is poſſible that they may be regardleſs or ignorant that there is no other Way for them to be freed from theſe Miſeries, but by altering their Elections, and not know how to do this, ſo as to perſiſt in them for ever, and become more deſperate by Diſappointments, and to augment and multiply their Miſery by new Attempts, which prove no leſs unhappy. The Power of willing the State they are in is not therefore of any Service to them towards the Attainment of Happineſs, but renders them capable of Eternal Miſery. For ſuch Elections may have the ſame Relation to this kind of Miſery, as the natural Appetites have to Pain.

Such Puniſhment is very great, and very well anſwers the End of Divine Puniſhments.

XII. Now it is ſufficiently conſonant to the Divine Goodneſs to permit or inflict this kind of Puniſhment, nor would it be leſs ſubſervient to the Ends for which Puniſhments are wont to be impoſed, *viz.* that by a previous Apprehenſion of them we may learn to be wiſe, and others be deterred from offending by our Example. For who does not dread

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" Actions we ſhall *rue* or *rejoice* to eternal Ages *h Scott*, 2d " Vol. p. 26. See alſo 4th Vol. Chap. 6, p. 992, *&c.* Fol. " Edit. or *Hutcheſon* on the Conduct of the Paſſions and Af- " fections, §. 4, and 6. or Note 81, 87, 90, and par. 14. of " this Section.

dread Fury and Madneſs as the moſt miſerable ſtate of Mind? Who does not condemn the Folly and Madneſs of Men in Love, of envious and ambitious Perſons? Eſpecially when he beholds them labouring thereby under innumerable Evils, from which they will not be delivered?

God ought to prefer the common Salvation to that of particulars.

XIII. But allowing that Exiſtence is worſe than Non-exiſtence to the Damned, let them imagine their Miſery to be greater than it really is. Let it be a part of their Miſery, to be conſcious that they were the only Cauſe of all their Grief: yet ſince that could not be prevented without greater detriment to the whole, there is no room for objecting againſt Providence which always does the beſt. If God had made nothing at all, and been contented to have remained alone, there would have been nothing that could ſin, that could chooſe amiſs, that could be miſerable. But ſince it is impoſſible that there ſhould be more *Gods*, the Deity made *Creatures* ſuch as the Nature of a Created Being allowed. Now it was expedient, for the Good of the whole, that ſome of them ſhould have a Power of bringing Miſery upon themſelves by Evil Elections. Nor can any thing be charged upon the Goodneſs of God in this, unleſs that he created *Men*, and not *Gods* equal to himſelf; and that he preferred the Salvation of the *Generality* to that of ſome *Particulars*. He choſe therefore that ſome ſhould regret their having been made by God, *viz.* through the abuſe of their Free-Will, rather than that none ſhould be happy by uſing it aright.

Anſwer to the third Objection. 'Tis probable that the Miſery of the Wicked ariſes from the very Nature of Sin.

XIV. As to the third Objection, I believe it to be a great Truth that the Miſery of the Wicked ariſes from the very Conſtitution of the Sinner and that the Laws of Nature hold in evil Elections. We ſee that our Bodies may be maimed for ever, and our Limbs diſlocated and diſtorted to ſuch a degree as to become totally incapable of thoſe Functions for which Nature deſigned them. Why ſhould we

we not have the ſame Opinion of the Mind, *viz.* that by depraved Elections, Paſſions, and Affections, it may be ſo far diverted from the right way of thinking, as to become equally diſabled and unfit for governing its Actions according to the Dictates of Right Reaſon, as a lame Man is for a Race? We may ſee every Day that right Notions of things are capable of being perverted by a perverſe Habit of thinking; and it is evident from Experience that we miſtake and are ignorant of uſeful things. We are wont to labour under Prejudices, and be averſe to ſober Counſels; in ſhort, we are willing to endure any thing rather than alter our Choice. It is a common thing for us to pleaſe ourſelves in Dangers, in the Ruin of our Fortunes, in the Loſs of Eaſe, and Life itſelf; and our Volition, perverſe as it is, ſometimes appears more deſirable than Friends, Kingdoms, Pleaſures, or even Life. If therefore God does not interpoſe his Omnipotence, the ſame Errors, the ſame Ignorance, the ſame Habit of a perverted Mind and obſtinate Propenſity to Evil, which here draw us aſide from the right Path, may continue with us for ever: nor will the Soul that is immerſed in this kind of Evil be capable of curing itſelf: For one that is infected with theſe Maladies is as unfit to help himſelf, as one that has cut off his Hands and Feet is unable to run or feed himſelf. (90.)

XV.

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(90.) This is the true Meaning of that *Macula Peccati* which is ſaid to remain and ſet us at Enmity with God, and under a natural Incapacity of Happineſs, and which according to ſome makes it impoſſible for future Puniſhments to have any other Period than the total Extinction or Annihilation of the Subjects of them; and what Ground there can be to hope for that may be ſeen from the Authors referred to in Note 86.

Our Author, in the following Paragraph, explains how this *Macula* may be conceived to render God and good Men our Averſion, and it is eaſy to apprehend how utterly incapable of Happineſs that Man muſt be, whoſe whole Soul is bent another

XV. Secondly, A Perſon of this Diſpoſition of Mind hates God, for he ſees that he has choſen ſuch things, in the Enjoyment whereof he places his Delight, as cannot be conſiſtent with the Divine Will. He therefore looks upon God as his Enemy, and conſequently avoids all Commerce with him, and endeavours to abſcond from him, but never thinks of changing his own Will: For thro' Error and Ignorance he knows not how to take delight in any thing elſe. Therefore he applies all his Endeavours to the Attainment of ſuch things as cannot really be attained, and ſtrives for ever in vain with a more powerful Being, *i. e. God*; nor ceaſes from ſtruggling, though full of Miſery and Deſpair. For though he feels himſelf tormented with a moſt exquiſite Pain, yet he dreads a greater from the change of his Reſolution: he ſees Miſery invading him on each Hand, and is forced either to oppoſe the Deity without any proſpect of Succeſs, or to give over the Conteſt, and lay aſide all Hopes of enjoying the Object of his Choice: He em-

The Wicked, through Ignorance and Error, will delight in ſuch things as they cannot enjoy, and may not know how to take delight in any thing elſe.

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ther way; whoſe every Motion, Thought, and Inclination; whoſe Deſigns, Deſires and Hopes, are all fixed and riveted to thoſe Objects which can never ſatisfy them, which are either quite different from, or contrary to the very Nature and Idea of true rational Happineſs. A view of the Conſequences attending each inveterate evil Habit, each ungovernable Paſſion, or Affection miſapplyed, will ſhew the abſurdity of ſuppoſing any Perſon in ſuch a Caſe to be happy even in Heaven itſelf *. But this important Doctrine of the force of *Habits*, &c. in this World, as well as the Continuance of them in the next, has been ſo well ſtated and inforced by the Authors referred to above, that an attempt to give any further Illuſtration of it ſeems impracticable. I ſhall therefore diſmiſs it with a Paſſage from the *Cauſes of the Decay of Chriſtian Piety*, Ch. 1. 'Thoſe immaterial Felicities we expect,' do naturally ſuggeſt 'to us the neceſſity of preparing our Appetites, and hungers 'for them, without which Heaven can be no Heaven to us: 'For ſince the Pleaſure of any thing reſults from the Agree'ment between it and the Deſire, what Satisfaction can *Spiri'tual* Enjoyments give unto a *Carnal Mind?* Alaſs, what Delight

* *See the* Spectator, N. 90.

embraces the former, as the leſs Evil of the two, and yet a greater can ſcarce be deviſed. The perverſe Fool may be pleaſed with the very Conteſt, though it proves to no manner of purpoſe. In the interim God leaves ſuch a one to himſelf, who by purſuing abſurd and impoſſible things will become troubleſome to himſelf and others, aſſaulting ſome, and being attacked by others like himſelf. We ſee in this World how much bad Men delight in heaping Miſeries on others, and who are therefore bad Men becauſe they take delight in Miſchief. The Servant of an abſurd Maſter is unhappy, and ſo is he who lives near a malevolent and moroſe Neighbour. Suppoſe then the Wicked who are baniſhed from God, and odious to all good Men, aſſociating together, and it is eaſy to conceive what kind of Society that of Reprobates and Devils muſt be; how grievous and offenſive to each other. We may obſerve how very pernicious a wicked Governor is in his Province, how miſerable they that are ſubject to ſuch: how much more wretched muſt the ſtate of the Wicked be, who are ſubjected to, and joined

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" light would it be to the Swine to be wrapt in fine Linen " and laid in Odours? His Senſes are not gratified by any " ſuch Delicacies; nor would he feel any thing beſides the " Torment of being with-held from the Mire. And as little " Complacency would a brutiſh Soul find in thoſe purer and " refined Pleaſures, which can only upbraid, not ſatisfy him. " So that could we, by an impoſſible Suppoſition, fancy ſuch " a one aſſumed to thoſe Fruitions, his Pleaſure ſure would " be as little as his preparation for it was. Thoſe Eyes which " have continually beheld *Vanity*, would be dazled, not de- " lighted with the *beatific Viſion*; neither could that Tongue " which has accuſtomed itſelf only to *Oaths* and *Blaſphemies*, " find Harmony or Muſic in *Hallelujahs*. It is the peculiar " Privilege of the *pure in Heart*, that they ſhall ſee God; and " if any others could ſo invade this their Incloſure, as to take " Heaven by Violence, it ſurely would be a very joyleſs Poſ- " ſeſſion to theſe Men, and only place them in a Condition to " which they have the greateſt Averſion and Antipathy. So " that Holineſs here is not only neceſſary to the acquiring, " but the Enjoyment of Bliſs hereafter.

ed with none but mad, malicious, envious and froward Beings?

XVI. It is to be believed that God has provided a place that is ſuitable and proper for them, and to which they are as much confined by the Laws of their Nature, as Fiſhes to the Sea, or terreſtrial Animals to the Earth. What ſort of a Place that is we know not, but it is reaſonable to believe that there is ſuch an one. Men in this Life chooſe for themſelves Habitations and Companions according to their own Genius, Temper, and Diſpoſition of Mind: and Likeneſs begets Love: and who can doubt but the ſame thing may attend the bad and good after Death? The Good reſort therefore to the Society of *God*, *Angels*, and *Spirits of Good Men*; But the Wicked chooſe thoſe *Ghoſts* which were Partakers in their Iniquity, and *Devils* for their Companions: And this may poſſibly be brought about by natural Inſtinct, and mere human Diſpoſition. Nor is God wanting in Goodneſs if he ſuffers them to live in their own way, and enjoy the Life themſelves have choſen. For this could not be prevented without doing Violence to the Laws of Nature. And theſe Puniſhments which the Wicked voluntarily bring upon themſelves, tend to the Benefit of the Univerſal Syſtem of Rational Beings.

The Wicked are confined to certain places and Companions by the Laws of Nature, as we are to the Earth.

XVII. So much for *Moral Evils*, *Laws*, *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*. In which ſome things may appear too ſubtle for common Apprehenſion; but we ought to remember that the Diſpute is concerning one of the niceſt things in Nature, *viz.* the Operations of our own Mind: and whatever is ſaid in order to explain theſe, muſt neceſſarily be ſubtle. On this Account the Art of *Logic* is called ſubtle, becauſe it has theſe for its Object, and any thing that is more ſubtle than ordinary is reckoned Logical. He that does not like any thing that is ſubtle therefore ought not to diſpute about what relates

The diſpute about *Moral Evil* relates to the mind and its Operations, and on that account muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhat ſubtle.

relates to our own Minds. *Moral Evil* is as it were the Diſtemper of our Minds ariſing from the irregular Motion of the cogitative Faculties: now, as 'tis difficult to diſcover the Cauſes of thoſe Diſtempers which infect the Body, ſo it is much more difficult to find out the Cauſes and the Motions of thoſe Maladies which afflict the Mind. For it is neceſſary that we perfectly underſtand our own Minds, the Notions, Operations, and Means whereby the Will is moved, and the Underſtanding operates, before we can hope to make a full Diſcovery of theſe Paſſions of the Mind, and the Cauſes of them. And 'tis evident to any one how difficult that is: what nice Abſtractions, and long Deduction of Conſequences it muſt require. 'Tis no wonder then if the Inveſtigation of the Cauſes, and Origin of the *Evil of the Mind* require ſome things which are too ſubtle for all to comprehend.

SECT. III.

Concerning the Queſtion, Why bad Men are happy, and good Men miſerable.

This Queſtion has been ſo well treated by many, that there is ſcarce any room for ſcruple.

I. THIS Queſtion ſeems to have ſome relation to the former. For if *Puniſhment*, that is, Natural Evils, be inflicted in Proportion to the deſert of Evil Elections, whence come good things to evil Men, and Evil to the Good? 'Tis not ſo difficult to anſwer this Queſtion upon the Suppoſition of a future State, as to make it neceſſary for us to inſiſt much upon it. And it muſt be confeſſed, that it has been treated of in a very proper Manner by ſeveral Writers: (91.) ſo that there's ſcarce any

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(91.) Viz. *Sherlock* on *Judgment*. Ch. 1. § 3. p. 76. *&c.* 1ſt Edit.—on *Providence* Ch. 7. p. 258. 2d Edit. *Cudworth*, p. 877. *Cockburn*, &c.

any Room for Scruple. Nevertheleſs a few things ſhall be touched upon, and very briefly, that we may not repeat what has been ſaid already.

II. In the firſt place then the matter of Fact is very often doubtful, notwithſtanding the Complaints which many Perſons make to the contrary. We ſee indeed good Men frequently miſerable, but it is a Query whether their Goodneſs may not be owing to their Miſery, and they would have proved wicked if they had been tempted by Proſperity? It is not the Good then that are afflicted, but the Miſerable that are reclaimed. On the other hand, we behold happy, rich, and powerful Men that are wicked; but their Wickedneſs may be attributed to their Proſperity, and they would perhaps be very good if the Incitements to Evil were removed. 'Tis not the Wicked therefore that are happy, but the happy that are corrupted with Proſperity, and therefore fall into Wickedneſs.

The matter of Fact is often doubtful: for it is not good Men that are miſerable, but rather reformed by Adverſity: Nor are bad Men proſperous, but made bad by Proſperity.

III. Secondly, We are blinded with Prejudice, and thereby rendered very *partial Judges* of the Goodneſs or Badneſs of other Men. He that is our Acquaintance and befriends us is a good Man, he that favours our Enemies is a very bad one. Thus *Scipio* is celebrated by the *Roman* Hiſtorians, and if any hard or unproſperous Accident befal him, they begin to aſk whether there be any Gods? Whether Divine Providence takes care of human Affairs? But *Hannibal* is condemn'd, his Victories are charged as Crimes on Providence, and they repine at his having been ſo long ſucceſsful. Whereas 'tis really dubious whether of the two was the worſe

We are partial Judges of Merit: from the inſtance of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*.

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Cockburn, Eſſay 5. prop. 7, 8. p. 137, &c. *Wollaſton*, p. 71, and 110, &c. *Cradock* on *Eccl.* 9. 2. *Seneca*, Ep. 24. *Fiddes*'s Sermons, Fol. 14 and 19. *Scott*, 2 vol. Ch. 4. § 3. p. 331, &c. 8*vo.* and Diſcourſe 16. p. 320, &c. 2d vol. Fol. *Stillingfleet, Origines Sacræ*, B. 3. Ch. 3. § 21. p. 326, &c. Fol. *Grew*, *Coſmologia Sacra*, B. 3. Ch. 2. § 57, 58. But with the greateſt Accuracy by Mr. *Foſter*, Diſcourſes, Vol. 1. 4*to.*

worſe Man; both certainly were very bad: For their Aim was to put the World into Confuſion, to ſubdue Nations by force of Arms, the one intending to make *Carthage*, the other *Rome*, the Head of the World, by Slaughter, Rapine, War, and Injuſtice. Now the Man that ſtudies to oppreſs the whole World in Servitude, and bring it under the Power of that Nation to which he belongs, this Man is truly wicked and unworthy of Succeſs, however he may veil his Ambition, Pride, and Fury in ſome particular Inſtances, under the ſpecious pretence of Clemency and Love of his Country.

We are bad Judges of the Happineſs of Men: for thoſe are often the moſt miſerable whom we eſteem happy, and the contrary.

IV. Thirdly, as we are partial Judges of the *Deſerts* of other Men, ſo are we no leſs unqualified to pronounce on their *Felicity*. For we are taken with the pomp, and noiſe, and glittering outſide of things, and conſequently judge the Rich, the Potent, the Noble, and the Learned, to be happy; but the Poor, Ignoble and Unlettered, miſerable. And yet herein we are very frequently miſtaken, ſince neither of them are what they appear to be. For life is often attended with more Happineſs among Cottages, Huſbandry, and Trade, nay in the midſt of Bodily Pains and Diſeaſes; than among Scepters, Diadems, high Pedigrees, and ſuperfluous Heaps of Books; ſince, as we have ſhewn before, and Experience teſtifies, Happineſs lies chiefly, if not ſolely, in Election.

The chief Happineſs here conſiſts in Hope; which is a ſign that perfect Happineſs is reſerved for another Life, and all theſe things which befal good or bad Men, are means to it.

V. Fourthly, It is to be obſerved, that the greateſt Part of the Happineſs of this Life conſiſts in *Hope*, and that the Fruition of the deſired Object is not anſwerable to the Hope pre-conceived, which muſt be eſteemed an Indication that complete Happineſs is reſerved by Nature for another Life; the more then we aſpire after, and adhere to the preſent Objects, the leſs Care we ſhall take of thoſe things which tend to our future Happineſs. It was therefore wiſely provided by God, that the Good ſhould not be corrupted with too plentiful an Enjoyment,

joyment of the things of this World, but that the Bad ſhould have them in abundance: For by this means all may underſtand that their time ought not to be ſpent in theſe things, but that the Space of this ſhort Life ſhould be employed in looking after other Matters, *i. e.* ſuch as regard Eternity.

To conclude, we muſt affirm that nothing happens to good Men which may not prove a Means of greater Good; nor to the Bad, which may not be for their Puniſhment or Reformation.

VI. And I hope it appears from what has been ſaid, that the Objections of the *Manicheans* and *Paulicians* are not ſo formidable as they have ſeem'd to ſome; and that human Reaſon is not ſo blind but that it can ſolve theſe Difficulties from the Principles laid down, and ſuch Suppoſitions as are generally admitted; and though not abſolutely certain, yet probable however, and ſuch as we uſe to acquieſce in, in the Solution of other Phenomena. Concluſion of the whole.

But I offer all theſe things to the Cenſure of the Learned: I ſubmit them entirely to the Judgment of the *Catholic Church*, eſpecially to the Governours of thoſe Parts of it which conſtitute the Churches of *England* and *Ireland*. If there be any thing herein which ſeems not perfectly agreeable to their Faith, as I hope there is not, and would not have it, I deſire that may looked upon as abſolutely unſaid and retracted.

F I N I S.

Divine Predeſtination and Fore-knowledge conſiſtent with the Freedom of Man's Will.

A

SERMON

PREACHED AT

CHRIST-CHURCH, DUBLIN,

May 15, 1709.

By his GRACE

WILLIAM Lord Archbiſhop of *Dublin.*

THE SEVENTH EDITION.

Divine Predeſtination and Fore-knowledge conſiſtent with the Freedom of Man's Will.

ROMANS VIII. 29, 30.

For whom he did foreknow, he alſo did predeſtinate to be conform'd to the Image of his Son, that he might be the Firſt-Born among many Brethren. Moreover, whom he did predeſtinate, them he alſo called; and whom he called, them he alſo juſtified; and whom he juſtified, them he alſo glorified.

§ I. IN theſe Words the Apoſtle lays down the ſeveral Steps by which God proceeds in the ſaving of his Elect. 1*ſt*, He knows and conſiders thoſe, whom he deſigns for Salvation. 2*dly*, He decrees and predeſtinates them to be like his Son Jeſus Chriſt, in Holineſs here, and Glory hereafter, that he might be the Firſt-born among many Brethren. 3*dly*, He calls them to the Means of Salvation. 4*thly*, He juſtifies: And laſtly, He glorifies them. This is the Chain and Series of God's dealing with his beloved; in which he is repreſented to us as firſt deſigning, and then executing his gracious Purpoſes towards them.

I am very ſenſible, that great Contentions and Diviſions have happened in the Church of God about *Predeſtination* and *Reprobation*, about *Election* and the *Decrees* of God; that learned Men have engaged with the greateſt Zeal and Fierceneſs in this Controverſy, and the Diſputes have proved ſo intricate, that the moſt diligent Reader will perhaps, after all his labour in peruſing them, be but little ſatisfied, and leſs edified by the greateſt part of all that has been written upon this Subject. And hence it is that conſidering Men of all Parties ſeem at laſt, as it were by conſent, to have laid it aſide; and ſeldom any now venture to bring it into the Pulpit, except ſome very young or imprudent Preachers.

Not but that the Doctrine laid down in my Text, is undoubtedly true and uſeful, if we could but light on the

true and uſeful way of treating it; for ſo our Church has told us in her ſeventeenth Article, where ſhe informs us. That *as the godly Conſideration of Predeſtination is full of ſweet, pleaſant, and unſpeakable Comfort to godly Perſons, ſo for curious and carnal Perſons, lacking the Spirit of Chriſt, to have continually before their Eyes the Sentence of God's Predeſtination, is a moſt dangerous Downfal, whereby the Devil doth thruſt them either into Deſperation, or into Wretchedneſs of moſt unclean living.*

The Caſe therefore being thus, I ſhall endeavour to lay before you that which I take to be the edifying part of the Doctrine of *Predeſtination*; and in ſuch a manner (I hope) as to avoid every thing that may give occaſion to ignorant or corrupt Men to make an ill uſe of it.

§. II. In order to this, I ſhall

Firſt, Conſider the Repreſentation that the Text gives of God, as contriving our Salvation; and ſhall endeavour to explain how theſe Terms of *Fore-knowing* and *Predeſtinating* are to be underſtood when attributed to God.

Secondly, Why the holy Scriptures repreſent God to us after this manner.

Thirdly, What uſe we are to make of this Doctrine of God's fore-ſeeing, freely *electing* and *predeſtinating* Men to Salvation.

As to the firſt of theſe, you may obſerve that in the Repreſentation here given of God's dealing with Men, there are five Acts aſcribed to him, *Fore-knowing*, *Predeſtinating*, *Calling*, *Juſtifying*, and *Glorifying*. And about each of theſe great Diſputes have ariſen among Divines, and Parties and Sects have been formed on the different Opinions concerning them. However, as to the three laſt, *Proteſtants* ſeem now pretty well agreed; but as to the two firſt, the Difference is ſo great, that on account thereof, there yet remain formed and ſeparate Parties, that mutually refuſe to communicate with one another: though I believe, if the Differences between them were duly examined and ſtated, they would not appear to be ſo great as they ſeem to be at firſt view; nor conſequently would there appear any juſt reaſon for thoſe Animoſities, that yet remain between the contending Parties.

§ III.

§ III. In order to make this evident, we may conſider,

(1.) That it is in effect agreed on all hands, that the Nature of God, as it is in itſelf, is incomprehenſible by human Underſtanding: and not only his Nature, but likewiſe his Powers and Faculties, and the Ways and Methods in which he exerciſes them, are ſo far beyond our reach, that we are utterly incapable of framing exact and adequate Notions of them. Thus the Scriptures frequently teach us, particularly St. *Paul* in his Epiſtle to the *Romans*, Ch. 11. v. 33. *O the depth of the Riches both of the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God! How unſearchable are his Judgments, and his Ways paſt finding out.* Ver. 34. *For who hath known the Mind of the Lord or who hath been his Counſellor.*

§ IV. (2.) We ought to remember, that the Deſcriptions which we frame to ourſelves of God, or of the divine Attributes, are not taken from any direct or immediate Perceptions that we have of him or them; but from ſome Obſervations we have made of his Works, and from the Conſideration of thoſe Qualifications, that we conceive would enable us to perform the like. Thus obſerving great Order, Conveniency, and Harmony in all the ſeveral Parts of the World, and perceiving that every thing is adapted and tends to the Preſervation and advantage of the whole: we are apt to conſider that we could not contrive and ſettle things in ſo excellent and proper a manner without great Wiſdom; and thence conclude that God who has thus concerted and ſettled Matters muſt have *Wiſdom:* And having then aſcribed to him Wiſdom, becauſe we ſee the effects and reſult of it in his Works, we proceed and conclude that he has likewiſe *Foreſight* and Underſtanding, becauſe we cannot conceive Wiſdom without theſe, and becauſe if we were to do what we ſee he has done, we could not expect to perform it without the Exerciſe of theſe Faculties.

And it doth truly follow from hence, that God muſt either have theſe, or other Faculties and Powers equivalent to them and adequate to theſe mighty Effects which proceed from them. And becauſe we do not know what his Faculties are in themſelves, we give them the Names of thoſe Powers, that we find would be neceſſary to us in or-

der to produce ſuch Effects, and call them Wiſdom, Underſtanding, and Fore-knowledge: but at the ſame time we cannot but be ſenſible that they are of a nature altogether different from ours, and that we have no direct and proper Notion or Conception of them. Only we are ſure that they have Effects like unto thoſe that do proceed from Wiſdom, Underſtanding, and Fore-knowledge in us: And when our Works fail to reſemble them in any particular, as to Perfection, it is by reaſon of ſome want or defect in theſe Qualifications.

Thus our Reaſon teaches us to aſcribe theſe Attributes to God, by way of reſemblance and analogy to ſuch Qualities or Powers as we find moſt valuable and perfect in ourſelves.

§ V. (3.) If we look into the holy Scriptures, and conſider the Repreſentations given us there of God or his Attributes, we ſhall find them generally of the ſame nature, and plainly borrowed from ſome reſemblance to things with which we are acquainted by our Senſes. Thus when the holy Scriptures ſpeak of God, they aſcribe Hands, and Eyes, and Feet to him: Not that it is deſigned we ſhould believe that he has any of theſe Members according to the literal Signification: but the meaning is, that he has a Power to execute all thoſe Acts, to the effecting of which theſe Parts in us are inſtrumental: That is, he can converſe with Men as well as if he had a Tongue and Mouth; he can diſcern all that we do or ſay as perfectly as if he had Eyes and Ears; he can reach us as well as if he had Hands and Feet; he has as true and ſubſtantial a Being as if he had a Body; and he is as truly preſent every where as if that Body were infinitely extended. And in truth, if all theſe things which are thus aſcribed to him, did really and literally belong to him, he could not do what he does near ſo effectually as we conceive and are ſure he doth them by the Faculties and Properties which he really poſſeſſes, though what they are in themſelves be unknown to us.

After the ſame manner, and for the ſame reaſon, we find him repreſented as affected with ſuch Paſſions as we perceive

perceive to be in ourſelves, *viz.* as angry and pleaſed, as loving and hating, as repenting and changing his Reſolutions, as full of Mercy and provoked to Revenge. And yet on Reflection we cannot think that any of theſe Paſſions can literally affect the Divine Nature. But the meaning confeſſedly is, that he will as certainly puniſh the Wicked as if he were inflamed with the Paſſion of Anger againſt them: That he will as infallibly reward the Good as we will thoſe for whom we have a particular and affectionate Love: that when Men turn from their Wickedneſs, and do what is agreeable to the Divine Command, he will as ſurely change his Diſpenſations towards them, as if he really repented and had changed his Mind.

And as the Nature and Paſſions of Men are thus by analogy and compariſon aſcribed to God, becauſe theſe would in us be the Principles of ſuch outward Actions, as we ſee he has performed, if we were the Authors of them: ſo in the ſame manner, and by the ſame condeſcenſion to the weakneſs of our Capacities, we find the Powers and Operations of our Mind aſcribed unto him.

As for example, it is the part of a wiſe Man to conſider beforehand what is proper for him to do, to preſcribe Means and Methods to obtain his Ends, to lay down ſome Scheme or Plan of his Work before he begins, and to keep reſolutely to it in the Execution; for if he ſhould be conceived to deviate in any thing from his firſt purpoſe, it would argue ſome imperfection in laying the Deſign, or want of Power to execute it. And therefore it is after this manner the Scripture repreſents God, as purpoſing and contriving beforehand all his Works; and for this reaſon Wiſdom and Underſtanding, and Counſel and Fore-knowledge are aſcribed to him; becauſe both Reaſon and Scripture aſſure us that we ought to conceive of God as having all the Perfection that we perceive to be in theſe Attributes, and that he has all the Advantages that theſe Powers or Faculties could give him.

The Advantages that Underſtanding and Knowledge give a Man in the uſe of them, are to enable him to order his Matters with conveniency to himſelf, and conſiſtency

in

in his Works, ſo that they may not hinder or embarraſs one another: And inaſmuch as all the Works of God are ſo ordered that they have the greateſt Congruity in themſelves, and are moſt excellently adapted to their ſeveral Uſes and Ends, we are ſure there is a Power in God who orders them, equivalent to Knowledge and Underſtanding; and becauſe we know not what it is in itſelf, we give it theſe Names.

§ VI. *Laſtly*, The uſe of Fore-knowledge with us is to prevent any Surprize when Events happen, and that we may not be at a loſs what to do by things coming upon us unawares. Now inaſmuch as we are certain that nothing can ſurprize God, and that he can never be at a loſs what to do in any Event, therefore we conclude that God has a Faculty to which our Fore-knowledge bears ſome analogy, and therefore we call it by that Name.

But it does not follow from hence that any of theſe are more properly and literally in God, after the manner that they are in us, than Hands or Eyes, than Mercy, Love, or Hatred are; but on the contrary we muſt acknowledge that thoſe things, which we call by theſe Names, when attributed to God, are of ſo very different a nature from what they are in us, and ſo ſuperior to all that we can conceive, that in reality there is no more likeneſs between them, than between our Hand and God's Power: nor can we draw Conſequences from the real Nature of one to that of the other with more juſtneſs of Reaſon, than we can conclude, becauſe our Hand conſiſts of Fingers and Joints, that therefore the Power of God is diſtinguiſhed by ſuch Parts.

And therefore to argue becauſe Fore-knowledge, as it is in us, if ſuppoſed infallible, cannot conſiſt with the Contingency of Events, that therefore what we call ſo in God cannot, is as far from Reaſon, as it would be to conclude, becauſe our Eyes cannot ſee in the dark, that therefore, when God is ſaid to ſee all things, his Eyes muſt be enlightened with a perpetual Sunſhine; or becauſe we cannot love or hate without Paſſion, that therefore when the Scriptures aſcribe theſe to God, they teach us that he is as liable to theſe Affections as we are.

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We ought therefore to interpret all theſe things when attributed to God, as thus expreſſed only by way of condeſcenſion to our Capacities, in order to help us to conceive what we are to expect from him, and what Duty we are to pay him; and particularly, that the terms of Fore-knowledge, Predeſtination, nay, of Underſtanding and Will, when aſcribed to him, are not to be taken ſtrictly or properly, nor are we to think that they are in him after the ſame manner or in the ſame ſenſe that we find them in ourſelves; but on the contrary, we are to interpret them only by way of Analogy and Compariſon.

That is to ſay, when we aſcribe Fore-knowledge to him, we mean that he can no more be ſurprized with any thing that happens, than a wiſe Man, that foreſees an Event, can be ſurprized when it comes to paſs; nor can he any more be at a loſs what he is to do in ſuch a Caſe, than a wiſe Man can, who is moſt perfectly acquainted with all Accidents which may obſtruct his Deſign, and has provided againſt them.

§ VII. So when God is ſaid to predetermine and foreordain all things according to the Counſel of his Will, the importance of this Expreſſion is, that all things depend as much on God, as if he had ſettled them according to a certain Scheme and deſign, which he had voluntarily framed in his own Mind, without regard had to any other conſideration beſides that of his own meer Will and Pleaſure.

If then we underſtand Predetermination and Predeſtination in this analogous Senſe, to give us a Notion of the irreſiſtible Power of God, and of that ſupreme Dominion he may exerciſe over his Creatures, it will help us to underſtand what the Sovereignty is that God has over us, the Submiſſion that we ought to pay him, and the Dependance we have upon him.

But it no ways follows from hence that this is inconſiſtent with the Contingency of Events, or Free-Will. And from hence it appears what it is that makes us apt to think ſo: which is only this, that we find in ourſelves when we determine to do a thing, and are able to do what we have reſolved

reſolved on, that thing cannot be contingent to us: And if God's Fore-knowledge and Predetermination were of the ſame nature with ours, the ſame Inconſiſtency would be juſtly inferred. But I have already ſhewed that they are not of the ſame kind, and that they are only aſcribed to him by way of Analogy and Compariſon, as Love and Mercy, and other Paſſions are; that they are quite of another nature, and that we have no proper Notion of them, any more than a Man born blind has of Sight and Colours; and therefore that we ought no more to pretend to determine what is conſiſtent or not conſiſtent with them, than a blind Man ought to determine, from what he hears or feels, to what Objects the ſenſe of Seeing reaches: for this were to reaſon from things that are only comparatively and improperly aſcribed to God, and by way of analogy and accommodation to our Capacities, as if they were properly and univocally the ſame in him and in us.

If we would ſpeak the Truth, thoſe Powers, Properties and Operations, the Names of which we transfer to God, are but faint Shadows and Reſemblances, or rather indeed Emblems and parabolical Figures of the Divine Attributes, which they are deſigned to ſignify; whereas his Attributes are the Originals, the true real Things, of a Nature ſo infinitely ſuperior and different from any thing we diſcern in his Creatures, or that can be conceived by finite Underſtandings, that we cannot with reaſon pretend to make any other Deductions from the Natures of one to that of the others, than thoſe he has allowed us to make, or extend the Parallel any farther than that very Inſtance, which the reſemblance was deſigned to teach us.

Thus Fore-knowledge and Predeſtination, when attributed to God, are deſigned to teach us the Obligations which we owe to him for our Salvation and the Dependance we have on his Favour; and ſo far we may uſe and preſs them: but to conclude from thence that theſe are inconſiſtent with Free-Will, is to ſuppoſe that they are the ſame in him and us; and juſt as reaſonable as to infer, becauſe Wiſdom is compared in Scripture to a Tree of Life, that therefore it grows in the Earth, has its Spring and fall, and is warmed by the Sun and fed by the Rain.

§ VIII.

§ VIII. And this brings me to the ſecond Head which I propoſed to myſelf in this Diſcourſe, which was to ſhew you, *Why God and heavenly things are after this manner repreſented to us in holy Scripture.* And the firſt Reaſon I ſhall offer is that we muſt either be content to know them this way, or not at all. I have already told you, and I believe every conſidering Man is convinced, that the Nature and Perfections of God, as he is in himſelf, are ſuch that it is impoſſible we ſhould comprehend them, eſpecially in the preſent State of Imperfection, Ignorance, and Corruption in which this World lies. He is the Object of none of our Senſes, by which we receive all our direct and immediate Perception of things; and therefore if we know any thing of him at all, it muſt be by deductions of Reaſon, by Analogy and Compariſon, by reſembling him to ſomething that we do know and are acquainted with.

'Tis by this way we arrive at the moſt noble and uſeful Notions we have, and by this Method we teach and inſtruct others. Thus when we would help a Man to ſome Conception of any thing that has not fallen within the reach of his Senſes, we do it by comparing it to ſomething that already has; by offering him ſome Similitude, Reſemblance, or Analogy, to help his Conception. As for example, to give a Man a Notion of a Country to which he is a Stranger, and to make him apprehend its Bounds and Situation, we produce a Map to him; and by that he obtains as much knowledge of it as ſerves him for his preſent purpoſe. Now a Map is only Paper and Ink, diverſified with ſeveral Strokes and Lines, which in themſelves have little likeneſs to Earth, Mountains, Valleys, Lakes and Rivers. Yet none can deny but by Proportion and Analogy they are very Inſtructive; and if any ſhould imagine that theſe Countries are really Paper, becauſe the Maps that repreſent them are made of it, and ſhould ſeriouſly draw Concluſions from that Suppoſition, he would expoſe his Underſtanding, and make himſelf ridiculous: And yet ſuch as argue from the faint Reſemblances that either Scripture or Reaſon give of the divine Attributes and Operations, and proceed in their Reaſonings as if theſe muſt in all reſpects anſwer one another,

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fall into the ſame Abſurdities that thoſe would be guilty of, who ſhould think Countries muſt be of Paper, becauſe the Maps that repreſent them are ſo.

To apply this more particularly to the Caſe before us: We aſcribe Decrees and Predeſtination to God; becauſe the things ſignified by theſe words bear ſome reſemblance to certain Perfections that we believe to be in him. But if we remember that they are only Similitudes and Repreſentations of them, and that there is as little likeneſs between the one and the other, as between the Countries and Maps which repreſent them; and that the likeneſs lies not in the Nature of them, but in ſome particular Effect or Circumſtance that is in ſome Meaſure common to both: we muſt acknowledge it very unreaſonable to expect that they ſhould anſwer one another in all things: or becauſe the different Repreſentations of the ſame thing can't be exactly adjuſted in every particular, that therefore the thing repreſented is inconſiſtent in itſelf.

Fore-knowledge and Decrees are only aſſigned to God to give us a Notion of the Steddineſs and Certainty of the divine Actions; and if ſo, for us to conclude that what is repreſented by them is inconſiſtent with the Contingency of Events or Free-Will, becauſe the things repreſenting (I mean our Fore-knowledge and Decrees) are ſo, is the ſame Abſurdity, as it is to conclude, that *China* is no bigger than a Sheet of Paper, becauſe the Map, that repreſents it, is contained in that compaſs.

§ IX. This ſeems to me a material Point, and therefore I will endeavour to illuſtrate it with an Inſtance or two more. Every Body is ſatisfied that Time, Motion, and Velocity, are Subjects of very uſeful Knowledge; and that adjuſting and diſcovering the Proportions that theſe bear to one another, is perhaps all that is profitable in natural Philoſophy. How is it then, that we proceed in our Demonſtrations concerning theſe? Is it not by repreſenting Time by a Line, the Degrees of Velocity by another, and the Motion that reſults from both, by a Superficies or a Solid? And from theſe we draw Concluſions, which are not only very true, but alſo of great Moment to Arts and Sciences;

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and never fail in our Deductions, while we keep juſtly to the Analogy and Proportion they bear to one another in the Production of natural Effects; neither is it eaſy, nor perhaps poſſible, to come at ſuch Knowledge any other way.

Yet in the nature of the thing, there is no great Similitude between a Line and Time; and it will not be obvious to a Perſon, who is not acquainted with the method of the ſkilful in ſuch Matters, to conceive how a Solid ſhould anſwer the compounded Effect of Time and Motion. But if any, inſtead of endeavouring to underſtand the Method and Proportions uſed by the Learned in ſuch Caſes, in order to diſcover to them theſe uſeful Truths, ſhould reject the whole as a thing impoſſible; alledging that we make Time a permanent thing and exiſting altogether, becauſe a Line which repreſents it in this Scheme is ſo; we ſhould think that he hardly deſerved an Anſwer to ſuch a fooliſh Objection.

And yet of this nature are moſt, if not all, the Objections that are commonly made againſt the Repreſentations that the Scripture gives us of the divine Nature, and of the Myſteries of our Religion.

§ X. Thus the holy Scriptures repreſent to us that Diſtinction which we are obliged to believe to be in the Unity of God, by that of Three Perſons, and the Relation they bear to one another, by that of a Father to his Son, and of a Man to his Spirit: And thoſe that object againſt this, and infer that theſe muſt be three Subſtances, becauſe three Perſons among Men are ſo, do plainly forget that theſe are but Repreſentations and Reſemblances; and fall into the ſame abſurd way of reaſoning that the former do, who conclude, that we make Time a permanent thing, becauſe a Line is ſo, by which we repreſent it.

§ XI. Again, if we were to deſcribe to an ignorant *American* what was meant by Writing, and told him that it is a way of making words viſible and permanent, ſo that Perſons at any diſtance of Time and Place, may be able to ſee and underſtand them: The Deſcription would ſeem very ſtrange to him, and he might object that the thing muſt be impoſſible, for Words are not to be ſeen but heard; they paſs in the Speaking, and it is impoſſible they ſhould affect

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the Abſent, much leſs thoſe that live in diſtant Ages. To which there need no other anſwer, than to inform him that there are other ſort of Words, beſide thoſe he knows, that are truly called ſo, becauſe equivalent to ſuch as are ſpoken; that they have both the ſame uſe, and ſerve equally to communicate our Thoughts to one another; and that if he will but have patience, and apply himſelf to learn, he will ſoon underſtand, and be convinced of the Poſſibility and Uſefulneſs of the thing: And none can doubt but he were much to blame, and acted an unwiſe part, if he refuſed to believe the Perſon that offered to inſtruct him, or neglected to make the Experiment.

And ſure, when any one objects againſt the Poſſibility of the Three Perſons of the Trinity in one God, it is every whit as good an Anſwer to tell ſuch an Objector that there are other ſort of Perſons beſides thoſe we ſee among Men, whoſe Perſonality is as truly different from what we call ſo, as a Word written is different from a Word ſpoken, and yet equivalent to it. And though three Perſons, ſuch as Men are, can't be in one human Nature, as a Word ſpoken can't be viſible and permanent: yet what we call three Perſons by Compariſon and Analogy, may conſiſt in the Unity of the Godhead.

And after the ſame manner we ought to anſwer thoſe who object againſt the Fore-knowledge and Decrees of God, as inconſiſtent with the Freedom of Choice, by telling them that though ſuch Fore-knowledge and Decrees as are in our Underſtanding and Wills, cannot conſiſt with Contingency, if we ſuppoſe them certain: yet what we call ſo in God may, being quite of a different Nature, and only called by thoſe Names, by reaſon of ſome Analogy and Proportion which is between them.

And if Men will but have patience, and wait the proper time, when Faith ſhall be perfected into Viſion, and we ſhall know even as we are known; they may then ſee and be as well ſatisfied that there is no Abſurdity in the Trinity of Perſons, or Fore-knowledge of Contingency, as the *Indian* is, when he has learned to read and write, that there is no impoſſibility in viſible and permanent Words.

§ XII.

§ XII. *Laſtly*, It is obſervable, that no Care, Induſtry, or Inſtruction, can ever give a Perſon born, and continuing blind, any Notion of Light; nor can he ever have any Conception how Men who have Eyes diſcern the Shape and Figure of a thing at a diſtance, nor imagine what Colours mean: And yet he would, I believe, readily (on the account he receives from others, of the Advantage of knowing theſe things) endure Labour and Pain, and ſubmit to the moſt difficult and tormenting Operations of Phyſick and Chirurgery, in order to obtain the uſe of his Eyes, if any reaſonable hope could be given him of the Succeſs of ſuch an Undertaking. And why then ſhould not we as willingly ſubmit to thoſe eaſy Methods which God has preſcribed to us, in order to obtain that Knowledge of his Nature and Attributes, in which our eternal Satisfaction and Happineſs hereafter is in a very great meaſure to conſiſt? And 'tis certain we now know as much of them as the blind Man, in the Caſe ſuppoſed, does of Light or Colours; and have better reaſon to ſeek, and more certain hope of attaining in the next Life to a fuller and a more compleat Knowledge, than ſuch a Man can have with relation to the uſe of his Eyes, and the advantage of ſeeing. And then will not he riſe up in Judgment againſt us, and condemn us? Since he endures ſo much to obtain Sight on the imperfect Repreſentations of it made to him by other Men, whilſt we will not believe and endure as much for eternal Happineſs, on the Teſtimony of God.

§ XIII. If it be aſked, Why theſe things are not made clearer to us? I anſwer, for the ſame Reaſon that Light and Colours are not clear to one that is born blind, even becauſe in this imperfect State we want Faculties to diſcern them: And we cannot expect to reach the Knowledge of them whilſt here, for the ſame reaſon that a Child, whilſt he is ſo, cannot ſpeak and diſcourſe as he doth when a grown Man; there is a Time and Seaſon for every thing, and we muſt wait for that Seaſon. There is another State and Life for the clear diſcerning of theſe Matters; but in the mean time we ought to take the Steps and Methods which are proper for our preſent Condition: And if we will not

do so, we can no more expect to arrive to the Knowledge of these necessary Truths, or that State which will make them plain to us, than a Child can hope he shall ever be able to read and write, who will not be perswaded to go to School, or obey his Master.

This analogical Knowledge of God's Nature and Attributes, is all of which we are capable at present; and we must either be contented to know him thus, or sit down with an intire Ignorance and Neglect of God, and finally despair of future Happiness. But it concerns us frequently to call to mind the Apostle's Observation, 1 *Cor.* 13. 12. *For now we see through a Glass darkly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known.* Though our present knowledge of divine Things be very imperfect, yet it is enough to awaken our desire of more; and though we do not understand the Enjoyments of the Blessed, yet the Description we have of them is sufficient to engage us to seek after them, and to prosecute the Methods prescribed in Scripture for attaining them.

§ XIV. And therefore let me offer it as a second Reason why God and divine Things are thus represented to us in Scripture, *viz.* That such Knowledge is sufficient to all the Intents and Purposes of Religion; the Design whereof is to lead us in the way to eternal Happiness, and in order thereunto, to teach and oblige us to live reasonably, to perform our Duty to God, our Neighbours, and ourselves, to conquer and mortify our Passions, and Lusts, to make us beneficent and charitable to Men, and to oblige us to love, obey, and depend upon God.

Now it is easy to shew, that such a Knowledge as I have described, is sufficient to obtain all these Ends: For though I know not what God is in himself, yet if I believe he is able to hurt or help me, to make me happy or miserable, this Belief is sufficient to convince me, that it is my Duty to fear him. If I be assured that all his Works are done with Regularity, Order, and Fitness; that nothing can surprize or disappoint him, that he can never be in doubt, or at a loss what is proper for him to do; though I do not comprehend the Faculties by which he performs so many

admirable and amazing things, yet I know enough to make me adore and admire his Conduct. If I be ſatisfied that I can no more expect to eſcape free, when I break the Laws and Rules he has preſcribed me, than a Subject can who aſſaults his Prince in the midſt of all his Guards; this is enough to make me cautious about every Word I ſpeak, and every Action I perform, and to put me out of all hope of eſcaping when I offend him.

If I am convinced that God will be as ſteddy to the Rules he has preſcribed for my Deportment as a wiſe and juſt Prince will be to his Laws; this alone will oblige me to a ſtrict Obſervation of the divine commands, and aſſure me that I muſt be judged according as I have kept or tranſgreſſed them.

If a man be convinced that by his Sins he has forfeited all Right and Title to Happineſs, and that God is under no Obligation to grant him pardon for them; that only the free Mercy of God can put him into the way of Salvation; and that he may as well without Imputation and Injuſtice, pardon one, and paſs by another, as a Prince may, of many equal Malefactors, reprieve one for an inſtance of his Mercy and Power, and ſuffer the reſt to be carried to Execution: If a man, I ſay, finds himſelf under theſe Circumſtances, he will have the ſame Obligations of Gratitude to his God, that the pardoned Offender owes to his Prince, and impute his Eſcape intirely to the peculiar Favour of God, that made the Diſtinction between him and others without any regard to their Merits.

If we believe that there is a Diſtinction in the manner of the ſubſiſting of the divine Nature, that requires ſuch particular Applications from us to God as we pay to three diſtinct Perſons here; and that he has ſuch diſtinct and really different Relations to himſelf and to us on this account, as three Men have to one another; that is enough to oblige us to pay our Addreſſes to him as thus diſtinguiſh'd, and to expect as different Benefits and Bleſſings from him under this Diſtinction, as we expect from different Perſons here: And it can be no hindrance to our Duty, that we are ignorant of the nature and manner of that Diſtinction.

Let us conſider how many honour and obey their Prince, who never ſaw him, who never had any perſonal Knowledge of him, and could not diſtinguiſh him from another Man if they ſhould meet him. This will ſhew us, that it is not neceſſary that we ſhould perſonally know our Governor, to oblige us to perform our Duty to him: And if many perform their Duty to their Prince without knowing him, why ſhould it ſeem ſtrange that we ſhould be obliged to do our Duty to God, though we do not know any more of his Perſon or Nature but that he is our Creator and Governor?

Laſtly, To ſhew that this kind of Knowledge is ſufficient for Salvation, let us ſuppoſe one who takes all the Deſcriptions we have of God literally, who imagines him to be a mighty King that ſits in Heaven, and has the Earth for his Footſtool; that at the ſame time hath all things in his view which can happen; that has thouſands and thouſands of Miniſters to attend him, all ready to obey and execute his Commands; that has a great Love and Favour for ſuch as diligently obey his Orders, and is in a Rage and Fury againſt the Diſobedient: Could any one doubt but he, who in the ſimplicity of his Heart ſhould believe theſe things, as literally repreſented, would be ſaved by virtue of that Belief, or that he would not have Motives ſtrong enough to oblige him to love, honour, and obey God?

If it ſhould be objected that ſuch Repreſentations do not exactly anſwer the Nature of Things, I confeſs this is true; but I would deſire you to conſider, that the beſt Repreſentations we can make of God are infinitely ſhort of the Truth, and that the imperfections of ſuch Repreſentations will never be imputed to us as a Fault, provided we do not wilfully diſhonour him by unworthy Notions, and our Conceptions of him be ſuch as may ſufficiently oblige us to perform the Duties he requires at our hands.

And if any one farther alledges that he who takes theſe Repreſentations literally, will be involv'd in many Difficulties, and that it will be eaſy to ſhew that there are great Inconſiſtences in them, if we underſtand them according to the Letter.

I anſwer, He is to be look'd upon as very officious and impertinent, that will raiſe ſuch Objections, and put them

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in the Heads of plain, honeſt People, who by the force of ſuch common, though figurative Knowledge (as it may be term'd) practice the ſubſtantial and real Duties of Religion, that lead them to eternal Happineſs.

'Tis true, when curious and buſy Perſons, by the unſeaſonable abuſe of their Knowledge, have rais'd ſuch Objections, they muſt be anſwer'd: and it is then neceſſary to ſhew in what Senſe theſe Repreſentations ought to be taken; and that they are to be underſtood by way of Compariſon, as Condeſcenſions to our Weakneſs,

But though theſe Objections are eaſily anſwer'd, yet he who makes them unneceſſarily is by no means to be excuſed, becauſe they often occaſion diſturbance to weak People. Many that may be ſhock'd by the Difficulty, may not be capable of readily underſtanding the Anſwers: and therefore thus to raiſe ſuch Scruples, is to lay a Stumbling-block in the way of our weak Brethren, and perplex them with Notions and Curioſities, the Knowledge of which is no way neceſſary to Salvation.

We ought therefore to conſider that it was in great Mercy and Compaſſion to the Ignorance and Infirmity of Men, that the holy Spirit vouchſafed to give us ſuch Repreſentations of the divine Nature and Attributes. He knew what Knowledge was moſt proper for us, and what would moſt effectually work on us to perform our Duty: and if we take things as the Scripture repreſents them, it can't be deny'd but they are well adapted to our Capacities, and muſt have a mighty Influence on all that ſincerely believe them, in truth greater than all thoſe nice Speculations that we endeavour to ſubſtitute in their Place.

§ XV. But thirdly, If we conſider ſeriouſly the Knowledge that we have of the Creatures, and even of thoſe things in this World with which we are moſt familiarly acquainted, it will appear that the Conceptions we have of them, are much of the ſame ſort as thoſe are which Religion gives us of God, and that they neither repreſent the Nature or eſſential Properties of the things as they are in themſelves, but only the Effects they have in relation to us. For in moſt Caſes we know no more of them but only how they affect us, and what Senſations they produce in us.

Thus for example, Light and the Sun are the moſt familiar and uſeful things in nature: we have the comfortable Perception of them by our Senſes of Seeing and Feeling, and enjoy the Benefit and Advantage of them; but what they are in themſelves, we are intirely ignorant.

I think it is agreed by moſt that write of Natural Philoſophy, that Light and Colours are nothing but the Effects of certain Bodies and Motions on our Senſe of Seeing, and that there are no ſuch things at all in Nature, but only in our Minds: and of this at leaſt we may be ſure, that Light in the Sun or Air, are very different things from what they are in our Senſations of them; yet we call both by the ſame Name, and term that which is only perhaps a motion in the Air, Light, becauſe it begets in us that Conception which is truly Light. But it would ſeem very ſtrange to the generality of Men, if we ſhould tell them, that there is no Light in the Sun, or Colours in the Rainbow; and yet ſtrictly ſpeaking, it is certain, that which in the Sun cauſes the Conception of Light in us, is as truly different in nature from the Repreſentation we have of it in our Mind, as our Fore-Knowledge is from what we call ſo in God.

§ XVI. The ſame may be obſerved concerning the Objects of our other Senſes, ſuch as Heat and Cold, Sweet, and Bitter, and which we aſcribe to the things that affect our Touch and Taſte. Whereas it is manifeſt, that theſe are only the Senſations that the Actions of outward things produce in us. For the Fire that burns us has no ſuch Pain in it as we feel, when we complain of it's heat; nor Ice, ſuch as we call Cold.

Nevertheleſs we call the Things, whoſe Actions on our Senſes cauſe theſe Senſations in us, by the ſame Name we give to our Conceptions of them, and treat and ſpeak of them, as if they were the ſame. We ſay the Fire is hot, becauſe it produceth heat in us; and that the Sun is light, becauſe it affects our Eyes in ſuch manner, as enables us to frame that Thought which we then perceive in ourſelves. But in the mean time we are altogether ignorant, what it is particularly in the Fire and the Sun, that has theſe Effects

fects on us, or how it comes thus to affect us. And yet this Ignorance of ours doth not hinder us from the Use or Advantage that Nature design'd us in these Sensations; nor does our transferring to the Objects themselves the Names that we give our own Perceptions of them, draw any evil Consequences after it: on the contrary, they serve the Uses of Life, as well as if we knew the very things themselves. The Sun by giving me the Sensation of Light, directs and refreshes me, as much as if I knew what its Nature and true Substance are. For in truth, Men are no farther concerned to know the Nature of any thing, than as it relates to them, and has some effect on them. And if they know the Effects of outward things, and how far they are to use or avoid them, it is sufficient.

If then such Knowledge of natural things, as only shews the effects they have on us, be sufficient to all the Uses of Life, though we do not know what they are in themselves; why should not the like Representation of God and his Attributes be sufficient for the Ends of Religion, though we be ignorant of his and their Nature?

Every one knows that Steddiness, Regularity, and Order, do always proceed from Wisdom. When therefore we observe these in the highest degree in all the Works of God, shall we not say that God is infinitely wise, because we are ignorant what that really is in itself which produces such stupendous Effects? though after all Wisdom, as in us, be as different from what we call so in God; as *Light* in our Conception is different from the *Motion* in the Air that causes it.

§. XVII. We all of us feel a tendency to the Earth, which we call *Gravity*; but none ever yet was able to give any satisfactory account of its Nature or Cause: but inasmuch as we know that falling down a Precipice will crush us to pieces, the Sense we have of this Effect of it, is sufficient to make us careful to avoid such a Fall. And in like manner, if we know that breaking God's Commands will provoke him to destroy us, will not this be sufficient to oblige us to Obedience, though we be ignorant what it is we call *Anger* in him?

§ XVIII. I might go through all the Notices we have of natural Things, and ſhew that we only know and diſtinguiſh them by the Effects they produce on our Senſes, and make you ſenſible that ſuch Knowledge ſufficiently ſerves the Purpoſes of Life. And no Reaſon can be given why the Repreſentations given us in Scripture of God and divine Things, though they do only ſhew us the Effects that proceed from them, ſhould not be ſufficient to anſwer the Purpoſes of Religion.

Particularly we aſcribe Fore-knowledge to God, becauſe we are certain that he cannot be ſurprized by any Event, nor be at any loſs what he is to do when it happens. And thereby we give him all the Perfection we can, and aſſure ourſelves that we cannot deceive him.

After the ſame manner we aſcribe Predeſtination to him, and conceive him as predetermining every thing that comes to paſs, becauſe all his Works are as ſteddy and certain, as if he had predetermined them after the ſame manner that wiſe Men do theirs.

We farther repreſent him as abſolutely free, and all his Actions as ariſing only from himſelf, without any other Conſideration but that of his own Will; becauſe we are ſure, the Obligations we owe to him are as great as if he acted in this wiſe. We are as much obliged to magnify his free Mercy and Favour to us, to humble our Minds before him, and return our tribute of Gratitude to him, as if our Salvation intirely proceeded from his mere Good-will and Pleaſure, without any thing being required on our part in order to it.

§ XIX. Let me in the fourth Place obſerve, that as we transfer the Actions of our own Minds, our Powers, and Virtues, by analogy to God, and ſpeak of him as if he had the like; ſo we proceed the ſame way in the Repreſentations we make to one another of the Actions of our Minds, and aſcribe the Powers and Faculties of Bodies to the Tranſactions that paſs in them. Thus to weigh things, to penetrate, to reflect, are proper Actions of Bodies, which we transfer to our Underſtandings, and commonly ſay, that the Mind weighs or penetrates things, that it reflects on itſelf, or

Actions;

Actions; thus to embrace or reject, to retain or let ſlip, are corporeal Performances, and yet we aſcribe the firſt to the Will, and the laſt to the Memory. And it is manifeſt that this does not cauſe any Confuſion in our Notions: though none will deny but there is a vaſt difference between weighing a piece of Money in a Scale, and conſidering a thing in our Minds; between one Body's paſſing thro' another, which is properly penetrating, and the Underſtanding's obtaining a clear Notion of a thing hard to be comprehended. And ſo in all the reſt, there is indeed a reſemblance and analogy between them, which makes us give the ſame Names to each: but to compare them in all particulars, and expect they ſhould exactly anſwer, would run us into great Abſurdities. As for example, it would be ridiculous to think that weighing a thing in our Minds ſhould have all the Effects, and be accompany'd with all the Circumſtances that are obſervable in weighing a Body.

§ XX. Now to apply this, let us conſider that Love, Hatred, Wiſdom, Knowledge, and Foreknowledge, are properly Faculties or Actions of our Minds; and we aſcribe them to God after the ſame manner that we do Reflection, Penetrating, Diſcovering, Embracing, or Rejecting, to our intellectual Actions and Faculties, becauſe there is ſome analogy and proportion between them. But then we ought to remember that there is as great a difference between theſe, when attributed to God, and as they are in us, as between weighing in a Balance and Thinking, in truth infinitely greater; and that we ought no more to expect that the one ſhould in all reſpects and Circumſtances anſwer the other, than that Thinking in all things ſhould correſpond to Weighing. Wou'd you not be ſurpriz'd to hear a Man deny, and obſtinately perſiſt in it, that his Mind can reflect upon it ſelf, becauſe it is impoſſible that a Body, from whence the Notion is originally taken, ſhould move or act on itſelf; And is it not equally abſurd to argue that what we call Fore-knowledge in God, cannot conſiſt with the Contingency or Freedom of Events, becauſe our Preſcience, from whence we transfer the Notion to the divine Underſtanding, could not, if it were certain? And is it not equally a ſuffi-

a ſufficient anſwer to both, when we ſay that the Reflection of Bodies, tho' in many Circumſtances it reſembles that Action of the Mind which we call ſo, yet in other Particulars they are mighty unlike? And tho' the Fore-knowledge that we have in ſome things, reſembles what we term ſo in God, yet the Properties and Effects of theſe in other particulars, are infinitely different.

Nor can we think that whatever is impoſſible in the one, muſt be likewiſe ſo in the other. 'Tis impoſſible Motion ſhould be in a Body, except it be mov'd by another, or by ſome other external Agent; and it requires a Space in which it is perform'd, and we can meaſure it by Feet and Yards; but we ſhould look on him as a very weak Reaſoner, that would deny any Motion to be in the Mind, becauſe he could find none of thoſe there. And we ſhould think that we had ſufficiently anſwer'd this Objection, by telling him that theſe two Motions are of very different Natures, tho' there be ſome analogy and proportion between them. And ſhall not the ſame Anſwer ſatisfy thoſe that argue againſt the divine Fore-knowledge, Predeſtination, and other Actions attributed to God, becauſe many things are ſuppoſed poſſible to them, which are impoſſible to us?

§ XXI. It may be objected againſt this Doctrine that if it be true, all our Deſcriptions of God, and Diſcourſes concerning him, will be only Figures and Metaphors; that he will be only figuratively merciful, juſt, intelligent, and fore-knowing: and perhaps in time, Religion and all the Myſteries thereof, will be loſt in mere Figures.

But I anſwer, that there is great difference between the analogical Repreſentations of God, and that which we commonly call Figurative. The common uſe of Figures is to repreſent things that are otherwiſe very well known, in ſuch a manner as may magnifie or leſſen, heighten or adorn the Ideas we have of them. And the deſign of putting them in this foreign Dreſs, as we may call it, is to move our Paſſions, and ingage our Fancies more effectually than the true and naked view of them is apt to do, or perhaps ought. And from hence it too often happens that theſe Figures are employ'd to deceive us, and make us think better or worſe of things than they really deſerve.

But

But the Analogies and Similitudes that the holy Scriptures or our own Reaſon frame of divine Things, are of another nature; the uſe of them is to give us ſome Notion of things whereof we have no direct Knowledge, and by that means lead us to a Perception of the Nature, or at leaſt of ſome of the Properties and Effects of what our Underſtandings cannot directly reach, and in this Caſe to teach us how we are to behave ourſelves towards God, and what we are to do in order to obtain a more perfect Knowledge of his Attributes.

§ XXII. And whereas in ordinary figurative Repreſentations, the thing expreſs'd by the Figure is commonly of much leſs moment than that to which it is compar'd: in theſe Analogies the Caſe is otherwiſe, and the things repreſented by them have much more Reality and Perfection in them, than the things by which we repreſent them. Thus weighing a thing in our Minds, is a much more noble and perfect Action, than examining the Gravity of a Body by Scale and Balance, which is the original Notion from whence it is borrow'd; and Reflection as in our Underſtandings is much more conſiderable than the rebounding of one hard Body from another, which yet is the literal Senſe of Reflection. And after the ſame manner, what we call Knowledge and Fore-Knowledge in God, have infinitely more reality in them, and are of greater moment than our Underſtanding or Preſcience, from whence they are transferr'd to him; and in truth, theſe as in Man are but faint Communications of the divine Perfections, which are the true Originals, and which our Powers and Faculties more imperfectly imitate than a Picture does a Man: and yet if we reaſon from them by Analogy and Proportion, they are ſufficient to give us ſuch a Notion of God's Attributes, as will oblige us to fear, love, obey, and adore him.

If we lay theſe things together, I ſuppoſe, they will furniſh us with ſufficient Reaſons to ſatisfy us why the holy Scriptures repreſent Divine things to us by Types and Similitudes, by Compariſons and Analogies, and by transferring to God the Notions of ſuch Perfections as we obſerve

ſerve in our ſelves, or other Creatures: ſince it appears that we are not capable of better; that ſuch Knowledge anſwers all the Deſigns of Religion; and that when the Matter is duly examin'd, we hardly know any thing without our ſelves in a more perfect manner.

I ſhall therefore proceed to the third and laſt thing I propos'd, which was to ſhew the Uſes we ought to make of what has been ſaid, particularly of God's fore-knowing and predeſtinating his Elect to Holineſs and Salvation.

§ XXIII. And firſt, from the whole it appears that we ought not to be ſurpriz'd, when we find the Scriptures giving different and ſeemingly contradictory Schemes of Divine things.

It is manifeſt that ſeveral ſuch are to be found in holy Writ. Thus God is frequently ſaid in Scripture, to *repent* and *turn* from the Evil that he purpos'd againſt Sinners; and yet in other places we are told, that *God is not a Man that he ſhould lye, neither the Son of Man that he ſhould repent:* So *Numb.* 23. 19. Thus *Pſal.* 18. 11. God is repreſented as dwelling in thick Darkneſs: *He made Darkneſs his ſecret place; his Pavilion round about him, were dark Waters, and thick Clouds of the Sky.* And yet 1 *Tim.* 6. 16. he is deſcrib'd as *dwelling in the Light which no Man can approach unto, whom no Man hath ſeen, nor can ſee*: And 1 *John* 1. 5. *God is Light, and in him is no Darkneſs at all.* Thus in the ſecond Commandment, God is repreſented as viſiting the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate him: and yet, *Ezek.* 18. 20. *The Son ſhall not bear the Iniquity of the Father, neither ſhall the Father bear the Iniquity of the Son*; and Ver. 4. *The Soul that ſinneth, it ſhall die.*

After the ſame manner, we are forbid by our Saviour, *Matt.* 6. 7. to uſe *vain Repetitions as the Heathen do*; or to think that we ſhall be *heard for* our *much ſpeaking*; becauſe, Ver. 8. *Your Father knows what things ye have need of, before ye aſk him.* And yet *Luke* 18. 1. we are encourag'd always *to pray, and not to faint:* And this is recommended to us by the Parable of an importunate Widow, who thro' her inceſſant Applications became uneaſy to the Judge, and

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by her continual Cries and Petitions ſo troubled him, that to procure his own Eaſe he did her Juſtice: Ver. 5. *Becauſe this Widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, leſt by her continual coming ſhe weary me.*

Thus it is ſaid, *Exod.* 33. 11. *The Lord ſpake unto* Moſes *face to face, as a Man ſpeaketh to his Friend.* And yet in Ver. 20. he declares to the ſame *Moſes, Thou canſt not ſee my Face: for there ſhall no Man ſee me, and live.* There are multitudes of other Inſtances of the like nature, that ſeem to carry ſome appearance of a Contradiction in them, but are purpoſely deſign'd to make us underſtand that theſe are only aſcrib'd to God by way of reſemblance and analogy, and to correct our Imaginations, that we may not miſtake them for perfect Repreſentations, or think that they are in God in the ſame manner that the Similitudes repreſent them, and to teach us not to ſtretch thoſe to all Caſes, or farther than they are intended.

§ XXIV. We ought to remember, that two things may be very like one another in ſome reſpects, and quite contrary in others; and yet to argue againſt the Likeneſs in one reſpect, from the Contrariety in the other, is as if one ſhould diſpute againſt the Likeneſs of a Picture, becauſe that is made of Canvas, Oil, and Colours, whereas the Original is Fleſh and Blood.

Thus in the preſent Caſe, God is repreſented as an abſolute Lord over his Creatures, of infinite Knowledge and Power, that doth all things for his mere Pleaſure, and is accountable to none; as one that *will have Mercy on whom he will have Mercy*, and *whom he will he hardens*; that *foreſees, predeſtinates, calls, juſtifies*, and *glorifies* whom he will, without any regard to the Creatures whom he thus deals with. This gives us a mighty Notion of his Sovereignty, at once ſtops our Mouths, and ſilences our Objections; obliges us to an abſolute Submiſſion, and dependance on him, and withal to acknowledge the good things we enjoy to be intirely due to his pleaſure. This is plainly the Deſign and Effect of this terrible Repreſentation: and the meaning is, that we ſhould underſtand that God is no way oblig'd to give us an account of his Actions; that we are

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no more to inquire into the Reaſons of his dealing with his Creatures, than if he really treated them in this arbitrary Method. By the ſame we are taught to acknowledge, that our Salvation as intirely depends on him, and that we owe it as much to his pleaſure, as if he had beſtow'd it on us without any other Conſideration, but his own Will to do ſo. Thus *Jam.* 1. 18. *Of his own Will begat he us with the Word of Truth, that we ſhould be a kind of Firſt-fruits of his Creatures.* And that we might not think there could be any thing in our beſt Works, the proſpect whereof could move God to ſhew kindneſs to us, the Scriptures give us to underſtand that thoſe good Works are due to his Grace and Favour, and the Effects, not Cauſes of them. So *Eph.* 2. 10. *For we are his Workmanſhip, created in Chriſt Jeſus unto good Works, which God hath before ordain'd, that we ſhould walk in them.*

§ XXV. All which Repreſentations are deſign'd as a Scheme, to make us conceive the Obligations we owe to God, and how little we can contribute to our own Happineſs. And to make us apprehend this to be his meaning, he has on other occaſions given us an account of his dealing with Men, not only different, but ſeemingly contradictory to this. Thus he frequently repreſents himſelf, as propoſing nothing for his own pleaſure or advantage in his Tranſactions with his Creatures, as having no other Deſign in them, but to do thoſe Creatures good, as earneſtly deſiring and proſecuting that End only. Nay, he repreſents himſelf to us, as if he were as uneaſy and troubled when we fail'd to anſwer his Expectations; as we may conceive a good, merciful, and beneficent Prince, that had only his Subjects Happineſs in view, would be, when they refus'd to join with him for promoting their own Intereſt. And God, farther to expreſs his tenderneſs towards us, and how far he is from impoſing any thing on us, lets us know that he has left us to our own Freedom and Choice: and to convince us of his impartiality, declares that he acts as a juſt and equal Judge; that he hath no reſpect of Perſons, and favours none; but rewards and puniſhes all Men, not according to his own pleaſure, but according to their deſerts;

and

and in *every Nation he that fears him, and works Righteouſneſs, is accepted with him*, Acts 10. 25.

§ XXVI. Whoever is acquainted with the holy Scriptures, will find all theſe things plainly deliver'd in them. Thus to ſhew us that God propoſes no advantage to himſelf in his Dealings with us, he is deſcribed as a Perſon wholly diſintereſted: *Job* 22. 2, 3. *Can a Man be profitable unto God, as he that is wiſe may be profitable unto himſelf? Is it any pleaſure to the Almighty that thou art righteous? or is it gain to him that thou makeſt thy ways perfect?* And Chap. 35. 6, 7. *If thou ſinneſt, what doſt thou againſt him? or if thy Tranſgreſſions be multiplied, what doſt thou unto him? If thou be righteous, what giveſt thou him, or what receiveth he of thine hand?*

And as to his leaving us to the liberty of our own Choice, obſerve how he is repreſented, *Deut.* 30. 19. *I call Heaven and Earth this day to record againſt you, that I have ſet before you Life and Death, Bleſſing and Curſing; therefore chooſe Life.*

And as to his earneſt Concern for our Salvation, he orders the Prophet *Ezekiel* to deliver this Meſſage from him: Chap. 33. 11. *Say unto them, As I live, ſaith the Lord God, I have no pleaſure in the death of the Wicked, but that the Wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O Houſe of* Iſrael? And *Hoſea* 11. 8. *How ſhall I give thee up,* Ephraim? *How ſhall I deliver thee,* Iſrael? *How ſhall I make thee as* Adnah? *How ſhall I ſet thee as* Zeboim? *Mine heart is turned within me, my Repentings are kindled together.*

Every one may ſee how diſtant this view of God, and of his Dealings with his Creatures, is from the former; and yet if we conſider it as a Scheme fram'd to make us conceive how graciouſly, mercifully, and juſtly God treats us; notwithſtanding the ſupreme and abſolute Dominion he has over us, there will be no inconſiſtency between the two. You ſee here, that tho' the Creatures be in his hand, as *Clay* in the *Potter*'s, of which he may make Veſſels of *Honour* or *Diſhonour*, without any injury, or being accountable; yet he uſes that Power, with all the paſſionate Love and Concern

cern that Parents ſhew towards their Children: and therefore we are to conceive of him as having all the tenderneſs of Affection, that Parents feel in their Heart towards their young ones; and that if he had been ſo affected, he could not (conſidering our Circumſtances) have gone farther than he has done to ſave us; that our Deſtruction is as intirely due to ourſelves, as if we were out of God's Power, and abſolutely in the hand of our own counſel.

§ XXVII. If we take theſe as Schemes deſign'd to give us different Views of God, and his Tranſactions with Men, in order to oblige us to diſtinct Duties which we owe him, and ſtretch them no farther, they are very reconcileable: And to go about to claſh the one againſt the other, and argue, as many do, that if the one be true, the other cannot; is full as abſurd as to object againſt that Article of our Belief, that Chriſt ſits on the right hand of God, becauſe Scripture in other places, and plain Reaſon aſſures us, that God hath neither Hand nor Parts.

And whilſt a thing may in one reſpect be like another, and in other reſpects be like the contrary; and whilſt we know that thing only by reſemblance, ſimilitude, or proportion; we ought not to be ſurpriz'd, that the Repreſentations are contrary, and taken from things that ſeem irreconcilable, or that the different Views of the ſame thing ſhould give occaſion to different, nay contrary Schemes.

§ XXVIII. We ought farther to conſider, that theſe are not ſo much deſign'd to give us Notions of God as he is in himſelf, as to make us ſenſible of our Duty to him, and to oblige us to perform it. As for Example, when the Scriptures repreſent God as an abſolute Lord, that has his Creatures intirely in his Power, and treats them according to his pleaſure; as one that is not oblig'd to conſider their Advantage at all, or any thing but his own Will; that may elect one to eternal Salvation, and paſs over another, or condemn him to eternal Miſery, without any other reaſon but becauſe he will do ſo: When we read this, I ſay, in the holy Scriptures, we ought not to diſpute whether God really acts thus or no, or how it will ſuit with his other Attributes of *Wiſdom* and *Juſtice* to do ſo; but the uſe we ought to

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make of it, is to call to mind what Duty and Submiſſion we ought to pay to one who may thus deal with us if he pleaſe, and what Gratitude we ought to return him, for electing and decreeing us to Salvation, when he lay under no manner of Obligation to vouchſafe us that Favour.

Again, when we find him repreſented as a gracious and merciful Father, that treats us as Children, that is ſollicitous for our welfare, that would not our Death or Deſtruction; that has done all things for our eternal Happineſs, which could be done without violating the Laws of our Creation, and putting a force upon our Natures; that has given us *Free-Will*, that we might be capable of Rewards at his hands, and have the pleaſure of chooſing for ourſelves; which only can make us happy, and like unto himſelf in the moſt noble Operations of which a Being is capable: that has given us all the Invitations and Encouragements to chooſe well, that Mercy could prompt him to, or that the Juſtice which is due to himſelf and Creatures would allow; and that never puniſhes us, but when the Neceſſity and Support of his Government requires he ſhould: When we hear theſe things, we are not ſo much to inquire whether this Repreſentation exactly ſuits with what really paſſes in his Mind, as how we ought to behave ourſelves in ſuch a Caſe towards him that has dealt ſo graciouſly with us.

§ XXIX. And tho' theſe Repreſentations be but Deſcriptions fitted to our Capacities, thro' God's great Condeſcenſion towards us; yet it is certain, that there is as much Mercy, Tenderneſs, and Juſtice in the Conduct of God, as this Scheme repreſents: And on the other hand, that we owe as much Fear, Submiſſion, and Gratitude to him, as if the firſt were the Method he took with us.

We make no ſcruple to acknowledge, that Love and Hatred, Mercy and Anger, with other Paſſions, are aſcrib'd to God; not that they are in him, as we conceive them, but to teach us how we are to behave ourſelves toward him, and what Treatment we may expect at his hands. And if ſo, why ſhould we make any difficulty to think that *Foreknowledge*, *Purpoſes*, *Elections*, and *Decrees* are attributed to him after the ſame way, and to the ſame intent?

§ XXX. The ſecond Uſe that I ſhall make of this Doctrine, is to put you in mind, how cautious we ought to be in our Reaſonings and Deductions concerning things, of whoſe nature we are not fully appriz'd. 'Tis true, that in Matters we fully comprehend, all is clear and eaſy to us, and we readily perceive the Connection and Conſiſtency of all the Parts: but it is not ſo in things to which we are in a great meaſure ſtrangers, and of which we have only an imperfect and partial view; for in theſe we are very apt to fancy Contradictions, and to think the accounts we receive of them abſurd.

The truth of this is manifeſt from innumerable Inſtances: as for example, from the Opinion of the *Antipodes:* whilſt the matter was imperfectly known, How many Objections were made againſt it? How many thought they had prov'd to a Demonſtration the Impoſſibility and Contradiction of the thing? And how far did they prevail with the generality of the World to believe them? And yet how weak, and in truth fooliſh, do all their Arguments appear to Men that know, and by experience underſtand the matter?

Others will ſay the ſame concerning the Motion of the Earth, notwithſtanding the great Confidence with which many have undertaken to demonſtrate it to be impoſſible; the reaſon of which is only the imperfect Knowledge we have of the thing: And as our underſtanding of it is more and more enlarg'd and clear'd, the Contradictions vaniſh.

Ought we not then to think all the Contradictions we fancy between the *Fore-knowledge* of God and *Contingency* of Events, between *Predeſtination* and *Free-will*, to be the Effects of our Ignorance and partial Knowledge? May it not be in this, as in the Matter of the *Antipodes*, and Motion of the Earth? May not the Inconſiſtencies that we find in the one, be as ill-grounded as thoſe that have been urg'd againſt the others? And have we not reaſon to ſuſpect, nay believe this to be the Caſe; ſince we are ſure that we know much leſs of God and his Attributes, than of the Earth and heavenly Motions?

§ XXXI. Even in the Sciences that are moſt common and certain, there are ſome things, which amongſt thoſe that

that are unacquainted with ſuch Matters, would paſs for Contradictions. As for example, let us ſuppoſe one ſhould happen to mention *Negative Quantities* among Perſons ſtrangers to the Mathematicks; and being aſk'd what is meant by thoſe Words, ſhould anſwer, That he underſtands by them *Quantities* that are conceived to be leſs than *Nothing*; and that one of their *Properties* is that being multiplied by a Number leſs than *Nothing*, the Product may be a Magnitude greater than any aſſign'd. This might juſtly appear a Riddle, and full of Contradictions, and perhaps will do ſo to a great part of my Auditors. *Something* leſs than *Nothing*, in appearance is a Contradiction; a *Number* leſs than *Nothing*, has the ſame face: That theſe ſhould be multipliable on one another, ſounds very oddly; and that the Product of leſs than *Nothing* upon leſs than *Nothing*, ſhould be poſitive, and greater than any aſſign'd Quantities, ſeems inconceivable. And yet, if the moſt ignorant will but have patience, and apply themſelves for Inſtruction to the ſkilful in theſe Matters they will ſoon find all the ſeeming Contradictions vaniſh, and that the Aſſertions are not only certain, but plain and eaſy Truths, that may be conceiv'd without any great difficulty.

Ought we not then to ſuſpect our own Ignorance, when we fancy Contradictions in the Deſcriptions given us of the Myſteries of our Faith and Religion? and ought we not to wait with Patience, till we come to Heaven, the proper School where theſe things are to be learned? And in the mean time, aquieſce in that Light the holy Spirit has given us in the Scriptures; which, as I have ſhew'd, is ſufficient to direct us in our preſent Circumſtances.

§ XXXII. The third uſe I ſhall make of this Doctrine, is to teach us what anſwer we are to give that Argument that has puzzled Mankind, and done ſo much miſchief in in the World. It runs thus: "If God foreſee or predeſti-"nate that I ſhall be ſaved, I ſhall infallibly be ſo; and if "he foreſee or have predeſtinated that I ſhall be damned, "it is unavoidable. And therefore it is no matter what I "do, or how I behave myſelf in this Life." Many Anſwers have been given to this, which I ſhall not at preſent

examine: I ſhall only add, that if God's *Fore-knowledge* were exactly conformable to ours, the conſequence would ſeem juſt; but inaſmuch as they are of as different a nature as any two Faculties of our Souls, it doth not follow (becauſe our foreſight of Events, if we ſuppoſe it infallible, muſt preſuppoſe a Neceſſity in them) that therefore the divine Preſcience muſt require the ſame Neceſſity in order to its being certain. It is true, we call God's *Fore-knowledge* and our own by the ſame Name; but this is not from any real likeneſs in the Nature of the Faculties, but from ſome proportion obſervable in the Effects of them: Both having this advantage, that they prevent any ſurprize on the Perſon endow'd with them.

Now as it is true, that no Contingency or Freedom in the Creatures, can any way deceive or ſurprize God, put him to a loſs, or oblige him to alter his Meaſures: So on the other hand it is likewiſe true, that the divine Preſcience doth not hinder Freedom; and a thing may either be or not be, notwithſtanding that Foreſight of it which we aſcribe to God. When therefore it is alledged, that if God foreſees I ſhall be ſaved, my Salvation is infallible, this doth not follow; becauſe the Fore-knowledge of God is not like Man's, which requires Neceſſity in the Event, in order to its being certain, but of another Nature conſiſtent with Contingency: And our inability to comprehend this ariſes from our ignorance of the true Nature of what we call Fore-knowledge in God. And it is as impoſſible we ſhould comprehend the Power thereof, or the manner of its Operation, as that the Eye ſhould ſee a Sound, or the Ear hear Light and Colours.

Only of this we are ſure, that in this it differs from ours, that it may conſiſt either with the being or not being of what is ſaid to be foreſeen or predeſtinated. Thus St. *Paul* was a choſen Veſſel, and he reckons himſelf in the number of the predeſtinated, *Epheſ.* 1. 5. *Having predeſtinated us to the adoption of Children by Jeſus Chriſt to himſelf.* And yet he ſuppoſes it poſſible for him to miſs of Salvation: And therefore he look'd on himſelf as obliged to uſe Mortification, and exerciſe all other Graces, in order to make his Calling

Calling and Election ſure; leſt, as he tells us, 1 *Cor.* 9. 27. *That by any means when I have preach'd to others, I myſelf ſhould be a Caſt-away*, or a *Reprobate*, as the word is tranſlated in other places.

§ XXXIII. The fourth uſe I ſhall make of this Doctrine, is to enable us to diſcover what Judgment we are to paſs on thoſe that have manag'd this Controverſy: And for mine own part I muſt profeſs, that they ſeem to me to have taken Shadows for Subſtances, Reſemblances for the Things they repreſent; and by confounding theſe have embroiled themſelves and Readers in inextricable Difficulties.

Whoever will look into the Books writ on either ſide, will find this to be true: But becauſe that is a Taſk too difficult for the generality of Men, let them conſider the two Schemes of the *Predeſtinarians* and *Free-Willers*, in the Biſhop of *Sarum*'s Expoſition of the XVIIth Article of our Church; where they will (as I think) find the Opinions of both Parties briefly, fully, and fairly repreſented, and withal perceive this Error runs through both.

As for example, the great Foundation of the one Scheme is, that God acts for himſelf and his Glory, and therefore he can only conſider the Manifeſtation of his own Attributes and Perfections in every Action; and hence they conclude that he muſt only damn or ſave Men, as his doing of one or other may moſt promote his Glory.

But here it is manifeſt that they who reaſon thus are of opinion, that the deſire of Glory doth really move the Will of God; whereas Glory, and the Deſire of it, are only aſcribed to God in an analogical Senſe, after the ſame manner as Hands and Feet, Love and Hatred are: And when God is ſaid to do all things for his own Glory, it is not meant that the Deſire of Glory is the real End of his Actions, but that he has ordered all things in ſuch an excellent Method, that if he had deſigned them for no other End, they could not have ſet it forth more effectually. Now to make this figurative Expreſſion the Foundation of ſo many harſh Concluſions, and the occaſion of ſo many Contentions and Diviſions in the Church, ſeems to me the ſame kind of Miſtake, that the Church of *Rome* commits in taking the words of Scripture, *This is my Body*, literally;

from whence ſo many Abſurdities and Contradictions to our Senſes and Reaſon are inferred.

§ XXXIV. *Secondly*, If you look diligently into theſe Schemes, you will find a great part of the Diſpute ariſes on this Queſtion, What is firſt or ſecond in the Mind of God? whether he firſt foreſees and then determines, or firſt determines, and by virtue of that foreſees? This Queſtion ſeems the more ſtrange, becauſe both Parties are agreed, that there is neither firſt nor laſt in the Divine Underſtanding, but all is one ſingle Act in him, and continues the ſame from all Eternity. What then can be the meaning of the Diſpute? Sure it can be no more than this, whether it be more honourable for God, that we ſhould conceive him as acting this way or that, ſince it is confeſſed that neither reaches what really paſſes in his Mind. So that the Queſtion is not concerning the Operations of God as they are in themſelves, but concerning our way of conceiving them, whether it be more for his Honour to repreſent them according to the firſt or ſecond Scheme: And certainly the right Method is to uſe both on occaſion, ſo far as they may help us to conceive honourably of the divine Majeſty; and to deal ingenuouſly with the World, and tell them, that where theſe Schemes have not that effect, or where through our ſtretching them too far, they induce us to entertain diſhonourable Thoughts of him, or encourage Diſobedience, they are not applicable to him. In ſhort, that God is as abſolute as the firſt repreſents him, and Man as free as the laſt would have him to be; and that theſe different and ſeemingly contradictory Schemes are brought in to ſupply the Defects of one another.

§ XXXV. And therefore, *Thirdly*, The Managers of this Controverſy ought to have looked on theſe different Schemes as chiefly deſign'd to inculcate ſome Duties to us; and to have preſs'd them no farther than as they tended to move and oblige us to perform thoſe Duties. But they, on the contrary, have ſtretch'd theſe Repreſentations beyond the Scripture's deſign, and ſet them up in oppoſition to one another; and have endeavoured to perſuade the World that they are inconſiſtent: inſomuch that ſome, to eſta-

eſtabliſh Contingency and Free-Will, have deny'd God's Preſcience; and others, to ſet up Predeſtination, have brought in a fatal neceſſity of all Events.

And not content therewith; they have accuſed one another of Impiety and Blaſphemy, and mutually charg'd each the other's Opinion with all the abſurd Conſequences they fancy'd were deducible from it. Thus the Maintainers of Free-Will charge the Predeſtinarians as guilty of aſcribing Injuſtice, Tyranny, and Cruelty to God, as making him the Author of all the Sin and Miſery that is in the World: And on the other hand, the Aſſerters of Predeſtination have accus'd the others, as deſtroying the Independency and Dominion of God, and ſubjecting him to the Will and Humours of his Creatures. And if either of the Schemes were to be taken literally and properly, the Maintainers of them would find difficulty enough to rid themſelves of the Conſequences charg'd on them: But if we take them only as analogical Repreſentations, as I have explained them, there will be no ground or reaſon for theſe Inferences.

§ XXXVI. And it were to be wiſh'd, that thoſe who make them would conſider, that if they would proſecute the ſame Method in treating the other Repreſentations that the Scriptures give us of God's Attributes and Operations, no leſs Abſurdities would follow: As for example, when God is ſaid to be merciful, loving, and pitiful, all-ſeeing, jealous, patient, or angry; if theſe were taken literally, and underſtood the ſame way as we find them in us, what abſurd and intolerable Conſequences would follow; and how diſhonourably muſt they be ſuppoſed to think of God, who aſcribe ſuch Paſſions to him? Yet no body is ſhock'd at them, becauſe they underſtand them in an analogical Senſe. And if they would but allow Predeſtination, Election, Decrees, Purpoſes, and Fore-knowledge, to belong to God, with the ſame difference, they would no more think themſelves obliged to charge thoſe that aſcribe them to him, with Blaſphemy in the one Caſe, than in the other.

'Tis therefore incumbent on us to forbear all ſuch Deductions, and we ſhould endeavour to reconcile theſe ſeveral Repreſentations together, by teaching the People,

that God's Knowledge is of another Nature than ours; and that tho' we cannot, in our way of thinking, certainly foreſee what is free and contingent, yet God may do it by that Power which anſwers to Preſcience in him, or rather in truth, ſupplies the place of it. Nor is it any wonder that we cannot conceive how this is done, ſince we have no direct or proper Notion of God's Knowledge; nor can we ever in this Life expect to comprehend it, any more than a Man who never ſaw can expect to diſcern the Shape and Figure of Bodies at a diſtance, whilſt he continues blind.

§ XXXVII. The fifth uſe we are to make of what has been ſaid, is to teach us how we are to behave ourſelves in a Church, where either of theſe Schemes is ſettled and taught as a Doctrine: and here I think the Reſolution is eaſy. We ought to be quiet, and not unſeaſonably diſturb the Peace of the Church; much leſs ſhould we endeavour to expoſe what ſhe profeſſes, by alledging Abſurdities and Inconſiſtencies in it. On the contrary, we are obliged to take pains to ſhew that the pretended Conſequences do not follow, as in truth they do not, and to diſcourage all that make them, as Enemies of Peace, and falſe Accuſers of their Brethren, by charging them with Conſequences they diſown, and that have no other Foundation but the Maker's Ignorance.

For in truth, as has been already ſhewed, if ſuch Inferences be allowed, hardly any one Attribute or Operation of God, as deſcribed in Scripture, will be free from the Cavils of perverſe Men.

'Tis obſervable, that by the ſame way of reaſoning, and by the ſame ſort of Arguments, by which ſome endeavour to deſtroy the divine Preſcience, and render his Decrees odious, *Cotta* long ago in *Cicero* attacked the other Attributes, and undertook to prove that God can neither have Reaſon nor Underſtanding, Wiſdom nor Prudence, nor any other Virtue. And if we underſtand theſe literally and properly, ſo as to ſignify the ſame when apply'd to God and to men, it will not be eaſy to anſwer his Arguments: but if we conceive them to be aſcribed to him by Proportion and Analogy, that is, if we mean no more when we

apply

apply them to God, than that he has ſome Powers and Faculties, though not of the ſame nature, which are analogous to theſe, and which yield him all the Advantages which theſe could give him if he had them, enabling him to produce all the good Effects which we ſee conſequent to them, when in the greateſt Perfection; then the Arguments uſed by * *Cotta* againſt them have no manner of force: ſince we do not plead for ſuch an Underſtanding, Reaſon, Juſtice, and Virtue, as he objects againſt, but for more valuable Perfections that are more than equivalent, and in truth infinitely ſuperior to them, though called by the ſame Names; becauſe we do not know what they are in themſelves, but only ſee their Effects in the World, which are ſuch as might be expected from the moſt conſummate Reaſon, Underſtanding, and Virtue.

And after the ſame manner, when perverſe Men reaſon againſt the Preſcience, Predeſtination, and the Decrees of God, by drawing the like abſurd Conſequences, as *Cotta* doth againſt the poſſibility of his being endowed with Reaſon and Underſtanding, *&c.* our Anſwer is the ſame as before mention'd. If theſe be ſuppoſed the very ſame in all reſpects when attributed to God, as we find them in ourſelves, there would be ſome colour from the Abſurdities that would follow, to deny that they belong to God; but when we only aſcribe them to him by analogy, and mean no more than that there are ſome things anſwerable to them, from whence, as Principles, the divine Operations proceed; it is plain, that all ſuch Arguments not only loſe their force, but are abſolutely impertinent.

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* Qualem autem Deum intelligere nos poſſumus nulla virtute præditum? Quid enim? prudentiamne Deo tribuemus? Quæ conſtat ex ſcientia rerum bonarum & malarum, &, nec bonarum nec malarum? Cui mali nihil eſt, nec eſſe poteſt, quid huic opus eſt delectu bonorum & malorum? Quid autem ratione? quid intelligentia? quibus utimur ad eam rem ut apertis obſcura aſſequamur. At obſcurum Deo nihil poteſt eſſe. Nam Juſtitia quæ ſuum cuique diſtribuit, quid pertinet ad Deos? hominum enim ſocietas, & communitas, ut vos dicitis, Juſtitiam procreavit: temperantia autem conſtat ex prætermittendis voluptatibus corporis: cui ſi locus in cœlo eſt, eſt etiam voluptatibus. Nam fortis Deus intelligi qui poteſt? in dolore, an in labore, an in periculo? quorum Deum nihil attingit. Nec ratione igitur utentem, nec virtute ulla præditum Deum intelligere qui poſſumus? *Cic.* de *Nat. Deor.* L. III. Sect. 15.

It is therefore ſufficient for the Miniſters of the Church to ſhew that the eſtabliſhed Doctrine is agreeable to Scripture, and teach their People what uſe ought to be made of it, and to caution them againſt the Abuſe; which if they do with Prudence, they will avoid Contentions and Diviſions, and prevent the Miſchiefs which are apt to follow the miſtaken Repreſentations of it.

§ XXXVIII. This is the Method taken by our Church in her XVIIth Article, where we are taught, that *Predeſtination to Life is the everlaſting Purpoſe of God, whereby before the Foundations of the World were laid, he hath conſtantly decreed by his Counſel, ſecret to us, to deliver from Curſe and Damnation thoſe whom he hath choſen in Chriſt out of Mankind, and to bring them by Chriſt to everlaſting Salvation.—And that the godly Conſideration of Predeſtination, and our Election in Chriſt, is full of ſweet, pleaſant, and unſpeakable Comfort to godly Perſons,—as well becauſe it doth greatly eſtabliſh their Faith of eternal Salvation, to be enjoyed through Chriſt, as becauſe it doth fervently kindle their Love toward God.—And yet we muſt receive God's Promiſes, as they be generally ſet forth to us in holy Scripture.* Here you ſee the two Schemes join'd together: And we are allowed all the Comfort that the Conſideration of our being predeſtinated can afford us: and at the ſame time we are given to underſtand that the Promiſes of God are generally conditional; and that notwithſtanding our belief of Predeſtination, we can have no hope of obtaining the benefit of them, but by fulfilling the Conditions. And I hope I have explained them in ſuch a way, as ſhews them to be conſiſtent in themſelves, and of great uſe towards making us holy here, and happy hereafter.

A

SERMON

ON THE

FALL of MAN.

By his GRACE

WILLIAM Lord Archbiſhop of *Dublin.*

THE THIRD EDITION.

On the FALL of MAN.

GEN. II. Ver. 16, 17.

And the Lord God commanded the Man, ſaying, Of every Tree of the Garden thou mayſt freely eat.
But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil thou ſhalt not eat of it: For in the Day that thou eateſt thereof, thou ſhalt ſurely die.

DAILY Experience ſhews us that there is much Ignorance, Folly and Miſery amongſt Men; that we have a proſpect of theſe as ſoon as we begin to think; and that nothing more imbitters Life than that View. The Beaſts are ſick, and want and die as well as Men; but yet are not ſo miſerable, becauſe they ſee no farther than the preſent, and therefore are not tormented with the Remembrance of what is paſt, or the fear of what is to come. Whereas Men are apprized that Pains and Diſeaſes, Diſappointments and Death are before them, and have not the like certainty of one ſingle Act of Pleaſure to ballance the diſmal Conſideration. This ſhould make us ſenſible that we are not in the State in which Nature placed us, ſince a Good God can hardly be ſuppoſed to have made a Creature with leſs Views of Happineſs than of Miſery. From whence we may conclude that our preſent Eſtate is not that wherein God created us, but that we are ſome way or other fallen from it. The Text gives us the occaſion of that Fall, and there is no other Account to be given of our preſent Condition, but what we receive here from the Holy Scriptures: for although all conſidering Men have ſeen and bemoaned our Miſery, yet none could ever diſcover any other rational ground for it, or give any tolerable Reaſon how it came to be ſo.

It is ſurely of great moment to us to be acquainted with it, becauſe it is one Step to the Cure to diſcover the Diſeaſe. It is a Subject not commonly handled, and requires Atten-

Attention in You, as well as Diligence and Care in Me to inform you in the following Particulars.

1ſt. Of the State of Circumſtances of Man, when this Command in the Text was given.

2dly. The Command itſelf forbidding *Adam* to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

3dly. How Man was ſeduced to break this Command.

4thly. The Conſequences of this Diſobedience.

As to the State and Circumſtances of Man when this Command was given.

1ſt. It is manifeſt, that he was then immediately created, and being juſt come out of the hands of God, he was in a ſtate proper to his Nature, pure and innocent, without any Stain or Corruption. He had no Law but that of his Mind, or what he received by immediate Revelation from God; nor any defect, but that which is unavoidably incident to every thing created, which may be perfect in its kind, but cannot be abſolutely ſo; that being proper to God. For to ſay a thing was created is to confeſs that it depends on the Will and Power of him that made it; and therefore it cannot be ſelf-ſufficient, but needs the continual ſupport of its Creator, and the aſſiſtance of ſuch of its fellow Creatures as God has been pleaſed to appoint as neceſſary helpers for its ſubſiſtence. All the Perfection therefore to which Creatures can pretend, is to anſwer the deſign for which they were created. This is that Goodneſs God ſaw in them, This undoutedly Man had, and in this ſenſe he was *very good.* If therefore God did not deſign that Man ſhould be ſelf-ſufficient, but have a Communion with the bodies that are about him, and as a portion of the Univerſe depend on their Aſſiſtance and Influence as to his Material part; it will be no Imperfection in him that he owes his Food to the Earth, his Warmth to the Sun, and his Breath to the Air. For ſince God has made all theſe neceſſary to his Subſiſtance, he anſwers the deſign of Providence, whilſt he uſes them to the purpoſes, to which God has appointed them,

2dly. We muſt remember that if Man's Underſtanding at firſt was never ſo clear, and his ſenſes and faculties never

ſo

ſo ſtrong; yet having made no Obſervations, and being abſolutely without Experience, he could know no more of any thing, than what was revealed by God to him. And there was no neceſſity that God ſhould reveal more Knowledge to him than was at preſent to be uſed by him. You may obſerve in the 19th Verſe of this Chapter, that *out of the Ground the Lord God form'd every Beaſt of the Field, and every Fowl of the Air, and brought them to* Adam, *to ſee what he would call them, and whatſoever* Adam *called every living creature, that was the name thereof.* This was the way by which God taught him Language; and you ſee it went no farther than the Names of the Beaſts of the Earth, and Fowls of the Air amongſt whom he lived, and over whom he was to exerciſe Dominion.

Nor was it any Imperfection in the firſt Man, that he was ignorant of the Nature of things, if we ſuppoſe that he had a certain way to come to that Knowledge, when he had occaſion for it. For the deſign of Knowledge is not to amuſe us or fill our heads with Notions, but to ſerve and direct us in the Affairs of Life. It is only this ſort of Knowledge that is truly valuable: And he that has moſt of it and beſt applies it, is to be accounted moſt wiſe. If therefore *Adam* had a certain way of knowing the nature of every Thing, when he was to employ that Knowledge; though he was actually without it, yet he was in a better State than any of his Poſterity, who have made many Obſervations and are furniſhed with many actual Notions, but have no certain way of coming to ſuch Knowledge as upon every Occaſion is neceſſary for their Direction.

3dly. Therefore we muſt conceive that *Adam* was under the immediate conduct and direction of God, and was not to judge for himſelf, but was to leave himſelf entirely to be guided and directed by his Maker. You ſee he was not left to determine for himſelf what he ſhould eat: But God by Revelation aſſigned him his Food and provided it for him. So Chap. 1. v. 29. *And God ſaid, Behold I have given you every herb bearing ſeed which is upon the face of all the Earth: And every Tree in which is the fruit of a Tree yielding ſeed, to you it ſhall be for Meat.* And in the Text,

of every Tree in the Garden thou mayſt freely eat. This ſeems added, becauſe theſe Trees of Paradiſe were not planted when God made the Revelation of the firſt Chapter: And therefore it might be doubted whether they were intended for the Food of Man, or given him by the former Revelation, if God had not expreſly declared it.

Now if a Man was not to feed himſelf before he had God's Direction for it, which ſaved him the trouble and hazard of finding out by Trials what was fit for him; It is reaſonable to believe that in every Affair of Life he was to depend on the ſame Direction; that he was not to aſſume to himſelf that Knowledge of Good and Evil, that is, of what was profitable or hurtful to him, but entirely to depend on God for the Determination thereof, and whilſt he did ſo, he could never know Evil, becauſe God would always direct him to what was Good, and to that only.

It is to be conſidered that Man by his Conſtitution was Mortal, and ſubject to the Impreſſions of the Bodies that ſurrounded him; for being compoſed of the Elements as to his material Part, in which he reſembled other living Creatures, thoſe might be ſeparated and diſſolved, and the Separation of the Parts of our Body infers Death. And therefore Man in his natural Compoſition was ſubject to it; but yet was capable of Immortality, to which he could not be intitled but from a ſupernatural Principle, and the peculiar Care of God. For it was impoſſible that Man's Underſtanding how great ſoever, ſhould be ſo perfect as to enable him of himſelf to know and avoid all thoſe things that might occaſion a Decay and Diſſolution of his Body. Only God's Knowledge could reach this; and therefore it is manifeſt he muſt depend on that; and on all occaſions have recourſe to it, if he expected to continue Immortal.

Nor 4thly, Was his being obliged to ſuch dependance to be looked on as a Defect, but rather a moſt ſignal Favour. I obſerved before, that he depended on the Air for Breath, on the Sun for Warmth, and on the Earth for Food; And yet none of theſe could be reckon'd an Imperfection; How much leſs could his Dependance on his Creator

Creator for the inlightning and informing his Underſtanding for the Diſcovery of what was Good and Evil, either in his Moral or Natural Actions, be look'd upon as derogatory to his Nature. On the contrary nothing could be a greater Honour to him, than that God ſhould vouchſafe to become his Guide; nothing could be a greater Security or Advantage. This muſt and only could take away all Doubt and Solicitouſneſs out of his Mind and render him perfectly eaſy and ſecure. By this he had the Benefit of all Knowledge, and was freed from the trouble of acquiring it.

It is true that we have now an unmeaſurable Thirſt of improving our Underſtanding and penetrating into the Nature of Things, we reckon a great part of our Happineſs to conſiſt in it, and value ourſelves on it; but we are not to imagine that it was ſo from the beginning. The reaſon of our Eagerneſs for Knowledge now ariſes from our depending on our own Conduct. Hence on all occaſions we find great Uſe for it, and having nothing elſe to truſt to, that can lead us through the Difficulties of Life, we endeavour to know as much as we can, and are glad when we can attain to any new Notion; becauſe we find ourſelves often at a loſs and cannot tell how ſoon it may be uſeful to us. But whilſt Man was not to judge for himſelf, whilſt he depended on the Omniſciency of God to direct him, he had no ſuch occaſion for knowing the Nature of Things, nor need be much concerned about them. For to what purpoſe ſhould *Adam* have deſired to acquire Knowledge, when he could have recourſe to the infinite Wiſdom of God on all occaſions to inform and guide him? Whilſt Children are ſupply'd by their Parents, can call for any thing they want, they are little covetous of Money, and can hardly be prevailed with to apply their Heads to the Methods of acquiring it; nor are they fond of it when they have it: But a Stock being once put into their Hands, and they finding that they muſt want, if they do not provide and manage induſtriouſly, They do by degrees grow thirſty of Gain and parſimonious; lay projects and eagerly purſue the means of enriching themſelves. We may conceive it

was thus with Man in his Innocency; and that he was little ſolicitous about acquiring Knowledge, whilſt he could recur to the inexhauſtible Stock of God his Parent, and be ſupply'd by a free Communication from thence on all Occaſions. But when by Sin he cut himſelf off from that, and became his own Maſter to judge what was good and evil for himſelf, he then found himſelf under continual doubts and Difficulties; he is become ſenſible of his Ignorance and Diſability how to determine in the Affairs of Life, and has no other Aſſiſtance than his own Underſtanding: This makes him diligent to improve it, and as covetous of Knowledge as of Money; and ſo ſearches for the treaſure of the one with as much Induſtry and Pains as of the other. Whereas whilſt he depended on God only for his Direction, he was freed from all that Labour, Thirſt and Anxiety wherewith he now proſecutes Knowledge, and was content with the inexhauſtible Treaſure of Divine Wiſdom, to which he had an eaſy and ready Acceſs on all Occaſions: and till we have the like again we can never be happy or ſecure. God is the Father of Spirits, and as a Father he is ready to make Proviſion for them, if they will have recourſe to him and depend on him. He is the Light of Souls, and has the ſame proportion to them, that the Sun and his Beams have to the Eye. Whilſt we have the uſe of theſe, we know our way and can ſee about us; But when theſe are abſent, we are forced to uſe artificial Lights that can never perfectly ſupply the want of them. All our acquired Knowledge is but like theſe artificial Lights that can never ſupply the Communication of Wiſdom, which God was pleaſed to impart to our firſt Parents in that State of Innocency, and of which he deprived them for their Sin. This I ſuppoſe may be ſufficient to teach us the Condition and Circumſtances of Man when that Command in the Text was given him.

As to the Command itſelf, which was the 2d Head of my Diſcourſe, *But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, thou ſhalt not eat of it, for in the Day that thou eateſt thereof thou ſhalt ſurely die*; We are to conſider, 1ſt. the Tree here mentioned.

2dly

2dly. The Congruity of God's applying it to the preſent uſe, and

3dly. The Reaſonableneſs of God's making it an Inſtance of our Obedience.

Concerning the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil here mentioned, Let us obſerve 1ſt. that it was a true literal Tree, and that we are not to be put off with a meer Figure. For it is ſaid, v. 9. of the Chapter. *And out of the Ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleaſant to the Sight, and good for Food, the Tree of Life alſo in the midſt of the Garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.* If the Trees for ſight and food were true literal Trees, then ſo likewiſe were the Trees of Life and Knowledge, for both are equally ſaid to grow out of the Ground. And when God in the Text allows Man to eat of the other Trees, he forbids him on pain of Death to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Now to underſtand *eating* and *Trees* literally in one part of the Text, and figuratively in the other, when there is no intimation or ground for a different Senſe, is incongruous to reaſon. No! it will be plain to any one that conſiders the deſign of *Moſes*, that he is giving us here the literal Hiſtory of the Creation of the World, of the Making and Fall of Man, and not an *Allegory*. But becauſe this does not ſuit with the Notions of ſome Men, to whom the Scripture in the literal Senſe ſeems not ſufficiently ſpiritual, therefore they endeavour to allegorize the Hiſtory of Man's Fall, but might with equal reaſon turn his Creation and that of the World into a Figure. And it is obſervable that the ſame Perſons that put a figurative Senſe on the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, and on the manner of Man's becoming liable to Death, as the Scriptures deliver it; do the ſame with the Methods God has appointed for our Recovery, and deny not only the literal Sacraments, but likewiſe the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, the Power of the literal Death of Chriſt and the Satisfaction purchaſed by it. But we muſt not ſeparate the literal from the myſtical Senſe; as we muſt not deny the Baptiſm of Water, becauſe we acknowledge that of the Spirit, nor the Reſurrection of our Bodies becauſe we own another of

our Souls; ſo neither muſt we deny a literal Tree of Knowledge becauſe it had a myſtical Senſe and Importance.

And this brings me to the ſecond thing concerning this Tree, the congruity of God's applying it to the uſe mentioned in the Text: For the Underſtanding of which we muſt remember that God in all his Intercourſes with Men has conſtantly made uſe of ſome viſible or outward Means; and that it is reaſonable it ſhould be ſo. For ſince Man has a Body as well as a Soul; Senſes as well as Underſtanding; and that the Soul does make uſe of the Organs of the Body and of the Senſes for its information; and that this is the natural courſe of our acquiring Knowledge; it were a violence to the Nature of Man to invert the Method, or ſeparate the one from the other. And therefore God in his Communications with us ſeems induſtriouſly to have avoided it; eſpecially where the joyning them together may contribute to the certainty and effectualneſs of the Revelation, and to ſecure us from being impoſed on by pretenders. Whenever therefore God has ſhewed any Miracle, he has made uſe of ſome outward Action to prepare the Minds of Men for it, and aſcertain them of his preſence. Thus *Moſes* did all his Miracles with his Rod, Thus *Eliſha* ordered *Naaman* to waſh ſeven times in the river *Jordan* to cure his Leproſie. And although God induſtriouſly avoided aſſuming any ſhape, when he gave the Law; yet he aſſured the People of *Iſrael* that he was preſent by Thunder, Smoke and Fire at Mount *Sinai*, and by a burning Buſh at his firſt appearance to *Moſes*. Nor did our Saviour go about the public execution of his Office, 'till anointed by the *Spirit*, and viſibly commiſſioned to it by the *Holy Ghoſt* deſcending on him in a bodily ſhape: And thus he ſtill communicates to us the Principles of our new Birth by Water, and his Body and Blood by Bread and Wine. Now this being the manner of God's entertaining an Intercourſe with Man through the whole Scripture, it is very evident that the two remarkable Trees of Paradiſe, that of Life, and this of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, were deſigned for theſe myſtical purpoſes, and intended as ſettled and viſible means to ſupply Man with God's

God's Influence and Aſſiſtance in thoſe caſes in which he could want them.

For 1ſt. Man might be at a loſs how to preſerve his Body from Decays, to which (as was obſerved before) it was naturally ſubject. And 2dly, how to direct his Actions. For the firſt of theſe God appointed the Tree of Life. Not that any Tree by any natural Virtue could preſerve us immortal: but ſince God commanded Man to eat of it as often as he needed to be reſtor'd in his Body, he ſurely was ready and able to convey his ſupernatural Aſſiſtance to him by it, and make it effectual to the deſign for which it was appointed. Man's eating therefore of it with Faith and in Obedience to God, was the Signal upon which the Divine Power was pleas'd to exert itſelf for the Reſtauration of him to his primitive Vigour. And there is no more difficulty to conceive how this ſhould be done, than how the *Iſraelites* in the Wilderneſs ſhould be cured of the Bitings of the venomous Creatures by looking on the brazen Serpent. Every faithful Chriſtian expects God ſhould anſwer his Prayers, and grant him ſome things, which he could not have without aſking; and if God exert his Power on our ſpeaking a word, or offering a deſire, which have no natural Virtue to procure the Effect; he may do the ſame upon our giving a Signal by ſome Action appointed by him to that purpoſe. If he gives his *Holy Spirit* to them that aſk it according to his Promiſe, why not to thoſe likewiſe who in Obedience to his Command are baptized in his Name? And if he give Life and Immortality now to thoſe that believe and are baptiſed, why might he not give and preſerve Life by means of that Tree, to the uſe of which he had promiſed it, when they in Faith ſhould eat of it? Now that Life was annexed to the uſe of that Tree is plain from Chap. 3. ver. 22. *And now leſt he put forth his hand, and take alſo of the Tree of Life, and eat and live for ever; therefore the Lord God ſent him forth from the Garden of* Eden. This ſhews that the reſtoring of Strength and preſervation of Life was annexed to that Tree by an irrevocable Decree: for the Words plainly intimate that if Man after his fall, could have continued the uſe of it, he had been Immortal.

And as God provided for the preſervation of his Body by the tree of Life, ſo he likewiſe provided for his Soul, and taught him how to govern it by the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil: and this he was not to eat, nor to touch it. By which was ſignified unto him that he was not to pretend or any way to judge what was good or evil for him: but on all occaſions to have recourſe to God, and entirely to reſign and truſt himſelf to the Divine Conduct. That as it was by the Declaration of God certain Death to eat of this Tree on account of its being a Symbol of the immediate dependance on his Maker, for the diſtinguiſhing of what was good or evil for him; ſo he was not to truſt to his own Underſtanding for the determining of theſe; but to have recourſe to God without further concerning himſelf about them.

And this ſufficiently ſhews how congruous it was for God to make uſe of this Tree for this purpoſe, and is a Step to diſcover to us the reaſonableneſs of God's making Man's abſtinence from it an inſtance of Obedience; which was the 3d thing to be ſhewed concerning it.

For the underſtanding of which, you muſt obſerve, 1ſt. That the whole Duty of Man lay in obedience to this Command, as the whole means of Immortality was in eating of the Tree of Life. Whilſt man refrain'd from eating of this Tree, he could have no other Temptation, he could neither feel nor know any Evil, for he was under the immediate care and protection of God; and thoſe were ſufficient to preſerve him from all hurt or miſchief; which his own Underſtanding could never do. Man's whole Duty therefore and ſafety were comprehended in this one Command: and as the uſe of the Tree of Life was an infallible and the only means of preſerving his Body, ſo the eating of this, and thereby violating the Divine Command, was the only way to hurt his Soul. This was the only Door by which Evil could come in upon him, and if he had kept that ſhut, it could never have entered.

2dly. We muſt conſider that Man was fallible in his Underſtanding, peccable in his Will, and mortal in his Body; and therefore the preſerving him from Deceit, Sin and Death muſt be due to ſome ſupernatural Grace of God;

and that in order to confer that Grace there ought to be ſome obvious means, eaſy to be known and ready to be uſed. And perhaps it will be hard to think of any other way ſo ſuitable as this which God choſe. For if ſome outward means ought to be uſed, this reſtraining him from the uſe of one of the Trees ſeems the moſt proper: ſome ſuch Symbol ſeems not only reaſonable but neceſſary; and food being the only thing he needed, and that provided for him out of the fruits of the Earth, the Inſtance could not be ſo proper in any other matter.

3dly. We muſt remember that Man was created a free Agent, and it is the Nature of ſuch to be pleas'd with nothing that is not agreeable to their choice. The beſt and moſt pleaſing thing in the World if it be forced on us againſt our choice, is uneaſy to us. There muſt be ſomething of choice in what makes us happy; and could there be a more eaſy thing to be left to that, than not to eat of one Tree where there were ſo many? We may imagine that God in effect ſaid to Man, Your Nature requires that you ſhould chooſe thoſe things the enjoyment whereof will make you happy. I will make your Duty eaſy unto you; abſtain from this one Tree, and whilſt you do ſo, I will take care that you ſhall not chooſe amiſs in any thing elſe. Your obedience in this ſhall be an infallible means to ſecure you from chooſing wrong in any other thing. Whilſt you uſe your Free-Will right in this, I will take care that you ſhall not abuſe it on any other occaſion. Some Inſtance of your free Obedience is neceſſary: And this is the moſt eaſy that could be provided for you. But by your wrong uſe of Free-Will here, you will open a Gate for Sin and Death to enter.

Surely this account makes this Command very reaſonable, very agreeable for God to give, and Man to receive. And from this it appears that it was not given meerly as an arbitrary tryal of ſubmiſſion to the Will of God; but rather as a means to facilitate and ſecure the Obedience we owe him. When *Chriſt* ſent the blind Man to the Waters of *Siloam* for opening his Eyes, no-body will ſay that that Command was a meer tryal of his Obedience; but rather a means to reſtore his Sight. And ſo when God commanded Man here not to eat of the *Tree of Knowledge*, &c. That Abſti-

nence was not impoſed upon him ſo much by the way of tryal, as to be a means to aſſure him of the Grace and Aſſiſtance of God. This gave him an Intereſt in his own Happineſs, becauſe it made it in ſome meaſure depend on his Free-Will, without which it could not have been Happineſs, as has been ſhew'd before; and yet it made it ſo eaſy to him, that nothing but the Goodneſs of God could have found out ſo very ſenſible and ſo effectual a means. Thus you ſee a fair meaning and reaſon of this Command, and that there is no neceſſity of forſaking the Letter of Scripture to juſtify God's impoſing it.

Let us now in the 3d place conſider by what means Man was ſeduced to break this Command. Of this we have an Account, Ch. 3. When God aſks the Queſtion of the Woman, ſhe anſwers, v. 13. *The Serpent beguiled me and I did eat.* Now it will be neceſſary, 1ſt, to conſider the Seducer, and 2dly, the Argument by which he prevailed on her. As to the Seducer, 'twas a Serpent, Ch. 3. v. 1. *Now the Serpent was more ſubtle than any Beaſt of the Field, which the Lord God had made; and he ſaid unto the Woman, yea, hath God ſaid ye ſhall not eat of every Tree of the Garden?* From which you are to obſerve, 1ſt, that this was a literal Serpent; the ſame Serpent that is now curs'd, and goes on his Belly, and eats Duſt; that is hated and abhorred by Man, that is ſo poiſonous and pernicious to him, between whom and Man there is a natural Enmity to this Day, is literally meant in this place, and is not to be allegoriſed away, as ſome would have it.

2dly. The Serpent was then the moſt ſubtle and cunning of Beaſts, we muſt not underſtand this of him, as now ſtupify'd by the Curſe of God, but as created at firſt in perfection. The tradition of whoſe cunning was ſo conſtant and univerſal that it became proverbial among all the Antients, with whom to be wiſe as Serpents (meaning the firſt of the kind) denotes the perfection of Subtlety; which ſhews a general belief that he had at firſt a Sagacity more than ordinary.

3dly. We are not to wonder that *Eve* was not ſurpriz'd or frighten'd at the Serpent's ſpeaking to her; for as I obſerv'd before, ſhe had yet no experience of things, was ignorance

norant of the nature of Beaſts, and for ought ſhe knew, all of them might ſpeak as well as *Adam* did. This Ignorance could be no hurt to her, for if ſhe had deſir'd to know, ſhe had no more to do but to apply herſelf to God, who was her immediate Director, and would have diſcover'd it to her, if ſhe had aſk'd it; and we are not to doubt but it was as eaſy for her to have had recourſe to him, as it is for us to open our Eyes in order to ſee; and therefore ſhe was as inexcuſable as a Man would be that ſhould fall into a Pit becauſe he would not look before him.

But 4thly. Tho' this was a true literal Serpent, yet there was more in it, the Devil made uſe of it to compaſs his Ends: And he was the Perſon that ſpake through it. This, as I take it, is confeſs'd by all; for no Brute could ever reaſon or ſpeak of itſelf: And it ought to be obſerv'd that when the worſhip of the Devil was ſettled in the World, a Serpent was the Sign and Symbol of whatever was ſacred to him; he was worſhipped under that form, and ſeem'd to take a peculiar Pleaſure to appear and receive homage in that Shape in which he deceived Man. Add to this, that a Serpent was the Beaſt by which he vented his Oracles in many Places, and the very Word by which his Divinations are ſignified in ſeveral Languages is taken from this Animal; as if the Devil were ſtill acting his Deceits in the Serpent.

As to the Argument that he uſed to ſeduce our firſt Parents, we ſhall find it a very plauſible one. 'Tis in Chap. 3. v. 4. *And the Serpent ſaid unto the Woman, Ye ſhall not ſurely die; for God doth know, that in the Day ye eat thereof, then your Eyes ſhall be opened, and ye ſhall be as Gods knowing Good and Evil.* The Meaning of this ſeems to be as if he had ſaid, God doth but mock you, when he threatens you with Death; this is not the reaſon why he forbids you the Uſe of this Tree: the true deſign is to keep you in Ignorance, to blindfold you, and hinder you from judging for yourſelves by your own Eyes and Reaſon. By this means you are kept altogether in a dependance on him, and obliged in all caſes to have recourſe to him, and not ſuffer'd to enquire by the ſtrength of your own Faculties, what may hurt or help you. You have not the uſe of the Senſes and Underſtanding

ſtanding you poſſeſs by Nature, but are kept in a blind unreaſonable ſubjection to his Will. But he knows if you eat of this Tree, you ſhall be freed from this pupilage of Slavery. That you will of yourſelves, as well as he, underſtand what is good or evil for you, and ſo need not be beholden to him: He judges what is good for himſelf, and that Privilege makes him God: and therefore you may be ſure it is a pleaſant thing to do ſo. And for this reaſon he keeps it to himſelf, and will not allow it you. But if you will venture and eat, you will then be like him, and be competent Judges of your own Advantage, as well as he is. Thus our firſt Parent was prevail'd on to ſuſpect God, and make a tryal by Diſobedience whether her own Eyes and Underſtanding might not be ſufficient to direct her. Nor is it any wonder ſhe was deceiv'd, if we conſider her want of Experience and innocent Simplicity. Not that ſhe was excuſable, ſince ſhe had no more to take care of but this one thing, and ſhe ought to have had recourſe to God or her Huſband before ſhe made the experiment. But the Argument was ſo framed as to prevent that recourſe, and therefore it only was capable to deceive her. The Serpent ſuggeſted to her, that God impoſed on her, and therefore it ſeemed improper to conſult with him, when ſhe deſired to diſcover whether it was ſo or no. This is ſo powerful a Method of deceiving that it is obſervable it ſeldom fails to be effectual, and that an Argument almoſt like this corrupts the generality of Mankind. Either ill Company or our own Heads ſuggeſt to us, when we are Children and ignorant of our Intereſt, that our Parents Guardians and Tutors debar us of the pleaſures of Life, out of envy. We argue with ourſelves and one another, that theſe old Fellows keep us to our Books and to our Work, debar us of our pleaſures and recreations, bring us under Rules, and admoniſh us to be aware of Luſt, and Exceſſes, that they may engroſs thoſe to themſelves and keep us in a dependance on them; that therefore they will not ſuffer us to try theſe Enjoyments, and that the deſign of all is to make us ſlaves. Whereas we are apt to think, that we have Underſtanding enough to manage ourſelves, and therefore why may we not be left to be our own guides and to chooſe for ourſelves? Hence we

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conclude, let us make the Experiment and throw off the Reſtraints our conductors would put on us. And thus thouſands have been and daily are deceived. And few young People are able to reſiſt the force of this Temptation; which ſhews the power of it: eſpecially when it comes as it did on *Eve*, cloathed with all outward advantage of Allurement, as in the 6th v. *The Tree was good for food, pleaſant to the Eyes, and a Tree to be deſir'd to make one wiſe.* So wiſe that they needed no more to conſult God to teach them what was Good or Evil for them. Theſe were Charms ſhe could not eaſily reſiſt; by theſe ſhe was then ſeduc'd, and deceived her Huſband, and by the like Temptations her Poſterity daily fall. Whoever knows the humour of Youth, and how it was with himſelf when Young, doth alſo know that this Curioſity of trying the pleaſures of Senſe, this Itch of being our own Maſters and chooſing for ourſelves, together with the charming face of Sins, and our ignorance and inexperience of the conſequences of them, are generally the firſt means of our being corrupted, againſt the good Maxims and Principles we receive from our Parents and Teachers: As the fairneſs of the Fruit, the ſeeming properneſs of it for food, and the deſire of being judge for herſelf of what might be good and evil, of being under her own Management and Government, were the Inducements that prevailed with our firſt Parent to throw off the conduct of God.

There remains now the 4th and laſt part of what I propoſed, the conſequences of this Diſobedience. They are ſo diſmal and numerous, that I can only hint at ſome of the principal of them. The firſt of them was the opening theſe Sinners Eyes, Ch. 3. 7. *And the Eyes of them both were opened.* A Man's Eyes are ſaid to be opened when he perceives or diſcovers ſomething relating to his State and Condition which he did not obſerve before. Now before this Tranſgreſſion Man had not diſcovered any want or defect in himſelf: He was directed by the Wiſdom of God, and ſupply'd by his All-ſufficiency, and therefore wanted nothing for his Conduct and Support. But when he put himſelf out of the Divine Protection, and was to manage and ſupport himſelf; he ſoon ſaw and felt his Imperfections and Wants.

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Whilſt young Children are under their Parents Government and Care; they are ſolicitous about nothing; They are not concern'd about their Meat, Drink or Safety, any farther than to call to their Parents for them when they want them: nor are they afraid while they are near them: but if they ſhould withdraw themſelves, and leave their Children in the dark, or in a Wilderneſs, their Eyes would ſoon be open'd; they would ſoon ſee and feel their Impotence to help and defend themſelves; Concern and Terror would ſeize them, and take away the uſe of the little Reaſon they have. We may imagine this to be the Condition of our firſt Parents, when God withdrew his Influence and Protection from them upon their deſerting him. Their Eyes were opened as ſoon as they were left to themſelves. They found their Neceſſities and Wants. They found the ſhortneſs of their own Power to help them, and inſufficiency of their own Underſtanding to direct them. They found themſelves incompetent Judges of what was good or evil for them, and they then in earneſt, to their coſt, *knew Evil*, that is, felt it. This was a natural Conſequence of their ſetting up to be their own Maſters, and to judge for themſelves: no finite Underſtanding being ſufficient to foreſee or know what in the infinite variety of our Circumſtances may hurt us; and tho' it did foreſee them, yet nothing leſs than an Almighty Power is able to prevent the Miſchief. The opening therefore of our firſt Parents Eyes to ſee their impendent Miſeries, and their Impotency to help themſelves, was the firſt effect of their Sin.

The 2d was their ſenſe of their being naked, and ſhame that they were ſo. Shame proceeds from a Conſciouſneſs of Weakneſs, or of Guilt, and from a ſecret Pride that makes us unwilling to own it, leſt we ſhould be deſpiſed for it. Man could not be conſcious of either before his Fall, becauſe he was innocent from Guilt, and was covered by the Power of God againſt all the defects of his natural Weakneſs; but being now left to himſelf, he felt both. He had offended God, and had no defence againſt his fellow-Creatures: the Sun ſcorch'd him, the Rain wet him, and the Cold pierc'd him. He found an Inconveniency in expoſing his Body, and was aſham'd of the Effects of it. He found himſelf

himſelf mov'd with Luſt and other irregular Paſſions, and his Reaſon unable to curb them. Whereas the Power of God, whilſt he was under the Divine Government, had kept all his Faculties in perfect order. He ſaw therefore now great hurt in Nakedneſs, which no way incommoded him whilſt cover'd in Innocency.

The 3d Effect of this Tranſgreſſion of our firſt Parents was Averſion to God. Ch. 3. v. 8. *And* Adam *and his Wife hid themſelves from the Preſence of the Lord God amongſt the Trees of the Garden:* ver. 10. *I was afraid, becauſe I was naked, and I hid myſelf.* This was a very natural Effect; for ſince they were concern'd to ſee their Nakedneſs, ſince they were aſham'd of it, and it now diſpleas'd their Eyes, they could not think it could be pleaſing to God. There was a viſible Preſence of God in *Eden*, and Man no doubt was taught to come before him with Decency and Reverence: And being now blotted and ſtain'd with Sin in his Soul, and naked in his Body, he muſt needs be afraid to appear in ſuch Circumſtances before his Maker. When he was aſham'd to ſee himſelf, he might well be afraid to be ſeen of God. A Child that has dirty'd and hurt himſelf in diſobeying his Parent's Command, will naturally fly his Preſence. Thus it far'd with Man in Paradiſe, and thus it continues with us his Poſterity to this Day. We are afraid of that Commerce, and flee that Communion with God that was the great Comfort and Security of Man in his Innocency.

The 4th Conſequence of Man's Tranſgreſſion was God's pronouncing Sentence on each of the Tranſgreſſors; on the Serpent, on the Woman, and laſtly on *Adam*.

Firſt on the Serpent, *And the Lord God ſaid unto the Serpent, Thou art curſed above all Cattle, and above every Beaſt of the Field; upon thy Belly ſhalt thou go, and Duſt ſhalt thou eat all the Days of thy Life; and I will put Enmity between thee and the Woman, between thy Seed and her Seed, it ſhall bruiſe thy Head, and thou ſhalt bruiſe his Heel.* To be curſed is to become abominable and miſerable; to be deſigned and devoted to Deſtruction; to be under the Diſpleaſure of God and the Execration of Men. The Serpent carries ſtill the Marks of this Curſe, and is forced to cover and hide its Head on all occaſions, as being offenſive

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to the Eye, and obnoxious to the revenge of any that can ſurpriſe it. We kill other Creatures for Food or Diverſion, but Serpents are declar'd Enemies; we equally hate and fear them, and therefore deſtroy them with Pleaſure and Eagerneſs.

The 2d part of the Serpent's Puniſhment is to go on his Belly, and feed on Duſt. How he was framed at firſt we know not, but ſee now that he crawls on the Ground, and can't lift up his Head. This was a juſt Puniſhment for his high Attempt in oppoſing himſelf to God, and teaching Man to queſtion the Goodneſs and Veracity of his Maker. As to his Food which God has here decreed to be Duſt, it was very congruous that the Serpent who had tempted our firſt Parents by the lovelineſs of the Fruit of the Tree of Good and Evil, ſhould be condemn'd to the vileſt of Meat, and be obliged to feed on Filth and Dirt; that his Fault might in ſome meaſure be ſeen in his Puniſhment.

The 3d part of the Sentence paſs'd on the Serpent, is Enmity between him and Man his Lord, which continues to this Day, their very Natures being contrary and deſtructive to one another. There is a perpetual War between them, and tho' he ſometimes hurts or wounds his Maſter by ſurpriſe in his more ignoble Parts; yet he has the worſt of it: for Man bruiſes his Head and effectually deſtroys him. All this is literally true, and without an Allegory. But if it be enquired why the Serpent was thus ſentenced, when he committed no Fault, but was acted by the Devil? It muſt be anſwer'd, that he was the only viſible Tempter that appear'd to Man, and therefore the Puniſhment was firſt to fall on him, for Example ſake, and to beget in us an abhorrence of the Guilt. The Serpent of himſelf was no more capable of being puniſhed than of ſinning; but theſe Marks of God's Diſpleaſure were left on him for our ſake, that we might have a viſible Remembrancer of what Sin deſerves. If the Inſtruments of the Temptation were thus uſed, we may be ſure the principal Actor did not eſcape the Vengeance of God.

But 2dly, If we ſuppoſe the Devil poſſeſſed the Serpent, and was as it were incarnate in it; we may have leave to think that the Power of God could unite them as cloſely as

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our Souls and Bodies are joined, and cauſe the Puniſhment inflicted on the literal Serpent to affect Satan in it, as well as the Injuries done our Bodies do reach our Souls; at leaſt while that very Serpent was in Being.

3dly. Inaſmuch as the Literal Senſe does not exclude the Myſtical, the Curſing of the Serpent is a Symbol to us, and a viſible pledge of the Malediction with which the Devil is ſtruck by God, and whereby he is become the moſt abominable and miſerable of Creatures. The Serpent's being confined to go on his Belly, points out to us the wretchedneſs of that Condition to which the Devil is reduced: his eating Duſt, the blaſting of all his Enjoyments, and debarring him from all thoſe Pleaſures that flow from the Right-Hand of God; being thrown below the Feet of all other Creatures, to be trampled by them; that is to be confined to the loweſt, vileſt and moſt miſerable, as well as moſt contemptible Eſtate. As to the Serpent's Enmity with Man, it needs no great pains to apply it to the Devil. It is plain he is continually laying Snares for us; he lies in Ambuſh and ſurpriſes us; he wounds us in our Paſſions and lower Faculties, and by theſe ſometimes reaches our Souls: though that can never be, if we don't conſent to it, and by that make it our own Act. But Man by the help of the *Seed of the Woman*, that is by our Saviour, ſhall bruiſe his head, wound him in the place that is moſt mortal, and finally confound and deſtroy him with eternal ruin. In the mean time the enmity and abhorrence we have of the Serpent is a continual warning to us of the danger we are in from the Devil, and how heartily we ought to hate and abhor him and all his works.

2dly. As to the Woman, her Puniſhment conſiſts of two Parts, 1ſt, in the Pains of Child-bearing. v. 16. of Ch. 3. *And to the Woman he ſaid, I will greatly multiply thy Sorrow and thy Conception. In Sorrow thou ſhall bring forth Children.* This was a very juſt and proper Puniſhment. She had brought Sorrow and Death on all her Poſterity, and in bringing them forth it was but reaſonable ſhe ſhould ſuffer ſomething of what they were to ſuffer all their Lives: And it is continued on all thoſe that deſcend from her, as an Item and Memorandum of the Miſchief brought on Mankind

kind by Sin. By this ſhe and her Deſcendants may learn how much God abhors Diſobedience, and it is a Pledge to them of God's Anger againſt the Guilty.

The 2d. part of her Puniſhment is in theſe Words in the ſame Verſe, *Thy deſire ſhall be to thy Huſband, and he ſhall rule over thee.* This too was a moſt reaſonable Sentence, and proportionable to her Sin. Her Offence was an Attempt to be a judge of Good and Evil for herſelf, to be her own Miſtreſs, and depend no more on God for her Government. Inſtead of attaining her Deſign, God makes her ſubject to her Huſband; places thoſe Deſires and Inclinations on him which ſhe had withdrawn from God, and conſtitutes him her Ruler and Head. By this ſhe and her whole Sex became Subjects, and dependent on the froward Will of thoſe Huſbands ſhe had corrupted; being obliged to endure not only the Miſeries of her own choice, but likewiſe a Share in thoſe of her Huſband's. This is a Demonſtration to us of the Folly of an Attempt to judge of Good and Evil for ourſelves, and the great Abhorrence God has of Sin; ſince he avenges it not only on the Perſon immediately guilty, but extends the Puniſhment to the whole Sex.

As to the Man, his Puniſhment conſiſts in the following Particulars, 1ſt, v. 17. *Becauſe thou haſt hearkened unto the Voice of thy Wife, and haſt eaten of the Tree of which I commanded thee ſaying, Thou ſhalt not eat of it; Curſed is the Ground for thy ſake. In ſorrow ſhalt thou eat of it all the Days of thy Life.* This Puniſhment is rightly adapted to Man's Sin. He would not be content with the Meat God had provided for him, which the Earth of itſelf furniſhed him by God's Appointment, therefore God decreed that it ſhould do ſo no more, but Man ſhould be put to force his Food out of it, and provide for himſelf with Labour and Toil, with the Sweat of his Brows and the Anguiſh of his Heart: By this we may underſtand how much better it had been to have left the proviſion of Suſtenance for us to God, and to depend on him for it, as well as for the Government of our Actions. Since we would not do the latter, God has refuſed to do the former for us.

The 2d. part of God's Sentence againſt Man, is the Condemnation of him to temporal Death, v. 19. of Ch. 3. *For Duſt thou art, and unto Duſt thou ſhalt return.* It was obſerved before that Man by his natural Conſtitution was Mortal, and that it was only by the eſpecial Favour of God, that he was preſerved from Death. Since therefore he had forfeited that Favour, he muſt of courſe ſink into his native mortality. It was not neceſſary that God ſhould alter his Nature or Conſtitution to make him Mortal, there needed no more but taking away the means of Immortality, the uſe of the Tree of Life, to ſubject him to Death; and the uſe of it was no ways due to his Nature: God therefore did him no Injuſtice by depriving him and his Poſterity of Paradiſe and the uſe of the Tree of Life, theſe being matters of Favour, and we intitled to them only on this condition, that our firſt Parents ſhould continue in Obedience to God. This withdrawing of God's Favour is a great and dreadful Puniſhment, but far from Injuſtice, becauſe it takes nothing from us that was due to our Nature, and leaves us ſtill in a condition preferable to not being at all, which is as much as God in ſtrictneſs of Juſtice is obliged to do for any Creature. Thus we find ourſelves ſubjected to the Diſpleaſure and Wrath of God by our deſcent from *Adam*, ſo far as to prevail with God to withdraw from us his peculiar Favours that he deſigned for us, if our firſt Parents had continued in their Obedience, the conſequence of which is that we become ſubject to Pains and Miſeries, to Sickneſs and temporal Death.

But 2dly. The Souls of Men are immortal, and capable of Miſery or Happineſs after this Life, and the Tranſgreſſion of *Adam* does likewiſe affect them, and they become liable to Damnation on account thereof. It ſeems indeed hard that God's Anger ſhould reach ſo far as to deprive all Mankind of eternal Happineſs for the Sin of one, but if we conſider Man as a free Agent, we ſhall find that eternal Happineſs is not abſolutely due to him, but only the poſſibility thereof: and if God has not deprived us of that poſſibility, he has done us no Injuſtice. And it appears from the very Hiſtory of Man's Fall, that God has not done that: for he has entered into new Terms of Sal-

vation with us, and has intimated them, though obſcurely, in the 3d. Ch. and 15th ver. when he declares that *the Seed of the Woman ſhall bruiſe the Head of the Serpent.* Signifying thereby that Mankind ſhould not deſpair. For notwithſtanding the Devil had got an Advantage over them, yet by the means of Chriſt they ſhould finally conquer and vanquiſh him. And the World was ſo far poſſeſſed with the belief of the poſſibility of a Reconciliation with God, that they ſtill applied to him with Prayers and Sacrifices; and he gave them ſufficient Proof, that his Mercy towards them was not quite extinct, and that he ſtill continued his Goodneſs to the wicked Poſterity of wicked Parents. Hence St. *Paul* obſerves, *Acts* 14. 16. *That tho' God in Times paſt ſuffer'd all Nations to walk in their own ways, yet he left not himſelf without Witneſs in that he did Good, and gave us Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seaſons, filling our Hearts with Food and Gladneſs.*

But 3dly. We may conceive a double Happineſs, firſt, that which is abſolute and perfect, according to the utmoſt Capacity of the Creature that enjoys it. 2dly. That which is better than not to be, but yet is mixed with Sufferings, and may come as much ſhort of perfect Bleſſedneſs as our preſent State is diſtant from perfect Eaſe and Pleaſure. The latter of theſe is due in Juſtice to every Being that God has made, if they have not forfeited their Title by Sin. But the firſt of theſe is a Favour that God may beſtow on whom he pleaſes, or with-hold from them upon other Conſiderations beſides guilt. The Sin of our firſt Parents is ſuch a Motive as has induced God to deny it to all the Poſterity of *Adam*, however actually Innocent. And this is a great Indication of his Diſpleaſure toward them. Upon this Account the moſt innocent Children are eternally baniſhed Heaven, and deprived of the Preſence of God, which may juſtly be reckon'd an eternal ſpiritual Death, when compared with the Pleaſures and Happineſs that otherwiſe they would have enjoyed. For though we cannot ſay of them, that it had been better for them never to have been, yet their Life may truly be reckoned a Hell comparatively to what they might have expected if their firſt Parents had not offended

fended, and brought this Puniſhment upon their Deſcendants. Though this may ſeem to be very hard on Infants that never actually ſinned, yet it cannot be called unjuſt, becauſe they are not deprived of any thing that was abſolutely due to their Nature, but only of thoſe Favours that God might have denied them on other Conſiderations beſides that of their perſonal guilt. Neither doth this infer any third State for Souls after Death, but only a Difference among ſuch as are condemned to Hell. There is ſuch a Difference acknowledged in the State of the Bleſſed, where all are happy according to their ſeveral Capacities; and ſo it is in Hell, where all are miſerable if compared with the Condition of the Bleſſed, but in different degrees; and as in this Life ſome are ſo unfortunate that it were better for them not to be at all, than to continue always in the State in which they are; ſo in Hell there may be ſome whoſe Condition is preferable to not being; though for *Judas* and ſuch Sinners it had been better if they had never been.

The 3d part of Man's Puniſhment was that withdrawing of the extraordinary Grace of God from him, that was ready to guide and direct him in all his Actions, and leaving him to his own Power and Faculties to conduct and ſupport him. So I underſtand the 22d. v. of the 3d. Ch. *And the Lord God ſaid, Behold the Man is become as one of us to know Good and Evil. And now leaſt he put forth his Hand and take alſo of the Tree of Life and eat and live for ever. Therefore the Lord God ſent him forth from the Garden of Eden.* Some take this for an Ironical Speech, whereby God mocked and upbraided Man for his Folly: But I rather think it, a declaration of the Divine Will: for ſince Man had taken on him to chooſe for himſelf and to judge what was good and evil for him without conſulting his Maker, therefore God reſolved to deprive him of the ſupernatural Aſſiſtance he deſign'd to afford him, and leave him to his natural Faculties to guide and direct him; let him be as it were his own God, and enjoy the fruit of his choice. To this purpoſe he deprived him of the uſe of the Tree of Life, drove him out of the Garden where it was, and fenced it againſt him.

The effects of Man's being left to his own Powers and Faculties for his direction and ſupport, are many and fatal. It is eaſy to ſhew that from hence come all the Errors and Follies of our lives. For our Underſtandings being finite, we are every moment at a loſs, we are forced in moſt things to gueſs, and being unable to find Truth, are frequently miſtaken. From the ſame come all the Sins, Corruptions and Crimes that overwhelm the World. For being left to our choice, we not only miſtake, but chooſe amiſs. One Error or Sin makes way for another; we proceed daily in Corruption, and the Infection ſpreads as the World grows older; Cuſtom, Education and Company do all contribute to make us worſe and worſe; And in nothing of this God is to be blamed: we bring them on ourſelves, and they are not to be prevented without a Miracle, which none can ſay, God is obliged to work for us. We may accuſe ourſelves and one another for our temporal and eternal Evils, but muſt acquit God who has done us no Injuſtice. He has allowed us a poſſibility of Happineſs, as has been obſerved before, and we by our Sins make ourſelves incapable of it. As to the Children that die before they come to chooſe, we may be ſure God will deal juſtly with them, and put a great difference between them and actual Sinners. It is Miſery and Hell enough for them to be deprived of thoſe Felicities to which they could not pretend but by the Favour of God, and to be ſubjected to thoſe Sufferings that ballance their *Being*, and hinder their Lives from being a bleſſing to them. They are the ſeed of Rebels and Traytors and cannot expect any ſpecial Favour from God.

Thus I have gone through the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man, and ſhewed you the Conſiſtency and Reaſonableneſs of the account the Scripture gives of it. Nor ought we to depart from the Letter thereof; ſince the matter of fact is plain, that Man is corrupted, that the literal Underſtanding of the Scripture accounts for it, and no other Book or Record gives any tolerable reaſon for it.

I might draw many uſeful Obſervations from what I have ſaid, but I ſhall content myſelf with two.

1ſt. You may ſee from this that God did not think it fit that Man ſhould be abſolutely happy in the State of Innocency;

nocency, without *Revealed Religion* and the uſe of *Sacraments*. For the diſcovery of what was Good and Evil was to proceed from a continued Communication of Divine Wiſdom, which would have been equivalent to a Revelation; and the Trees of Knowledge and of Life were truly Sacramental; they were outward and viſible Signs, and means of Grace, which is the true notion of a Sacrament. And then judge with yourſelves what Pride and Folly it is for any in this corrupted Eſtate to pretend that they are too ſpiritual for ſuch, or that they need them not in order to Communion with God. Man in his State of Perfection needed them, how much more muſt we in our preſent condition of Corruption and Averſion from God? Let us not therefore deſpiſe or abuſe them. Death was the Conſequence of the violation of the ſacramental Tree in my Text, and the ſame is threatned as the Puniſhment of our abuſing the Chriſtian Sacraments, 1 *Cor.* 11. 29. *He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Damnation to himſelf, not diſcerning the Lord's Body. For this Cauſe many are weak and ſickly among you, and many ſleep.* The neglecting of them is no leſs penal, *John* 3. 5. *Except a Man be born of Water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.* And *John* 6. 53. *Except ye eat the Fleſh of the Son of Man and drink his Blood, ye have no Life in you.* Theſe are expreſly offered to us in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and we are ſure in that the faithful feed on them. And though their feeding may not be confined to the uſe of the outward Elements, yet whoever rejects them, debars himſelf of the ſpiritual Food communicated by them: for when God has appointed Means to obtain a Bleſſing, it is reaſonable to believe that he will never grant it to thoſe who neglect or contemn them.

But 2dly, as it is a great Folly to deſpiſe the Sacraments, ſo it is much greater madneſs to think of Happineſs without revealed Religion. It is plain we have a proſpect and eager deſire of a future Life, and in many Circumſtances there is nothing but that hope can make the preſent tolerable to us. But natural Religion can neither give us any certain clear ſecurity of it, nor means to attain it. Revealed gives both; and the view is ſo comfortable to a good Man,

and ſo uſeful to the World, that it ſeems, to be an Imitation of the Devil's Spite and Malice to go about to deprive us of it. 'Tis this hope only can make all Men equally happy, and ſend the Poor, the unfortunate as to the Circumſtances of this World, and the oppreſſed, to bed as contented as the greateſt Prince. 'Tis this only that can make us chearfully diſpenſe with the Miſeries and Hardſhips of Life, and think of Death with Comfort. Except therefore theſe Patrons of natural Religion can ſhew as ſure and effectual means to comfort us on theſe Occaſions as Revealed Religion affords us, they are ſpiteful and unreaſonable; for they go about to take from us that which gives us patience in our Sickneſs, relief in our Diſtreſſes, and hope in our Death; and offer us nothing in lieu of it. If a Man be oppreſſed by his Enemies, if he be in Sickneſs, Pain or Anguiſh, if the Agonies and Terrors of Death approach him, what Comfort or Support can he have without Religion? What a diſmal thing muſt it be to tell a Man that there is no Help, no Hope for him, to bid him deſpair and die, and there is an end of him. Such Reflections may make a Man ſullen, mad, curſe himſelf and nature; but can never give him any Satisfaction without a well-grounded hope of a bleſſed Immortality. Now only Revelation can give the generality of Mankind, eſpecially the unphiloſophical part of it, who are not capable of long or ſubtle Reaſoning, ſuch a clear and well-grounded hope. For we may add to this that if we take natural Religion with all the Advantages that Reaſon can give it, yet the Rewards and Puniſhments diſcoverable by it are not ſo clear or determined, as to be a ſufficient Encouragement to ſuch as are good, or diſcouragement to the Evil. Revealed Religion ſerves all theſe ends; and therefore we ought firmly to adhere to it, and not hearken to wicked and unreaſonable Men, or ſuffer them to wreſt it out of our Hands. It is our Joy, our Comfort and our Life; it carries us beyond Death, and ſecures our eternal Felicity. Juſtice, and Charity, and Peace are the Fruits of it here, and Glory hereafter.

POSTSCRIPT.

THere has lately appeared a Pamphlet entitled *a Defence of Dr. Clarke**, &c. which profeſſes to be an Anſwer to ſome part of the Notes on ABp *King*'s Eſſay, and which may ſeem to deſerve ſome notice on account of its great Candor and Civility; I ſhall therefore take this opportunity to declare my Sentiments of it ſo far as relates to the foregoing Book, and will handle it as tenderly as poſſible.

Of *Space* and *Duration*.

(*P.* 2.) He begins to prove that *Space* muſt be ſomething more than the Abſence of Matter, otherwiſe the walls of an empty Room would touch. The force of his Argument ſeems to be this. When two things touch one another, there's nothing between them, *Ergo*, when there is nothing between two things they muſt touch. This Conſequence is a very lame one. The reaſon why they do not touch is becauſe they are really *diſtant*, but is *Diſtance* therefore in the Abſtract any thing real? We two differ, or there's a Difference between us, but is *Difference* itſelf any thing exiſting? Things are long, broad, thick, heavy, *&c.* but are *Length*, *Breadth*, *Denſity*, *Weight*, &c. properly any thing? Have they any real *Archetypes*, or external *Ideata?* Or can they exiſt any where but in their Concretes? We are apt indeed to conceive them by way of *Subſtance*, or to clap an imaginary *Subſtratum* to them, as we do to every Thing, Quality or Mode, which we abſtract, and often impoſe upon ourſelves ſo far as to take theſe for ſo many realities exiſting in that preciſe manner wherein we have been uſed to conſider them: But a little Examination into the Original of theſe Notions, and our way of acquiring them, detects the Fallacy. A ſmall conſideration of the Nature of *abſtract Ideas* would I think have prevented this and the following Arguments, and diſcovered *Space*, *Duration* and *Neceſſity* to be nothing more.

* This was wrote in the year 1732, in anſwer to Mr. *Clarke*'s firſt Defence; and as the omiſſion of it in the laſt Edition has given occaſion to various conjectures, it is here, by the advice of ſome friends, reſtored to its place.

(*P.* 3.) "*Whiteneſs*, ſays he, is widely different from "Space; for 1ſt all Bodies are not white," *&c.* Whiteneſs is an abſtract Idea, which can have no Subſiſtance of itſelf, and ſo far it agrees with pure *Extenſion*, which was all the agreement between them that was ever intended.

(*P.* 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.) I had maintained that to aſſign poſitive Properties to Space was as bad Senſe as to apply poſitive Properties to *Darkneſs*, *Silence*, *Abſence* or mere *Nothing*: or in other words, that the three firſt, which are confeſſedly *privations*, might with equal propriety be ſaid to have the properties of receiving Light, Sound, *&c.* as Space is affirmed to have penetrability, or the Capacity of receiving Body. He anſwers by affirming that Space has and muſt have the property of receiving Body, and then proceeds to prove at large that *Darkneſs* is not properly a Capacity of receiving Light; (which I was ſo far from aſſerting that I propoſed it as a parallel piece of nonſenſe with the former.) The ſum of his Argument is this. *All* Darkneſs is not capable of receiving Light; he inſtances in that *Darkneſs* which is included within the Pores of the Particles of *Light itſelf*, which muſt be ſmaller than a whole Ray of Light, and conſequently no Light at all can get into it. Were this extraordinary Argument true, it would not prove his point, *viz.* that the Darknaſs *as ſuch* is incapable of receiving Light, becauſe it aſſigns an external accidental impediment in the Caſe, *viz.* the interpoſition of the parts of Matter, or (which comes to the ſame) minuteneſs of the Pore: But what is ſtill worſe, if matter does not conſiſt of certain primogeneal parts, but, as he ſays, of ſuch as are "ſo very ſmall, that were we to ſuppoſe them *never ſo ſmall*, "we may yet ſuppoſe them *ſmaller*," p. 6. Then will there be no cavity ſo minute but that we may ſuppoſe a particle of Light commenſurable to it. Laſtly this Argument would prove equally againſt Space itſelf; and were I diſpoſed to be pleaſant, I might argue that the *Space* ſuppoſed to be within theſe ſame Cavities is no Space, becauſe it has not the property of receiving Body, *i. e.* 'tis too ſmall to admit any kind of Body.

But I ſhall readily be excuſed for dropping this Point.

He

(*P.* 9.) He argues that "Infinity is not in *itſelf* an actual "addition of finite Spaces, though all the Idea we can get "concerning it ariſes from an *endleſs* addition of finite Spa-"ces, without ever being able to reach to any *End*:" And then introduces Mr. *Locke*'s Diſtinction between the infinity of Space and Space infinite B. 2. C. 17. § 7.

But if all the Idea we can get concerning this *infinity of Space* ariſe purely from an addition of finite Spaces, then muſt it alſo conſiſt or be compoſed of ſuch Portions of that ſame Space, or elſe 'tis ſomething of which we have actually no Idea at all. Something beyond and beſide all our Ideas, and inconſiſtent with the method of acquiring them: The *Idea* of it muſt be one thing, and *itſelf* quite different. Mr. *Locke*'s Diſtinction might one would think convince us that this Infinite of his is not a real *Metaphyſical* one, but only a mere Negation or *Non-ens*, a bare impoſſibility of ſtopping any where; which has nothing to do with that other abſolute Infinity, or rather *Perfection*, which belongs to the Divine Attributes, and all ſuch Qualities as are menſurable not by *Parts*, but *Degrees*: which the ſame Author alludes to B. 2 C. 17. § 1. and in the Sect. immediately preceeding his Quotation.

(*P.* 11.) "Space is the *thing containing*, and Body is that "which is *contained* in it: I would not be underſtood by "*thing* to mean a *Subſtance*, which ſeems to be the mean-"ing of all thoſe, if they have any meaning at all, who "call Space nothing."

But you muſt determine this ſame *thing containing* to be either a Subſtance, or a Property, or find out a new Diſtinction for it. Till one of theſe be done, we are obliged to take it for a mere *Ens rationis*, or a fiction of the Mind, conceived indeed (as we ſaid) by way of Subſtance, but which cannot be perfectly reconciled to that or any other *Category*, nor proved to have a real proper Exiſtence *ad extra* under any Name or Notion whatſoever. By and by we ſhall hear of its having a *Subſtratum*, and ſome *Properties* too, as well as being *its own Subſtratum*.

(*Ibid.*) "How abſurd is it to conclude from our being "continually able to *add* to Space, that Space is really "not infinite? Whereas for this very reaſon it muſt neceſ-

"ſarily

" ſarily follow that it is infinite, *&c.*" *i. e.* negatively ſo, or incapable of any aſſignable Bounds; which is a roving, indeterminate, perpetually growing Idea, and directly repugnant to our Notion of abſolute Infinity or Perfection, which is ſomething actual, poſitive and fixed in all Qualities capable thereof: Something eſſentially and every way incapable of any Addition. This you allow (p. 20.) to be the true meaning of a *Metaphyſical Infinite*, the only Queſtion therefore is which of theſe two Infinites (which you ſee are very different ones) ought to be apply'd to Matter, Space and all *Quantity*, and which to the Divine Perfections.

(*P.*12.) " Were it true that Space could never be ſo " big but that more Magnitude might be added to it, it " would then follow that it could not be poſitively infinite. " But how does this appear? We can never have an Idea " of it ſo large, but we may ſtill add more to it; but our " Idea of it is not the *Thing itſelf.*"

I ſhould be glad to find what we can know of the *thing*, otherwiſe than from our Idea of it, (though in the preſent caſe I believe there is no *thing* at all, but barely an Idea) and if all the Ideas we can poſſibly frame of it include addibility, how ſhall we be able to exclude that ſame addibility from the thing itſelf? Can Knowledge reach beyond Ideas? or can we conceive any thing to exiſt in a manner quite different from all the poſſible ways we have of conſidering its Exiſtence? This is ſuch Knowledge, ſuch a Salvo for mere Ignorance, as this Author would, I dare ſay, diſdain in other Caſes, and be glad to quit in this, if he could find a better Hypotheſis.

(*P.*13.) " Infinity is indeed an individual Attribute of " the Deity, ſo that it is impoſſible that Infinity can be an " Attribute of any thing elſe; yet were Matter infinite, it " would not follow from thence that Infinity was an At- " tribute of this *infinite Matter*, any more than that Ex- " tenſion is an Attribute of all finite Beings throughout the " whole Univerſe." Infinity is an Attribute of any *infinite thing*, as well as Extenſion is of every thing *extended*, if there be any meaning in words. If theſe can be ſo predicated of *Matter*, they muſt be ſo far Attributes or Properties of it, at leaſt while they can be predicated; in like manner as

as Knowledge is a Property of every finite Being that *poſſeſſes* it, though not an abſolutely neceſſary, eſſential, or immutable one, (which is nothing to the caſe) and in what other Senſe the Author could affirm the contrary below (*p.* 14) I do not apprehend. To make Extenſion, Knowledge, *&c.* Properties of God only, ſeems to me the ſame as making every thing *God*; ſince finite things do as really, though in a leſs Degree, partake of them, (and conſequently they are equally affections of their ſeveral Natures while theſe Natures continue what they are, or ſo long as they continue to *poſſeſs* them, as he words it) as the Deity himſelf can be ſuppoſed to do. In the very ſame ſenſe and for the very ſame reaſon that the Deity is ſaid to occupy the whole, muſt theſe be allowed to occupy ſome part or ſhare.

(*Ibid.*) "If Extenſion was an Attribute of finite Beings, "if we ſuppoſe all finite Beings away—itſelf ought to ceaſe." When all finite things are away, all *real* Extenſion goes with them: *Ideal* Extenſion (or the abſtract Ideas of Height, Depth, *&c.*) may probably remain, *i. e.* in your Head, and it may be hard to get them out: but till you prove a connection between ſuch Ideas and reality, your Argument will be inconcluſive. I think it ought to be conſider'd here that Knowledge is not the perceiving an agreement or connection of Ideas and Objects, (as ſome ſeem to imagine) but of Ideas to one another: it lies between our Thoughts themſelves, not between Thoughts and Things.

(*P.*15.) "As for an infinite Being, that I think is in the "Power of God to create, for it does not make the created "Being either neceſſarily exiſtent or powerful, or even give "to him freedom of Will." But it makes him equal to his Creator in ſome one reſpect, which is as bad as to ſuppoſe him equal in all. He that can ſuppoſe an *Effect* ſtrictly and properly equal to its *Cauſe* in any reſpect, is, I think, incapable of confutation.

(*P.*16.) I had argued that it was *improper* to apply bounds and bounders to *Non-entity*, i. e. to *Space*, which was as far as yet appeared, nothing. He anſwers, "In this "he is entirely miſtaken, for *Non-entity* in that ſenſe is a "direct *Contradiction*." Which how it makes againſt the foregoing Aſſertion I know not. However he goes on proving

ving that it is a direct Contradiction to ſay *Non-entity in general* (and at the ſame time makes uſe of theſe words, "When any Being is created it is a mutation from *Non-entity* to *Entity*, &c.") which is equally above my comprehenſion; except he tacitly ſubjoins the Verb *is* or *exiſts* to make one; a Quibble I would not willingly ſuppoſe him guilty of. Without this, pray where's the Abſurdity (I mean a *priori*) in ſaying or ſuppoſing mere Nothing or abſolutely *Non-entity*, or in other words, the abſence, annihilation, non-exiſtence of any thing in Nature? To ſtile this non-exiſtence, *&c. infinite* or *immenſe*, is indeed a flagrant Abſurdity, becauſe it is applying Properties to it, which at the ſame time imply it to be ſomething, *i. e.* 'tis making it both *ſomething* and *nothing*,, which is all the Contradiction that I know of in the Suppoſition, and for which they only are accountable that make it. The *Pamphlet Writer* was not perhaps ſo abſurd and childiſh (*ibid.*) here, as the Anſwerer may imagine.

(*P.*17.) "The Tranſlator, by his Quotation from Dr. "*Cudworth*, ſeems to confound the Idea of Space with that "of *Number*, as if they were the ſame thing." The Quotation is from a greater than Dr. *Cudworth*, and ſo far from implying Space and Number to be *the ſame thing*, that it is expreſly introduced as *another parallel Caſe* (*Origin of E.* p.11.) *i. e.* parallel to the former only in the reaſon of their being both *incapable of Bounds*, which was the Point in hand, and which was there ſhewn to ariſe from the nature of our own Faculties, not from theſe themſelves, be they *Ideas* or *Things*. The two following Pages are, I think, abundantly anſwered already in the ſame place.

(*P.*20.) "A Poſitive or Metaphyſical Infinite, as the "Tranſlator ſays, certainly means what is abſolutely per-"fect, that to which nothing can be added, but then this "muſt always mean in the *particular way* that it is infinite. "For inſtance, an infinite *Line* cannot be made either lon-"ger or ſhorter, but it may be made *broader*; becauſe it is "not infinite in breadth, but finite, yet it will ſtill be an "infinite Line whatever breadth you ſuppoſe it. So alſo an "infinite *Superficies* can never be made longer or wider, "yet it may be made *thicker*, &c." A poſitive or abſolute infinite

Infinite (in its proper ſubjects) is every way incapable of Addition; the other infinite is directly the reverſe to whatever you apply it. You can never imagine a Line to be actually ſo long, but you may make it longer, *i. e.* increaſe it *as a Line*; a ſurface ſo broad, but it may be yet broader, *i. e.* enlarged *as a Surface*; a Body ſo great but it may ſtill be augmented *as ſuch*: and to ſuppoſe the contrary, *viz.* any one of theſe to be poſitively infinite, ſo that you cannot add to it, it to ſuppoſe what is falſe in fact.

Every one of theſe indeed is indefinitely increaſable (or what this Author is pleaſed to call *infinite*) only in ſome *particular way*, *viz.* each in its *own way*. 'Tis very true that adding to a Line does not make it *broad*, which would be to make it ſomething elſe, *i. e.* a *ſurface*; enlarging a ſurface does not make it *thick*, *i. e.* more than a ſurface: But each of theſe may be made larger every way that we can poſſibly conſider them, and I think that's enough. How an impoſſibility of enlarging (as alſo of conſidering) ſome things more than one way, proves the poſſibility of their being abſolutely infinite or perfect in another, let the Reader judge.

The ſame Reaſoning runs through the ten following Pages, as applied to infinite *Duration*, and if I underſtand it right, this is a ſufficient anſwer.

(*P.*21.) "It is true indeed that Duration is a perpetual "Flux, yet it neither is, nor can poſſibly be in the Power "of any Being whatſoever to add to it, to make it move "ſlower or faſter, or to ſtand ſtill." We can always add to or take from our *Idea* of Duration; can conſider it by *parts*, and add to or ſubſtract from it as many of theſe as we pleaſe, either *a parte ante* or *a parte poſt* (*p.*28.) and thereby demonſtrate the abſurdity of its being actually or poſitively *infinite* either way. 'Tis therefore but improperly and negatively ſo, "it can only *mentiri infinitatem*, as *Cud-* "*worth* ſays, in its having more and more added to it infi- "nitely, whereby notwithſtanding it never reaches or over- "takes it." *p.*647,648. And if this be the nature of our *Idea*, I ſhould be glad to know how it can be made appear that it is not likewiſe the nature of the *Ideatum* or *thing itſelf*, (if there were one in the preſent caſe) or indeed how it can ever

ever be proved that here is any thing at all, beſide an artificial or abſtract Idea: An Idea of Duration in *general*, ſet up by the Mind as a common Meaſure and Receptacle for all things which exiſt in a ſucceſſive manner, or do *endure*, and which is of great uſe to us in our way of conſidering them: though when it is carried into abſolute Infinity, and ſuppoſed to be placed beyond a poſſibility of Increaſe, it becomes an inconſiſtent ſelf-contradictory Idea: as will be farther ſhewn when he comes to an *infinite ſeries*. p. 110, *&c.*

(*P.* 24.) He argues that ſince God exiſted from all Eternity he could act from all Eternity; Creation is an Act, *ergo* he could have created from all Eternity, otherwiſe he exiſted a *whole* Eternity *a parte ante* before he had the Power of creating, *i. e.* he was an impotent Being, *a whole Eternity*.

Anſ. Power the *Faculty*, and the actual *Exerciſe* of that Power are two different things. God might always have the power, will and intention to create, yet not always *exert* his power, and put that Will and Intent in execution; nay one of theſe muſt in the order of our Ideas be previous to the other: His Being and eſſential Attributes muſt be eternal, uncauſed, or (as this Author ſays) beginningleſs; his Acts muſt be in time, or have a beginning; every *Change*, *Act* or *Effect* is poſterior in conception to the *Power changing*, the *Agent* or *Cauſe*; and to make them coeval, is to make them all the ſame, *i. e.* is no more the Object of any power, than to make two things one and the ſame while they are two different ones. 'Tis no defect therefore in God's power not to be able to *exerciſe* it *ab æterno*, any more than not to be able to make a Change without beginning. Neither do theſe Acts or Exerciſes of the Divine Attributes make a Change in the Divine Nature, or the *Attributes themſelves*, as this Author ſuppoſes, (*p.* 25, *&c.*) any more than every motion produced or volition exerted by a free ſelf-determining Principle, alters the Nature of this Principle itſelf; or every action of a Man alters his Conſtitution.

Laſtly, If every act of Man as ſuch is temporary and requires beginning, the caſe muſt be the ſame in God, eſpecially in thoſe Acts of his which relate to Man himſelf; otherwiſe, and indeed for the ſame reaſon, every Divine Act regarding Man or any thing elſe muſt be eternal: He made

tis all then from Eternity, and every act of Providence which concerns the preſervation or the government of us is likewiſe eternal, and that alſo which is to be and will ſome time hence concern our Poſterity, is, and muſt neceſſarily be eternal; for otherwiſe there would be a change in God. You ſee whither your Principle will lead us.

(*P.*26.) He ſays "how God could create from Eternity ap-"pears to us very *abſurd* and *almoſt impoſſible*" (though he had juſt before been labouring to prove that the Deity both could and muſt do ſo) to which I add, therefore for any thing that we know, or as far as we can ſee, it is abſurd and impoſſible; except we can be certain of any thing beyond the reach and againſt the repreſentation of our own Ideas; a certainty which the Gentlemen in this way of thinking are often reduced to. *v. p.*12. 29. *&c.*

(*Ibid.*) He objects that Dr. *Bentley*'s Arguments againſt *infinite Generations* are contrary to the Suppoſition; becauſe they imply ſome *firſt* or *beginning*. Anſ. they imply and ſhew the neceſſity for a beginning and therefore overthrow the Suppoſition. If whatever is now paſt was once preſent, and every aſſignable part in this ſame *Series* was and muſt be ſo, the Conſequence is that it cannot but have a *firſt*, and therefore is an abſurd, inconſiſtent Suppoſition. Inſtead of confuting this and the like Arguments, you anſwer "they "are grounded on a wrong Baſis, becauſe they deſtroy the "Suppoſition:" *i.e.* We muſt allow the poſſibility of the Suppoſition, before we can ſhew it to be impoſſible, and every argument which proves it to be abſurd is falſe and foreign, becauſe 'tis contrary to the poſition, which is ſuppoſed already to be true. *i. e.* We argue wrong except we grant the Queſtion. This is the Subſtance of moſt of his reaſoning in the "Tranſlator's Demonſtration examined" which may perhaps be re-examined in its proper place.

(*P.*27.) He urges that, "theſe Arguments will equally "prove againſt the Exiſtence of the Deity from all Eternity," which is already obviated in R. c.

(*P.* 30.) His next Argument for the infinity of *Space* ſtands thus. "A Body in motion can never come to an end "of Space, *Ergo* Space is poſitively infinite:" rather the contrary, *Ergo* Space is incapable of poſitive Infinity, or if

it

it is any thing at all, yet the Infinity of it cannot be conſidered in a poſitive abſolute way; it is ſomething indeterminate and negative (as has been often repeated) and therefore to have a poſitive conception of it is a Contradiction. That we have a poſitive and adequate Idea of the true infinity in its proper Subjects has been ſhewn already.

(*P.* 32.) Dr. *Green* had argued that a *Mathematical Solid*, or mere *Length*, *Breadth* and *Thickneſs*, was the Definition of *Space*, but theſe were only *imaginary*, and therefore ſo was Space itſelf. He replies "This is rather a mental Con-"ſideration of real Space." But if we can find nothing elſe to conſider in it, nothing that leads us beyond theſe three abſtract Notions abovementioned, by what medium will you prove its reality? ſhew it to be ſomething more than *mental*, to be attended with any conſequence, or to exhibit any appearance which properly implies or requires real Exiſtence, and is not fully ſolvable by the Mind's power of Abſtraction and force of mere imagination. He adds, "for "if there were no diſtance exiſting really, the Sun and Moon muſt be in the ſame individual Place." This is the ſame Quibble we ſet out with, and it is ſufficient here to obſerve that if there was nothing in the World beſide theſe two, and mere Diſtance or *Space*, they would be properly in no Place at all (*i. e.* no abſolute Place) nor could they be ſaid ever to change Places, except in relation to each other.

It is to no purpoſe to anſwer what he ſays in the following pages concerning the Impoſſibility of defining Subſtance, till we are better agreed about the meaning of the word. It may indeed be an impoſſibility with him who has ſomething to define beyond his Ideas, who includes ſomewhat in the Subſtance of a thing above and beſide all its conſtituent Properties. I have given my own Notion of it as clearly as I can in Note 1. 2d. Ed.

(*P.* 36.) "If a Spirit is unextended, it muſt exiſt in no "place, and is therefore incapable of Motion. For if it can "move, it muſt either move or go out of one place into a-"nother, or out of no Place, into ſome Place, or laſtly out "of no Place into no Place, *&c.*" And again, "that a "Spirit has the power of moving is very manifeſt, or elſe "the Soul of a Man would be very often a hundred Miles

" diſtant from his Body." If matter be incapable of Thought (as I think *Cudworth* has ſufficiently demonſtrated in the paſſage cited below) the reaſon is becauſe it has Parts; *i. e.* is extended, conſequently a thinking Subſtance cannot be extended or made up of Parts, and if ſo, it has nothing to do with either *Place* or *Motion*, any more than with a *Shape* or *Colour*. It may act on and influence a Body which exiſts in Place, but to apply *Place*, *where*, &c. (terms which peculiarly belong to Beings extended) to itſelf, is joining the moſt diſparate, heterogeneous things in Nature. " I would not, ſays he, mean that the Soul is extended in the ſame *manner* as Matter is." *ib.* But if all the notion we can poſſibly frame of Extenſion is derived from Matter and cannot reach beyond it; if the very Definition and Idea of it includes *partes extra partes* (*real* parts, when it is ſo, *mental* when it is only mental) as he might have learnt from *Bayle* cited above; it will be in vain to fly to the old refuge of a ſimple *uncompounded* Extenſion, or what he calls *Continuum*; which is indeed extended, but yet in a different manner from all the Extenſion we know of; which has aſſignable Parts, but not material, ſeparable ones; *i. e.* properly no parts at all.—But this is not the firſt time we have been forced to go beyond our Ideas.

(*P.*37.) " Though we frame our Idea of a Being from " the eſſential Properties of it, yet that is no reaſon why " the Being ſhould not require ſomething to its Exiſtence " which the eſſential *Property* (he ſhould have ſaid *Proper-* " *ties*) does not, only by the Being's requiring it." By Being or *Subſtance* we mean only the Collection, Aggregate or Union of the Eſſential or conſtituent Properties; and how theſe when taken together can require ſomething which each of them did not require when ſeparately conſidered, I do not apprehend. The Properties of *Spirit*, i. e. *thinking*, *willing* and their *Modes*, have no relation to Space or Extenſion, have nothing to do with a *Subſtratum*, conſequently neither has a ſpiritual Being which conſiſts only of theſe and the like Properties. He goes on ſuppoſing that all Beings muſt *as ſuch* be commenſurate to Space, and occupy ſome portion of it; as well as every *Quality* be ſtuck in

ſome *Subſtratum*, which alſo muſt take up ſome room; all which has been conſidered in the place referred to above.

I ſhall truſt the paſſage from *Cudworth* with the Reader, only obſerving that after the words "leaſt Extenſion that can poſſibly be" *Cudworth* has "if there be any ſuch *leaſt*, "and Body or Extenſion be not infinitely diviſible" p. 825. which was omitted in the Quotation.

(*P.* 46.) "It neceſſarily follows that the Soul is extend-"ed, becauſe were it not, it would, as Dr. *Cudworth* ſays, "perceive all Diſtances indiſtantly, and conſequently "would have an Idea of Infinity." He means, would ſee to the End of all Diſtance, or perceive the end of what is *endleſs*, according to his Senſe of the word *infinite*. He had argued p. 41. that an unextended Being muſt be ſo *ſmall* as to perceive nothing, here from the ſame principle he urges that it will be ſo *great* as to be able to perceive every thing, and indeed both his Arguments are equally concluſive. The Limitation of our Sight in every caſe is, I think, owing to the Nature of *Body*, not of *Soul*.

(*P.* 47.) "To ſuppoſe any thing to be annihilated is not "to ſuppoſe it to be taken away from *itſelf* or from *being* "or from *Exiſtence*, but more properly Exiſtence taken "from that." I wiſh he had ſhewn the difference of theſe Phraſes.——

But we have enquired into the poſſibility of *annihilation* already, and he comes at laſt to allow it in every thing but *Space itſelf*, to which indeed it cannot be well apply'd, any more than to *nothing itſelf*.

(*P.* 49.) "That Dr. *Clarke* aſſerts Space to have real "Qualities is true; but then he does not conſider it "ſtrictly as a *Property*, but as *its own Subſtratum*." I will "anſwer this when I underſtand it. If he means conſi-dering it *as a Subſtance*, Dr. *Clarke* and he conſider it very differently at different times, See *p.* 11. and in *p.* 63, the Dr. is introduced affirming the *Deity* himſelf to be the *Subſtra-tum of Space*.

(*P.* 50.) "I do not ſee ſo much abſurdity in ſuppoſing "Qualities inherent in one another, as the Tranſlator would "make it, at leaſt not in the Inſtance of *Space*. For why "cannot *Penetrability*, *Indiſcerpibility* and *Infinity* be ſaid to

be

" be Modes of Space? as well I think as all kinds of Shapes " are Modes or Modifications of Figure."

But *Figure* itſelf is nothing excluſive of every particular Shape, *Ergo* ſo is Extenſion letting aſide every particular extended Being: unleſs we muſt have a Subſtratum likewiſe for *Figure* and *Form* in general; and by the ſame way of reaſoning we may ſeek one for *Weight*, for *Sound*, &c. in general: in ſhort for every abſtract Idea we have. " Dura- " tion, ſays he immediately after, is only *enduring*, and " what can enduring be without ſomething to endure?" Anſw. A mere *Ens rationis* or *Idea*, as well as your next Inſtance of *Exiſtence* without ſomething exiſting: Which one would think might be enough to ſhew you that theſe neither require nor can properly admit of any real Subſtratum, nor infer the exiſtence of any thing but our own imagination. To what purpoſe therefore ſhould we ſpend time in enquiring whether *Duration* be a *punctum ſtans*, or " a " continual regular flowing of itſelf" p. 51? When we already find that it is nothing more than a complex Idea got from obſerving the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds? one who conſiders how he comes by his Ideas will never build ſuch Arguments upon them.

(*P.* 53.) " It is very evident that neither Extenſion nor " Duration can be modes of the Exiſtence of any created " Beings." Extenſion and Duration in the Abſtract can be modes of nothing at all; but our Ideas of them are entirely got from created Beings, and applicable to no other; and to them they muſt be applicable ſo long as we can properly ſay theſe Beings are *extended* or do *endure*.

(*P.* 55.) " Succeſſion is not, ſays the Tranſlator, neceſ- " ſarily joined with Exiſtence. Perhaps not, that is not " ſuch a Succeſſion as ours." Here we are got again to ſomething *Supra nos*. I would only aſk, is not all Succeſſion the ſame *as ſuch?* is not Succeſſion without a Change the very ſame as no Succeſſion? Neither Change indeed nor Succeſſion are the very Idea of Duration (as this Author would have me affirm) but yet they neceſſarily accompany it, and without them it is abſolutely loſt.

(*P.* 57.) " What the meaning of *preſent in his ſimple* " *Eſſence to* is, I confeſs I do not underſtand." The

Phraſe is Dr. *Clarke*'s, 6th Prop. par. the laſt: where he may find another full as hard to underſtand, *viz.* that the Deity is equally preſent — *by the immediate and perfect Exerciſe of all his Attributes to every Point of the boundleſs Immenſity, as if it were really all but one ſingle Point.* p. 74. 2d Edit.

(*P.* 61. *&c.*) He builds his *Proof* of the real Exiſtence of Space and Duration on the Ideas we have of them, which, he ſays, are ſimple ones, and "we cannot by any means "have a ſimple Idea but from ſomething actually exiſting "in Nature." Firſt, the Ideas of Space and Duration in the Abſtract are not ſimple Ideas, but complex Modes made up of the leaſt Portions of each, *viz.* a *ſenſible Point* and *Moment.* See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 1. 5. S. 9. Secondly, if they were, they would not prove the Exiſtence of any external Object correſpondent to them, but only that there is ſomething in Nature which occaſions them; whether that be poſitive or a *privation* in the Subject does not always appear. See *Locke*, B. 2. C. 8. I gave you an Inſtance before in *Darkneſs*, which is as able to produce a ſimple Idea, as *Space*, and yet you have taken a deal of pains to prove that it is really nothing: You might as well have added Space and Duration to it, and if you had a mind too, concluded them to be *three Nothings.* p. 61.

But I ſhall need an Apology for dwelling ſo long on this dry Subject.

Of Neceſſary Exiſtence.

(*P.* 66.) He begins his Account of neceſſary Exiſtence with the following Obſervation. "We may be able to "know and perceive in what Beings this neceſſity of Na- "ture inheres without knowing either the Nature of this "Neceſſity, or the Nature of the Beings and Subſtances in "which it inheres. Thus we can ſee that two and two are "neceſſarily equal to four, *&c.*" What! though we do not know the nature of two and two, or underſtand what theſe Words mean? as the Courſe of his Argument muſt require. What follows is, I think, mere quibbling on the two Words *Neceſſity* and *Contradiction.* The Caſe, in ſhort, is this. Wherever there is an apparent Contradiction on one ſide of the Queſtion (either *a priori* or *poſteriori*) the oppo-

ſite is neceſſarily true, or there is a *Neceſſity* for our ſuppoſing it: but except this Contradiction be perceived *à priori*, *i. e.* prior to the exiſtence of the thing or truth in Queſtion, it does not *make* it to be what it is, it cannot be the *ground* of its Exiſtence. Thus from the abſurdity of an infinite Series of dependent Beings we find it neceſſary to ſuppoſe, or there is a *Neceſſity* for our ſuppoſing, one firſt Cauſe or independent Being: But is this ſame Neceſſity therefore ſomething *by* which he exiſts? ſomething which may be conſidered as an *antecedent ground* or *reaſon* of his being what he is, *i. e.* uncauſed or independent? At this rate every Reaſon which reduces us to a neceſſity of believing the exiſtence of any thing, muſt be the Cauſe, Ground or Reaſon of the Thing itſelf: which I think needs no Confutation.

(*P.* 67.) He goes upon a diſtinction between Neceſſity *abſolute* and *relative*: whereas every Notion we can poſſibly fix to the word *Neceſſity* implies *Relation*, and means nothing more than the connection we find between two or more Ideas, which is uſually expreſſed by this Term, as was ſhewn of all the common Senſes of it in Note 9. If therefore this word can only ſtand to denote the Habitude or Manner of our own Conceptions, it will be in vain to proceed with this Author in enquiring whether it is really *uniform* and *invariable*; or whether its exiſtence be confined to Time and Place. *p.* 68, *&c.*

(*P.* 79.) He maintains that the Being which exiſts by Neceſſity can be but *one*, and attempts to anſwer a very reaſonable Objection ariſing from his firſt Aſſertion aforecited, *viz.* that as Neceſſity of Exiſtence is beyond our Comprehenſion, and the Being or Beings to whom we apply it are ſo too; there may be a number of neceſſarily exiſtent Beings, as well as different Neceſſities, for any thing that we know. "If ſays he, in his reply to this, any Being "whatever exiſts neceſſarily by a Neceſſity of Nature, it "muſt be both impoſſible and contradictory *in itſelf*, (*v.* "below, and *p.* 74.) independent of, and antecedent to "all our Suppoſitions about it, that that Being ſhould not "exiſt. Whatever Number therefore of neceſſary Beings "there is, there is neceſſarily ſuch a Number, and neither

" more or leſs is poſſible, *&c.*" *i. e.* there can be no more than there really are. But how do you know by this what Number there are? or where is the Abſurdity (*a priori*) of ſuppoſing more than one ſuch? Your argument will ſerve as well for twenty: *viz.* provided we allow them all to be *in rerum natura* neceſſary, then none of them can be ſuppoſed away.

(*Ibid.*) " The Objection therefore in its full force can-" not be urged any farther than this, that a thing may be " in itſelf a perfect Contradiction, without appearing to us " to be any Contradiction at all, but rather the quite con-" trary. In anſwer to this I muſt beg leave to ſay that " then all our Underſtanding is uſeleſs, all our Knowledge " and Reaſon, *&c.*"

What this has to do with the former Objection, or who is capable of making ſuch an one, I leave him to conſider: We ſay there is no Contradiction to our Ideas in ſuppoſing more than one independent Being, and therefore the contrary cannot be demonſtrated. The anſwerer here is got on the wrong ſide, and anſwering his own aſſertion in the laſt cited Paſſage. It is he only, and the Gentlemen in the ſame way of thinking, that are obliged to find *Contradictions in themſelves*, which yet are not ſuch to any of *our Ideas*, and who alone therefore are chargeable with the Conſequences he ſets forth below. The true and proper Objection to his Demonſtrations of the Unity is, that we have no *Data* to proceed upon in proving one ſide or the other.

(*P.*75.) " Neceſſity of Exiſtence——can only be where " there is no other Cauſe or Foundation of that Exiſtence." The true meaning of which is, that this kind of Neceſſity can never come in but where a Perſon has nothing elſe to ſay. That exiſtence which has no prior, external Cauſe, is abſolutely uncaus'd. I know no other diſtinction.

(*P.*76.) " An Objector may indeed ſay that a Being " can exiſt without any Cauſe, any Ground or Foundation " at all. To which I muſt deſire to anſwer that nothing " can be more abſurd and contradictory, and that it is—— " all owing merely to Prejudice and Partiality; ſince to in-" ſtance in things which affect our ſenſes daily, they will all " allow that if there is no reaſon why a thing (the World

" ſuppoſe) is of this or that particular ſhape, it might have " been of ſome other ſhape than what it now is."

The two Caſes are very different, as was ſhewn ſufficiently in Note 14. The World, which *we* ſuppoſe to have had beginning, might for that reaſon either have not been at all, or been of a different ſhape, *&c.* from what it is. That which never had beginning was never under a poſſibility of not being, or of being any thing elſe but what it always actually was. Here is no effect, nothing that wants ſupport, conſequently no room for any Cauſe or Ground.

(*P.* 78.) " Here I muſt deſire the Reader to take no- " tice that when any thing is ſaid to be *fit*, *right*, *reaſon-* " *able in itſelf*, it is only meant that the fitneſs of it does " not depend upon the will of any Being, but is a neceſſary " conſequence of the exiſtence of that thing of which it is " affirmed." But *fitneſs* is evidently a relative term and muſt have reference to ſome *End*. Whatever is *fit* muſt neceſſarily be fit *for* ſomething. *Fit in itſelf* is therefore both a ſoleciſm in Expreſſion, and a miſtake of means for End.

(*Ibid.*) " Thus it is abſolutely right, right and fit in it- " ſelf, antecedent to any Command that a Creature ſhould " reverence his Creator: where can be any abſurdity in this " Propoſition? Is not the relation between a Creature and " Reverence to his Creator ſuitable to the natures of each of " them?"

It is ſuitable to the nature of the 1ſt as productive of its *Happineſs*, and to that of the 2d as agreeable to his *Will*, who originally deſigned the Happineſs of his Creatures, and therefore bound this and the like Duties on them. As therefore it naturally conduces to this end it is *fit*, &c. antecedently to any poſitive Command about it: But what means *fit*, *right*, &c. without regard to any *End* at all? This is the abſurdity we juſtly charge upon the Authors of that Language.

(*P.* 85.) " Not having had a Beginning, or having ex- " iſted from all Eternity neither does, nor poſſibly can make " a Being neceſſarily exiſting." This Being does not want to be *made* ſo at all.

Not having had a beginning is no Reaſon indeed *a priori* why a Being ſhould be neceſſarily exiſtent, but it is a very

good one drawn *a poſteriori*, and implies it by neceſſary conſequence, which is enough for us. His inſtance of a Ballance hanging uneven from all Eternity, would indeed be contrary to the preſent Laws of Nature; but except we preſuppoſe the eſtabliſhment of ſuch Laws (which I imagine this Author does not believe abſolutely neceſſary) there will be no reaſon why it ſhould not hang in that as well as any other poſition, and it would be a ſufficient account to ſay it always was ſo.

(*P.* 86.) "There is no Impoſſibility in ſuppoſing created Beings to have exiſted from Eternity, provided they have ſome *original Cauſe*." That is, as far as I can apprehend, provided they have ſome *beginning*. A Cauſe coeval with its Effect has been already conſidered.

Ibid. "The Word Cauſe as he uſes it, cannot poſſibly mean any thing but an *Efficient Cauſe*, and if ſo, I readily grant his Conſequence to be true."

I ſhould be glad to know what other ſort of Cauſe will ſerve your purpoſe, *i. e.* infer *Unity*, *Immenſity*, &c. and perform thoſe *operations* which Dr. *Clarke* ſo frequently aſcribes to it. See his Anſwers to the 3d and 6th Letters.

Ibid. "To ſay that becauſe ſuch a Being could not begin to exiſt, he muſt therefore always have exiſted, *i. e.* does neceſſarily exiſt, is as abſurd as one can imagine. Where is the connection of the Propoſitions? No more I think than if a Perſon ſhould tell me that becauſe a Being *will* certainly exiſt from this time to all Eternity, that ſuch a Being is therefore ſelf-exiſtent."

If he now is and *could never begin* to be, is there any other poſſible Conſequence but that he muſt have *always* been? And is not the contrary a Contradiction in Terms? Whether a Being which depends on the pleaſure of ſome other *will certainly* exiſt for ever, is a very different Queſtion. The Deity could never derive his Being from any thing, *Ergo* he muſt be underived, *i. e.* independent, *i. e.* ſelf-exiſtent: I add, and alſo *neceſſarily exiſtent*; but of this below.

(*P.* 87.) "If there never had been any *Cauſe*; *Reaſon* or *Foundation*, why the thing was what it was, I ſhould be glad to know how it came to be what it was, and why it was not ſomething elſe?"

It never *came to be*: there never was any room for a *Cauſe*, &c. It was not ſomething elſe becauſe it always actually was what it is, and never under a poſſibility of being otherwiſe.

(*P.* 88.) "To affirm that the ſupreme Being has no "Ground or Foundation for his Exiſtence, is the moſt abſurd thing in the World; for if he has no reaſon for his "Exiſtence really in Nature, it is impoſſible that it ſhould "imply any Contradiction not to ſuppoſe him ever to have "exiſted. If it does imply a Contradiction not to ſuppoſe "ſome one neceſſary ſelf-exiſtent Being, then is the ground "or Cauſe of its being a Contradiction not to ſuppoſe ſuch "a one, the reaſon why he does exiſt rather than not exiſt." It implies no Contradiction *a priori* (as was ſhewn before) to ſuppoſe the Deity not to have exiſted always: How the abſurdity *a poſteriori* (or the *ground of its being an abſurdity* if it has any ſuch ground) *viz.* that there never could have been any thing, or that the Univerſe muſt have aroſe from nothing; how this, I ſay, can be the reaſon *why*, or *by* which God exiſts, I leave to this Gentleman to explain. Though in truth he does not ſeem to have once conſidered the two different kinds of *Reaſons*, or *Contradictions*, touched on above.

(*Ib.* and 89.) "To ſay that he *neceſſarily exiſts* becauſe "he *always did exiſt*, is the ſame as to ſay that he *neceſſa*"*rily exiſts* becauſe he *does exiſt*." We don't pretend to aſſign any Cauſe, or (which muſt always mean the ſame, if it anſwers any purpoſe in the preſent Queſtion) *Reaſon* of his Exiſtence; but only the Cauſe or Reaſon why we believe, or by which we know that he muſt neceſſarily exiſt: and if he be the firſt of all Cauſes, underived from, and independent of any, *i. e.* (in our ſenſe of the Word) *ſelf-exiſtent*, all which are Conſequences of his *Eternity*; to ſuppoſe his Being at any time altered or deſtroyed by, or without a Cauſe, is an abſurdity, and by conſequence affords ſufficient ground for the contrary ſuppoſition. I hope you ſee the difference between this and the argument you have been pleaſed to make for us.

(*P.* 89.) "Never having begun to exiſt cannot make a "Being incapable of *ceaſing to exiſt*."

It

It cannot, as we ſaid before, *make* him ſo by direct *Efficiency*, or in any ſenſe *a priori*; but it does by juſt *inference* and implication, or *a poſteriori*; or at leaſt makes the thing appear ſo to us in every caſe, which is as far as we need go.

(*P.*90.) "Though it is true that it requires no *efficient* "*Cauſe* to keep in the ſtate it is, yet if there is no ground "or reaſon why it ſhould *go on* to exiſt, that itſelf is a reaſon why it may *ceaſe to exiſt.*" The difference lies here, one of them is properly an *effect* or *Change* which *as ſuch*, and as ſuch *only*, requires a Reaſon; the other not. There can be no kind of antecedent Reaſon why an independent Being continues in the ſame ſtate in which it always was, or as this Author phraſes it, *goes on* to exiſt; any more than why he is independent, or *what he is*; and to want an antecedent Reaſon where there is nothing to be cauſed, is I think, the very ſame as wanting one where it has nothing to do, or where there's no *occaſion* for it.

(*P.*92,93.) "Should we ſuppoſe all Beings out of the "Univerſe or not exiſting, ſave one, to ſuppoſe that one "Being away implies a Contradiction: but why? Becauſe "to ſuppoſe that one away is to ſuppoſe an *infinite Nothing*, "which is a plain Contradiction."

You might as well urge that it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe any thing away if we leave nothing in the *room* of it. *Infinite* has no more to do with this ſame *Nothing*, than *finite penetrable*, &c. have — But we have had this argument once before.

(*P.*94.) "If it is a Contradiction not to ſuppoſe ſome "one Being to exiſt, that Being exiſts by ſome neceſſity "in its own Nature, which neceſſity having no reſpect or "relation to any thing external, muſt be a Neceſſity *ab-* "*ſolute in itſelf*, that is a Neceſſity which has no depen- "dance upon any thing whatever, but is in itſelf abſolutely "that which it is."

If it be a Contradiction to ſuppoſe the abſence of ſome one Being, does this give you the reaſon *why*, or the ground *by* which this Being exiſts? Nay, if in the preſent Caſe his Exiſtence be founded, as you ſay, on a Neceſſity which has no dependance upon any thing whatever, I ſhould be glad to ſee how any thing will lead us to this Founda-

tion,

tion, or how we can ever find it out. In truth, the beſt account of it will be to ſay, 'tis ſomething *ſui generis*, or *abſolutely that which it is*, and there I'm willing to leave it.

(*P.*96.) "That this *ground* of Exiſtence ſhould be the "*Subſtance itſelf*, no body was ever ſo weak as to imagine: "but that therefore the Exiſtence of the *Being* muſt be "pre-ſuppoſed to the Exiſtence of the *Attribute*, and that "therefore it cannot be pre-ſuppoſed to the Exiſtence of "the *Subſtance*, is one of the greateſt Difficulties our preſent "Queſtion labours under."

(*P.*97.) "When therefore a Subſtance is pre-ſuppoſed "to the exiſtence of the eſſential Attribute, or when one "of the eſſential Attributes is pre-ſuppoſed to the Exiſtence of the *Subſtance*, the Word *before* is only meant in "the order of our Ideas, and not in the order of the things "themſelves." But except you ſuppoſe it previous in the order of Nature too (which is indeed included in the former ſuppoſition) it cannot ſerve your purpoſe, *i. e.* be with any tolerable propriety the real foundation, and *a priori* infer the Exiſtence of the Subſtance and all its other Attributes: Which ſuppoſition you are indeed forced to make in the next Sentence.

Ibid. "So that when we ſuppoſe this Neceſſity to be the "ground or foundation of the exiſtence of the ſelf-exiſtent "Being, we do indeed pre-ſuppoſe it (*i. e.* ſuppoſe it to be "*really* and in *order of nature* previous, or this is not ſenſe) "to that exiſtence, when in reality it is coeval." What other Conſequence can be drawn from this, but that the Suppoſition is a falſe and groundleſs one, and all the Arguments founded thereon, fallacious. The foregoing Paſſages, I think, explain themſelves.

(*P.*101.) "To ſay that *this Neceſſity muſt be by way of* "*Cauſality, or we can fix no manner of Idea to the Words* is "mere trifling, as if there cou'd be no ground or Reaſon "of exiſtence in any Being unleſs that Ground or Reaſon "were the actual producers of the Being, which is as abſurd "as is poſſible." There can be no kind of *antecedent* Reaſon for an Exiſtence when there is nothing that can actually cauſe, produce, or at all affect that Exiſtence, (as in the preſent Caſe:) except you'll have an antecedent reaſon why

it is uncaus'd, or why it needs no producer, which wou'd be trifling indeed.

(*Ibid.* & 102.) " I aſk why he cou'd not but always have " exiſted? The anſwer ſhould be, that it is and always " was a Contradiction. I aſk therefore once more, *why* it " is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe him not to exiſt?" The proper Queſtion I think, here ſhould be, *What* is that Contradiction? (Which has been often anſwer'd) not *why* it is one? However he goes on to prove that there muſt be a reaſon or ground for every contradiction. A cauſe why the ſame thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time (*p.* 100, 101.) Why 2 and 2 do not make 5: i. e. you muſt have a reaſon for the very firſt principles of all reaſon, or a Cauſe why ſome of your Ideas differ and others agree, or elſe he will tell you *they might not have been ſo.* He that can ſee the neceſſity for this may I ſuppoſe apprehend the neceſſity for a Cauſe or Ground of all Cauſes and Grounds whatſoever, and another for that, and will ſee no reaſon to ſtop any where.

(*P.* 104.) " I aſk again why God is that greateſt and " *moſt ſuperior* Being which they ſuppoſe him? What an- " ſwer can they make to that? If they are conſiſtent with " themſelves, they muſt ſay, that he is the greateſt Being " becauſe he exiſted from all Eternity. But then again why " did he exiſt from all Eternity?" I might as well aſk why this Neceſſity of yours is that moſt wonderful thing which you ſuppoſe it to be, or why it is antecedent to the firſt Being. We know him to be the *greateſt* from his Eternity, why he is eternal we know not, (*a priori*) but this we know that if there were any ground really and truly antecedent to his exiſtence, he cou'd not be eternal; which is enough to overturn your Foundation. What this Author adds in *pages* 106, 107. about the Cauſes of the determination of the Divine *Will* has been conſider'd in the latter part of Note 53. 2d Edit.

The Tranſlator's Demonſtration examin'd.

To conſider minutely what he has advanced on this Head wou'd be to repeat every thing which went before concerning an *Infinite ſeries, Eternity of the World, Cauſe and Effect coeval, Abſolute Infinity without any end, &c.* He that

that has once thoroughly reflected on ſuch principles will not require a ſecond Confutation of them.

(*P.* 110, 111.) He labours to maintain the poſſibility of an infinite ſeries of ſucceſſive Beings againſt all thoſe arguments which ſhew that either ſome *one part* of it was not ſucceſſive to others, or that *every part* of it was, both which deſtroy the ſuppoſition, " and therefore, ſays he, they are " nothing to the purpoſe. For in a ſeries of Beings exiſting " from Eternity down to this preſent Time, there could be " no firſt, nor could there be a time when none of them " did Exiſt, for then theſe wou'd not have Exiſted from " Eternity". But there is no one of them which was not once future, *Ergo* there muſt have been a time when none of them did exiſt, *Ergo* there was a firſt; and conſequently the ſuppoſition contradicts itſelf. He goes on " Let us then " ſuppoſe a ſeries of Beings to begin to exiſt now, and " that they will exiſt to all Eternity, would any perſon be " ſo abſurd as to ſuppoſe that there muſt be ſome one not " *previous* to any other, (I ſuppoſe he means *ſubſequent* to " all others,) that is, that there muſt be a *laſt*?" We may add, and would any perſon be ſo abſurd as to call ſuch a perpetually growing ſeries *poſitively* or *abſolutely infinite?* or conceive it as any *whole* or *entire thing really exiſting?* 'Tis an *indefinite* flux or aggregate of *parts* which are continually *added*, but never *make up* any thing at all; which is abſurd, ſee Note 10. 2d Ed. Below he attempts to bring this ſeries off by aſſerting that it is infinite *one way*, but finite another; which ſeems to me the ſame as affirming it to be partly infinite; and partly finite but we examin'd this before.

(*P.* 118, 119.) " That other Beings beſides the ſelf-ex- " iſtent Being might have been eternal has been before " proved, though they would not be in the ſame manner " as He, becauſe they would equally be dependent as if " they had not exiſted from Eternity." i. e. they would depend on the ſelf-exiſtent Being for their original, or derive their Beings from ſomething pre-exiſtent, and yet be all eternal, which appears to me ſomething like a Contradiction.

Here the Defender of Dr. *Clarke* ſeems to be in ſome confuſion. He begins " There's no impoſſibility in an end- " leſs ſeries of *dependent* Beings exiſting from Eternity. For

as

" as Dr. *Clarke* ſays, If we conſider ſuch an infinite Pro-
" greſſion as *one entire endleſs* ſeries of *dependent* Beings it is
" plain this *whole* ſeries can have no Cauſe from *without*, or
" from *within &c.*" and ſo produces the Doctor's Demonſtration directly againſt himſelf, and when he has done, ſays " this is a true, if not the only reaſon—why it is im-
" poſſible, that there ſhould have exiſted from Eternity
" ſuch an infinite *independent* ſeries ;" though how he comes to allow this ſame ſeries, whether it be *dependent* or *independent*, to be conſider'd here by the Dr. as *one entire thing* or *whole*, which he had ſo frequently complain'd of in others, or why this does not deſtroy the ſuppoſition as much as a *firſt* and *laſt*, I cannot apprehend.

(*P.* 120.) He endeavours to invalidate the old Maxim, that *a Cauſe is prior to its Effect*, by a diſtinction between priority *in the order of our Ideas* and priority *in nature*. " For
" as Dr. *Clarke* ſays, Light would eternally proceed from
" the Sun, or an impreſſion from an impoſed Seal, were
" their Cauſes Eternal. In the ſame manner created Beings
" might eternally ſpring from the workmanſhip of the Al-
" mighty, as Light from the Sun." Anſ. Whatever is neceſſarily prior in the order of our Ideas, is for that reaſon prior alſo in the order of Nature, if we have any knowledge at all of Nature: or can prove any thing from our Ideas concerning it. Every *mover* muſt be previous to the *moved* as well in Nature as in Idea, though it cou'd not be properly a mover till it produced ſome motion. In like manner as the Sun could not be what we now ſtile *Sun* till it emitted Light, but yet the matter of it, as well as the motion excited in its parts, muſt be previous (except you will ſuppoſe it ſelf motive) both in Nature and Time to the actual Emiſſion of theſe parts which cauſe the Idea of Light, and which require ſome time for every Motion: i. e. their Motion is not inſtantaneous, and conſequently Light, which is the effect thereof, cannot be ſtrictly coetaneous with the Sun. Your Father was no *Father* indeed till he had a ſon, but will you ſay that his ſon and he might poſſibly have been coeval? The contrary is intuitively certain, and he that will demand a proof of it, or a reaſon why it is ſo, does not know when he ought to be convinc'd.

What

What he brings in the following pages concerning *Omnipotence* and the *Unity*, has been conſider'd in R.g. 2d Ed.

(*P.*124.) He concludes " What the Tranſlator ſay, about " *Neceſſity of exiſtence* is mere trifling and ought not to be " conſider'd at all. As if uniformity excluded attributes of " different kinds."

Abſolute Neceſſity, in the ſenſe it is ſome times uſed, would deſtroy all variety or *diverſity* of every kind, as Dr. *Clarke* endeavours to prove in the 6th prop. p.72. 2d Ed. And it may exclude all diverſity of perfections in the Divine Nature for the very ſame reaſon that it does exclude a difference of *Perſons*, which was perhaps the reaſon of its being firſt introduced. Though in truth 'tis ſuch a vague equivocal principle that it will be hard to affirm poſitively what it may or may not do.

Theſe few curſory Remarks may ſuffice at preſent to point out the inconcluſiveneſs of this Gentleman's chief arguments, ſo far as they concern the Notes on ABp. King. If any thing material have been omitted, it will be amply ſupply'd in a Controverſy which is ſhortly expected on the ſame Subjects with a certain celebrated, Writer, who has promis'd to conſider them: (a) and who, 'tis hoped, will not think himſelf anticipated by this Gentleman's performance.

(a) Calumny no Conviction &c. p. the laſt. This was perſormed by the Rev. Mr. *Jackſon*, in his *Exiſtence and Unity*, &c. 1734. and anſwer'd in *An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, &c. to which is annex'd a *Diſſertation on the Argument A priori*. A regular account of the whole controverſy may be ſeen in the *General Dictionary*, V.4. Art. *Clarke*. Note 1. p. 358. excepting Mr. *Jackſon*'s Defence of his Book entitled *Exiſtence and Unity*, 1735. which ended the Debate.

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